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Preface
For decades almost the only social scientists who visited Indonesia’s prov-
inces were anthropologists. Anybody with a special interest in politics or eco-
nomics spent most of their time in Jakarta, where the action was. The usual 
pressures facing foreign researchers contributed to this weakness ‒ shrinking 
budgets and the waning of area studies in the West, a slow research visa pro-
cess in Indonesia. As a result, academic expertise on the regions beyond Java 
became fragmented and patchy. yet as field visits grew shorter, conclusions 
about the nature of ‘Indonesia’ became more sweeping in their generality. 
Our view of the world’s fourth largest country threatened to become simplis-
tic, lacking that essential graininess and heterogeneity. 
Just then, in 1998, Indonesia was plunged into a crisis that could not 
be understood with simplistic tools. Massive demonstrations, amidst an 
economic crisis triggered by a plunging exchange rate, forced President 
Soeharto to resign. After 32 years of enforced stability, the New Order was at 
an end. Things began to happen in the provinces that no one was prepared 
for. Democratization was one of them. Everyone wanted it, but there was 
no doubt that the movement was not equally strong all over the country. 
The demands were stronger in Java ‒ especially Jakarta ‒ than outside it. 
The 1999 elections, the freest since 1955, showed strong regional differences. 
Decentralization was another new development. The push for that was 
almost the inverse of the democratization drive ‒ stronger outside Java than 
within. Powers were transferred from Jakarta to the local level, precisely the 
level to which scholars had paid little attention during the centralizing New 
Order. The decentralization process set off dynamics for which we hardly 
had a vocabulary. Ethnic and religious identities emerged that had lain 
buried under the blanket of the New Order’s modernizing, secular ideol-
ogy. Unfamiliar forms of political competition came to light. Mostly these 
remained civil, but in a few cases they became violent. New modes of eco-
nomic exchange came into view. And all this took place in an atmosphere of 
political and economic crisis.
Today, almost a decade after those tumultuous events of 1998, some of the 
changes hurriedly introduced back then have turned out to be ephemeral. 
The New Order political party Golkar was back in power in 2004. So was a 
former general in the presidential palace. Decentralization, too, was being 
wound back to some extent. Security had improved. But even if the six years 
between 1998 and 2004 described in this book turn out to be a momentary 
irruption ‒ and we are convinced they are far more than that ‒ then they still 
imply profound changes in the way we need to think about the state and 
society in Indonesia. Our total surprise at the volume of demands for new 
districts to be carved out of old, and at the emergence of local identity politics 
‒ to name just two developments ‒ suggests there was a gap in our under-
standing. We had made progress at describing Indonesia under conditions 
of stability, but we had no idea what to expect when stability broke down. 
To speak about ‘chaos’, as many did at the time, was no substitute for under-
standing. Indonesia had far more structure than that word suggests. 
This book is the result of a two-year research project, based at the 
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV, Royal 
Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and caribbean Studies), and enti-
tled ‘Renegotiating boundaries; Local politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia’.  It 
brought together a remarkably international group of 24 scholars ‒ mainly 
from Indonesia and the Netherlands but also from the United States, Australia, 
Germany, canada and Portugal. The KITLV hosted a work-in-progress work-
shop in July 2004, attended by a number of authors, and invited seven of 
the authors to spend between a month and six months at the institute for 
research.1 Both editors did their work at the KITLV. The Indonesian Institute 
of Sciences (LIPI) co-hosted the final conference in Jakarta in December 2004, 
at which the authors discussed each others’ work. The entire project was 
generously funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(KNAW). To the directors and staff at the KITLV, LIPI, and KNAW, we wish 
to extend our sincere appreciation for their unstinting support. We hope the 
results, concretely in this book but also in terms of strengthening academic 
exchanges, will justify the confidence they placed in us.
Just four days after the Jakarta conference ended, one of our authors lost 
his life in the tsunami that swept the coasts of Aceh. M. Isa Sulaiman had 
been an enthusiastic participant in the project throughout its duration. He 
will be greatly missed. An obituary included in this volume describes his 
work. We dedicate this book to his memory.     
1 They were Lorraine Aragon, Erwiza Erman, Syarif Hidayat, Isa Sulaiman, Arianto Sangaji, 


































































































































































































































































































































































































henk schulte nordholt and gerry van klinken 
introduction
Renegotiating boundaries 
After the monetary and political crisis of 1997 and 1998, which was followed 
by a period labelled ‘Reformasi’, many observers said Indonesia had entered 
a transitional phase from authoritarian rule towards a new democratic sys-
tem of government in which civil society played a more prominent role.1 
The transition was, moreover, accompanied by a process of decentralization, 
bringing regional autonomy and democracy while making government more 
transparent. 
Others contested this optimistic perception and sketched a negative tran-
sition from ‘order to disorder’. After decades of authoritarian centralist 
governance, attempts to introduce political and economic change seemed 
doomed, in the face of bureaucratic sabotage, corrupt power politics, short-
term opportunism, and the absence of a widely shared vision of the future. 
In the light of outbursts of ethnic and religious violence in various regions of 
the archipelago, regional resistance movements, the inability to restructure 
both the army and the economy and to curb collusion, nepotism and corrup-
tion, pessimists were inclined to classify Indonesia in the category of ‘failing’ 
or ‘messy’ states. In short, they predicted further disintegration, which could 
eventually lead to the breaking up of the nation-state.
Recently the process of decentralization in Indonesia was equated with a 
process of democratization and the rise of civil society.2  These are, however, 
three very different processes. A shift from centralized to a decentralized gov-
ernment is not synonymous with a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule 
nor does it automatically imply a shift from a strong state towards a strong 
civil society. The weakening of the central state does not automatically result 
in more local democracy. On the contrary, decentralization can under certain 
conditions be accompanied by new forms of authoritarian rule.
Although the term ‘transition’ can also be used to indicate the transfer 
1  Parts of this introduction draw on Schulte Nordholt 2003.
2  Antlöv 2003; Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Shaikhu Usman 2002.
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from one authoritarian system to another, it does not capture the complexity 
of the historical processes that are creating contemporary Indonesia, nor does 
it offer the opportunity to trace ‘changing continuities’ in Indonesian politics. 
Given that a ‘new Indonesia’ still seems out of reach and that the present 
period is marked by a certain amount of stagnation, it seems, for the time 
being, wiser to use the more neutral term ‘post-Soeharto Indonesia’. 
This book is the latest in a growing series of studies providing ‘snapshots’ 
of Indonesia after the resignation of President Soeharto. Some of these have 
focused mainly on the democratization.3 Others dealt more with the dynam-
ics of decentralization.4 The present volume belongs to this second category. 
Like its predecessors it takes up questions that range from the political, such 
as democratization versus ‘elite capture’ of local state institutions, to the cul-
tural, especially ethnic identities that emerge along with regional autonomy.5 
However, coming in behind the front-runners has permitted us to be a little 
more ambitious. Firstly because almost all the contributors have conducted 
in-depth field studies for their chapter. A new research agenda that takes local 
dynamics seriously is beginning to bear fruit. And secondly, the longer view 
has allowed us to realize that what we are observing is not exclusively the 
result of the decentralization agenda. Often these are patterns of politics that 
may be new to observers from outside the region, but have been practised 
for decades in the provinces. Decentralization comes into this world not as a 
deus ex machina but as a rearrangement of existing force fields. This view from 
below gains credibility by the biographical interest of some contributions in 
this book. 
This book aims to explore new approaches to local politics in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia. In order to understand the dynamics of these politics we propose 
to investigate the nature and role of regional elites, particularly in the fields of 
bureaucratic, economic and identity politics. First, we will focus on the role of 
regional bureaucratic elites in the huge increase in the number of administra-
tive districts, from 300 in 1999 to 440 in 2004. This process is aptly called peme-
karan, or ‘blossoming’. As we will demonstrate, this ‘administrative involution’ 
was driven by the interests of particular bureaucratic and political elites who 
often mobilized ethnic sentiments to achieve their goals. In the second place, 
we will concentrate on the economic policies of certain bureaucratic and politi-
cal interest groups. Here we will introduce the concept of the ‘shadow state’, 
3  Aspinall 2000; Arief Budiman et al. 1999; Emmerson 1999; Kingsbury and Arief Budiman 
2001; Liddle 2001; Manning and Diermen 2000.
4  Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Erb et al. 2005; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Sakai 2002.
5  A separate but related literature has focused on the violence that surrounded the end of the 
New Order in some places: Anderson 2001; Bertrand 2004; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; Van 
Klinken forthcoming-a; Törnquist 2000; and Wessel and Wimhöfer 2001. 
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which is used in Indian and African settings in order to indicate the vital 
connections between formal and informal arrangements that characterize the 
regional economy. Related to these themes are questions regarding an econo-
my of violence and the relative weakness of civil society. Finally, we focus on 
aspects of regional identity politics as they are manifested in terms of ethnicity, 
religion, and/or region. We take a particular interest in the role played by pro-
vincial urban middle class intellectuals. Taken together, the reorganization of 
power relationships at the regional level implies a fundamental renegotiation 
of boundaries in terms of bureaucratic competences, political power, economic 
arrangements and the (re-)definition of group identities. Throughout this book 
we aim to identify the major actors in these fields in order to understand the 
nature of (old and new) regional elites and the role they play.  
Before we introduce these themes in more detail, we will briefly review 
the dominant approaches to Indonesian politics during the New Order and 
discuss some of the implications of the recent focus on regional dynamics. 
The sudden demise of the strong New Order state in 1998 came as a sur-
prise to many professional Indonesia watchers. What seemed to be a solid 
and invincible regime turned out to be a fragile state, in which regional, 
religious, and ethnic identity politics became more dominant.6 The collapse 
of Soeharto’s regime in 1998 invites us to abandon the concept of the strong 
centralized state in favour of a model that offers room for a more fragmented 
polity. It is in this respect not only necessary to find new concepts to describe 
the present situation in Indonesia, but it is also imperative to rethink estab-
lished views on the New Order.
The appearance of order
When after 1966 the New Order gradually took shape, the focus of academic 
research shifted away from the tensions between processes of nation-build-
ing and primordial attachments – which emphasized the importance of local 
attachments expressed in terms of kinship, religious community, language 
or customs (Geertz 1963) – and concentrated to a large extent on the nature 
of the state.7 In an influential essay, Harry Benda had characterized the late 
6  But see the last chapter of Michael Vatikiotis’ book, titled ‘The fragile state’ (Vatikiotis 
1993:206-19).
7  Geertz (1963) borrowed Edward Shils’ notion of ‘primordial sentiments’ and argued that 
they formed an obstacle to the civil politics of the new nation-states. It required an ‘integrative 
revolution’ to adjust old societies to the needs of the new states. Today we would label these 
primordial attachments ‘ethnic’ (see for example Liddle 1970), but we would no longer apply the 
evolutionary transition from traditional/local/primordial attitudes to the modernization process 
of nation-building.
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colonial state as a beamtenstaat (Benda 1966). Framed in a Weberian model 
this state was seen as an apolitical administrative polity that was staffed by 
Dutch and ‘native’ officials – but with the Dutch firmly in control – for whom 
sound and centralized administration mattered most. It was a state that 
emphasized modern, efficient developmental governance. 
Due to the rise of the strong New Order state, large groups in society were 
soon excluded from the political domain, which was restricted to competing 
factions within a small political elite. Harold Crouch (1979) argued that the 
New Order should be seen as a patrimonial cum military regime in which 
patron-client ties kept the state together. He also perceived a gradual process 
towards rational policy-making. There was considerable consensus among 
scholars about the patrimonial nature of the state.
Modifying the (neo-)patrimonial approach, Dwight King (1982) launched 
the concept of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime that is characterized by 
a high degree of corporatism. Instead of individual patron-client ties, vari-
ous groups within the state as well as in society were collectively tied to the 
leaders of the state. Apart from the disciplining effects of the incorporation 
of these groups, there was, according to King, also a modest possibility for 
upward interest representation.
The New Order was, of course, not a static phenomenon, but evolved 
gradually into a relatively hegemonic regime (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994). 
Apart from the broad consensus about the (neo-)patrimonial cum corporatist 
nature of the New Order, scholars also agreed on the strength of the state and 
its autonomy vis-à-vis society. 
Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson introduced in this respect a compara-
tive historical perspective. McVey (1982) took Benda’s idea of the beamtenstaat 
as her point of departure when she compared the late colonial state with the 
New Order. Although the colonial state was basically run by civil servants 
and the New Order by the military, the similarities were compelling because 
both regimes were ultimately based on force, political demobilization, and a 
technocratic approach towards the modernization of society. 
The continuity from the late colonial state to the New Order regime was 
further elaborated in a paradigmatic article by Benedict Anderson (1983). 
Referring to the book Old societies and new states edited by Geertz in 1963, 
Anderson gave his article the reversed title ‘Old state, new society’ because 
he located the origins of the New Order in the late colonial state. It was no 
longer society, but the state that had the most solid foundations.
By emphasizing the autonomy of the state qua state, Anderson took issue 
with Marxist interpretations of the state as a tool of international capital and 
the ruling bourgeoisie. Both McVey and Anderson reinforced a tendency 
among Indonesia watchers to conceptualize the state as disconnected from 
society. And since the state was growing stronger and did achieve economic 
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growth, studies of Indonesia were primarily focused on the New Order 
regime and its centre, Jakarta. 
Criticizing the scholars who studied Indonesian politics from a strict 
Weberian perspective, Richard Robison initiated an alternative political 
economy approach in the 1980s. Indonesia was now situated within a 
broader context of international flows of capital, but the strength and rela-
tive autonomy of the state could not be ignored. Due to the absence of a 
strong indigenous bourgeoisie, Robison (1986) located the origins of the new 
capitalism within the bureaucracy, which was financed by oil income and 
international aid, while a small and dependent class of capitalists operated 
outside the state. The concept of authoritarian-bureaucratic capitalism was 
born in which the state figured prominently. 
Meanwhile, however, economic growth had facilitated capitalist bureau-
crats to become more independent of the state, and it accelerated the forma-
tion of a domestic capitalist class primarily of Chinese-Indonesian descent. 
Paradoxically the fall of oil prices in the 1980s undermined the monopolistic 
position of the state and necessitated a diversification of the economy, which 
opened possibilities for new groups to enter the market (Robison 1988). 
Whereas Jeffrey Winters (1988) had questioned the actual size of the new 
capitalist class, Andrew MacIntyre (1991) argued that fundamental changes 
were indeed taking place in the Indonesian economy. Elaborating both the 
corporatist nature of the regime suggested by King, and the political econ-
omy approach, MacIntyre demonstrated that from the late 1980s onwards 
a substantial group of indigenous entrepreneurs had been established that 
operated outside the state on a relatively autonomous basis.
Acknowledging its economic success, most authors now labelled the 
New Order an authoritarian interventionist developmental state. As long as 
Soeharto managed to maintain a balance between various competing groups, 
favouring the spendthrift ‘high tech’ people in affluent times, and pushing the 
cautious technocrats centre stage in times of crisis, the Indonesian economy 
and its regime performed well in terms of growth, crisis management and 
stability. A good illustration of the widespread confidence in the Indonesian 
economy and the quality of the regime is Hal Hill’s book from 1996. After a 
thorough analysis of developments since the 1960s, he was optimistic about 
the capacity of the government to handle the conditioning factors that shape 
the future (Hill 1996).
Blinded by its economic success, many observers tended to conceptualize 
the New Order in terms of a rather well-integrated set of institutions that 
operated apart from society and facilitated the gradual growth of a relatively 
free market economy. More than ever Jakarta was the place to be for anyone 
interested in the impressive success story of Soeharto’s regime. Under his 
paternal rule an expanding and affluent middle class inhabited the new sub-
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urbs, shopping malls and traffic jams of the capital, where they consumed 
new air-conditioned life-styles and where during the mid-1990s 70% of all 
the money in the Indonesian economy circulated.
A backstage perspective
 
Just as Indonesia’s international respectability grew during the 1980s, cracks 
began to appear in the decent image of the New Order. In East Timor (1975-
1999), Tanjung Priok (1984) and Lampung (1989) the regime showed its 
ruthless face, while the so-called Petrus murders (1983) and brutal military 
actions in Papua and Aceh showed how the regime manifested itself as a boss 
among other criminals.
As long as the Cold War was not over, the international community noticed 
these violent practices but tolerated them. After the fall of the Berlin Wall how-
ever, Soeharto faced serious problems in defending the legitimacy of his aging 
regime. Video footage of the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor in November 
1991 was broadcast all over the world, while in 1996 the headquarters of the 
relatively small opposition party PDI was attacked by a government-sponsored 
mob. The 1990s witnessed an increase in political violence and criminality as 
protest movements faced repression and militias were engaged in intimidating 
campaigns and political gang wars. At the same time the presidential family 
was increasingly portrayed as being at the centre of unprecedented corrup-
tion, damaging Jakarta’s image as a booming metropolis of modern business. 
It seemed that the future of the nation-state was no longer threatened by ‘pri-
mordialism from below’, but by ‘criminality from above’. 
With the wisdom of hindsight one may wonder how strong the New 
Order actually was in institutional terms. Adrian Vickers (2001) has argued 
that the New Order was a regime that mainly kept itself busy keeping up 
appearances. While the bureaucracy produced the appearance of rational 
administration, it consisted of inefficient clusters of largely incompetent 
institutions with overlapping responsibilities, overstaffed with underpaid 
employees. The state produced an appearance of order, expressed primarily 
in elaborate ceremonies. The New Order even tried to keep up the appear-
ance of democracy by staging elections every five years. As John Pemberton 
(1986) showed, it was not the results that mattered but the campaigning that 
preceded the elections, which could easily turn into violence and disorder. If 
the government was able to maintain order during that period it had dem-
onstrated its legitimacy. 
The regime also tried to keep up the appearance of orderly capitalism 
operating in a free market. But rent or crony capitalism and patrimonial 
hierarchies reinforced each other in such a way that nobody could escape 
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the structure of corruption controlled from the centre. Estimates indicate that 
over a period of 30 years of New Order rule 30% of the 30 billion US dollars 
of foreign aid disappeared into private pockets. Apart from routine corrup-
tion – paying for access, protection, loyalty, and licenses – the system also 
allowed for large scale plunder of natural resources. 
When the Asian monetary crisis hit Jakarta in August 1997 the regime 
collapsed within nine months. John Sidel (1998) has shown how the financial 
and political crisis of 1997-1998 can be conceptualized as a macet total, or 
a total traffic jam of the patrimonial networks leading to the centre of the 
regime. Various groups, from old aristocracies, Christians, and socialists, to 
modernist Muslims, who had initially supported the New Order, had been 
gradually marginalized and lost their access to the sources of wealth at the 
centre. A similar thing happened to high ranking military officers who had 
enjoyed the spoils of power at the centre while on active duty but fell by the 
wayside upon retirement, and Chinese entrepreneurs who lost their privi-
leged position through miscalculation. Many people thus removed from the 
network felt betrayed, while others were dissatisfied with the ‘traffic jam’, 
which increased dramatically because of the monetary crisis. When the 
money flow from the centre stagnated, large groups of people lost their loy-
alty to the president. The collapse of the patrimonial regime soon followed.
Towards the end of the New Order and especially during its demise, it 
became clear that a sharp analytical distinction between state and society 
was no longer valid, and it probably never had been. The security state had 
blurred the boundaries between (legitimate) state violence and (illegal) crim-
inality, and between formal institutions and semi-informal criminal gangs. 
Problems were ultimately not solved by the rule of law or bureaucratic pro-
cedures but by violent means. 
Rethinking analytical categories
It seems that the image of the bureaucratic interventionist developmental 
state, heir of the colonial beamtenstaat, has now changed into that of a messy, 
criminal crony state. Does this imply that we need a fundamental shift of 
paradigm in order to understand why the New Order state so suddenly 
‘failed’? Do we perhaps need new ways of looking at ‘the state’ in order to 
incorporate various arrangements that link formal institutions with informal 
networks, which help to undermine artificial distinctions between ‘state’, 
‘society’ and ‘market’?
Particularly relevant here is the continuity of patrimonial patterns during 
the colonial and post-colonial period. The New Order regime distributed 
large amounts of so-called INPRES (Instruksi Presiden) funds, in such a way 
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as to suggest that the president himself had personally paid for specific 
projects. Meanwhile a substantial amount of state income was generated by 
informal means, underlining once more the patrimonial character of the sys-
tem. The armed forces rely only for 30% on state revenues and depend for the 
remaining 70% on their own sources of income. The army has therefore been 
characterized not as a hierarchically integrated organization, but instead as 
an archipelago of semi-independent ‘warlords’. In terms of violence there 
are also continuities from the colonial into the post-colonial period (Schulte 
Nordholt 2002), and protection against intimidation and violence involves 
the payment of informal taxes. Old notions of invulnerability are in this 
respect still relevant, but they do not in the first place refer to efforts by 
potential victims to protect themselves against violence and corruption, but 
to perpetrators who are allowed to act above and beyond the law.
A comparable system of informal taxation and ‘bottom up’ distribution of 
income characterized and still characterizes the Indonesian bureaucracy as 
well. Underpaid bureaucrats supplement their salaries with informal sources 
of income by selling licenses and levying personalized forms of taxation. The 
sheer lack of independent state institutions reinforces the reproduction of 
these patrimonial hierarchies.
The New Order was also part of a wider set of capitalist structures, which 
should be taken into account in order to understand how capital, production, 
labour and markets were controlled. The patron-client nature of patrimo-
nial networks helped to obscure and deny issues of class. But New Order 
Indonesia did of course produce rather clear-cut class divisions. 
In many respects post-Soeharto Indonesia shows continuities with the 
previous period, albeit the central leadership of the old regime has been 
weakened, making way for a considerable degree of ‘factionalization’ and 
decentralization of power. It is therefore misleading to see the New Order 
too much as an integrated set of institutions operating primarily apart from 
society, and having its origins in the late colonial beamtenstaat. Artificial dis-
tinctions between ‘state’ and ‘society’, ‘state’ and ‘market’, and ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ relationships need to be critically reviewed.
It is even too simplistic to conclude that the state in Indonesia has weak-
ened since 1998. This is perhaps true if we look in a restricted and purely 
institutional way at the central state. But if we look at power structures 
throughout the country, which include both formal institutions and infor-
mal networks, a very different picture emerges. Here a comparison can be 
made with provincial Thailand, where the formal domains of politics and 
economics are interwoven with illegal economic activities and criminality, in 
which bureaucrats, politicians, military, police, businessmen and criminals 
maintain intimate relationships, while distinctions between their respective 
professions are often blurred (McVey 2000; Phongpaichit et al. 1998).  
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Apart from historical continuities, changes in global political and eco-
nomic arrangements had an impact on Indonesia as well. Since the 1980s 
a world-wide neo-liberal revolution has gained ground. Neo-liberalism 
attacked the belief in the regulating role of the state in the field of social and 
economic policies. The Western welfare state was downsized while the fall 
of the Berlin Wall signalled the failure of the socialist model. The end of the 
Cold War also marked the end of many authoritarian regimes in the Third 
World. Neo-liberalism needed open markets and advocated less state in 
exchange for more democracy. It was argued that a small and non-political 
administration would increase good governance, while a strong civil soci-
ety would reinforce a democratic system that guaranteed transparency and 
accountability. The only concession in this respect was motivated by the war 
on terror after ‘9/11’, which necessitated the strengthening of the security 
sector of the state. Summarized in ideological terms, decentralization would 
thus result in less state and more democracy. Taken together this would 
result in open markets, economic growth and higher standards of living. 
This optimistic scenario was based on the belief that markets and governance 
could be separated from political interests and conflicts.  However, Robison 
and Hadiz (2004) have pointed out the illusory character of this neo-liberalist 
view, and demonstrated the resilience of political and economic oligarchies 
in Indonesia.  It is against the backdrop of  this fractured structure of  pat-
rimonial relationships that recent developments in the regions should be 
understood.
Bringing the regions back in
Decentralization is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. The first legisla-
tion dates back more than a century. In 1903 the urban European elites were 
allowed a limited measure of self-government. The law offered, however, 
next to nothing in terms of autonomy (Benda 1966:241). While the first colo-
nial measures were primarily aimed at urban areas, the following decades 
saw a transfer of a range of administrative functions to provinces and large 
districts. The decentralization law of 1922 created new provinces, which 
had a fair degree of administrative autonomy. Apart from these new macro 
administrative units, in Java the so-called Ethical Policy of ontvoogding, or 
‘de-tutelization’, resulted at the district level in the establishments of councils 
in which the local elites were represented. Most of these councils were con-
servative and functioned as bastions against nationalism (Sutherland 1979). 
Under colonial rule, decentralization had nothing to do with democratiza-
tion and very little with the strengthening of civil society.
The reforms of the 1920s caused, nevertheless, a blurring of the lines of 
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responsibility between European and indigenous administrators, which led 
to confusion and irritation. Eventually the communist uprisings of the mid-
1920s in West Java and West Sumatra reinforced a conservative turn among 
the European rulers, and from 1931 onwards colonial rule was re-centralized.
By and large, the colonial system was characterized by indirect rule, in 
which the conservative European administrative elite controlled a subor-
dinate body of indigenous administrators. Moreover, European law was 
restricted to the European elite (and to some extent the Chinese), whereas 
the indigenous population was ruled according to ‘their own’ customary, or 
adat law. Moreover, the appointment of descendants of old dynasties as rep-
resentatives of colonial rule reinforced the conservative character of indirect 
rule in the Outer Islands. This system was primarily intended to isolate the 
small nationalist movement within urban sectors by keeping the countryside 
and the areas outside Java under control through colonized traditional rule. 
During the Indonesian Revolution, the Dutch tried to revive pre-war 
plans for a federation of Indonesian states along provincial lines in order to 
isolate the Republican forces. The Dutch also stimulated the establishment 
of regional rule by local aristocracies, also in order to counteract revolution-
ary nationalists. This strategy failed. In 1950 Indonesia chose for a unitary 
nation-state, and the concept of federation became strictly taboo. 
In reality, however, regional governments and military commands had 
a high degree of autonomy, since the centre lacked the means to exert strict 
control. Due to pressure from the regions and especially the political par-
ties who wanted to dismantle the monopoly of the post-colonial bureauc-
racy, far-reaching reforms were formulated in Law no. 1/1957 regarding the 
decentralization of provincial and regional government (Legge 1961; Malley 
1999). The law entitled provincial and district parliaments to appoint their 
own governor and district head, or bupati. For the first time power was trans-
ferred from appointed administrators to elected politicians and this measure 
invited the nation to participate in the state (Anderson 1983). An important 
side effect was an increase in the number of provinces from 12 in 1950 to 20 
in 1958.8 However, the fiscal side of the decentralization measures was highly 
centralist in character as a result of which many regions remained dependent 
on the centre. 
Decentralization did not get a chance to take root, because of regional 
rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi against Jakarta, and the subsequent 
proclamation of martial law, increased military power and, in 1959, the rise 
of authoritarian rule aborted this brief experiment. Law no. 1/1957 was abol-
ished by Presidential Decree no. 6/1959 (Magenda 1989:18). 
At the end of the turbulent years between 1959-1974, during which the 
8  Or more precisely: ten provinces plus two special regions in 1950; see Legge 1961:62-83.
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central state regained its dominant position, Law no. 5/1974 formalized the 
supremacy of the centre over the regions. Although the law defined prov-
inces and districts as ‘autonomous’ levels and elected councils were estab-
lished in order to generate a bottom-up representation, regional government 
consisted in practice of the top-down execution of developmental interven-
tions initiated by the state, accompanied by strict surveillance. Although 
provincial and district councils were entitled to nominate candidates for the 
position of governor and district head, they were actually appointed by the 
President and the Home Minister. These regional administrators were in fact 
agents of the centre. Law no. 5/1974 was accompanied by Law no. 5/1979 on 
village government, which made village administration uniform throughout 
Indonesia, and reinforced the grip of the centre on local politics. 
The appearance of development and order, and strict obedience to pro-
tocol, were as important as the channelling of large sums of routine and 
development funds from the centre to the regions, which made the system 
work. Due to an abundance of central resources – originating from oil 
exports and aid imports, later supplemented by foreign investments – the 
regions depended heavily on the centre. The flows of money entering the 
regions resulted in the formation and reinforcement of state agencies, which 
penetrated deeply into local society (Schiller 1996). Parallel to a tight centrali-
zation, there was a de-concentration of authority, which implied that central 
Ministries, like Agriculture, Public Works, and Religion, had their own repre-
sentatives in the regions executing central policies at the regional level. 
An even more powerful parallel state structure was formed by the mili-
tary presence running from the centre, through the province, district, and 
sub-district down to the village level. Moreover, the military had entered 
the civilian bureaucracy as well. At the high point in 1970, 20 out of the 26 
provincial governors were recruited from the military, while in 1997 they still 
formed a majority: 14 out of 27 (Malley 1999; Jaya and Dick 2001). 
Despite their dependency on the central government, regional govern-
ments were relatively powerful in terms of local administration because they 
also offered employment and channelled government funds. This facilitated 
the reproduction of patrimonial patterns of rule at the local level, while 
informal networks connected the interests of both local businessmen and 
bureaucrats. 
The agony of decentralization: 1999 and after
As indicated above, neo-liberalism over the last several decades has been 
accompanied around the world by a huge wave of decentralization in Latin 
America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. Powerful organizations like the 
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World Bank embraced the neo-liberal idea that decentralization would stim-
ulate both the economy and democracy. When neo-liberalism met Reformasi 
in Indonesia at the turn of the present century, this resulted in an unprec-
edented measure of decentralization.
Decentralization can be interpreted in three different ways (Dormeier-
Freire and Maurer 2002): 1. as the delegation of specific tasks while the centre 
retains its overall responsibility, which is comparable with the law of 1974; 
2. deconcentration, which refers to a relocation of decision-making within 
a centralized state, which is reflected in the law of 1957; and 3. devolution, 
which concerns the actual transfer of power to lower levels of government, 
and this was implemented in 2001.9
Looking back at the period 1998-2004 one may conclude that the most 
important reform measures were taken by the Habibie presidency (May 
1998-October 1999). Apart from press freedom, the freedom to establish 
political parties, free elections, and the granting of a referendum in East 
Timor, the Habibie government also pushed two important laws through 
parliament in great haste, which set in motion a process of administrative 
decentralization. 
The laws were primarily designed by a small group of bureaucrats, with-
out any feedback from the regions (Malley 2004; Turner et al. 2003). Known 
as the Team of Seven, the core individuals were American-trained academics-
cum-bureaucrats who maintained close links with overseas agencies ideolog-
ically committed to decentralization. The same team had earlier designed the 
new electoral laws. However, amid the excitement of democratizing reforms, 
the decentralizing initiative attracted little metropolitan public debate. One 
month before the general elections in June 1999, the national parliament 
– whose members ironically still belonged to the New Order era – agreed 
without much debate to implement Laws no. 22 and 25, which provided the 
administrative and fiscal framework for a process that seemed to change the 
very foundation of the unitary nation-state. 
One of the main reasons why the government wanted to accelerate this 
process was to accommodate the anti-Jakarta sentiments in many regions 
outside Java while the still-ruling Golkar party, which was on Java under 
political fire, tried to maintain its power bases in the outer islands by sup-
porting regional autonomy. The sense of panic about their own future led 
policy-makers to take drastic action. 
The proposed two-year period of transition and implementation was 
even shortened by six months, which meant that the biggest administrative 
reorganization in the history of the Indonesian state had to be completed by 
9  The most far-reaching form of decentralization is, of course, privatization (Frerks and Otto 
1996). 
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1 January 2001.10 A period of eighteen months was too short to get things 
done properly, and this was a major reason why the responsible deputy min-
ister Ryaas Rashid resigned.11 Moreover there were considerable differences 
between various ministries and levels of government about the desirability 
of the decentralization moves. Many within the Interior Ministry (and later 
in the presidential palace under Megawati) feared that, far from taming 
disintegrative dynamics, decentralization might unleash even more danger-
ous localist sentiments. Officials in the regions, meanwhile, often supported 
decentralization but for the wrong reasons – they wanted not less but more 
government.
In a sense the laws of 1999 revived the process of decentralization that 
was stopped in the late 1950s, but they went much further. Because the new 
autonomy was located at the level of districts and municipalities, the power 
of the provinces was dismantled, while a process of political fragmentation 
was stimulated. Seen from this perspective, decentralization was a divide-
and-rule strategy from the centre, aimed at permitting administrative frag-
mentation while maintaining fiscal control at the centre. 
Law no. 22 was written by the Home Ministry with the stated intention 
of achieving a substantial devolution of power in order to bring government 
closer to the people and to offer more transparency. Similar to Law no. 1/1957, 
governors, district administrators and mayors were no longer appointed by 
the centre but elected by regional parliaments. This brought regional politi-
cal leaders back onto the stage.12 The chapter by M. Isa Sulaiman in this col-
lection explains the electoral rules at this time, and how they shaped local 
politics in one province. 
At first sight the role of the central government seemed to resemble the 
so-called night watch state. The few remaining responsibilities included 
national defence and security, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary matters, 
macro-economic planning, natural resources, justice and religion. Regions 
have autonomy with regard to public works, education and culture, health 
care, agriculture, transport, industry, trade, investments, environmental 
issues, cooperations, labour, and land (Ray and Goodpaster 2003). But in 
order to assess the nature of this decentralization effort it is important to look 
at the fiscal arrangements as well. Whereas Law no. 22 facilitated devolu-
tion of power, Law no. 25, made by the Ministry of Finances, was centralist 
10  At least in theory more than a thousand government regulations and presidential decrees 
and instructions had to be revoked (Amzulian Rifai 2002:33; see also Turner et al. 2003).
11  Actually the department he headed was only in operation as a relatively independent unit 
during a limited period, from April till August 2000 (World Bank 2003).
12  Part of the operation was a massive transfer of 2.1 million state employees – 50% of whom 
were schoolteachers – to the regions. Since it concerned primarily a financial operation it did not 
imply actual mass migrations (Rohdewohld 2003).
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in character. This implied that the central government maintains its grip on 
the main sources of revenue of the regions, namely 80% of the income tax, 
value added tax, import duties and export taxes, and foreign aid, while it 
still controls a sizable number of government enterprises. What we actually 
witnessed in Indonesia was a decentralization of administrative power that 
was heavily subsidized by the central government.13 No less important is 
the way competition for power was organized at the regional level. The new 
law on political parties (No. 2/1999, written by the same Team of Seven) did 
not permit the establishment of regional parties – in contrast with the 1950s 
when they were allowed. Parties remained centralized in the hands of Jakarta 
party bosses, allowing little room for manoeuvre at the local level. This led to 
considerable friction between local branches and central headquarters, and 
even to local efforts to subvert the party system by forming cross-party alli-
ances based on ethnicity or district of origin.
By the time Megawati Sukarnoputri became president in July 2001, the 
earliest, breathless phase of reforms had passed. Problems with the decen-
tralization process were now regularly aired in the media, including ‘money 
politics’ among district parliamentarians electing new district heads and 
municipal mayors, the allegedly excessive power of district parliaments to 
dismiss heads annually, and the corruption of the now much more autono-
mous heads. Clearly some of these concerns were fanned by interests within 
the central government that had long regarded decentralization as danger-
ous. In the dying days of Megawati’s presidency two new laws were passed 
to deal with them. Technically, Law no. 32/2004 on Regional Government 
and Law no. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government 
and Regional Governments did not merely amend the previous laws but 
replaced them altogether (Malley 2004). Once again, the two laws passed 
with almost no public debate. The fiscal law did not much alter the power 
balance between the centre and the regions. But the law on regional govern-
ment did substantially cut back on the powers previously given to heads and 
parliaments. Local parliaments now cannot remove heads, while the central 
13  The central government keeps 75% of all these revenues, and distributes 25% to the regions 
in the form of a general grant (DAU, Dana Alokasi Umum), 90% of which goes to the autono-
mous regions while the provinces receive 10%. In 2001 in total Rp 60.5 trillion, or US$ 6.1 billion 
flowed from Jakarta to the regions. The criteria for the distribution of funds among the variety 
of districts are complex, depending on the relative size of the population, the poverty rate, geo-
graphical conditions and price indices. 
The contentious provinces Papua and Aceh received special autonomy (respectively Laws no. 
18 and 21/2001), granting Aceh 80% of the oil and gas revenues, and Papua 80% of its mining 
revenues and 70% of the revenues from oil and gas. It is ironic that in the case of both Aceh and 
Papua autonomy was granted to the province instead of the districts. One might expect this 
could favour separatist sentiment in the rebellious provinces. However, both provincial adminis-
trations are still dominated by old Golkar elites and the army, who control the flows of money.
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government can unilaterally suspend them for corruption or if they ‘threaten 
security’. Also, heads (called mayors if they head towns) are now elected 
directly by the voters, in a process that mirrors the direct presidential elec-
tion introduced in that same year. Thus in one stroke the district parliament 
was taken out of the most crucial parts of the power circuit – election and 
dismissal of the executive. Moreover the election of heads is supervised by 
regional electoral commissions following national government guidelines, 
rather than by the national electoral commission, raising fears of government 
interference. As a result the position of the regional administrators has on 
the one hand become more dependent on the central state, but on the other 
hand more powerful vis-à-vis the local parliaments since they can make use 
of their popular mandate.14
Nevertheless, the changes have so far not led to protests. The first direct 
district head elections passed smoothly in dozens of districts in June 2005. 
People voted for candidates they knew and trusted, rather than for party 
symbols as in the past. Democratically contested elections had become a 
routine affair in Indonesia, and participation rates were high.15
Professional optimism versus realistic pessimism
Differences of opinion concerning the effects of decentralization can be 
found among various groups, depending on the extent to which they are 
involved in the process. Professional optimism can be found among organi-
zations with an institutional interest in decentralization. NGOs like SMERU, 
and donor organizations like Support for Decentralization Measures (SfDM), 
Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation and financial giants like the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank actively support decentralization and pro-
claim a firm ideological belief in its success. In the SMERU report, decentrali-
zation is basically seen as a big administrative operation in which possible 
weaknesses can be improved (Syaikhu Usman 2002). The World Bank sees it 
as a huge financial operation – with the ominous title ‘Big Bang’ – which can 
be successfully managed (Hofman and Kaiser 2002; World Bank 2003). And 
in a publication sponsored by the Asian Development Bank it is said that 
‘The great achievement of decentralization in Indonesia is that it took place, 
and on schedule’ (Turner et al. 2003:136). Such a technocratic approach erases 
14  Law no. 32/2004 seems to offer more possibilities for provinces to strengthen their position 
vis-à-vis districts and autonomous towns. Personal communication Gustaaf Reerink.   
15  Since our research focused on the early days of decentralization, the effects of direct elec-
tions of mayors and district heads, which started in 2005, are not included in this volume, but 
will be discussed in future publications by some of the members of our research group.    
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questions referring to power struggles among competing interests groups 
(Hadiz 2003b). 
Decentralization is supported by a coalition of financial institutions and 
organizations like the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation, which 
support it because it is supposed to strengthen democracy and civil society. 
Between the lines, however, one can find carefully phrased doubts and con-
cerns about the outcome of the ‘transition’.16
Critical publications by authors without direct institutional involvement 
give voice to a more pessimistic attitude.17 A brief list of unresolved issues in 
this respect justifies an attitude of realistic pessimism. 
World Bank experts have measured that ‘on aggregate’ the regions receive 
enough revenues to cover the costs of their own autonomous administrative 
apparatus. However this does not imply that they have adequate funding for 
education, health care and poverty alleviation. Wihana Kirana Jaya (2002:39) 
remarks, moreover, that whereas Law no. 25/1999 reduces the vertical imbal-
ance between centre and regions, it is likely to increase horizontal imbalances 
among regions. The richest region has 50 times more income than the poorest 
one. Rich areas will try to develop their own trans-national networks, where-
as poor regions will fall further behind and become increasingly isolated.18  
A precise demarcation of responsibilities and claims between central gov-
ernment, province, and districts and municipalities does not yet exist. There 
seems to be a tendency for regions to issue their own regulations in fields 
not yet regulated by the central government, which may cause confusion 
and contention.
Especially the district level suffers a general lack of administrative exper-
tise. Most career paths head towards Jakarta, leaving few bright young 
people behind (Fanany 2003). Moreover, regional bureaucrats used to a wait-
and-see attitude now have to play a much active role over against the centre, 
something they were never trained for. 
District parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) are slow 
in initiating legislation and have a limited capacity to do so. Also lacking are 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts between DPRD and the executive adminis-
16  Although they professed their faith in the outcome of decentralization, Hofman and Kaiser 
(2002:7) state that more than one year into decentralization, much remained unclear on what 
exactly had been decentralized and which administrative functions had been decentralized 
(World Bank 2003). 
17  Dormeier-Freire and Maurer 2002; Hadiz 2003a; Hadiz and Robison 2003; Kingsbury and 
Aveling 2003; Malley 2003.
18 World Bank 2003. This does not necessarily mean that Indonesia will fall apart into a 
Balkanized archipelago of small states. The example of the recently formed resource-rich prov-
ince of Bangka-Belitung (the islands southeast of Sumatra) shows that loyalty towards Jakarta 
increased considerably when autonomy was granted (Sakai 2003a).
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trators, while members of the DPRD do not show much eagerness to rep-
resent their constituencies. Ryaas Rashid (2003) remarks that DPRD are by 
and large controlled by national party bosses who protect in the first place 
the special interests of their own party. There are indications that members 
of local parliaments prioritize substantial increases in their own salaries and 
travel budgets at the cost of education and health care (Dormeier-Freire and 
Maurer 2002; Shaikhu Usman 2002). 
Because most regions are subsidized by the centre, regional govern-
ments tend to become spending machines (Ray and Goodpaster 2003). In 
general, financial management and accountability is weak, while ‘money 
politics’ seem to prevail. There are widespread complaints that corruption 
has increased since regional autonomy was implemented. Elections of gov-
ernors and district administrators by provincial and district parliaments 
were generally accompanied by massive transfers of money (at least until 
the introduction of Law no. 32/2004), while budgets for development and 
construction projects are characterized by mark ups of 50-100%, which are 
divided among alliances of administrators and businessmen.19  
In order to acquire additional funds, regional administrations tend to 
burden their regions with extra taxes, while they pay little or no atten-
tion to environmental issues. Because of a lack of coordinating power at a 
supra-regional level, decentralization encourages interregional competition 
and conflict. One of the reasons that Bangka-Belitung wanted to become a 
separate province is that they did not want to share their mining revenues 
with the province and the other districts on the mainland. Conflicts between 
neighbouring districts along the north coast of Java about the demarcation 
of their fishing territories have been a regular occurrence. Elsewhere trade 
restrictions, which already existed under the New Order, are reinforced by 
new regulations (Ray and Goodpaster 2003). 
Measures that favour locals and exclude minorities may increase ethnic 
conflict. Cultural identity politics reinforce economic and political competi-
tion between districts, also in regions that are ethnically homogeneous. 
It is revealing that in the writings of the ‘professional optimists’ the role of 
the army and the police as important actors at the regional level is completely 
ignored. Both the World Bank (2003) and the Asia Foundation (2002) sketch 
in their reports an Indonesia without army, militias and organized crime. 
For those familiar with the literature on decentralization in post-colonial 
states, the issues mentioned here do not come as a surprise. In a general 
review of the subject worldwide, Frerks and Otto (1996) concluded that the 
19  The World Bank (World Bank 2003) refers to the surprisingly large number of newly elected 
district heads (bupati) who are not affiliated with majority parties in their region, and admits that 
substantial amounts of money from the centre seem to disappear once they reach the region.
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overall results of decentralization were rather disappointing and far behind 
initial expectations. They refer in this respect also to reports by USAID and 
the World Bank from the 1990s, illustrating the structural amnesia of these 
institutions.20 
Both the literature and the examples mentioned here illustrate that decen-
tralization does not necessarily result in democratization, good governance 
and the strengthening of civil society at the regional level. Instead we often 
witness a decentralization of corruption, collusion and political violence 
that once belonged to the centralized regime of the New Order, and is now 
moulded into the existing patrimonial patterns at the regional level. We may 
expect that the continuity of these patterns will prevent the establishment 
of transparent rules, democratic procedures and control mechanisms. The 
district head plays a crucial role in this system. This official receives most of 
the funds from the centre and controls the channels through which money is 
distributed. If they manage to cooperate with the chairperson of the district 
parliament and leading businesspeople, and if they are able to accommodate 
the military commander, they can rule the district and maintain their patron-
age network without encountering much opposition. Various people call 
the new autonomous regions ‘little kingdoms’, but do we know where the 
kings come from? Except for a few scholars (Hadiz 2003a; Van Klinken 2002; 
Malley 2003) this question is by and large ignored in recent publications on 
decentralization. 
Pemekaran and the dynamics of ethnicity
 
The most remarkable aspect of the decentralization process was quite 
unplanned. Pemekaran is the Indonesian word for the subdivision of existing 
districts and provinces to create new units. It does occur in other countries. 
In the United States it is called redistricting and concerns electoral politics.21 
It occurred often in some Eastern European countries after the end of the 
Soviet era, particularly Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia. Scholars 
described it there as a ‘far-reaching and spontaneous fragmentation of the ter-
ritorial administrative structure’ (Illner 2000; Majcherkiewicz 2000). It aimed 
to undo Soviet era amalgamation and return to earlier, smaller units. Neither 
20  A USAID report in 1995 on decentralization identified a lack of planning, the failure to 
mobilize enough local resources, competition between local officials, and poor natural resource 
management as major problems. The World Bank stated in 1992 that a weak administrative 
capacity at the local level would lead to waste and corruption, while resources are arguably open 
to capture by elite groups at the local level (Frerks and Otto 1996).
21  http://www.lib.purdue.edu/govdocs/redistricting.html.
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in the United States nor in Eastern Europe has the process been particularly 
controversial. In Indonesia, by contrast, it has often been a highly contested 
development involving strong localist identity movements. Yet the new units 
often had only a flimsy connection with previous boundaries. Sometimes pro-
tagonists invoked colonial history, but that was beyond living memory. 
We believe there are good grounds for regarding the Indonesian process 
as unique in the world for its extent and its politicization, and have therefore 
retained the Indonesian expression pemekaran, which literally means ‘flower-
ing’. Strictly speaking this is a misnomer, since the movement is not out and 
up but turned in upon itself in endlessly repeated subdivision. ‘Administrative 
involution’ is another appropriate term, reminiscent of Geertz’s notion of agri-
cultural involution when too many people need to live off the same piece of 
land. It reflects the same talent for improvisation in hard times. 
The foreign-trained policy-makers who wrote the Indonesian decentrali-
zation legislation did not intend it to trigger a rush of pemekaran (Turner et 
al. 2003). The extensive literature on decentralization around the world is 
about transferring powers from one administrative level to another, not 
about redrawing administrative boundaries at the same time. Yet that is what 
happened in Indonesia. In the space of a few years the number of provinces 
increased from 27 to 33 while the number of districts (sometimes called 
regencies or kabupaten) increased by almost 50% to 440. 
Pemekaran after 1998 was largely driven from below. Despite objections 
from Interior Ministry officials in Jakarta that pemekaran was often unneces-
sary and costly, time and again politicians in the regions managed to force 
them to authorize new provinces and districts anyway. Usually the regional 
politicians made their approach to Jakarta not directly through the bureauc-
racy but via the national parliament, which then passed legislation instruct-
ing the formation of new units. To add force to their argument that pemekaran 
would bring government ‘closer to the people’, they quietly handed out large 
amounts of money. Each new district promised a building contractors’ bonan-
za, as they had to be equipped with an array of new offices. The military and 
police supported pemekaran because their parallel territorial command struc-
tures were usually upgraded to reflect the change soon afterwards. 
The combination of two essentially different processes – administrative 
decentralization and popular democratization – produced much freer compe-
tition between local elites for control of the state. They often conducted their 
competition in ethnic terms. A district for each faction could be the answer to 
competing claims. Pemekaran is therefore a case study in the question ‘why is 
provincial statecraft so ethnic in moments of formal state weakness?’ The rush 
for pemekaran had a parallel in the late 1950s, when Jakarta’s formal powers 
were also weakened by factional struggles at the centre and armed revolts in 
the provinces. The centre responded then by creating eight new provinces. 
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But it would be a mistake to see this as a victory for centrifugal forces. Behind 
the fervor of local identity movements lay not a desire to secede but rather to 
outdo rivals in loyalty to Jakarta, which was still the source of cash. Indeed 
Jakarta offered new provinces as perks to loyalists in the regions in order to 
outmanoeuvre the separatists (Van Klinken 2006).
The first section of the present volume concerns the politics of pemeka-
ran after 1998. Two authors – Myrna Eindhoven on Mentawai Island (West 
Sumatra) and Lorraine Aragon on Poso (Central Sulawesi) – explore the eth-
nic turn in provincial statecraft that accompanied them. Mentawaian intellec-
tuals found themselves in the city of Padang at a moment of opportunity pro-
vided by the administrative flux of decentralization. Lacking a political party 
infrastructure, an ethnic ideology of indigeneity became their best weapon in 
the struggle to carve out a bureaucratic niche for themselves. But the ideology 
had nothing to say to the predatory combination of timber interests and a rent-
seeking officialdom that threatened to despoil their island. Despite their best 
intention, and illustrating the weak foundations of critical NGOs, they were 
eventually swallowed up by it themselves. In Poso, bureaucrats who had long 
been blandness personified turned suddenly into champions of religious and 
(later) ethnic ideologies when they had to compete for their positions in the 
newly democratizing order. Informal business interests pushed and pulled 
behind the scenes. Aragon’s chapter illustrates how elections plus rent-seek-
ing results in ethnic competition. Thus both studies raise painful questions 
about the unintended consequences that can arise when two of the modern 
world’s most prized ideals become a reality – democracy and the rights of 
indigenous peoples. A third author in another section of this book (on civil 
society) also describes ethnicized regional politics but reaches a more positive 
conclusion. Taufiq Tanasaldy, writing about West Kalimantan, argues that 
ethnic politics can be civil. Ethnic ‘power-sharing’ at the district level, based 
on new census data, has effectively short-circuited ethnic violence. Indeed 
ethnicity has taken on emancipatory meanings for Dayak, who deployed it as 
an ideology to help reverse their hitherto marginalized political status.
This section of the book also includes two studies of, thus far, failed peme-
karan movements – one by Jacqueline Vel on Sumba (East Nusa Tenggara) 
and another by Dik Roth on Luwu (South Sulawesi). In a few years time these 
movements may have been forgotten even by their protagonists. However, 
these studies are interesting not as chronicles of failure but because they 
show us exactly how the game was played. They take a close interest in 
networking. Networks of influence are key sites for researchers interested 
in less institutionalized, more personalized paradigms of state-society rela-
tions. They stretched from the remotest region all the way to Jakarta, often 
via the provincial capital. An ethic of family-like trust binds them together 
– whether derived from a common place of origin, descent, or religion. Thus 
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Roth and Vel are moving beyond provincial studies towards a new theoreti-
cal integration, in which networks of influence with a (sub-)provincial focus 
acquire a national scope. 
The salience of ethnic and religious identities (in the Indian context often 
conflated as ‘communal identity’) is the most striking feature of provincial 
Indonesia since the end of the New Order. In the four chapters in this section 
ethnicity was an ideology in a political struggle, but it was at the same time 
more than an ideology. It evoked a real depth of feeling. A little history may 
help to explain this, as well as provide a broader context for the detailed 
observations by Vel, Aragon, Eindhoven and Roth. 
The colonial period, as we have seen, contains the key to understand-
ing the connection between regional elites and ethnicity in present day 
Indonesia. Mahmood Mamdani (2001b) has noted that African colonial 
systems were marked by contrasts between Western overlords and local 
ethnicity, and between Western legal systems and local forms of customary 
law. This resulted in forms of indirect governance whereby regional ethnic 
elites acquired power. There are striking similarities with the situation in 
Indonesia, where in many regions local aristocracies came to power during 
the colonial period. Customary law was an important mechanism to regulate 
local relations and to keep ordinary people trapped in an ethnically ordered 
system. In the late colonial period a strong though relatively limited central 
state allied itself with aristocratic elites in the regions in order to reinforce a 
cheap but stable form of indirect rule. 
Dutch colonial thinking conceptualized its rule in the Netherlands Indies 
– especially in the islands outside Java – in dualistic terms. These ideas, 
which separated European interests from local society, were materialized in 
the fields of economy, education and law.22 In terms of law the Dutch cre-
ated a corpus of knowledge about local customs, which not only separated 
‘natives’ from Europeans (and Arabs and Chinese) but also produced sharp 
divisions among indigenous groups themselves. There was among ‘ethically’ 
inspired Dutch administrators a genuine ideal to respect and protect local 
cultures against the ambitions of the penetrating colonial state to introduce 
uniform rule. This was, however, also part of a strategy of divide and rule 
intended to counter the spread of Islam, while it later served as a conserva-
tive ‘medicine’ against the virus of nationalism. 
Throughout the archipelago ethnic groups and adat boundaries were defined 
in the sense that fluid communities with flexible boundaries were now demar-
cated in rigid terms and located within fixed territorial structures.23 In many 
parts of the archipelago the Dutch administered these ethnic groups and adat 
22  Burns 2004; Van Klinken 2003b; Lev 1985; Stoler 1995.
23  Kingston 1991; Kipp 1993;  Laksono 2002; Schrauwers 2000; H. Schulte Nordholt 1994.
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communities, through local aristocracies. And it was this colonial legacy that 
determined to a large extent post-colonial relationships. As a consequence of 
this colonial imprinting of ethnic identities, the first manifestations of national-
ism in Indonesia (Jong Java and so on) had a strong ethnic flavour.24 
Although ethnicity was a topic of scholarly discussion during the 1950s 
(Skinner and Bruner 1959), the dominant discourse was primarily focused on 
nation-building, the role of political parties and the so-called aliran (political 
pillars) on Java. As Ichlasul Amal (1992) has argued, this approach obscured 
to a large extent the importance of ethnic factors shaping Indonesian politics 
at the same time. 
Neither Geertz (1963) nor Liddle (1970) paid much attention to the colonial 
moulds within which post-colonial discourses of ethnicity had been shaped. 
For them ‘primordial’ sentiments referred to something that was authentic 
and without much history. Nevertheless, Liddle did notice that at least until 
1959 people in north Sumatra were at the same time organized along ethnic 
lines and deeply committed to the nation (Liddle 1970:208). Geertz (1963:270) 
even went one step further when he stated that ‘it is the very process of the 
formation of a sovereign civil state that […] stimulates sentiments of parochi-
alism, communalism, racialism […] because it introduced into society a valu-
able new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to 
contend’. Today the idea that ethnic identities might in fact be ‘products’ of 
colonial state formation has become widely accepted (Yinger 1985). 
Under the New Order, ethnicity, religion, race and class (summarized in 
the acronym SARA) were political no-go areas, which implied that public dis-
course about these topics was under close surveillance. However, there were 
still discourses about culture, adat, religion, and ethnicity, and these formed 
a complex repository for identity formation. Issues concerning religion and 
adat were monitored by state agencies, while the phenomenon of class was 
simply silenced. Culture was, moreover, both bureaucratized and folklor-
ized (Acciaioli 1985; Kipp 1993). Officially ethnicity was taboo because of its 
explosive potential, but the national motto – Unity in Diversity – seemed to 
legitimize diversity. And it was precisely the interpretation of what diversity 
meant and who was in control of this meaning that was to become a bone of 
contestation. Rita Smith Kipp (1993) has analysed the ambiguous and con-
tested nature of concepts like ethnicity, religion and culture in New Order 
Indonesia. She illustrates how since the colonial period the state has encour-
aged a process of dissociation by which she means that there is no longer an 
24  Van Klinken 2003a; H. Schulte Nordholt 2000. David Henley argues in the final chapter of 
his book on Minahasa (Henley 1996) for a distinction between adat and more modern notions of 
ethnicity. Adat was emphasized in areas with indirect rule, whereas ethnicity played an impor-
tant role in areas where the influence of Western institutions was more strongly felt.
Introduction 23
overlap of religious and ethnic identities (like in the old Malay world where 
masuk Melayu was synonymous with the conversion to Islam). Contrary to 
the old idea that national integration and increased contact between differ-
ent groups would erode ethnic identities, government policy, migration and 
intensified competition for scarce resources had led since the 1980s to an 
intensification of ethnic consciousness. The New Order believed that it could 
handle the variety of differences it had helped to create. For, ethnic diversity 
diminished religious unity, religion pluralized ethnic groups, and both ethnic-
ity and religion denied class (Kipp 1993:261). However, the violent conflicts 
in the Moluccas, Central Sulawesi and West- and Central Kalimantan, which 
accompanied the demise of the Soeharto regime, demonstrate that a monster 
of Frankenstein had been created. Because the New Order had transformed 
Soekarno’s popular nationalism with its mobilizing qualities into state-moni-
tored ceremonialism, ethnic identification seemed to become more powerful. 
Like nationalism, discourses based on ethnicity imagine bonds of loyalty also 
in terms of kinship and emotions, which persuade people to risk their lives 
and cleanse their territories from evil enemies. 
Thus by the late 1990s a language of ethnic and religious identity was 
taking shape that at one and the same time was blessed by the regime yet 
offered ample possibilities of refuge from and even resistance to that state. 
This idiom was, as Charles Tilly and his students put it (McAdam et al. 
2001), part of a ‘repertoire’ of action, which could be deployed for a variety 
of purposes at the appropriate moment. The many cross-cutting possibilities 
offered by ethnic and religious identifications gave it a theatrical quality, and 
this did not escape the notice of some of the authors in the present volume. 
Jacqueline Vel in particular has paid attention to the theatre of ethnic protest 
in Sumba, which appears to arouse great emotion in the heat of battle but 
then dims again just as rapidly. 
Shadow states and the black economy
Emotions and political theatre often hide a very different reality, in which 
hard economic interests are at work. This section takes us to one of the core 
concerns of this book. It explores the contrast between the main visualiza-
tions about the state and the economy of Indonesia in the western literature 
hitherto, and the reality that may be observed on the ground today. The 
chapters in this section present a wealth of grounded observations to chal-
lenge the orderly images of the state and the economy found in mainstream 
scholarship during the New Order. The criminalization of the state, the blur-
ring of boundaries between state and society, and the informalization of the 
economy are here closely observed in different parts of the country. They 
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occur not merely in the wild frontiers of upriver Central Kalimantan (as 
described by John McCarthy), or in the war zone of Aceh (Isa Sulaiman), but 
also in the quiet tin-mining islands of Bangka-Belitung (Erwiza Erman), and 
even in Banten, the new province just west of Jakarta (Syarif Hidayat). Two 
of these are examples of resource-based rent-seeking (timber and tin), while 
two others illustrate the simple ‘transfer rent’, in which money is moved out 
of the government into private pockets at the regional level. 
Even when these authors do not adopt an explicit terminology to cap-
ture the confusing interpenetration of state, society, and economy that they 
observe, they offer fascinating material to anybody inclined to develop one. 
Certainly none see anything resembling the autonomous, bureaucratic or cor-
poratist state that became accepted notions during the New Order. McCarthy 
does acknowledge the importance of the state regulations and institutions, 
but his contribution also illustrates how essential it is to avoid the reification 
of the state in inappropriate ways. This position reflects a literature arguing 
that endlessly qualifying the ideal Weberian state with predicates such as 
‘weak’ or ‘messy’ has reached the limit of the absurd, since no actual state in 
the world comes anywhere near this ideal (Migdal 2001). A different perspec-
tive allows us to see that ‘the state’ does many things that are remote from 
what it is expected to do by policy-makers. Decentralization, moreover, made 
certain hidden aspects of the state more explicit as it revealed the extent to 
which local actors used the state for their own interests. 
Isa Sulaiman undertakes a similar move when he analyses Acehnese 
politics, not in terms of institutional interests, but in those of the personal 
relationships among its leading actors. District of origin is the major bind-
ing factor. Here we see a continuity of neo-patrimonial models mentioned 
earlier.25 
Erwiza Erman and Syarif Hidayat, by contrast, do deploy a concept of the 
state. But it is not the kind of empowered state familiar to all since Weber 
defined it as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Gerth and 
Wright Mills 1946:77-128). It is the ‘shadow state’, a notion borrowed from 
the Indianist Barbara Harriss-White (2003:89), who in turn took it from the 
Africanist William Reno (1995). The key idea is that political authority can be 
drawn, not from the possession of undisputed force, but from the ability to 
control markets and material rewards, or, in other words, from hegemony in 
the ‘black economy’. This implies a blurring of boundaries between state and 
informal economy. The shadow state expands across that border. Whereas 
the ‘formal’ state resembles the set of institutions Weber would have recog-
25  Indonesia provided much of the material upon which the neo-patrimonial model was first 
based (Eisenstadt 1973; Roth 1968).
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nized, the ‘shadow state’ is larger than this formal state, and also has greater 
reality. Harriss-White (2003:89) defines it as:
that part of the informal, ‘real’ economy that cannot operate without the particular 
form taken by the State. While it might be considered to be analytically separate 
from the definition of the State as a set of institutions of political and executive 
control centred upon government, with which we embarked, the ‘shadow’ State 
is part of the actually existing state [...] Hence the real State, including its shadow, 
is bigger than the formal State, and has a vested interest in the perpetuation of a 
stricken and porous formal State. 
Syarif Hidayat detects a typical shadow state activity when he describes 
Banten’s main businessman, whose livelihood comes from government con-
tracts, going to great lengths to ensure he controls the new province’s parlia-
ment, which in turn makes executive appointments. Erwiza Erman similarly 
describes the ‘King of Tin’ in Bangka-Belitung turning himself into a major 
competitor for the state-owned tin mining company PT Tambang Timah by 
colluding with the local district and police chiefs. In each case the crucial 
observation is that the system only yields a profit to all participants because 
some of them are there ‘in their official capacity’. In Banten, parliament must 
appoint the district head who will agree to the monopolistic terms set by 
that contractor. In Bangka-Belitung, the district head needs to argue to his 
superiors in Jakarta that regional autonomy justifies special dispensations 
for local tin operators, and the police chief needs to cooperate with ‘illegal’ 
tin shipments. 
These are not stories of individual moral lapses, nor do they simply reflect 
a continuity of New Order practices. The shadow state is a system of author-
ity and exchange that is firmly embedded in local relationships and that has 
staying power. Nevertheless, more effort is needed to develop a conceptual 
model of the post-New Order state and its fragments which is as clear as the 
one we used during the New Order. It should account for the privatization 
of formal institutions and the institutionalization of private interests, but 
also for the ethnic turn of local politics in moments of formal state weakness 
discussed in the previous section, as well as the security failures discussed 
in the next. 
Fear and the failure of security
Security is a topic that is almost entirely neglected in the expert literature on 
decentralization in Indonesia. This reflects its origins in the corridors of the 
multilateral agencies that have attempted to depoliticize decentralization and 
turn it into a technical exercise for bureaucrats (Hadiz 2003b). Yet both the 
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decentralization process and the associated democratization have repeatedly 
led to violence. This is not a book about post-authoritarian communal violence 
in Indonesia (but see Van Klinken forthcoming-a), nor do we want to suggest 
that all post-New Order changes were inherently violent. In most places they 
unfolded peacefully. But when violence did occur it often involved the same 
actors. Lorraine Aragon’s chapter on Poso makes this clear. 
Violence is so destructive because it produces a psychology of insecurity 
that lingers long after the killing has stopped, and spreads to other places 
where violence never occurred. A threatening climate of fear poisons hopes 
and erodes the basic trust without which no democracy can flourish. The 
most fundamental political good that a state is expected to provide is security 
(Rotberg 2003). If democracy is a process of protected consultation, then the 
absence of protection spells its death. Democracy needs a functioning state. 
Suggestions that democracy is all about civil society pushing back the state (the 
‘counterweight’ theory of civil society (Foley and Edwards 1996) are mislead-
ing because they ignore the indispensable role of the state in this area. When 
violence does break out, blame ought to lie in the first place with the state. 
Anto Sangaji correctly points out in his chapter on Poso that a minimally func-
tional security capacity, subject to civilian control, is a legitimate state role.
The chapters in this section of the book complement the previous ones 
on the black economy and the shadow state. For both, the gap between con-
ventional understandings of the Weberian state and the observed reality is 
so wide yet so systematic that we are driven to search for a more adequate 
concept. The security failures observed in Poso by Anto Sangaji, and in 
Lombok by John MacDougall, can be as little explained by speaking of indi-
vidual moral lapses as could the rent-seeking behaviour of state officials in 
the previous section. Lack of professionalism, too, while real, often does not 
capture the dynamics of failure. 
As in the previous section, these authors are often not yet in a position 
to formulate a more adequate concept. But we do have some hints, and they 
relate once more to the logic of the shadow state. The failure of the security 
forces in Poso could be traced to their preoccupation with both formal and 
informal business activities. Having built business relationships with key 
local players whose activities spanned the government, the economy and the 
district’s religious and ethnic life, security officers may have been reluctant 
to imperil those friendships by taking repressive action (Mietzner 2003). 
Sometimes the interests of key players in the shadow state are better served 
not by withholding repressive capacity but by actually (mis-)applying it. 
Thus Sangaji and MacDougall both describe murky connections between 
the military and various private militias who in fact promote violence rather 
than reducing it. 
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How civil is civil society? 
In the next section on civil society the somewhat breathless sense of crisis of 
the previous chapters is tempered. It also turns our attention to the question, 
‘under what conditions can democratization be successful at the regional 
level?’. Is, to put it more sharply, democratic decentralization possible in the 
presence of ethnic and religious claim-making? Standard literature on mod-
ernization would have the answer ‘no’ ready before you could finish this sen-
tence. In this volume we do not take such a dogmatic position. Contrary to 
the pessimistic tone of other writing about the provinces, also in some parts 
of this book, three of the contributions in this section portray societies with 
salient religious and ethnic identities that are also reasonably democratic. 
They are the predominantly Christian North Sulawesi (described by David 
Henley, Maria Schouten and Alex Ulaen), majority Muslim Jepara, a town 
in Central Java (Jim Schillers), and the ethnically plural West Kalimantan 
(Taufiq Tanasaldy). 
The argument of these chapters will not be uncontested but deserves to be 
heard. If democracies are those places where talking trumps fighting, then it 
will be noticed that West Kalimantan had two serious episodes of ethnic vio-
lence, in 1997 and 1999, while Jepara had its share of political violence before 
the 1999 election. Nevertheless, a democracy does not necessarily have to be 
free of political violence, as India can testify. 
For Jepara and North Sulawesi, it helps to have a majority religion – NU-
oriented Islam in one, Protestant Christianity in the other – while minority 
groups know their place. But, as David Henley and his colleagues argue, 
responsible leadership embedded in strong religious institutions plays a 
role as well. It also helps to be reasonably prosperous. Jepara and North 
Sulawesi’s capital Menado are comfortable towns each with a small but self-
confident middle class, while in North Sulawesi the extremes of wealth and 
deprivation found in other parts of Indonesia are largely absent. In neither, 
moreover, has the military been particularly meddlesome – even during 
the New Order they preferred to stay in the background. Both these places 
survived the end of the New Order without political collapse. It is therefore 
just as important, as Henley and his colleagues note correctly, to study ‘the 
anatomy of peace’ as to study its pathological collapse. 
West Kalimantan is even more interesting. The province does not score 
highly on economic indicators. It is deeply divided into several ethnic 
groups, which became salient after the violent episodes of the late 1990s. 
And the military has left a deep imprint on it through decades of interference 
caused mainly by its proximity to Malaysia. Yet precisely the violent epi-
sodes of 1997 and 1999 put in motion a set of ethnic ‘power-sharing’ arrange-
ments to prevent the recurrence of trouble. This is an important example of 
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consociational democracy as a conflict-resolution approach (Lijphart 1977). 
This is, moreover, the first time West Kalimantan has been studied in terms 
of an anatomy of peace. 
Finally the chapter by Andi Faisal Bakti on Wajo, South Sulawesi, shows 
that social change is slower than often thought. Established elites are eager to 
maintain privileges and adapt easily to new circumstances. It may seem that 
non-government organizations multiply to create the appearance of a civil 
society, but often they do not act accordingly. For that matter, this chapter is a 
salutary reminder of the truth of Partha Chatterjee’s remark that civil society 
is itself a problematic saviour. Its middle class members are born and raised 
in the warm embrace of the state. They speak on behalf of the ‘masses’ but 
are secretly afraid of them (Chatterjee 1993:85-102).
Identities under construction
The last set of essays investigates discussions about regional identities 
which are constructed with bricks made of ethnicity, religion and custom, 
and mortar taken from a nation-wide middle class seminar culture. It is in 
this context important to note that decentralization and regional autonomy 
have excluded a fundamental discussion about the meaning of citizenship in 
contemporary Indonesia, which forms an important cornerstone of democ-
racy. Facing rapid political and economic changes, regional intellectuals try 
to conceptualize who they are, how they are tied to their region and how 
they relate to Indonesia. These discussions are marked by ambivalence, com-
plexity and contradiction, which pretty much reflects Indonesian societies 
today. A closer look at discourses on regional identities shows an interest-
ing paradox, in the sense that regional authenticity is often emphasized in 
a very ‘Indonesian’ way. More in general we may conclude that throughout 
the archipelago differences are increasingly expressed in similar ways (see 
for example Van Klinken forthcoming-b). Two factors contribute to the 
Indonesian way these regional differences are expressed. In the first place 
discourses about regional authenticity are firmly rooted in a body of colo-
nial texts which share a set of assumptions on the nature of these societies. 
These texts are moreover expressed in a bureaucratized New Order language 
which moulds them into a highly uniformed format. Therefore discussions 
about the essence and resilience of Balinese culture, or how the nagari is con-
sidered to be the basis of Minangkabau culture, as elaborated in the essays by 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, reflect 
an ‘Indonesian’ way of identifying cultural keys, as much as they express 
concerns about regional identities. If we look at the main participants in 
these discourses we encounter urban middle class intellectuals who are born, 
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educated and socialized in the New Order. Although they tend to empha-
size their unique regional identity, this group of people seems to embody at 
the same time the core of a national Indonesian middle class culture. Henk 
Schulte Nordholt takes the discussion about ‘Ajeg Bali’ (the Resilience of Bali) 
as a point of departure in an effort to give an integrated analysis of recent 
political changes which are seen in a wider Indonesian context. Franz and 
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann analyse the discourse concerning the nagari as 
a key to Minangkabau community and identity. They emphasize the inward-
looking nature of this debate but show also that apart from local actors, par-
ticipants at the provincial, national and international level are involved.
Regional identities are also heavily contested, and this is elaborated in the 
essays by Carole Faucher on Riau and Jaap Timmer on Papua. In Riau aris-
tocratic ideas compete with the threatening proximity of Singapore’s moder-
nity, while the younger generation opts for a more outspoken Indonesian 
identity. The picture which emerges from Faucher’s essay is one of confusion. 
Despite the existence of large groups if immigrants, the Malay elite tries to 
impose a coherent image of Malayness, which is contradicted by practices of 
exclusion by Singapore and Malaysia, while the high school curriculum is 
still to a large extent determined by Jakarta. Timmer, meanwhile, criticizes 
the idea of a unified and homogeneous Papua resisting Jakarta oppression. 
Instead he emphasizes the ethnic and demographic fault lines along which 
regional elites compete with each other. Increasingly, Papuan elites have 
accommodated to Indonesian ways of doing politics and found their way to 
political circles in Jakarta. In Papua a process of ‘pemekaran from above’ has 
increased tensions and conflicts between elites and their constituencies, as a 
result of which the hopes of reform expressed during the ‘Papua Spring’ of 
2000 have faded.
Taken together the essays in this book aim to document the hopes and 
anxieties in Indonesian societies at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
especially in its neglected regions. The idea of the nation is damaged, the 
legitimacy of the state questioned, the nature and future of regional identi-
ties contested, and the boundaries between ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘region’ have 
become zones of conflict. Yet amid this flux of boundaries renegotiated, 
Indonesians are also demonstrating an admirable confidence that futures 
can be made anew, a surprising resilience in the face of uncertainty and (let 
us not forget) poverty, and (also too often overlooked) a remarkable civility 
amid the differences. 

gerry van klinken
M. isa Sulaiman (1951-2004)
Isa Sulaiman was one of Aceh’s most important social scientists. Unlike other 
talented Acehnese, he did not move to Jakarta, nor did he go into politics or 
the bureaucracy. He stuck to his scholarship as if it was a calling. Three days 
after returning from the workshop that produced this book, on the morning 
of 26 December 2004, he was among the multitude of human beings swept 
away by the tsunami. His extensive archives also disappeared in the water. 
Isa Sulaiman was born on 28 June 1951 in Manggeng, Labuhan Haji, a 
small town in South Aceh. It lay near Meulaboh that was to be destroyed by 
the tsunami; the area was hurt by fighting in the 1990s. In 1977 he graduated 
from the History Department of the Faculty of Education at the Syiah Kuala 
University, in the provincial capital Banda Aceh. His thesis, on religion in his 
home town after independence, marked the beginning of two abiding inter-
ests – things that happen in small places, and how religion gets on in modern-
izing times. The Australian historian Lance Castles was one of his mentors. 
Impressed, the university offered him a lectureship. 
Academic work at a state university in an authoritarian system can be 
deadening. The 1980s were the height of the militaristic New Order. Some 
of Isa’s early work was little more than anthropological list-making. In order 
somehow to shape a national culture, the government asked social scientists 
around the country to make exhaustive ‘inventories’ of traditional rituals 
such as weddings.1 The ruling idea was that cultures are static things that 
need only be classified to be understood. 
In 1979 he was invited to Makassar (then Ujung Pandang), in South 
Sulawesi. The innovative Pusat Latihan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (PLPIIS, 
Centre for Social Sciences Research Training) was one of four sponsored by 
the Ford Foundation. Another stood in Banda Aceh. He wrote a fine field 
study on a Buginese ironworking village (Isa Sulaiman 1979). His supervisor, 
the Bugis specialist Christian Pelras, then arranged for him to write a doctoral 
dissertation in Paris. This was Isa’s big break. Separated from wife and two 
1 Isa Sulaiman 1978; Syamsuddin, Hasan Husin and Isa Sulaiman 1981; Hasan Husin, Isa 
Sulaiman Mahmud Main et al. 1982.
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young sons, he learned French and wrote a 365-page dissertation in that lan-
guage within the required three years (Isa Sulaiman 1985a). Denys Lombard 
was his supervisor. This solid study on the struggle for Aceh between aris-
tocrats and religious leaders in the years of occupation and revolution 1942-
1951 remains unpublished, though he wrote several articles based on it (Isa 
Sulaiman 1985b, 1985c). 
The same thorough approach informed his next book-length work, which 
also did not circulate widely because it was self-published. It was a transcrip-
tion with a long introduction of four epic poems (hikayat) about the Cumbok 
War, the decisive battle between the aristocracy and radical nationalists in 
Pidie in December 1945-January 1946 (Isa Sulaiman 1990b).
In 1997 his Sejarah Aceh (History of Aceh appeared with a major Jakarta 
publisher. It covered the tumultuous period 1942-1962 and thus incorporated 
and extended his dissertation work. This was his debut for a wider public. 
A foreword by the redoubtable T.H. Ibrahim Alfian placed him among only 
nine Acehnese with substantial work on Aceh’s politics and history, though 
only Isa and Ibrahim Alfian were historians.2 Sejarah Aceh is carefully crafted. 
He trawled archives in the Netherlands and Jakarta for it, persuaded key 
Acehnese actors to talk, and tracked down rare documents in private and 
public collections in Aceh. This bloody period covers the end of Dutch rule, 
the Japanese occupation, the independence struggle including the social revo-
lution of early 1946, and the Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s. 
Far more than a chronology, he also brought his own interpretation to 
this period. Till then the dominant Indonesian explanation of the Darul Islam 
revolt came from Nazaruddin Syamsuddin (Isa Sulaiman 1985, 1990), who 
portrayed it as persistent Acehnese primordialism obstructing national inte-
gration. Isa preferred to read the entire period as a struggle within Aceh itself, 
a fruitful struggle for an emerging modernity. He had been working on this 
theme for some time (Isa Sulaiman 1988a, 1988b). Like Nazaruddin he was a 
modern intellectual who only occasionally showed a touch of nostalgia for the 
‘harmony’ of traditional village life (Isa Sulaiman 1990a). If we read between 
the lines we can perhaps even detect some regret at his own role, Snouck 
Hurgronje-like,3 of lending his intellect to aid the destructive penetration by 
the modern bureaucratic state into this rural idyll (Isa Sulaiman 1988c; Isa 
Sulaiman, Hasan Husin et al. 1995). Yet more than Nazaruddin, Isa wrote 
about Aceh from within, and he refused to despair. The radicals who took 
2  The others were Ali Hasjmy, Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, Hasan Saleh, Amran Zamzami, 
Sjamaun Gaharu and Fachry Ali, to which we must add Ibrahim Alfian himself. 
3  Snouck Hurgronje was the late nineteenth century colonial anthropologist and official 
who advised the Dutch army in Aceh. Indonesian nationalists naturally regard him as a vil-
lain. However, Isa portrayed him more positively as a careful observer, who moreover trained 
Acehnese researchers (Isa Sulaiman 2004).
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on the aristocrats in 1946, and who went on to challenge Jakarta in the 1950s, 
were self-made individuals arising from the common people. They educated 
themselves in private religious schools in the 1930s because the Dutch and 
the Acehnese aristocrats had conspired to block their rise. The fact that they 
themselves later adopted the same patrimonial leadership style as those they 
had opposed merely led to new revolts from their own ranks. Thus in Isa’s 
view, the characteristic Acehnese heroism may have caused blood to run, but 
it was certainly not atavistic.4
Heroism was not something just to write about, but to do. When Reformasi 
came also to Aceh, Isa did not sit on the fence. He introduced his book on the 
Gerakan Aceh  Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) (Isa Sulaiman 2000) 
by saying he hoped it would add a historical dimension to a strident indict-
ment of military human rights abuse written earlier by Al-Chaidar (1998). 
Once again it was well-documented, and it displayed a fearlessness and 
compassion that few could match. It refused to bow to ideology – whether 
nationalist Indonesian, Acehnese, or religious. Accuracy and balance were 
everything. It was written at a moment when both the Indonesian armed 
forces and GAM carried out assassinations against civilian activists and aca-
demics who displeased them.
The book led to an invitation to join the ‘Acehnese civil society task force’ 
in Banda Aceh, which hoped to create a democratic space amid the fighting. 
In November 2002 the international mediation group Henry Dunant Centre 
(HDC) invited him and others to Geneva to shore up negotiations between 
the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government. It was his first 
meeting with Acehnese leaders in exile, and he was impressed with them. 
Just when the tsunami claimed him, Isa seemed to be going from strength 
to strength. His chapter for the present book was not quite finished. It was 
another well-documented indictment of the political order (Isa Sulaiman and 
Van Klinken 2006). He knew the whole cast personally, but refused to let his 
need for acceptance overwhelm his judgment of them. In May 2004 he co-
convened a conference at the Asia Research Institute in Singapore on the his-
torical background of the Aceh problem. He had just done fieldwork in the 
remote Simeulue Island off Sumatra’s west coast. He planned to write about 
the left, which disappeared from Aceh and from the history books in 1965 (he 
admired the socialist youth movement Pesindo). He wanted to write about 
Indonesian literature and social change in Aceh between 1927 and 1962. And 
he taught large classes in Banda Aceh. 
During his four and a half months at the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, 
4  Although he was only one of the ghost-writers, the biography of Abdul Muluk, Aceh’s 
best-known engineer who was also born in South Aceh, illustrates the same confidence that 
modernity and Aceh do go together (Isa Sulaiman 2001). 
Gerry van Klinken34
Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV, Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast 
Asian and Caribbean Studies) in Leiden in 2003, Isa was usually quiet in 
company. But when the ice was broken he could laugh, loudly. When he 
spoke about Aceh there was fire in his voice. That fire also lit up his scholar-
ship. Aceh deserves no less. 
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Local society and the dynamics of ethnicity

lorraine v. aragon
elite competition in Central Sulawesi
Maps and dreams
The post-1999 reorganization of Indonesia’s regional boundaries, literally 
termed ‘blossoming’ (pemekaran), is being done in the name of good govern-
ance, democratization, and regional autonomy.1 The use of this botanical 
term suggests a natural and organic unfolding of new parts, as the nation 
matures like a healthy plant. Yet the creation and financing of political units 
in Indonesia is anything but biologically natural. At least in some provinces, 
decentralization has less to do with good governance than revised incentives 
for seeking political rents from natural resources, which encourage the re-
drawing of administrative maps.2 This essay explores how rent seeking at the 
district level and social discrimination interacted with competitive elections 
and decentralization in Central Sulawesi. In the Poso District, elite competi-
tion turned to religious and then to ethnic identity politics when district 
executives encountered both the enrichment possibilities of decentralizing 
governance and the risks of newly competitive, more democratic, elections.
Several new districts have been formed in Central Sulawesi since 1999, 
and lobbying efforts now aim to create a new East Sulawesi Province.3 
There are many pedestrian issues for negotiation, such as which towns will 
become new capitals, which leaders from which groups will become district 
heads, and which people will receive new civil service jobs. Yet, the region’s 
decentralization has been coterminous with post-Soeharto collective violence. 
1  I wish to thank the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, a Research 
and Writing Grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Koninklijk 
Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV) Modern Indonesia program for research 
support and collegiality. For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Arianto 
Sangaji and Jacqueline Vel.
2  As used by economists, ‘rent-seeking’ describes how fees are garnered by state agents when 
governments stand in a monopoly position as contractual owners of public resources (Törnquist 
1990; R. Williams 1999).
3  We can contrast Central Sulawesi with provinces like Bali, where a long history of districts 
based on prior kingdoms with little internal ethnic diversity seems to have made the idea of 
pemekaran uninteresting.
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Ethnic constellations mobilized for religiously polarized violence largely 
overlap with groups increasingly separated by most new district plans. 
Thus, the 1999 regional autonomy laws constructed under President Habibie 
revamped local politics and accentuated religious and ethnic competition 
through administrative fragmentation and the intensified extraction of natu-
ral resources made accessible by new roads.
Central Sulawesi’s crony capitalism, violence between Muslim and 
Christian factions, and the push to redraw political boundaries are related. 
But their synergy is generated through multiple lines of local agency in con-
junction with periodic state agent support, rather than top-down state con-
trol.4 Although continuous with practices from the Soeharto era, corruption 
in Poso has in fact ‘blossomed’ under competitive elections, regional violence, 
and the potential for controlling local resources through pemekaran.5 These 
events stem from the ways transition economies in newly organized districts 
put public property ‘up for grabs’ to the marketplace, while elections evoke 
targeted patronage to insure the continued profits of public office. 
Many observers became disillusioned as promises of Indonesia’s pro-
democracy movement fizzled in the wake of faltering national leadership, 
economic crisis, regional violence, and bureaucratic corruption. In 2002 I 
spoke with a seasoned program director for an international NGO in Jakarta. 
Although more optimistic than many, he commented that the equal opportu-
nity dream of Indonesia’s Reformasi movement was now mainly a reality of 
‘equal opportunity buying’. Power over public resources and legal processes 
merely had shifted from the Soeharto regime into the hands of other wealthy 
people who could buy a piece of the decentralizing political economy system. 
In some regions, though, the same sums of money could not always buy 
the same slice. In Central Sulawesi’s capital of Palu, job seekers quoted dif-
ferent sums required for access to entry-level jobs. There was a low amount 
asked from those with relatives or ethnic cohorts already working in local 
government and a much higher amount requested from people with no 
strings to pull. In September 2003, non-insiders were asked to guarantee 20 
million rupiah (almost US$ 2,000) at civil service testing time when applying 
for a junior post. A 50% down payment was made to the department head 
(kepala dinas) before selections were announced. If lobbying for a paying client 
4  This ‘decentralized articulation’ argument and background on the first years of the Poso 
conflict can be found in Aragon 2001. For ensuing events, see Human Rights Watch 2002; ICG 
2004; George Junus Aditjondro 2003, 2004a; Aragon 2005; S. Sinansari Ecip, Darwis Waru, and 
Alip Yog Kunandar 2002; or Tahmidy Lasahido 2003.
5  To avoid misunderstanding, my thesis does not therefore recommend a return to central-
ized military control and rigged elections as seen under Soeharto, but rather for legal checks, 
community institutions, and press monitoring that better safeguard public funds and resources. 
See Jenkins and Goetz 1999.
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was overruled at the district secretary’s office, the payment was not refunded. 
The loser only received assurances of lobbying the following year.
This was not equal opportunity buying, I concluded. It was un-equal 
opportunity buying. The bureaucracy was corrupt in both social and finan-
cial aspects.6 This matches many political patronage patterns worldwide, 
as well as Indonesia’s local markets, where stores offering fixed prices are 
recent phenomena, which strangely displace personal negotiations over 
social difference and the local value of goods. Michele Ford (2003) describes 
a Batak man in Riau forced to pay higher prices for kerosene because of his 
non-Muslim, non-Malay identity. In that case, the Batak was considered an 
outsider to the majority population. Perhaps Muslim Malay migrants have 
similar problems near Lake Toba. Yet even people who consider themselves 
‘indigenous’ encounter such problems in many Indonesian regions. The poli-
tics of discrimination is something that local politicians, both native sons and 
migrants, understand well and manipulate to organize patronage alliances, 
now linked to voting.
Given the history of shifting populations and privileges in Poso, corrup-
tion at the district level came to operate according to ethno-religious alliances 
as well as material incentives. This claim challenges economic approaches to 
corruption that assume the income-maximizing behaviour of individuals in 
all cases. Rather, the Central Sulawesi case entails non-market or parochial 
corruption based on personal ties (Scott 1972:88-9). Such corruption often 
involves material risk because it is ‘socially conditioned and sustained by 
complex and enduring social networks’, rather than following an omnis-
cient and maximizing economic model with short-term goals (R. Williams 
1999:508). For example, if a bureaucrat helps a member of his ethnic commu-
nity to gain a job, he may or may not receive a direct economic benefit from 
that action. To give an example relevant for Poso, a bureaucrat may misuse 
his position to facilitate a militia killing for either material or non-material 
motives. These include monetary gain, revenge – if his family was harmed 
– or ideological reasons if he thinks in ethnic or religious conspiracy terms. 
This approach to corruption probes a wider cultural view of the ‘private gain’ 
aspect of the ‘misuse of public office’.
One native Central Sulawesi family who had sacrificed heavily for their 
children’s college degrees found that good performance on civil service 
exams could not outweigh the deficiencies of their minority status and 
6  Corruption is defined briefly as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ (Robertson-
Snape 1999:589). This Weberian type of definition has been critiqued for assuming too clean a line 
between public and private spheres, or too monolithic a public assessment of ‘misuse of office’. 
Yet, a legal-focused definition serves here better than economic ones, which introduce positivist 
‘rational choice’ biases I wish to avoid. See also R. Williams 1999 and Scott 1972.
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shallow pockets. The educated children were unable to find government or 
private jobs in their fields. The one who graduated with a promising spe-
cialized agriculture degree eventually migrated to another island to assume 
unskilled work through the family’s church organization. Some income was 
better than nothing, the family decided. The older child, with a law degree, 
stayed home to help her mother with housework. When I asked this bright 
young woman in 2003 whether there were any possibilities for her to use her 
university training and bring home a salary for her family, her answer was 
simple. If one of the newly proposed districts were authorized, a requisite set 
of civil servants would be needed. She was waiting for her chance to apply. 
Her dreams depended upon new maps. 
The example of ‘unequal opportunity buying’ warrants expanded theories 
of ‘non-market corruption’, and illustrates how urban ethnic groups on the 
losing end of ‘unequal buying’ still hope for the benefits of a ‘trickle-down’ 
effect when bureaucratic jobs are created for new districts. They thus often 
support plans to split up districts conceived to benefit particular religious or 
ethnic groups. Both the elite plans and broader popular support are based 
in competitive rather than cooperative views of citizenship. The resulting 
‘transaction costs’ (Bakker and Schulte Nordholt 1996) are rarely figured into 
analyses of decentralization or corruption at the policy level. 
Partition of existing districts to create new, smaller ones requires lobby-
ing in Jakarta, regional support, and sufficient local resources to make a new 
bureaucracy potentially self-supporting. Sponsors of pemekaran are motivat-
ed to control future capital from Jakarta, bureaucratic positions, and natural 
resource profits. Jakarta and regional politicians will share much of that 
income, along with business and military associates who protect them. What 
Jakarta or provincial officials seek in return for backing new districts and 
their would-be leaders are kickbacks (often termed ‘tribute’, upeti; or ‘allot-
ment’, ‘bribe’, jatah), business cooperation, and political constituencies who 
can be counted on in the next election. Competitive elections and uncensored 
requests for greater public control over policies are the kernels of democracy 
nestled within patrimonial administrations now managed by the regions’ so-
called ‘little kings’ (raja kecil). These newly empowered district heads (bupati), 
shift more of the authoritarian structure anchored in cronyism from Jakarta 
to the districts (H. Schulte Nordholt 2003; Hadiz 2003a). This ‘elite capture’ 
process is perhaps less a matter of what Michael Mann (2005) terms ‘the dark 
side of democracy’ than Indonesia’s lingering ‘dark side of autocracy’.7 
My discussion below targets four main issues. First, I discuss the rise and 
transformations of some ethno-religious groups seeking to control the Poso 
7  I thank Gerry van Klinken for suggesting this comparison. This is also akin to what Charles 
Tilly (2003:43) calls the ‘zone of fragmented tyranny’.
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District.8 Ethnic identities, consolidated through Dutch influences and pub-
licly fossilized during the New Order, moved in flux with political opportuni-
ties linked to the global market, regional bureaucracy, and informal economy. 
These ethno-religious constellations also developed historically in conjunc-
tion with colonial and post-colonial visions of ‘indigenous’ versus ‘migrant’ 
statuses. The situation in Poso thus emerged differently from what Rita Smith 
Kipp (1993) described for the Karo region of North Sumatra, where religious 
and ethnic identities became increasingly dissociated during the New Order. 
Second, I describe how the Soeharto family’s precedent of korupsi, kolusi, 
dan nepotisme (KKN, corruption, collusion, and nepotism) was realized in 
Poso. Whereas most literature on crony capitalism in Southeast Asia focuses 
on macro-economic structures and national elites,9 the focus here is on dis-
trict heads, their business links, and popular reactions to their activities. The 
Poso District illustrates how government institutions and illegal practices can 
construct each other to benefit incumbents who become inspired to main-
tain power at any social price. The Poso regimes echo the way Soeharto’s 
illicit practices were sheltered under the kinship metaphor of ‘Daddy-ism’ 
(Bapakism), where a good father provides well for his family (Saya Shiraishi 
1997). The most successful Poso political leaders of the late New Order were 
Sulawesi Muslims who claimed both ‘native’ ethnic and Muhammadiyah 
credentials as patronage shields for their profiteering activities.
Third, I document how Poso’s violence became a catalyst for regime 
change at the district level from an ethnic Tojo network to a Bungku network. 
The two district heads’ ethnic origins, Tojo and Bungku, can be traced back to 
pre-colonial entrepôt polities (Atkinson 1989; Velthoen 1997), setting an his-
toric precedent for the emergence of ‘little kingdoms’ under decentralization. 
Historically, the political economy of such ‘statelets’ is characterized as inher-
ently unstable, being based on competitive ‘trading and raiding’. Indeed, the 
initial solidarity of the winning Bungku administration gives way to resent-
ments about ‘Bungkuism’ from other Muslim ethnic groups. The district’s cor-
ruption eventually moves beyond the routine siphoning of funds designated 
for government services into the less accepted misuse of humanitarian funds 
intended for Poso conflict survivors. Post-violence military deployments pro-
vide additional business opportunities for incumbents. 
Fourth, I examine how successful district heads pursue pemekaran to 
counteract transfers of power at the end of their terms. Ethno-religious and 
8  The term ‘ethno-religious’ indicates where ethnic and religious identities usually over-
lap and are not readily disentangled with respect to most local perceptions or inter-actional 
behaviour. Examples, which will be elaborated below, include Protestant Pamona and Muslim 
Bungku.









































Map 2. Central Sulawesi (1)
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political debates surround the newly formed Morowali and Tojo Una-Una 
districts, as well as proposals for an East Sulawesi Province. It is through the 
realization of these ‘models for’ new districts and provinces that ambitious 
groups and leaders hope to prosper through natural resource extraction 
businesses. By contrast, Protestant minorities propose new districts in their 
homeland areas with little chance of authorization.
With increased migration during the Soeharto regime, Central Sulawesi’s 
population gradually became less rural and more linked to ‘de-territorial-
ized’ religious and ethnic networks based in major population areas. When 
Jakarta placed an outsider Christian governor and district head in charge 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, coastal urban Muslims saw themselves 
as repressed ‘native sons’ (putra daerah). By the late 1990s, however, national 
politics had shifted in their favour. Politicians with Golkar and ICMI backing 
built family-based patronage constituencies along nationally supported lines 
of Muslim identity politics.10 Because national migration incentives led to a 
demographic Muslim majority in Poso, Muslim politicians strategically sought 
votes in 1998 by appealing to religious competition. Subsequent violence re-
territorialized and separated different ethno-religious groups within the Poso 
District, as Protestants fled to the highlands centred in the mission town of 
Tentena while Muslims fled to the coasts, centred in Poso City. Seeing oppor-
tunity in the regional autonomy laws, Muslim politicians then lobbied for new 
districts to govern when their terms expired, offering to bring government jobs 
and development business to their ethnic constituencies. Thus far, newly cre-
ated districts such as Morowali (centred on ethnic Bungku) and Tojo Una-Una 
(centred on ethnic Tojo), and plans for an East Sulawesi province have led to 
demonstrations and wrangling rather than eased regional tensions.11
Emerging ethnic and religious constellations in Poso
Layers of individuals’ multiple social identities – including sex, community, 
ethnicity, religion, or class – become more firmly envisioned when govern-
mentally sanctioned or privileged by local economies. Indonesia’s decen-
tralization process introduced newly selective opportunities for some ethnic 
groups although their ascendance and 1998 mobilization is better under-
10  ICMI stands for Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, or Indonesian Association of 
Muslim Intellectuals. See Hefner 1993. Golkar was the professional organization to which all 
civil servants automatically belonged, but it functioned as a privileged corporatist political party 
under Soeharto’s rule.
11  Violent conflict also occurred in September 2003, October 2004, and April 2005 during a 
process of pemekaran in the new province of West Sulawesi when some Muslims contested the 
inclusion of their villages within Protestant majority districts; see ICG 2005. 
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stood in the light of a longer history. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
most Central Sulawesi inhabitants followed local cosmological traditions and 
there was little demand for purity from the few migrants professing foreign 
religions. Most native groups’ identities were based on known kinship ties 
and related claims to ancestral land (Aragon 2000). It was only the arrival 
of migrants, world religions, and state population controls that cultivated 
formal ‘ethnic’ categories, which colonial officers based partly on religious 
conversions. The results of these state and religious pressures were natural-
ized as the ethnic categories listed in government reports, and the religions 
listed on Indonesian identity cards.
Dutch colonial categories of indigenous ‘native’ and foreign ‘settler’ also 
became grafted onto religious and ethnic identities in post-colonial Indonesia, 
much as Belgian ones became grafted onto racial identities in central Africa.12 
Although the Dutch colonial regime created and favoured native Protestants 
in eastern Indonesia, both domestic migration and Muslims’ political power 
increased during the late Soeharto regime. Competing views about the rela-
tive legitimacy of migrants and natives often split along Muslim-Christian 
lines, increasingly supported through distant religious networks. As com-
petition over land and business increased in Poso, the interpretive framing 
of economic problems shifted from local frustration to broader religious 
agendas. The native versus migrant overlap with Christian versus Muslim 
populations was accentuated before and during the collective violence in 
Poso, Ambon and North Maluku. Once violence was perpetrated along reli-
gious lines, police and army troops as well as under-employed young men 
were drawn to participate in violent acts framed as ‘religious community 
defence’.
Dutch colonial officials introduced Protestantism as the true faith suit-
able for interior Sulawesi natives who had not been swayed by the foreign 
Muslim practices of early migrant Arabs or Malays. By contrast, the mixed 
coastal Sulawesi groups who adopted Islam argued that they were native 
Muslim ‘sons of the soil’, free to move anywhere along their trade networks 
in the archipelago, while Protestants were allied with foreign Western reli-
gion and imperial masters. Both rationales for religious nativism can be 
constructed by selecting among historical data concerning migration and 
religion in the Indonesian Archipelago. Therefore, rather than one set of 
‘victims’ turning into ‘killers´, as in the Rwandan case, both Indonesian 
12  Mamdani 2001a, 2001b. I use the terms ‘native’ and ‘indigenous’ here recognizing that 
they are constructed, fluid, and contested political categories. Both connote such varied ideas 
as: ‘original people’ (orang asli), ‘sons of the soil’ (pribumi), current residents, newly contacted 
isolated groups, and descendants of local people described in the first European records who 
have no other known origin.
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Muslims and Christians had grounds to see themselves as victims, and they 
took revenge upon each other during various phases of the Poso and Maluku 
conflicts. When these conflicts escalated, moreover, they did so because the 
attacked were able to attract financing, weapons, military agent support, or 
militia personnel from migrant and trans-national religious networks who 
saw these local conflicts in grander national or universal religious terms (see 
Aragon 2005).
As Central Sulawesi’s narrow coastline rises sharply to interior mountains, 
Muslim traders initially remained within a few kilometres from shore (Adriani 
and Kruyt 1950, II). Other than Chinese traders, pre-colonial migrants to 
Central Sulawesi were mostly Muslims, and many intermarried with native 
women. Indigenous coastal groups in the Poso area who became Muslim 
include Tojo, Bungku, and Togian. Muslim migrants include Gorontalo, 
Bugis, Makassar, Mandar, Kaili, and Javanese people. Earlier migrants formed 
an elite business class in Poso City, while later migrants more often assumed 
roles as labourers. After New Order bureaucratic reforms of the 1970s, out-
sider Muslims, usually Javanese, Gorontalo, or Bugis, were installed as civil 
servants. During the past decades, especially as the Trans-Sulawesi ‘highway’ 
was cut through Poso during the 1980s, large numbers of South Sulawesi 
migrant farmers entered the interior in search of land for cash cropping.
Sulawesi highlanders, viewed by earlier Europeans as ‘pagans’ eligible for 
Protestant conversion, were sorted by language and then lumped together 
by colonial authors as various kinds of ‘Toradja’.13 Ethnic identities that 
emerged during the colonial period in the Poso region include the mostly 
Protestant Pamona, Mori, Napu, Besoa, and Bada. Other Protestant converts, 
including Minahasa from North Sulawesi and Sa’dan Toraja from South 
Sulawesi, were sent to the area as preachers and teachers. Until the end of 
the New Order when migration shifted the demographic balance in Muslims’ 
favour, Protestant Pamona communities maintained significant political rep-
resentation in the Poso District.
Most Poso District residents either are Muslim, the unmarked national 
majority category, or Protestant, the unmarked highland category. But a 
small percentage of migrants are Catholic, Hindu, or Buddhist. Either a com-
mon religion or length of residence in a particular area can be invoked to 
minimize interpersonal differences based on the other criterion. Protestant 
Pamona and Muslim Tojo speak virtually the same language and may con-
sider themselves more alike than do Muslim Tojo and Bugis (or Javanese) 
migrants. By contrast, self-consciously Muslim Tojo may consider any of 
their fellow Muslims as more like them than any non-Muslims.
Indigenous versus migrant statuses in Sulawesi are relative categories that 
13  Adriani and Kruyt 1950; Aragon 2000; Kaudern 1925; Kruyt 1938.
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can elide both time and space, meaning the duration of present residence and 
its distance from an original homeland. In reality, the families of some Arab 
or Malay Muslim migrants became earlier Poso City residents than some 
migrant families from Protestant highland areas. Moreover, descendants of 
‘original’ groups living near the coast became Muslim through conversion or 
marriage to early Muslim traders, especially Bugis who elevated this integra-
tion strategy to a fine art. Struggles for control over resources among these 
earlier and later populations, whose ethnic identities were entangled with 
religious affiliations, animated the Poso conflict yet their ideological divi-
sions initially were more messy than Messianic.
During the past ten years, most anthropologists have focused on the con-
structed, political, or contextual aspects of ethnicity.14 Indonesianist scholars 
rejected ‘primordialist’ or essentialist notions of ethnicity, the monolithic 
stereotypical views that were drawn from colonial ethnography and later rei-
fied by the New Order government in its cultural programs. What appeared 
in their place, especially following John Pemberton’s book (1994) on ‘Java’, 
was a view of ethnicity as artificially constructed by the discourse of state 
power apparatuses. For Central Sulawesi, Albert Schrauwers (2000) makes 
this argument about the Pamona, who are a post-colonial amalgam of scat-
tered pre-colonial highland communities around Lake Poso. 
Yet new ‘opportunity structures’ have contoured more ethnic changes 
from the late New Order to the present. For example, the Javanese generally 
do not pursue migration, but the Soeharto regime brought them to Central 
Sulawesi in significant numbers, first in the capacity of trans-migrants to 
open wet rice fields, and second as Jakarta-appointed civil servants.15 In the 
first case with insufficient resources to stay at home, they had little choice but 
to become ‘Sulawesi people’. In the second case, Central Sulawesi was con-
sidered a hardship post. Some department heads in the 1980s routinely asked 
for bribes in the form of round-trip airline tickets to Java. These bureaucrats 
remained firmly ‘Javanese’, scorning Central Sulawesi and its natives. But 
their children are different. The grown daughter of an army officer stationed 
in Poso could not speak Javanese and had rarely been to Java. She called 
herself a Poso person (To Poso), speaking only Indonesian with friends 
who included Muhammadiyah Muslims from Tojo, Gorontalo, and South 
Sulawesi, as well as some Protestant Pamona.16 These varied migrants are not 
the kind of Javanese that either Geertz (1979) or Pemberton (1994) described. 
14  An excellent dissertation discussing ‘messy’ and changing identities in Luwu, Sulawesi is 
Roth (2003).
15  Some Central Sulawesi people, both Muslims and Christians, have interpreted transmigra-
tion (transmigrasi) as ‘Javanization’ (Javanisasi). Roth (2003) observes this also in South Sulawesi.
16  K. Robinson (2000) also notes that many poor Javanese women have emigrated to become 
domestic servants in the Middle East, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.
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The national and global economies have had novel effects on their class-
stratified cultural patterns and ethnic consciousness. 
Bugis migration patterns had an even greater effect upon Poso. Bugis are 
renown for their cultural inclination to rantau: to seek their fortune through 
migration in order to return with capital, buy land, and raise their status at 
home. But in Central Sulawesi, as in other regions, many Bugis migrants have 
little interest in returning ‘home’. Political disturbances in South Sulawesi, 
land shortages, ascribed status restrictions, and under-employment inspired 
many to emigrate. Ample opportunities awaiting Bugis in Central Sulawesi 
have included development projects desiring migrant labour, unplanted 
forests (often long-term fallow swiddens), and some government officials 
willing to sell customary village land (tanah adat) or conservation lands.17
Another pathway opened for South Sulawesi migrants from conjunctures 
in the global economy, ecology of cacao, and the unevenness of Sulawesi’s 
regional development. When the price of cacao (coklat) rose dramatically in 
the 1990s, South Sulawesi farmers already were familiar with its cultivation 
from government outreach programs, or earlier technology transfers from 
Sabah. Most Central Sulawesi farmers, by contrast, were not yet familiar with 
cacao horticulture. The Indonesian monetary crisis (Krismon) made cacao 
cropping for export more profitable than wage work or subsistence farming. 
Suddenly, local people who quietly had sold or otherwise lost access to their 
ancestral land through various development processes wanted that land 
back, and resented the many new migrants who had profited in their stead. 
Yet, what looks to some like Bugis or general migrant aggression and 
greed for land appears to others as admirably industrious, government-sup-
ported entrepreneurship in the nation’s booming agricultural export sector. 
Javanese became less uniformly ‘home bodies’ under New Order politics, 
transmigration, and global economy shifts. Bugis too, following new roads 
and economic frontiers, often migrated voluntarily on a permanent basis. 
Both these Diaspora populations retained strong ethnic constituencies ‘at 
home’ willing to lobby for, and defend them during post-Soeharto violent 
conflicts (K. Robinson 2002).
By contrast, Pamona (‘Bare’e speakers’) were subsistence rice farmers 
when the Netherlands Indies government began tinkering with their socie-
ties after 1905. The Dutch mission provided some of them education and 
opportunities for ministry or local civil service, but not for entrepreneur-
ship, which remained in the hands of Chinese and Arab-Malay populations. 
‘Bare’e speakers’ living in the coastal area of Tojo, east of Poso City, formerly 
17  Aragon 2002. As Acciaioli 2004 notes, Bugis cultural motivations to migrate are not strictly 
economic, but are contextualized within a broader set of behavioural and cosmological values. 
Those important nuances, however, are beyond the range of the arguments made here.
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also were labelled Pamona, but they intermarried with incoming Bugis and 
Gorontalo settlers and generally converted to Islam. By the 1990s, most 
eschewed the ethnic label ‘Pamona’ for its Protestant connotation and began 
to consciously identify themselves as Tojo.18 Tojo, Bungku, Gorontalo, and 
Bugis ethnic associations in many major towns suggest a new, multi-sited 
ethnic consciousness born from local expansions of political opportunity. 
Muslim leaders were at the vanguard of anti-colonial movements, and 
they see their entrepreneurship as responsible for Central Sulawesi’s recent 
development. As part of Indonesia’s Muslim majority and, by the 1990s, a 
demographic majority in the Poso District itself, they argue that they are enti-
tled to dwell anywhere in the district and control its political and business 
fortunes.19 This last scenario in fact existed when violence in the Poso District 
began and the political families described below took power. During the 
1980s and 1990s there was an addition of roughly 90,000 trans-migrants from 
Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara, and a perhaps equal number of voluntary 
migrants, mostly Muslim Bugis, Makassar, and Mandar people from South 
Sulawesi. By 1998, over 60% of the Poso District’s roughly 350,000 residents 
were registered as Muslim while less than 36% were recorded as Protestant 
(Arianto Sangaji 2003:13).
Thus, many factors besides bureaucratic corruption, including ethnic 
inequities, migration patterns, land alienation, changes in global markets for 
cash crops, religious proselytizing, and partisan media narratives played sig-
nificant roles in fostering communal distrust in eastern Indonesian regions 
such as Poso (Aragon 2001, 2005). Resentments about past inequities were 
cultivated during the competitive 1999 election campaigns. With Golkar’s 
success no longer automatic, candidates needed to attract both wealthy 
sponsors and the electoral action of the masses. Playing the cards of religious 
identity politics among sensitive ethnic constituencies brought predictable 
votes, but also uncontrollable violence.
18  In 2004 I tracked archival documentation of this identity shift in the Central Sulawesi 
Museum. A wall map of ‘Ethnic groups of Central Sulawesi’, which was installed in the mid-
1980s, includes only Pamona, Lore, Mori, and Bungku groups in the Poso region. The ethnic 
area now called Tojo is still identified under the Pamona label. The Bugis, Gorontalo, Javanese, 
Minahasa, and other migrants – now powerful residents of the region – do not appear on the 
map, which thereby erases the political and cultural realities of the province.
19  Mindanao is a useful comparative case because it offers a mirror image to Poso’s ethnic, 
nativity, and national political religious dynamics. In the Christian-majority Philippines, minor-
ity Muslims identified as native to Mindanao described to me how they resent being demo-
graphically overrun by Christian migrants seeking fertile land. By contrast, Christians told me 
that migrants should not be blamed because the land formerly was ‘wasted’ by Muslim groups 
who live by trade rather than ‘more productive’ farming.
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Family affairs: Tojo ascendance
George Junus Aditjondro (2003, 2004a) and his Central Sulawesi NGO activ-
ist collaborators, including Harley (2004) and Arianto Sangaji (2003), suggest 
that violence was intentionally provoked by incumbent Poso District leaders 
to mask and facilitate their corrupt governmental practices. These pro-reform 
investigators have done significant research into the less savoury aspects of 
Sulawesi politicians’ financial activities. Yet, district corruption in Indonesia 
was not confined to those areas succumbing to collective violence. If patrimo-
nial politics and ‘rent capitalism’ had been a sufficient condition to precipi-
tate post-Soeharto conflicts, most Indonesian districts would have followed 
the known cases.20 They did not. Rather, additional circumstances affecting 
group relations were required to promote violence. Such caveats aside, the 
politics of institutional corruption was integral to the Poso conflict’s emer-
gence as well as its perpetuation. 
Poso district heads’ bribery and nepotism practices, from the Soeharto 
to the post-Soeharto era, evince more continuity than radical change. The 
district head (bupati) for ten years before the Poso conflict governed for the 
maximum two terms (1989-1994, 1994-1999). Born in Poso City during the 
Japanese occupation, he identifies as ethnically Tojo. Tojo names the site of a 
colonial era Muslim kingdom (Atkinson 1989; Kruyt 1930), and now a coastal 
area east of Poso City influenced by Bugis and Gorontalo migrants. Tojo and 
Pamona dialects are nearly identical (Noorduyn 1991) although, in the past 
twenty years, the categories have diverged as ethnic identities, distinguished 
by coastal versus interior locations and respective conversions to Islam and 
Protestantism. 
The Tojo district head affiliated with the second largest Indonesian Muslim 
organization, Muhammadiyah, known for its relatively strict, modernist 
stance. He developed his career as an enthusiastic Golkar activist beginning 
in the early 1970s, part of the ‘native sons’ Muslim response to Christian 
bureaucratic dominance in the province. By the late 1980s he had consolidat-
ed authority among his fellow Tojo and also among Poso’s Muslim migrant 
communities by becoming head (ketua) of the Poso District branch of the 
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). He thereby became a 
leader of both Poso City’s ‘old’ migrant labourer community from Gorontalo, 
as well as ‘newer’ Muslim migrants from Java and South Sulawesi. 
The former district head’s triple affiliation with ICMI, Muhammadiyah, 
20  In an eye-catching comparative example of judicial exposé, virtually the entire West 
Sumatran Legislative Council (DPRD) was convicted in court in Padang, a relatively conflict-free 
area, of embezzling Rp 6.4 billion (US$ 711,111) from the 2002 provincial budget (Jakarta Post 18-
5-2004). 
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and Golkar, all favoured by Soeharto’s last vice-president and successor B.J. 
Habibie, was a winning political package for the late 1980s and 1990s.21 This 
trend among ambitious civil servants embodied a modernist Muslim politi-
cal ascension, despite the fact that, historically, party politics in Indonesia 
have been linked more to the favoured deliverance of resources than to 
strong commitments on debatable ideological issues (H. Schulte Nordholt 
2003). But perhaps it is exactly this added declaration of pious ‘purity’ to 
what had been the more oecumenical attraction of pay-offs through affilia-
tion with the previously nationalist Golkar party that is a novel element in 
the religiously polarized conflicts of post-Soeharto Indonesia. Golkar itself 
became factionalized with the Habibie wing of Golkar becoming allied to the 
Muslim United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; 
Malley 1999; O’Rourke 2002:344). This national factionalization of Golkar 
affected Sulawesi’s district politics in 1998 as well. 
Prior to the Poso violence, or even the success of the ‘triple affiliation 
package’, corruption was firmly entrenched in Central Sulawesi’s bureauc-
racy among both Protestant and Muslim civil servants. In the 1980s, Soeharto 
and his family presented a model of personal enrichment followed through 
the governorship to the district level (George Junus Aditjondro 2003:xxviii). 
To win his first district headship in 1989, the Tojo candidate reportedly paid 
the Central Sulawesi governor 250 million rupiah to secure the appointment 
(Harley 2004). To win a second term, he reportedly paid 350 million rupiah 
to the same governor, plus bribes to the staff of the Minister of the Interior, 
who would finalize the selection, and to members of the district parliament 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I, DPRD I), who needed to support his 
nomination to the governor. Why was winning the district head position 
worth so much?
Upon assuming his post, the district head assigned his wife to represent 
all other district civil servants (wakil sekretaris Korpri Kabupaten Poso). Then 
she was promoted to be head of all the district’s civil servants (kepala bagian 
pegawaian), and put in charge of hiring, promotion, and firing decisions. In 
that capacity, she could receive bribes from those who sought profitable 
bureaucratic positions.
Another member of the wife’s family was given the contract to produce 
Poso District residency or identity cards (KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk). 
21  In the 1990s, Arabs of Hadramaut origin claiming descent from the Prophet became increas-
ingly influential in high government circles (Mona Abasa 2004). Residing in Yemeni quarters of 
Jakarta, they made business connections with President Soeharto, Vice President Habibie, and 
the ‘Green’ or pro-Muslim army generals. Habibie’s preference for Harmoko to lead Golkar 
reflected the increasingly pro-Muslim activism of Golkar (see Hefner 2000). Although the idea 
behind ICMI was to create a ‘think tank’ to rival earlier Christian-led ones, ICMI branches in 
provinces such as Sulawesi were more pro-Muslim political organizations.
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Beyond the routine monitoring of new migrants to the district, citizens’ 
identity cards, which mark name, village, and religion (but not ethnicity) 
played two important roles in the Poso violence. First, they were inspected 
by vigilante groups ‘sweeping’ vehicles and neighbourhood roads for 
religious enemies. Second, many new identity cards became needed after 
the 2001 Malino ceasefire accord. Members of militias, displaced persons, 
or undocumented migrants then sought legitimate residency in certain 
villages, either for safety, or in pursuit of land or humanitarian aid allot-
ments. 
The district head’s younger brother was hired as director of district public 
construction (kepala bagian pembangunan), and assigned to build modernist 
Muslim junior high schools (madrasah tsanawiyah).22 Other family members 
were invited to take lucrative contracts for district projects such as building 
roads. Civil servants or police who did not cooperate with this nepotism 
program were transferred or demoted. Most simply took the perquisites 
offered.
The district head’s administration worked with some non-kin business 
cronies who were awarded construction projects known by the percentage of 
their kickbacks as 10 percent or 20 percent projects (George Junus Aditjondro 
2003:xxxiii; Harley 2004). Some of these partners were from the older Chinese 
or Arab elite of Poso. Others were members of the provincial or district 
parliaments. These politicians often sold the building contracts onward to 
subcontractors. Equipment from the district’s Public Works Department was 
provided or sold to preferred contractors. As a result, many district roads, 
bridges, and clean water projects were not built, or else were built poorly 
with diluted cement or inferior materials. 
I had observed such badly built, corruption-related infrastructure in 
Central Sulawesi since the mid-1980s. Most urban residents were aware of 
these ‘transaction costs’ for local projects although they might not know the 
exact details or extent of mismanagement. Such activities were characterized 
as ‘not good’ (tidak baik), but they also were accepted as ‘business as usual’ 
(bisnis biasa saja). The national model for this kind of contract shorting was 
early set and symbolized by Soeharto’s wife, Ibu Tien, widely known as ‘Ibu 
Tien Persen’ (Mrs Ten Percent), or sometimes even Ibu Lima Puluh Persen 
(Mrs Fifty Percent).23 
The most unseemly money diversion exposed during the early Poso con-
22  That brother later was convicted of creating leaflets that slandered his father’s Protestant 
rivals in 1998.
23  President Megawati’s corruption was mocked with the name ‘Ibu Mega Persen’ (Mrs 
Gigantic Percent), while Soeharto’s grown children and business partners only multiplied the 
excesses.
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flict was the district head’s mismanagement of the Kredit Usaha Tani (KUT, 
Farmer’s Credit Program). Although the ostensible aim of the loan program 
was to help farmers cope with seasonally high planting costs, the district 
head used the funds from Jakarta to pay his political supporters. Many sup-
porters were lobbied through the Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR, Islamic People’s 
Sovereignty Party) to support the 1999 presidential bid of Adi Sasono, one of 
President Habibie’s ministers. Organized into regional Muslim NGO groups 
that were supposed to administer the farmers’ loan funds, these supporters 
were supervised by district head partners who also took cuts of the money 
(George Junus Aditjondro 2003:xxx-xxxi). Moreover, the lists of needy farm-
ers reportedly were padded by names of fictitious farmers. 
An ethnic Minahasan PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) member of the district parliament 
was murdered in 2000 as he began to expose the KUT fund improprieties. 
When the Javanese police chief in Poso investigated the case, his transfer 
from the area was demanded by a group of the district head’s partners 
(Aragon 2001:65). By that point, the ethnic Tojo district head had stepped 
down, his brother was implicated in the 1998 Poso violence, and the ethnic 
balance of power shifted from Tojo to Bungku rule.24
Bungku ascendance and limits to corruption
As the 1999 elections approached, the ethnic Tojo head of Poso District was 
reaching the end of his two-term limit. The first phase of Poso violence 
occurred during the campaign, where his second in command, a Protestant 
Tojo Golkar candidate, competed with his preferred successor, a Muslim 
party (PPP) Una-Una candidate. The Protestant had been selected as district 
secretary (sekwilda) by the prior governor in order to train him to become 
the next district head. A slanderous leaflet that accused the district secretary 
and one of his Protestant Pamona sponsors of planning to kill the incumbent 
district head was circulating when the first Poso street fight began on 24 
December, 1998. The Pamona associate was an ebony business competitor 
and political rival of several of the district head’s supporters. The handwrit-
ing on the leaflet, which led to demands that both Protestants be hanged, was 
traced to the district head’s brother. Reportedly, the leaflet was planned at a 
meeting convened by the incumbent, which included his business associates 
24  When the Farmer’s Credit Program was investigated thoroughly, it was discovered the 
loans were in arrears by 5.7 billion rupiah (George Junus Aditjondro 2003:xxxv). One of the pros-
ecuted killers of the parliament member was freed while another received four years in prison (S. 
Sinansari Ecip, Darwis Waru and Alip Yog Kunandar 2002).
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and a Poso District Ministry of Religion official.25
The leaflet’s accusations, the fighting between Muslim and Protestant fac-
tions associated with the candidates, and investigation of the brother’s leaflet 
tarnished the reputations of the ethnic Tojo incumbent and the top two can-
didates. After the 1999 elections, when Habibie’s Golkar machine fared better 
in Sulawesi than in Java, the governor eliminated both top contenders from 
the nomination list.26 As George Junus Aditjondro (2004a) has calculated, 
the retiring district head and his family moved quickly and comfortably to 
Yogyakarta with luxury automobiles and trillions of rupiah in visible hold-
ings, while Poso was abandoned to a state of escalating violence.
The remaining candidates then made payments to parliamentarians who 
would select the new Poso district head. By late October 1999, well-compen-
sated members of the Golkar party chose, and the governor installed, a new 
district head. Reports claim he paid 5 million rupiah in advance, and prom-
ised 35 million rupiah to each parliamentary supporter (Rinaldy Damanik 
2003:13; Surya 10-11-1999). Another long time Golkar activist, the new district 
head had been Assistant Rector at Tadulako University in Palu. Despite his 
outsider status in Poso, his candidacy was heavily supported in Palu through 
the Islamic Students Union (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), whose members 
sought positions as Poso department heads. He also received support from 
business contractors who had worked with the prior district head, based on 
his willingness to continue mutually profitable relationships. In fact, many 
members of the district parliament (DPRD) who chose the new district 
head owned businesses that received contracts from the district head office 
(Harley 2004).
The winning district head was from the coastal Bungku region, over 200 
kilometres southeast of Poso City. Muslim Bungku politicians, who were 
ICMI members and Golkar activists during the prior regime, then gained 
control of several key Poso District posts including deputy district head 
(wakil bupati), head of transmigration, and speaker of the DPRD. They also 
had lobbied successfully for a new Morowali District to be split off from 
the southeast of the Poso District. In fact, Morowali was one of the first new 
districts announced in September 1999 under Habibie’s Regional Autonomy 
Laws, suggesting the closeness of Muslim Bungku ties to the power centres 
of Jakarta. 
The Poso district head shift, along with Bungku success in governing 
25  George Junus Aditjondro 2004a. At a later stage the same official from the Department of 
Religion was instrumental in supporting the entrance of outside Muslim militias into Poso (ICG 
2004).
26 The Una-Una Muslim supported by the incumbent continued to mobilize supporters, how-
ever, and made a 2004 comeback as head of the new Tojo Una-Una District (see below).
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the new Morowali District, perturbed non-Bungku Muslims as well as 
Christians. Although several Bugis held important posts in the new govern-
ment, a Bugis sociologist based at Tadulako University in Palu described 
the new political trend in Poso as ‘Bungkuism’ (Sulaiman Mamar 2001:121). 
A Central Sulawesi joke claims that PBB (Persatuan Bangsa-Bangsa, United 
Nations) no longer stands for the United Nations, but instead for the United 
Bungku People (Persatuan Bungku-Bungku). 
This regional ascendance of Bungku people is not historically unprec-
edented, although Bungku’s glory dates back about 200 years. J. Vosmaer 
(1839) described the area as a fortified settlement and trading centre that 
operated independently from the Bugis and Makassar traders who sought 
sea slugs (tripang) collected by Bajo seafarers (Velthoen 1997; Velthoen and 
Acciaioli 1993). By the 1850s, however, Bugis involvement in the area led to a 
Bungku conflict with the Sultan of Ternate who destroyed the Bungku settle-
ment. Bugis merchants then gained political influence over eastern Sulawesi, 
including Bungku. In the early 1900s, the Netherlands Indies Government 
classified Bungku as a vassal of Ternate, then claimed it as a Dutch hold-
ing under administration from Makassar in 1908, and then from Manado in 
1924. Bungku was of little prominence during the twentieth century, until 
its untapped timber and other natural resources could be extracted via new 
roads built in the 1980s. Then Bungku leaders including the future district 
head became successful provincial politicians by networking through Golkar 
and the Islamic Students Union.
Although some observers of the Poso violence have spoken about pre-
conflict religious ‘power-sharing’ in district politics, most of the post-colonial 
district heads have been Muslims from coastal Sulawesi or from Java.27 The 
ethnic Bungku district head was championed by the new governor who was 
grateful for his help in mobilizing Golkar supporters during the 1999 cam-
paign. The governor also responded to pressure from Muslim Al-Chaira’at 
organization leaders in Palu to install an ethnic Arab in Poso’s district secre-
tary post.28 The Arab was a close associate of the prior district head of Poso, 
and one of his in-laws is a Saudi weapons parts manufacturer with business 
ties to Pindad, the government munitions factory whose products appeared 
27  What is noted accurately is that when past Poso district heads were Muslim, regional 
secretary or other executive offices often were given to Protestants to make for a more balanced 
district government than those beginning in 1989. See Suriadi Mappangara 2001 and Rinaldy 
Damanik 2003.
28  Al-Chaira’at (also transcribed Al-Khaira’at or Al-Khaerat), which runs a large and popular 
network of madrasah and other Muslim schools in eastern Indonesia, was begun by a mixed 
Bugis-Hadrami migrant, Al-Habib Sayyid Idrus ibn Salim al-Juffrie, who settled in Palu in 1930. 
Photographs of the founder are displayed in many Muslims’ homes, and the founder’s son 
directs the headquarters, which remains in Palu.
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in later phases of the Poso conflict.29
The new Poso district head kept past corruption unchallenged, while he 
installed his own relatives into profitable posts. His oldest child owns a build-
ing contract firm while a younger one uses leadership of the local Bungku 
ethnic association (Kerukunan Keluarga Bungku) to facilitate contracting 
operations in Poso (George Junus Aditjondro 2004a; Harley 2004). One of his 
children’s contracts was to renovate and expand the Poso district head’s office 
building, possibly in anticipation of it becoming their father’s governor’s 
office for the proposed new province of East Sulawesi. The district head also 
placed a first cousin to head the Welfare and Development office (Kesbang) 
of the Social Services Department (Dinas Sosial), one of the main channels for 
Poso conflict aid funds. A nephew headed the Transmigration Department. 
Contractor partners were appointed as directors of government divisions, 
such as education or transportation, where they awarded their own firms 
contracts to build new schools or roads. Some of these were chosen from 
non-Bungku groups, their allegiance to the administration insured by their 
comfortable placements.30 The ethnic Arab district secretary’s relatives also 
were put into key positions, making more funds available to lobby for a new 
Tojo Una-Una District where he hoped to become future district head.
The nepotism described above was business as usual in Central Sulawesi. 
What began to draw scorn to the new district head’s corruption was his 
willingness to allow embezzlement of humanitarian aid intended for vic-
tims of violence, even re-routing some to militias. For example, an in-law 
of the district secretary assigned to rebuild Poso’s ruined infrastructure was 
investigated in 2002 for selling aid supplies to finance his luxury house, and 
for giving two tons of ‘rice for the poor’ (beras miskin) to Laskar Jihad troops 
(George Junus Aditjondro 2004a; Harley 2004). 
In late July 2001, soon after the grisly and well-publicized killings of thir-
teen Muslim civilians at Buyung Katedo Village, Laskar Jihad sent a delega-
tion from Java to visit Palu and Poso. The delegation was publicly received 
by the governor, the Poso district head, Tadulako University professors, and 
by Muslim groups such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of 
Indonesian Muslim Leaders) and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia 
(DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic Appeals). According to an August 2001 
29  Sulawesi military officers said the use of Pindad weapons in Poso attacks entail no neces-
sary connection to strategic military involvement, implying that such weapons are sold routinely 
on the black market; not a comforting claim. Some Muslim web site messages also claim their 
proud use of smuggled army weapons in Poso.
30  As suggested by Syarif Hidayat (personal communication), certain types of corrupt clien-
telism such as contracting awards are driven strictly by mutual business interests (instead of eth-
nic or religious identity) in contrast to many bureaucratic positions, which have more significant 
political effects. 
Lorraine V. Aragon58
report in the Palu newspaper Mercusuar, the Laskar Jihad leaders asked to 
bring humanitarian aid to Poso Muslims harmed by the conflict, and to pro-
tect them from further attacks. They claimed reconciliation efforts were only 
weakening law officials’ attempts to control and prosecute Christian attackers 
(S. Sinansari Ecip, Darwis Waru and Alip Yog Kunandar 2002:35-6). 
Indeed, during May-July 2000, Poso Christian militias took revenge for 
previous episodes of violence by killing hundreds of Muslim migrants. Both 
the new district head and Poso’s head of the Department of Religion sup-
ported the plans of Laskar Jihad and other militias to supplement govern-
ment forces. Even then Minister for Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
voiced this perspective on television although, when the violence worsened 
with jihad groups’ participation in November 2001, he and Jusuf Kalla spear-
headed the Malino Accord mediation.
Few besides Protestant leaders publicly objected to politicians’ support for 
Muslim militias. Yet, the widespread aid corruption while sporadic violence 
continued sparked criticism from both Muslims and Christians. As much as 
two-thirds of the over 160 billion rupiah designated for post-Malino Accord 
humanitarian and recovery aid disappeared in the hands of government 
officials, never reaching the programs or disappointed persons for whom it 
was intended (Aragon 2004; Suara Pembaruan 24-2-2005).
Although the Indonesian verb proyekkan, referring to ‘the making of a 
government service program into a personally profitable business’, is not yet 
in the Echols and Shadily or Kamus Besar dictionaries, it is used frequently 
by both Muslims and Christians in Poso. They employ the term (usually in 
the passive form diproyekkan) to describe how rebuilt buildings are destroyed 
anew, false village census figures are used, and there is no transparency for 
aid funds. In fact, Poso businessmen well-entrenched in past corruption 
schemes often changed hats to become Malino Accord signatories, and so 
were placed into post-Malino fund distribution posts.
A powerful Bugis merchant involved in the Farmer’s Credit Program 
(KUT) scam, who also was a Muslim militia supporter in the district heads’ 
inner circle, was selected as a Malino Accord signatory, and then placed on 
the Malino Accord Task Force (Pokja Deklama), which administers gov-
ernment aid. Through that position, he received reconstruction contracts, 
including one for a new Mobil Police Brigade (Brimob) outpost west of Poso 
City. It was not the conflict of interest that angered Poso citizens, but the 
shamelessness of the extremely rich stealing from impoverished victims of 
violence even as they were aiding militias who caused more destruction. 
Many Poso Muslims and Christians say they no longer trust either their 
political or religious leaders because too many have joined the manipulation 
(ikut manipulasi) of Poso recovery funds.
One cynical joke about the misuse of Poso aid funds goes, ‘while refu-
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gees get Super Mie (instant noodles), bureaucrats get Super Kijang (cars)’ 
(Sementara pengungsi dapat Super Mie, pejabat dapat Super Kijang). Even Jusuf 
Kalla, formerly Megawati’s Minister for People’s Welfare, Malino Accord 
mediator, and Toyota tycoon was embarrassed to hear reports about the mis-
handling of aid. He visited Central Sulawesi in December 2003 and lectured 
officials about how they should not make the plight of Poso refugees into a 
field of personal profiteering. Kalla himself was involved in a dispute with 
President Wahid over who had profited from the Bulog scandal in early 2000 
(Tajuk 7 (25-5-2000); Van Dijk 2001:495, 518-20).
But generally, Kalla’s immense wealth as a businessman left most ordi-
nary Sulawesi people thinking that he had no need to steal welfare funds or 
take sides in any conflict that would interfere with his road-building projects 
or automobile sales.31
Another business arena linked to the ethnic Bungku district head’s regime 
and the prolongation of violence in Poso is the expansion of Indonesia’s 
army territorial command. The dangers of spreading regional violence in 
areas such as Ambon and Poso gave top army generals a national secu-
rity rationale to increase deployments and provincial bases (George Junus 
Aditjondro 2004a; Arianto Sangaji, this volume). Military officers made busi-
ness arrangements with district leaders to build the bases and assist with 
troop funding. Given the territorial command structure, the army profits 
from the transfer of authority from Jakarta to the regions (Mietzner 2003). If 
only 30-40% of Indonesian army soldiers’ deployment costs is covered by the 
national budget, the remainder must be raised on site, leading to soldiers’ 
coercive involvement in both legal and illegal businesses. These include 
security checkpoint fees, protection services, aid donation re-sale, muni-
tions diversion, gambling, prostitution, natural resources appropriation, and 
smuggling.32
The temptation for military personnel to ‘share’ in funds for war-torn 
Poso is overwhelming. People displaced by violence complain how soldiers, 
rather than needy local people, were paid to build refugee barracks (Aragon 
2004). Even some key Poso District executives, Bungku relatives accustomed 
to enjoying the spoils of political victory, found newly delivered office equip-
31  Kalla’s personification of the ultra-successful Bugis entrepreneur has succeeded the image 
of B.J. Habibie, raised in South Sulawesi, as representing Bugis national triumphs. During Kalla’s 
2004 vice-presidential campaign, his Palu Golkar supporters engaged in ethnic identity politics 
by proclaiming on market banners that ‘Honouring Jusuf Kalla (with a vote for his ticket) equals 
honouring Bugis people’.
32  For example, passing a Poso checkpoint in 2003 cost most drivers Rp 5,000-20,000, even if 
their licenses were in order. On long trips from Palu via Poso to Luwuk or South Sulawesi, driv-
ers would pass dozens of TNI and Brimob posts, some open and collecting while others might 
be closed with troops ‘on break’.
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ment appropriated by army officers they were afraid to challenge. After 
the Malino Accord in December 2001, a new battalion, Yon 714 Sintuwu 
Maroso, was created to protect Poso City, plus three companies were added 
for areas east of Poso. George Junus Aditjondro (2004a) alleges that these 
deployments were made less to protect Sulawesi people than to suppress 
uncooperative villagers who resist new investments such as Tomy Winata’s 
planned Morowali District marble mine, or the new 270-kilometer road from 
Kolonedale to Kendari.
The influx of aid money to Poso creates incentives for power brokers to 
insure that the conflict never completely ceases. As one displaced person 
explained bureaucrats’ insouciance about continuing violence: ‘in a conflict 
area, there is money to be had’ (di daerah rusuh ada uangnya). Aside from the 
theft of aid money, the speaker meant that many are willing to pay for protec-
tion or weapons once there is ongoing violence. As in Aceh, Poso people say 
that soldiers arrive in their area with M16s (assault rifles) and leave with 16M 
(16 billion rupiah). Christians sometimes view the violence and corruption of 
government officials as ideologically motivated, basically an extreme form of 
Muslim clientelism, while Muslims tend to see it as purely economic, simply 
a matter of personal aggrandizement combined with callous neglect of the 
population. It may well be some of both. But even if corruption is purely a 
matter of greedily harvesting political windfalls, its grounding in ethno-reli-
gious violence has aggravated regional disharmony. 
Motives for new districts 
Central Sulawesi politicians’ lobbying for new districts reveals ethnic lead-
ers looking for new political units they can rule when their terms expire, or 
they lose campaigns in their current district. The creation of Morowali and 
Tojo Una-Una Districts are the direct result of ethnic block politics promoted 
by allies of the last two Poso district heads. In the Morowali District, further 
schisms have occurred over the capital of the district. The two main compet-
ing groups, Bungku and Bugis, are both Muslim, illustrating an emerging 
ethnic rather than overarching religious dimension to the competition. The 
proposal to create a new East Sulawesi Province following the 2004 presiden-
tial elections emanated from the combined demographic and political gains 
of Bungku, Tojo, and Bugis blocks.33
Although Central Sulawesi politicians run newspaper advertisements 
that support proposed districts, most citizens have only a vague sense of why 
33  A freeze on the creation of new political units was set in place in November 2003 prior to 
the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections.
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new districts are being made, and what impact this will have on daily life. 
Protestants in both the new Morowali District and the smaller Poso District 
were disappointed with the initial results of pemekaran. Many Protestant 
Mori had favoured pemekaran, thinking a closer regional government in 
Kolonedale would be more responsive than the distant one in Poso City. But, 
when only one relatively weak political office (wakil bupati, deputy district 
head) went to a Protestant Mori while most went to Muslim Bungku politi-
cians, Mori felt a continued lack of political representation for Protestant-
majority sub-districts (kecamatan). The plan to shift the Morowali District 
capital southeast from the more cosmopolitan city of Kolonedale to Bungku 
City in 2004 left non-Bungku residents, both Protestant and Muslim, feeling 
further disenfranchised. 
The 2000 splitting of Morowali District from Poso put ethnic Bungku men 
in charge of both areas, which are rich in ebony, meranti and palapi (woods 
used in ship building), oil, marble, and nickel mined by PT Inco Mining 
Corporation. Illegal logging in Morowali Conservation Park reportedly has 
increased exponentially in recent years (Tajuk 7 (25-5-2000); Jakarta Post 13-
5-2004).
Bungku leaders’ temporary control of both districts gave the Poso district 
head and his business partners more capital to lobby for a new East Sulawesi 
Province, while they advanced development projects that may provide few 
benefits to local populations. This follows both New Order and general 
decentralization trends, leading to an increasing pace of resource removal for 
the global market (Ida Ayu Pradnja Resosudarmo 2003).
Law no. 51 authorizing the Morowali District in 1999 contained an ambi-
guity about what town would become the district capital. The law stated that 
Bungku would become the eventual capital, but that first Kolonedale would 
be capital because it already had the necessary governmental infrastructure. 
By 2003, however, the new Morowali district head, an ethnic Bugis, was so 
profitably entrenched in Kolonedale that he petitioned the Minister of the 
Interior to keep the capital in Kolonedale. He recommended splitting the 
Morowali District again, to make a separate Bungku District with Bungku 
City as its capital. These plans angered ethnic Bungku and various youth 
associations, which lobbied for the immediate transfer of Morowali’s district 
capital to Bungku City. Demonstrations by Bungku groups in Kolonedale, 
and Kolonedale groups in Bungku, led to the burning of government vehi-
cles and ethnic sparring between Bungku and Bugis around Kolonedale. 
Although the central government has supported the original plan to move 
the capital to Bungku City and maintain the Morowali District borders as 
specified, the transfer of the capital is not yet realized.
In addition to ebony in the upland forests, the reported discovery of oil off-
shore from the Tojo coast made that area attractive for the creation of a sepa-
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rate district. The splitting of mostly Muslim Tojo Una-Una District from the 
Poso District in 2003, re-elevated ethnic Tojo to control of their own district. 
The Muslim Una-Una candidate favoured by the Poso district head in 1998 
but denied both district headship and district secretary positions in Poso, was 
installed as the new head of Tojo Una-Una District in January 2004. From one 
perspective, this was a delayed victory for one of the Muslim leaders cham-
pioned by fighters in the early phases of the Poso conflict (December 1998 
and April 2000). Yet, the creation of Tojo Una-Una District also coincidentally 
eliminated the Muslim majority in the residual Poso District. For this reason, 
many non-Tojo Muslims in Poso and Palu resisted the creation of Tojo Una-
Una. By contrast, its formation has given Protestant Pamona and Lore resi-
dents hope for more future control over the now smaller Poso District. If Poso 
City becomes its own district (kotamadya), then the interior Poso highlands 
would become a more autonomous, but tiny and weak, Protestant district.
By 2003, a key issue in Central Sulawesi was a proposed new province 
of East Sulawesi (Sulawesi Timor), to extend from Poso City to the Banggai 
Islands. Economic analyses of the Regional Autonomy laws explain that 
provinces are to have a more minor role than during the Soeharto era, basi-
cally only coordination and ‘backstopping’ for any district unable to perform 
its own governance functions. So, what are the incentives to create new prov-
inces such as East Sulawesi? If an area has certain natural resources poten-
tial, then by becoming a new province it will no longer need to share that 
income with the adjacent districts or original province (Hofman and Kaiser 
2002). Thus the motivation to create provinces, as with districts, emanates 
from a competitive rather than a cooperative view of citizenship. Political 
leaders of eastern Central Sulawesi wish to benefit from timber, mining, gas 
and offshore oil deposits without sharing revenue with people in western 
Central Sulawesi. The push to create provinces also hints that provinces are 
not expected to become as politically weak as the 1999 laws and the revised 
autonomy laws of 2004 suggest.
Although both Protestant and Muslim politicians first proposed creating 
East Sulawesi in early 2000, district boundaries and executives have changed 
in the intervening years. The districts now usually planned to enter the new 
province are Poso, Morowali, Tojo Una-Una, Banggai, and Banggai Islands. 
Throughout 2003, supporters noted that Central Sulawesi was the largest of 
the island’s provinces (14,434 square km), far too huge and rugged to govern 
effectively. They added that the eastern section needed the economic boost 
that new province status would bestow. Skeptics, however, suggested that 
the politicians’ true aims concerned greater access to, and military protection 
for, the region’s timber, cacao, oil, nickel, marble, and shrimp. 
A rancorous debate concerns whether East Sulawesi should have its capi-
tal in Poso or Luwuk. Poso residents argue for their city, saying it is older, 
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centrally located, and – because of the recent violence – already has an army 
battalion, a prerequisite for all provinces. They note that Poso was the capital 
of a much larger district before the recent partitions. Only by becoming the 
capital of East Sulawesi Province, which would reincorporate exactly the 
same partitioned areas (and Banggai) can Poso City regain or surpass its 
former administrative stature. But then, one might wonder, what was the 
point of the whole contentious pemekaran exercise of the past five years?
In 2003, some Poso Muslims claimed there would be anger and more 
violence in Poso if their city was not chosen to become the new provincial 
capital. By contrast, advocates for Luwuk noted that their city is peaceful 
and its infrastructure intact, unlike Poso. This debate over the future capital 
of the proposed province pits the leadership of two western districts – Poso, 
and Tojo Una-Una – against those of the two eastern districts – Banggai and 
Banggai Islands.34 This is a clear case where a ‘reunifying’ pemekaran plan 
intended to benefit some segments of a population only radiates further 
inter-regional competition and hostility. The dispute ultimately will be set-
tled by central government authorities, who likely will evaluate future pay-
ments or investment deals.
In mid-2004, the East Sulawesi issue was still provoking demonstrations, 
counter-demonstrations, and angry debate (Arianto Sangaji 2004). A national 
parliamentary leader (wakil ketua Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) noted 
the planned borders of East Sulawesi would make it a larger province than 
the province from which it would split – a formula technically prohibited in 
the pemekaran rules. He argued that Poso District should remain in Central 
Sulawesi, disqualifying Poso City from capital status, while the new districts 
removed from the Poso District would become East Sulawesi. This sugges-
tion aroused further rage, with Muslim-oriented youth groups such as the 
Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Sulawesi Timur (FKGM Sultim, Youth 
Communication Forum East Sulawesi) lobbying fiercely against politicians 
unwilling to defend a Poso City-centred East Sulawesi Province (Arianto 
Sangaji 2004).
Protestant minorities in Poso developed their own Protestant majority 
district plans, but they never got far in the lobbying process. Some argue that 
Pamona and Lore people will regain more control within the Poso District 
now that the Tojo Una-Una region has exited. One Protestant plan for a 
Pamona-Lore District follows 2001 ‘wishful thinking’ to create a province 
called Sintuwu Maroso. This plan aimed to reunite the current Poso and 
Morowali Districts back into what was the Soeharto era Poso District, except 
the capital of the new province would be the Protestant mission centre of 
34  Morowali District leaders split on the issue with the Bugis Morowali district head support-
ing Luwuk and the deputy district head, a Mori Protestant, supporting Poso City.
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Tentena instead of Muslim majority Poso City. The nativist character of the 
proposed province was stressed by naming it with the Pamona language 
motto ‘Sintuwu Maroso’, meaning ‘Strongly United’. Given the prolonged 
violence in Poso, that phrase has become the source of many jokes. Many 
Poso residents say that Sintuwu maroso, ‘United we are strong’, has become 
Sintuwu malonco, ‘United we flee’. As the word play suggests, the Sintuwu 
Maroso Province plan disappeared along with violence and the loss of 
Protestant Pamona in any significant bureaucratic positions.
Decentralization and democracy
Decentralization in post-Soeharto Indonesia cannot be equated simply with 
democratization, but must be investigated in terms of power struggles linked 
with the revised regional finances specified by the 1999 regional autonomy 
laws (H. Schulte Nordholt 2003). States like Indonesia routinely operate in 
part through illegal practices that are rarely prosecuted (Heyman and Smart 
1999). Post-Soeharto patterns of corruption in Central Sulawesi, and their 
entrenchment within family networks and ethnic constituencies, are continu-
ous with Soeharto regime models. What has changed is the greater political 
and financial autonomy of the district from Jakarta, creating increasingly 
empowered district heads with a need to attract local voting blocks and 
develop untapped natural resources. In Poso, this situation became com-
bined with the revised public performance of religious and ethnic identities 
for the purpose of extending claims to both political power and land rights. 
In terms of national strategies for resource development, we should consider 
pemekaran as another form of economic ‘outsourcing’, but one with specific 
Indonesian socio-political antecedents and local ecological consequences.
District leaders in Poso turned to religious identity politics in 1998, moti-
vated by a combination of ideology and efforts to protect political power and 
payments. The transition to regional autonomy was coterminous with Poso’s 
collective violence, as district leaders sought to heighten religious tensions 
to mobilize voters. Only by focusing on district governance are we likely to 
answer the puzzling question of why escalating waves of violence generally 
followed the major roads outwards from Poso City, but then, with some recent 
exceptions, stopped at the pre-conflict district (kabupaten) boundaries.35
35  The exceptions include 2000 and 2001 Christmas season church bombings in Palu, the kill-
ing of a Palu prosecutor on May 26, 2004, a woman minister during a Palu church service on 18 
July 2004, and nearly simultaneous shooting attacks on two Palu churches during services on 12 
December 2004. All three of the recently attacked churches are branches of the Poso Protestant 
denomination (GKST, Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah).
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Because district and provincial executive posts in the New Order were 
regulated by choices made in Jakarta, Muslim religious credentials were 
necessary for 1990s success at the regional level, although native ethnic 
credentials also were promoted to insure broad local support. The Golkar-
Muhammadiyah-ICMI activism by district leaders, who sought support from 
Muslim migrants and natives, accentuated the region’s religious polarization 
in 1998. An ethnic conflict strictly between Muslim Tojo and Bungku, or 
between Protestant Pamona and Mori, would never have escalated beyond 
local interest, or been prolonged for six years by attracting outsider fight-
ing specialists. It was rather the invocation of a bipolar religious divide that 
turned a petty youth fight and a contentious district campaign into a chronic 
state of siege and suspicion between deterritorialized religious groups. 
When the Poso conflict was nationally mediated in December 2001 after 
attacked Muslims and Christians fled into different territories, Muslim 
leaders could lobby the divided ethnic blocks to create new districts for 
administration and development. Muslim Bungku politicians conceived the 
Morowali District just before they took control of the Poso District from an 
ethnic Tojo leader. Bungku politicians then could administer two regions, 
one in their home ethnic territory and one beyond it. Tojo politicians, in turn, 
conceived the Tojo Una-Una District as a means to regain a regional centre of 
power in their ethnic territory. By splitting Tojo Muslims off from the remain-
ing Poso District, however, Protestants returned to a demographic majority 
in the now smaller district. Pamona leaders hope to regain control in Poso 
even though Protestants are still too intimidated by violence to return to Poso 
City, where their old neighbourhoods are occupied by displaced Muslims. 
The fissiparous process of pemekaran not only draws on prior ethno-religious 
identities, but also cultivates them in new ways to define groups who should 
dwell in separate political territories.
Poso District administrations crossed the line of ‘routine corruption’ when 
they began to use conflict aid funds to buy personal luxuries and support 
militias instead of helping the displaced. Regional NGOs in Central Sulawesi 
have worked hard to expose government malfeasance and cultivate local 
unity. Yet, populist activism like that in Jakarta makes slower headway in 
provincial outposts where intimidation and state suppression exist beside 
new media and imported products as ‘the natural features of a landscape 
of power’ (Tsing 2003:215). In this landscape the terms and conditions for 
receiving ‘democracy’ often look much like the New Order terms and condi-
tions for receiving ‘development’, that is, they involve the attrition of local 
group autonomy and environmental control. Any upgrade in the political 
status of one’s locality may entail a trade-off of little understood resource 
rights. Poso District’s non-elite groups are unsure about the impact of pemeka-
ran although many Muslim and Christian urban dwellers hope that new dis-
Lorraine V. Aragon66
tricts will deliver bureaucratic jobs that they might win despite the patterns 
of ‘unequal buying’. Pemekaran in Central Sulawesi unquestionably is aimed 
towards the elite pursuit of forest and shoreline resources. Whether profits 
from those development projects will be shared more widely and equitably 
to fulfil needs of the diverse populace is still unclear.
The Soeharto government created a symbolic map of the Indonesian nation 
in its famed Jakarta theme park Taman Mini, where every province had its own 
ethnic groups and all groups were theoretically equal as portrayed by their 
material culture displays. Religion was relegated to the background. In the 
actual provinces, however, ethnicity was more complex, often nascent, mobile, 
or entangled with religious identities. The dominance of Java could hardly be 
hidden, although inequities among other groups largely were. Political econo-
my inequities emerged from a combination of demographic, geographic, and 
state policy differences dating from the colonial period forward.
Soeharto’s regime then fostered new movements of these diverse peoples 
across the provinces, through transmigration, road construction, and devel-
opment projects attracting labour migrants. The Soeharto regime’s increasing 
regulation and prioritizing of religion over ethnicity and custom had addi-
tional consequences for district leadership success, as well as the development 
of local identities and inter-religious tensions. The post-Soeharto regional 
violence, religious territorialization in places like Poso, and initiatives for the 
ethnic partitioning of districts after 1998 can be seen as a culmination of these 
policies, where unequal opportunity buying still exists largely unexplored 
and unchecked by either national or local social institutions. Future leaders, 
both national and local, may want to consider this history and the potential 
for greater harmony among a diverse citizenry.
The true bright blooms in Central Sulawesi’s ‘blossoming’ process, which 
need to be emphasized in closing, are the impressive efforts made by several 
Central Sulawesi NGOs and international investigators to bring Poso con-
flict aid embezzlement and continued violence to national attention. With 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s initial public push against bureau-
cratic corruption, Central Sulawesi NGOs seized the moment to speak out 
about Poso’s continued troubles. In both local and national newspapers, 
NGO directors have demanded that local bureaucrats, their hired hands, and 
even military personnel, be investigated and prosecuted for their misdeeds 
(Kompas 31-5-2005; Suara Pembaruan 29-4-2005). Some police authorities also 
are rising to the challenge, despite continued killings and bombings such as 
those in Tentena on 28 May 2005. These nationwide efforts, and the direct 
elections in June 2005 for new district heads in Poso and elsewhere, remind 
us of the possibilities for democratization and accountability that, at least 
ostensibly, set the decentralization wheel in motion. 
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new colonizers?
identity, representation and government in the 
post-new order mentawai archipelago
Sedang bicarakan situasi politik di kepulauan ini […] boleh dibilang bisnis seperti biasa. 
Dulu kami digigit kucing, sekarang digigit anjing, rasa sakitnya sama aja.
Talking about politics with regard to this archipelago […] it may be said it is 
business as usual. In earlier times we were bitten by the cat, now we are bitten 
by the dog, both are equally painful. (Liong Hamid Satoko, December 2002, Saibi 
Samukop.)
Introduction
Even before Law no. 22/1999 on decentralization of the state administra-
tion became operative the then-president Habibie granted the Mentawai 
Archipelago full independent district status at once.1 As a result of intense 
lobbying on the part of various local non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the Mentawai Archipelago finally detached itself from the mainland 
district of Padang-Pariaman on 9 October 1999 (Mimbar Minang 14-10-1999). 
The Mentawaian case, a pioneer project within the pan-Indonesian process of 
administrative fragmentation or pemekaran, is foremost the result of activities 
by local elites entangled in a contest for political positions. The whole process 
is characterized by intense political turmoil and all kinds of exclusionisms on 
the basis of various ethnic sentiments. 
The detachment of the Mentawai Archipelago from the mainland district 
Padang-Pariaman marked a long awaited shift in political power over the ar-
1 Most of the data used in this chapter have been gathered during extensive field research in 
Indonesia in 2002-2003 and late 2004. Earlier versions have been presented during the EUROSEAS 
Conference 2004 in Paris and the Renegotiating Boundaries workshop 2004 in Jakarta. I would 
like to thank the Renegotiating Boundaries workgroup and Juniator Tulius for their inspiring 




























Map 3. Mentawai archipelago and West Sumatra
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chipelago. Local elites have been able to take over the political power from the 
mainland Minangkabau who had been ruling the archipelago for decades. The 
Mentawaians were euphoric now that they finally saw themselves freed from 
their ‘colonization’ by the significantly different – in cultural as well as religious 
senses – mainland Minangkabau. Now that the initial excitement over the new 
district has died down, new patterns of power and representation have become 
visible, but at the same time old modes of representation and familiar adminis-
trative styles suggest a strong continuity with New Order politics.
The processes of decentralization currently taking place in Indonesia are 
believed to empower local communities and stimulate greater accountability 
by local governments, and have therefore often been equated with democra-
tization and the strengthening of civil society (Aspinall and Fealy 2003:1-14; 
Antlöv and Cederroth 2004, see also H. Schulte Nordholt 2003). Closer inves-
tigation of the experiences within the Mentawaian communities, however, 
raises the question of whether and to what extent these new power constel-
lations and reformulated modes of representation fulfil the aspirations of the 
Mentawaian constituencies. 
During the shift in local power relations, the notion of identity has been 
politicized. The term putra asli daerah (literally: autochthonous sons of the 
region) is omnipresent in negotiations over political positions (Puailiggoubat 
4(March 2002):2). It is only putra asli daerah that should control local govern-
ments, because only they are believed to be able to secure privileged access 
for their communities in the allocation of economic resources and govern-
ment positions (Aspinall and Fealy 2003:6). Regional autonomy and decen-
tralization have also resulted in a renewed interest in adat (tradition, custom). 
Local NGOs have taken up the notion of adat to voice their claims for greater 
recognition of certain local traditions and adat-based rights over natural re-
sources (Acciaioli 2001). Placing adat in the middle of the decentralization 
discussion is a powerful political act, because adat, in public discourse, is con-
sidered to originate from below. During Soeharto’s authoritarian, top-down 
New Order regime, adat was ‘domesticated’ and de-politicized by the state 
(Schefold 1998). Only its aestheticized ‘peaks’ were enlisted to contribute to 
the process of nation-building (Picard 1997). Recently, however, adat has re-
quired new symbolic and rhetorical importance which fuels political activity 
related to the administrative changes and political interests.
While these processes have certainly opened up new opportunities for 
some, others stand to lose their grip on the political process. While local elites 
are engaged in political negotiations it appears that local communities do 
not seem to be able to fully partake. Those prominently involved advocate 
adat and the privileges due to the Mentawaian community, but at the same 
time they view the new opportunities from a variety of interests, trying to 
find structures most sympathetic to their own interests. Ordinary people are 
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at best spectators, informed only when major decisions have already been 
taken. Common people thus easily develop cynical views about the political 
rhetoric which emphasizes adat and the bottom-up character of the whole 
decentralization process (Von Benda-Beckmann 2001). 
 Local NGOs tend to play a Janus-faced role within the whole process. 
Harbouring the majority of the local Mentawaian elite and having access to 
both the financial and the infrastructural means, many local NGOs have been 
recently transformed into political strongholds, bypassing their intermediate 
civil society function (Eindhoven 2002).
This chapter starts with an overview of the situation in which Mentawaians 
found themselves while the archipelago was still part of the district of Padang-
Pariaman. I will address the problematic inter-ethnic relations between 
Mentawaians and Minangkabau people. I will also briefly discuss govern-
ment policies with regard to the Mentawaians as a typical group of people in 
Indonesian society. In the next section I shall discuss the genesis of a critical 
elite among the Mentawaians and what kind of activities they deployed un-
der the banner of the local organizations IPPMEN and Yayasan Citra Mandiri. 
The third section explores the creation of the district of Kepulauan Mentawai 
and the rush for putra asli daerah that ensued. This will be followed by an ac-
count of how members of the Mentawaian elite have taken up their new role 
as politicians. I then discuss the role and position of both local NGOs and lo-
cal communities. The chapter will conclude with an overview of the political 
situation in the Mentawai Archipelago now that the initial turbulence raised 
by pemekaran has died down. 
Mainland colonizers
Both geographically and administratively the Mentawai Archipelago is part 
of the province of West Sumatra and was until late 1999 part of the district 
of Padang-Pariaman. The Mentawai Archipelago, consisting of four larger is-
lands (Siberut, Sipora, North Pagai, and South Pagai) and several smaller is-
lets, is situated in the Indian Ocean approximately 100 kilometres off the west 
coast of Sumatra. The autochthonous Mentawaians form a majority within 
their own territory, with an estimated 70,000 people. A still insignificant num-
ber of migrants from West and North Sumatra, Java, and Nias reside mostly 
in the harbour villages.
While Mentawai was still part of Padang-Pariaman district, the archipelago 
covered nearly 80% of the territory of the district and was responsible for al-
most three quarters of the district’s total revenue – the export of dried coco-
nut, rattan, and especially timber being the most important sources of income. 
Although insignificant in number, migrants almost completely controlled trade 
on the islands. It was they who enjoyed the surplus, leaving the Mentawaians 
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as ill-paid suppliers of rough materials only. With the migrants having their 
family and business interests abroad, most of the proceeds generated on the 
islands never returned to Mentawai. This, together with the unequal redistri-
bution of taxes and reforestation budgets, turned Mentawai into an area where 
exploitation was rife while structural investments were absent.  
Within Padang-Pariaman district, political power was invariably in the 
hands of the Minangkabau – the dominant ethnic group in West Sumatra. 
Due to a lack of education, experience, and ambition, the Mentawaians 
have not been able to take up positions in the administrative machinery. 
Nor was there ever any real attempt to interest Mentawaians in these func-
tions (Persoon 1994:227). One had to be a Muslim in order to be able to ap-
ply for the function of civil servant, and this made it virtually impossible for 
most Mentawaians to apply for government positions. Being Christianized 
since the beginning of the twentieth century, most Mentawaians nowadays 
see Christianity as an integral part of their identity.2 There are several cases 
known where Mentawaians have converted to Islam – or at least changed 
their Christian names into Islamic ones – in order to qualify as a government 
employee. However, the number of Mentawaians involved in local govern-
ment remained low, and where they were granted the opportunity to take up 
a position in the bureaucracy they did so at the lower administrative levels.
Government offices were located on the Sumatran mainland, so all ad-
ministrative matters for the Mentawai Archipelago had to be arranged on the 
mainland in either Padang, West Sumatra’s capital city, or Pariaman, some 60 
kilometres north of Padang. In earlier days a trip from one of the Mentawai 
Islands to the mainland took at least a fortnight and involved transportation 
costs and maintenance that were beyond the reach of most Mentawaians. This 
left many Mentawaians without proper administrative evidence of their citi-
zenship like birth certificates and marriage documents, leading to problems 
when travelling, seeking higher education or marriageable partners outside 
the Mentawaian region. 
As part of its ideology of national development, the Indonesian govern-
2 Compared to Protestantism, both Islam and Catholicism were rather late in targeting 
Mentawai. While the first German protestant missionary disembarked at North Pagai in 1901, 
Islam did not enter Mentawai until 1952 (Persoon and Schefold 1985:xv) and Catholicism 
started activities only in 1954 (Coronese 1986:29). In 1954 the local religion, arat sabulungan, 
was prohibited. During the so-called Rapat Tiga Agama (meeting of the three religions) it was 
decided that every Mentawaian had to forswear arat sabulungan, and had to embrace either Islam 
or Protestantism (Sihombing 1979:99). Later Catholicism was added as an official choice. Islam 
among the Mentawaians has taken a flight with the organized activities by Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (pan-Indonesian organization responsible for the spread and maintenance of the 
Islamic religion within the Indonesian Archipelago) which started in the late 1960s (H. Mas’oed 
Abidin 1997). The Islamic initiatives have been particularly influential on the island of Sipora and 
to a lesser extent on the Pagai Islands.
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ment has identified certain groups of people as backward and lost from the 
mainstream of national progress and development. Their isolation was sup-
posed to be the main cause of their backwardness and also the reason why 
these people became known as masyarakat terasing (isolated communities). 
The government has developed various development and assimilation pro-
grammes to modernize these people and turn them into proper Indonesian 
citizens. Mentawaians affected by these government policies have learned 
to understand themselves in mainly negative terms. As masyarakat terasing 
the Mentawaians have been stigmatized as a social, religious and agricul-
tural problem (Persoon 1994:67-120), practising a lifestyle that should be done 
away with as soon as possible. 
With the responsibility for governing the Mentawai Archipelago in the 
hands of the Minangkabau, it was to a large extent also the Minangkabau who 
were responsible for the implementation of these special development and as-
similation programmes. Convinced of their cultural and religious superiority, 
these mainland civil servants were eager to implement the government’s de-
velopment and civilization policies amongst the Mentawaians. But the imple-
mentation met with practical obstructions. The abundant free-roaming pigs, 
harsh environmental conditions, and a population perceived to be unfriendly 
and potentially dangerous turned the Mentawai Archipelago into a very un-
welcoming place for the predominantly Islamic Minangkabau. Consequently 
not many Minangkabau traders dared to expand their businesses into the 
hinterlands of the islands and Minangkabau civil servants were rarely pres-
ent on the Mentawai Islands and were ruling the archipelago primarily from 
the Sumatran mainland. Development projects in the fields of infrastructure, 
agriculture, and education were finished in haste, completed with inferior 
materials, prematurely abandoned, or even never implemented. In practice 
the development of the area was tuned in to the needs of the Minangkabau 
community residing on the islands. Physical development was confined to 
the construction of sub-district level government offices, mosques, schools, 
healthcare facilities, and basic infrastructural facilities in the harbour villages. 
This led to enclaves of migrants residing in the harbour villages surrounded 
by poorly serviced local communities. 
Critical voices
During the late 1980s growing dissatisfaction emerged among a small but 
growing number of Mentawaian intellectuals. They started to question the 
ongoing erosion of their cultural identity and the incompetent and corrupt 
governmental practices of Minangkabau officials. Eventually they started a 
lobby for more Mentawaian involvement in local politics. 
Due to various religiously based initiatives, opportunities for education 
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within and outside the Mentawai Archipelago have increased significant-
ly since the early 1960s.3 As a result an ever increasing number of young 
Mentawaians managed to finish higher levels of education. When transpor-
tation facilities between the Mentawai Islands and the Sumatran mainland 
improved during the 1980s, the number of Mentawaian students seeking 
education on the mainland increased rapidly. However, once arrived on the 
mainland, they encountered many problems: poor housing facilities in the 
city of Padang, the general shortage of finances, the fear of being Islamized,4 
the emergence of drug abuse amongst some of the young Mentawaians, and 
the omnipresent disdain for their being Mentawaian. With their substan-
tially different culture and lifestyle, the Minangkabau tend to look at the 
Mentawaians with a mixture of repugnance and fear. Convinced of their 
own cultural and religious superiority, the Minangkabau tend to perceive 
Mentawaians as a pagan, primitive and dirty people, still in close contact with 
nature and the spiritual forces it may encompass. This leads to the belief that 
Mentawaians have control over certain potentially dangerous spiritual pow-
ers. The Minangkabau therefore prefer to avoid open conflict and overt ag-
gression with regard to the Mentawaians. The idea of the Mentawaians being 
dirty is foremost based on their habit of keeping pigs and eating pork, which 
is haram (prohibited) in Islam. The Mentawaians in turn generally perceive 
the Minangkabau as religious fanatics. Moreover, the Mentawaians consider 
Minangkabau to be an unreliable and murderous people. Minangkabau are 
known for their ability to inflict disease and even death upon weak or un-
protected persons. As a result of these interethnic animosities, many young 
Mentawaians have long denied their own cultural background in order to be 
successful in the Minangkabau-dominated environment on the mainland.
The ecology of the city, together with the growing analytical capacities 
of the Mentawaians residing in Padang, made these people more sensitive 
with regard to notions of ethnic identity. Resulting from this increasing eth-
nic consciousness, the growing group of Mentawaian students and scholars 
residing in Padang started to cluster together and organize themselves along 
ethnic lines. Detached from their families, their wish to organize themselves 
was in the first instance the product of their feelings of uneasiness, loneliness 
3 Protestant and Catholic missionaries have upgraded the education system and offered 
possibilities for higher education elsewhere. Islamic organizations increasingly also try to get a 
grip on the Mentawaian community through education programmes.
4 Mentawaians generally perceive Islam and processes of Islamization as dangerous forces 
from outside, from which one has to abstain in order to avoid detachment from the Mentawaian 
self. Mentawaians adhering to Islam are, of course, not similarly convinced of this loss of ‘pure’ 
Mentawaian identity. Though growing at a considerable rate, the number of Mentawaian 
converts is still small and they generally have a hard time to publicly defend themselves as 
equally Mentawaians. 
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and uncertainty over their lives and futures, but soon political dimensions 
emerged as well.5
In 1982 IPPMEN, short for Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Mentawai (Association 
for Mentawaian Youth and Students) was founded by a group of Mentawaian 
students residing in Padang. Initially IPPMEN was meant as a forum through 
which Mentawaian students could gather in order to discuss, process and 
analyse their lives in Padang. In the early 1990s, however, IPPMEN began 
to comment on government policies regarding Mentawai and the position of 
Mentawaian individuals as citizens in the broader Indonesian society. In sev-
eral letter campaigns IPPMEN criticized the Padang-Pariaman bureaucracy 
for its unwillingness to develop the Mentawai Archipelago. While agreeing 
with the commonly accepted idea that the Mentawaians were engaged in a 
struggle through which they tried to escape from their backwardness (keter-
belakangan), ignorance (kebodohan), poverty (kemiskinan), and general state of 
misery (kemelaratan), IPPMEN also stated that these features should not be 
understood as an intrinsic part of Mentawaian culture, but were a result of 
imperfect, inappropriate and ill-adapted government policies, especially with 
regard to education and economic development of the Mentawaian region. 
The Minangkabau administrators were simultaneously accused of perceiving 
the Mentawai Archipelago as an income-generating area where the existence 
of a distinct ethnic group was only a disturbing factor in the exploitation of the 
natural resources. Somewhat impressed by the actions undertaken by these 
young intellectuals, the government of Padang-Pariaman started to formal-
ize its relationship with IPPMEN in 1992, as a result of which IPPMEN re-
ceived some financial aid in order to finance their activities.6 In the early 1990s 
the Padang-Pariaman administration even installed an assistant district head 
who was burdened with the pressing issue of development in the Mentawai 
Archipelago. However, due to a general lack of direction, a crisis in manage-
ment, mutual distrust, and the contested involvement of some of IPPMEN’s 
leaders in the logging sector, IPPMEN has over time lost most of its initial sig-
nificance and credibility. But it cannot be denied that IPPMEN was the cradle 
for a new generation of self-conscious Mentawaian individuals. Through their 
involvement in IPPMEN many young Mentawaians learned to organize them-
selves, to put their personal experiences into words and to negotiate their col-
lective wishes and constraints with those in power. The dignity of Mentawaian 
culture and identity and their exclusion from sharing the revenues generated 
5 Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Mentawai (IPPMEN), Padang, Voorstel voor internaat en secretariaat, 
project proposal, 1989.
6 This money is part of the so-called Dana Pembinaan Pemuda dan Karang Taruna (Youth 
Development Fund), which is money directly received from the central government for sport 
and other recreative activities among the younger generation within the district. Until IPPMEN 
explicitly asked for the Mentawaian share of this money, Mentawai had never received any of it. 
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through the exploitation of the natural resources present in the Mentawai 
Archipelago are recurring central points in these negotiations. 
These critical voices tuned in nicely with international movements pro-
moting the conservation of the world’s cultural and natural heritage. In con-
trast to the government’s point of view, international agencies perceive of 
the Mentawaians as another example of a marginalized indigenous people 
entrapped in a hostile nation state that is held responsible for the destruc-
tion of the natural habitat of these peoples. From the late 1970s onwards sev-
eral international organizations have been active on the Mentawai Islands. 
Amongst others, more established organizations like Survival International, 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), UNESCO, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), and Conservation International (CI) have been – and some of 
them still are – running various programmes and projects in Mentawai (see 
also Persoon 1998). 
Due to increased contact with these large international organizations the 
Mentawaian elite learned to present themselves as a genuine indigenous 
people living in an endangered tropical rainforest. While making use of this 
internationally accepted discourse on indigenous peoples and nature con-
servation, the Mentawaian intelligentsia has been able to generate consider-
able amounts of money from international donor agencies involved in nature 
conservation and the empowerment of indigenous peoples. Especially during 
the late 1990s the Mentawaian elite has institutionalized itself in various local 
organizations; one of the most prominent being Yayasan Citra Mandiri (YCM, 
‘Vision for Autonomy’ Foundation). 
In July 1995 Kortanius Sabeleake’ and Yudas Sabaggalet, both formerly ac-
tive in IPPMEN, founded Yayasan Citra Mandiri (YCM). It focuses on advoca-
cy and economic development of the Mentawaian communities through just 
and competent use of the natural resources within the Mentawai Archipelago. 
YCM aims at empowerment of the Mentawaian community through collec-
tive, community-based agricultural activities supported by technical assis-
tance, advocacy, education, training and credit facilities. YCM’s goal is not 
only to empower the Mentawaian communities in a material sense, but also 
to awaken Mentawaian ethnic consciousness through its activities. According 
to YCM ‘the empowerment of adat communities lies in the understanding of 
one’s rights and duties, not only as a member of the local community, but 
also as a citizen within the context of the Indonesian nation state’.7 The use 
of the word adat (custom, tradition) is clearly a political statement. Instead 
of using the much-contested terminology masyarakat terasing, YCM already 
in 1995 started to use the term masyarakat adat (traditional, indigenous com-
7 See also http://www.lp3es.or.id/direktori/data/sumbar/sumbar_005.htm (last accessed 22 
August 2006).
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munity), which is considered more respectful. After Yudas Sabaggalet left the 
organization in 1998, Kortanius Sabeleake’ became the executive director of 
YCM, a position he occupied until late 2004 when he became head of the dis-
trict parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). Over time YCM 
has been working with an ever-changing staff of some 20 persons, of which 
nearly a third work in the main office in Padang, another third in the editorial 
office of the newspaper Puailiggoubat, published by YCM, while the last third 
is active in the field. YCM has been involved in a great variety of activities, 
among which we can find advocacy with regard to land disputes, mapping 
of traditional territory, agroforestry, pilot studies and more in-depth research. 
Unlike IPPMEN, YCM’s activities are almost solely determined by their spon-
sors (UNESCO, German Embassy, Forestrade) and more powerful counter-
parts like Lembaga Riset Advokasi (LRA, Institute for Policy Research and 
Advocacy) and Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI, Indonesian 
Forum for the Environment). 
In 1997 YCM made a start with the creation of a local council of experi-
enced adat leaders, the dewan adat, an idea that they copied from the more 
experienced, Kalimantan-based organization Pancur Kasih.8 By late 1997 
YCM had established dewan adat in several villages on Siberut. The dewan 
adat is supposed to strengthen the position of local adat communities vis-à-vis 
government institutions, and to lobby local government bodies with crucial 
impulses from the bottom level of Mentawaian society (Puailiggoubat 6(May 
2002):8). In the beginning of 2002, however, the idea of dewan adat still had 
not found general acceptance yet. The dewan adat in the villages mentioned 
earlier where still struggling with their legal position. There was little to no 
cooperation between dewan adat and local NGOs other than YCM, and in the 
mean time the dewan adat were still waiting for its official acknowledgement 
by the local government. At the time of writing the factual implementation of 
dewan adat seems to have completely failed (Puailiggoubat 49(1-14 June 2004):5). 
Although in theory government officials support democratic strengthening 
and bottom-up strategies and activities, they tend not to be enthusiastic about 
such things. Government officials do not recognize the dewan adat as a serious 
initiative, but as another vagary by YCM, initially leading to disappointment 
and later to indifference on the part of those involved.
Since 2001 YCM is closely linked to the Rainforest Foundation Norway 
(RFN).9 The cooperation with RFN has significantly influenced the position of 
8 See also Tanasaldy in this volume for more information about Yayasan Pancur Kasih.
9 The Norwegian Rainforest Foundation, active in Indonesia since 1997, is an environmental as 
well as an aid organization that works for the protection of the rainforests and its rich resources 
for coming generations. To achieve this goal, the Rainforest Foundation supports indigenous 
and forest peoples that live in and off the forests in their struggle to protect the environment and 
attain respect for their human rights. (http://www.rainforest.no.)
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YCM. The Rainforest Foundation is not only a prestigious international part-
ner, but also a generous donor. The Rainforest Foundation Norway has more 
than doubled the budget for YCM from US$ 50,000 in 2001 to US$ 110,000 
in 2002.10 Lately YCM has invested considerable amounts of money in the 
bureaucratic expansion of the organization. In the second half of 2002 a new 
office was opened in Maileppet on the island of Siberut and a start was made 
on the building of another new office in Tuapeijat on the island of Sipora, 
which was operational at the time of writing. There are still plans to open 
a third office on the Mentawai Islands in Sikabaluan in the northern part of 
Siberut Island. Late in 2002 the editorial office of Puailiggoubat detached itself 
from the main YCM office in Padang and took up residence in an office in the 
vicinity. Especially the new office in Maileppet has raised negative public-
ity. The fact that the office seemed ready for use for several months, yet was 
still not operational on a day to day basis at the end of 2002, set evil tongues 
wagging. Malicious suggestions that YCM actually did not know what to do 
with the money they collected in the name of the local communities, that the 
money had been invested in a useless expansion of real estate, which was 
probably only meant to benefit the personal interests of YCM members, were 
much in the air. Besides, a considerable number of people involved in YCM 
campaigned quite intensively during the latest elections for district parlia-
ment. Although there is no direct proof for this accusation, local communities 
strongly believe that the RFN funding has largely been used for these personal 
political campaigns. Just like IPPMEN in earlier days, YCM is now generally 
believed to create fame and personal gain by selling the image of indigeneity 
and endangered natural environments to large donor organizations, without 
ever really taking local communities into account. In other words: the cred-
ibility and accountability of YCM is under increased questioning, not only 
among local government officials, but also – more alarmingly – among local 
communities on the Mentawai Islands.    
The rush for putra asli daerah
After the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime the initial, some-
what concealed, lobby for more Mentawaian political involvement changed 
into a blatant request for the rigorous detachment from Padang-Pariaman 
district as a completely new district. When the Mentawai Archipelago was 
eventually granted district status in October 1999, people immediately start-
ed falling over each other in order to guarantee the most profitable positions 
for either themselves or their protégés. In contrast with what the Mentawaian 
elite had been lobbying for, the governor of West Sumatra installed Badril 
10 http://www.rainforest.no.
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Bakar, a fellow Minangkabau originating from the Sumatran mainland, as 
interim district head for the new district Kepulauan Mentawai. Local NGOs 
and several politically engaged individuals were disappointed by the instal-
lation of this interim district head. For the majority of Mentawaians, still trau-
matized by non-indigenous, Islamic Minangkabau rulers, it was obvious that 
their district head should be a Christian and above all a putra asli daerah (in-
digenous person). Being a Muslim and a member of the commonly distrusted 
Minangkabau, Badril Bakar was the first target for the local NGOs. Their hos-
tility towards him withheld him from a more energetic performance and was 
definitely among the several reasons why he was dishonourably dismissed in 
April 2001 and sent back to the mainland. 
With Badril Bakar gone, the governor appointed a second temporary 
district head. This time he was a Mentawaian, Antonius Samangilailai, for-
mer sub-district head of South Siberut, originating from Sipora. Although 
a Mentawaian, his Islamic image and the fact that Antonius was widely be-
lieved to be the timber companies’ right hand man made his appointment 
controversial as well. Many considered Antonius and the governor hand-in-
glove when it came to logging matters in the Mentawai Archipelago.11 
Soon after Antonius was appointed interim district head, elections for 
the DPRD were announced. This became the moment when the political tur-
moil came to a climax, because the new members of the DPRD would be 
responsible for the constitution of the local government and the election of 
a permanent district head. A feature of striking importance in these political 
negotiations was the omnipresent call for putra asli daerah to take up this most 
influential position. The use of the term putra asli daerah is to be interpreted 
in ethnic terms, primarily differentiating between the Mentawaians and the 
Minangkabau. Whereas the initial lobby for more local political involvement 
was directed against the unreliable and corrupt Minangkabau administrators, 
it was a common wish that local politics now also had to be taken over by 
sincere and trustworthy local persons, putra asli daerah. 
Who is considered putra asli daerah, is, however, a matter of highly lo-
cal perspective. For many local communities, notions of belonging – rather 
than ethnicity – lie at the heart of their experienced identity. Mentawaians 
tell a myth in which at a certain moment the population on Siberut became 
involved in a serious dispute, which after some time had all the features of 
a real civil war. After a great wave of violence, people tended to stay out of 
sight of possibly violent individuals as far as possible. Some even fled as 
far as the southern Mentawai Islands. Since the clash, the population from 
11 The governor of West Sumatra, once district head of district Padang-Pariaman himself 
(therefore pretty well informed about the potential natural resources available within Mentawai), 
is known as an advocate of logging concessions on the Mentawai Islands.
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the southern Mentawai Islands refer to the inhabitants of Siberut as Sabirut. 
The population on Siberut in turn refer to the people on the southern islands 
as Sakalagat. The people on the Pagai Islands again differentiate between 
themselves and those on Sipora, calling them Sakalelegat (those we left on 
the island of Sipora but are still of our kind) or Sakobou. All are categories 
that come along with negative stereotypes. Sakalagat are the cowards (they 
migrated from Siberut in earlier ages), the ones who were driven away, the 
losers, the ones from whom we have to fear black magic, the ones who eat 
gette’ (taro – regarded as inferior), the ones who are maju (developed or mod-
ern) but who forgot about their culture and identity, the ones who became 
more or less similar to the Minangkabau. Sabirut in turn, of course, are de-
scribed by others as the ones who stayed, the passive ones, the ancient (kuno), 
outdated, old-fashioned and conservative part of the Mentawaians. They are 
rude, harsh, traditional and savage. The Sabirut like to kill. They are known 
for cutting your head off for no particular reason. While people might refer 
to themselves according to the above mentioned categories, all prefer to call 
themselves Simattaoi (Mentawaians).
The political translation of these intra-ethnic animosities is done with 
the help of the term putra asli setempat (people originating from a certain as 
yet unspecified place). While putra asli daerah only differentiates between 
Mentawaians and sasareu (literally: those from afar; outsiders), putra asli se-
tempat differentiates quite precisely among Mentawaians themselves. For 
people in search of political constituencies, the heterogeneous constitution of 
the population within the Mentawai Archipelago is thus a problematic issue. 
Which person is likely to get the broader support of society is a delicate ques-
tion. Putting a Satoko clan member, originating from Saibi Samukop (South 
Siberut), forward in political negotiations might guarantee the support of fel-
low clan members in Saibi Samukop, but not automatically the support of 
broader society in South Siberut, let alone in North Siberut or, even more 
unlikely, of those on the southern Mentawai Islands. Candidates in the first 
DPRD elections therefore often had to campaign against the odds. The elec-
tions, which were fought along party lines, led to an overwhelming victory 
for Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle), followed by Partai Damai Kasih Bangsa (PDKB, the Love 
the Nation Democratic Party) and Golkar. As soon as the DPRD was finally 
installed in late June 2001, negotiations over the position of district head be-
gan. PDI-P and PDKB clustered together and put forward two candidates 
for district head: Edison Saleleubaja, a Protestant clergyman originating from 
Sikakap (North Pagai), and Alexander Lukman, an ethnic Chinese with a 
Catholic background. Alexander was eager to take up the position of district 
head. He had far-reaching ideas about opening his own logging company on 
the islands. He had an elaborated political plan written even before he was 
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officially listed as a candidate for the position of district head. By contrast, 
Edison was not at all eager for the position. Many of his friends, however, 
whom he had known from his years in the local NGO Yayasan Kondisi,12 
were now involved in the logging sector in Mentawai and they thought it 
very convenient to have a close friend occupying the influential position of 
district head. Financially supported by his friends, Edison became a political 
puppet in the hands of the logging sector.13 
Besides Edison and Alexander there was a third serious candidate for the 
position of district head: former interim district head Antonius. Together 
with his equally Muslim running mate, Ridwan Siritubui, originating from 
Simalegi (North Siberut), they formed the Islamic pole in the elections. They 
could count on the votes from Golkar and the smaller Islamic parties in the 
DPRD. Not unlike the two other candidates, Antonius and Ridwan also leaned 
heavily on financial support from the logging sector.    
In a close finish between Antonius and Edison Saleleubaja after two 
rounds of elections, the latter was finally elected as the first district head of 
Kepulauan Mentawai district. The story goes that Edison’s camp had spent 
Rp 1.3 billion (€ 130,000) to buy the crucial vote within the DPRD.   
Edison was officially installed in August 2001, soon after which he appoint-
ed the various heads of the local government departments. All departments 
were now invariably headed by Mentawaians, most of whom were friends or 
close relatives of Edison. Edison’s old position of head of DPRD was taken up 
by his brother-in-law. Ridwan Siritubui, the former running mate of Antonius 
was asked to take up the important position of district secretary. Although 
Ridwan’s qualifications were officially not adequate to take up the position of 
district secretary – a point over which the deputy district head Aztarmizi was 
to fall at a later stage – Edison preferred to install fellow Mentawaians over the 
undoubtedly more experienced and better qualified outsiders.14 Edison was 
clearly reluctant to give the newly gained power back into the hands of the far 
more experienced Minangkabau administrators, who were also eager to take 
up some of the vacant positions. Interestingly, only the strategic position of 
head of the Department of Forestry was given to a Minangkabau. According 
to Edison himself he did so because he considered this position to be far too 
12 Under the leadership of Edison Saleleubaja, Yayasan Kondisi started as an evangelistic 
organization aiming to empower the Protestant population on the Mentawai Islands. After only 
a short time, however, they found themselves involved in the logging sector. 
13 Bakrial, involved in the logging company PT Mundam Sati, active on Sipora and the Pagai 
Islands, even pushed Edison as far as taking up Aztarmizi, the former assistant district head 
and close relative of Bakrial, as his running mate. Edison, lacking any experience in governing a 
district, thought it a good idea to link up with the experienced Aztarmizi.   
14 At the moment Ridwan became district secretary he had achieved the rank (pangkat, 
according to level of education and working experience) of 3D, while 4A is officially required to 
take up the position (Puailiggoubat 16(15-31 January 2003):3).
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contested to be occupied by a Mentawaian. Due to this decision, Edison found 
himself immediately under fire by local NGOs on the one hand, who demand-
ed the conservation of what was left of Mentawai’s tropical lowland rainforest, 
and by the financial supporters of his political campaign on the other hand.15 
Dealing with development 
Whereas the Mentawaian lifestyle has long been stigmatized as terbelakang 
(backwards), two key words in the discussions about the past, present and 
the future of the Mentawaians and their environment are pembangunan (de-
velopment) and kemajuan (progress). The word pembangunan has its origin in 
the word bangun, which means ‘to construct’, but also ‘to wake up from a state 
of unawareness’. In the latter meaning we can find a connection with the New 
Order government’s point of view that the masyarakat terasing should be brought 
back into the mainstream of national progress.16 Kemajuan implies a forward 
motion towards modernity. The local understanding of modernity comes in 
a multitude of variations. Depending on the circumstances modernity might 
imply having asbestos-roofed houses, schools, roads, prestigious infrastruc-
ture, churches, plastic kitchen utensils and western clothes, but also cars, bi-
cycles, motorcycles, outboard motors, computers and mobile telephones. The 
term maju is used in an interrelated sense for a way of life which foremost 
involves using manufactured goods and having the knowledge that pertains 
to them. Travelling by motorcycle for instance is considered lebih maju (more 
modern) than paddling along the river in a dug-out canoe. In order to prog-
ress and develop one should thus leave behind the old ways of life and start 
adhering to a more progressive, consumptive lifestyle. 
Completely in tune with these ideas about progress and development, 
the newly installed local government launched several prestigious devel-
opment projects. They were financed by the Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU, 
General Allocation Fund), an annual allowance from the central government 
in order to set up administration, transportation and infrastructural facilities. 
Transportation facilities between Mentawai and the mainland have improved 
considerably since 1999 and there is even a plan on the drawing board to re-
habilitate the airstrip on the Island of Sipora and construct a small airport. In 
accordance with the 2001 development plan for Tuapeijat a complex of com-
pletely new government offices was to be built in Tuapeijat on the Island of 
Sipora.17 Another important activity in the development of the archipelago is 
15 Especially the local NGO Yayasan Citra Mandiri has been very vocal in this respect.
16 See Ariel Heryanto (1988) for a more elaborate discussion of this topic. 
17 The choice for Tuapeijat as the new political centre of the district was not a deliberate one. 
While Muara Siberut – the main harbour village on Siberut – would have been a much more 
likely choice, under the guidance of interim district head Antonius it had already become clear 
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the construction of various roads. These are often old dirt roads and already 
existing trails within and between villages that are to be repaired and refur-
nished with a cement top layer. Elsewhere, often hand in hand with small 
scale logging concessions, completely new connections over considerable 
length are being realized. Contractor companies – almost invariably in the 
hands of local DPRD members – are eager to get their hands on these projects 
because the additional revenues from the lumber that must be removed from 
the trajectory is considerable. In order to collect as much timber as possible, 
roads from one village to the next often do not run in a straight line, but 
tend to meander tremendously. These practices not seldom lead to conflicts 
with intervening local communities who often see part of their gardens de-
stroyed by the advent of the road. In the meantime the local government does 
not seem to be very eager to act against these practices because they might 
then get into conflict with befriended persons or family members within the 
DPRD.18 Besides, the government generally perceives the forest as a realm 
that accommodates practices which contradict the local understanding of 
progress and modernity. The forest and all the cultural and natural diver-
sity it contains is not perceived as something valuable in itself, as promoted 
through Western notions of nature conservation and cultural survival. The 
forest and the lifestyle of its inhabitants are more often than not perceived as 
disturbing obstructions to the swift and sound development of the region. 
Since early 2003 the DPRD has tried to push through the idea of upgrad-
ing the number of sub-districts from four now to eight and more recently ten 
in the near future (Puailiggoubat 4(March 2002):11). This pemekaran wilayah is 
considered important for the development of the district. Ten sub-districts 
will lead to a considerable increase in the budget for development received 
from the central government, subsequently leading to an increase in local 
development projects, which is very much in the interest of several mem-
bers of the DPRD and the local government. Local communities also seem 
to be enthusiastic about the plans. Most people can already imagine how the 
quality of their lives will improve after the creation of the new sub-districts 
that will undoubtedly translate into more facilities such as  schools, medical 
centres, harbours, police offices, and telecommunications. While several local 
communities have already made part of their lands available for the construc-
tion of these facilities, the government wants local communities in each of the 
planned sub-districts to make at least 100 hectares available. These negotia-
that no other communities elsewhere within the archipelago were willing to hand over their land 
to the government. Besides, the limited availability of clean water suitable for consumption has 
seriously delayed the operability of the new offices in Tuapeijat. At the time of writing, problems 
with water are still not completely solved.  
18 Members of local government are generally believed to be bribed by contractor companies 
often in the hands of DPRD members. 
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tions over land is probably one of the reasons why the implementation of the 
ten sub-districts has been delayed. Since sub-district facilities can be built on 
5-10 hectares of land, the government’s request for at least 100 hectares is con-
sidered absurd. From a governmental point of view, however, this demand 
does make sense. Plots of at least 100 hectares that need to be cleared for dif-
ferent purposes can first be handed out as an IPK logging concession, which 
could in turn generate income for the district in the form of taxes.19 Whereas 
the land in Mentawai is now commonly considered to be in the hands of local 
communities, the local government has to negotiate with local communities 
over land on which they wish to realize the development projects. Since most 
land in Mentawai is owned by a great variety of clans, these negotiations are 
invariably extremely complicated and lead to great confusion among all par-
ties and sometimes even to serious conflicts among clan members and the 
government, and among clan members themselves.  
So far the development of the archipelago has been handled mainly in terms 
of physical development. While the construction of new offices and infrastruc-
ture might be called overwhelming, ideas for a more structural approach with 
regard to development are suspiciously absent. Problems in the critical sec-
tors of education, healthcare and economics are barely addressed. Although 
medical centres and schools have been erected at various locations in the archi-
pelago, there seems to be no planning for their actual operation. Teachers and 
medical personnel are still absent. Besides, facilities like these are still extreme-
ly poor in the more remote areas of the archipelago. Local politicians seem to 
lack a development perspective that goes beyond physical development only. 
The former New Order rhetoric and practices with regard to development are 
still very much in use. The dependency on the development budget from the 
central government remains extremely high. Local income generating activi-
ties are – apart from several small private enterprises paying taxes – generally 
absent. So far the local government has not been able to break the foreign mo-
nopoly over the vibrant surfing industry in the Mentawai Archipelago, has not 
been able to stop the illegal exploitation of the Mentawaian waters by foreign 
fishing fleets, and – even more surprisingly – has not been able to generate a 
substantial income from the logging sector active in the archipelago. Hopes 
for the future are set on foreign investments in the tourist industry, but with 
tourism in Mentawai focussing on surfing (monopolized by mainly Australian 
businessmen) as well as on the forested environment and its adherent local 
cultural practices, the current attack on the natural environment and the swift 
vanishing of the forest on the islands does not seem to be very constructive.   
19 So-called IPK logging concessions (Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu, Wood Utilization Permit) are 
issued to clear forested lands for other purposes such as infrastructure or plantations.
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Tricks of the trade
With the district itself not gaining from the logging activities, the question 
arises why then the logging sector seems to be more vibrant than ever before. 
Though in 2004 at least 20 new permits for small scale logging concessions 
were issued for a total area of more than 30,000 hectares, the local administra-
tion was not able to collect any retribution fees from the timber companies in-
volved (The Jakarta Post 24-3-2005). It is generally believed that both members 
of local government and the DPRD are subject to bribery from the logging 
sector. Besides, Edison himself was widely believed to have received payment 
for the smooth and unquestioned issuing of the smaller IPK licenses.20 When 
Kortanius Sabeleake’ in late 2004 – he had just been elected head of the DPRD 
– publicly confronted Edison with these accusations during a meeting between 
local government and DPRD on the issue of revenues generated within the 
district (pendapatan asli daerah), Edison suspiciously fell acutely ill and had to 
leave the meeting prematurely.21 While we might never find out what was pre-
cisely going on and how much money was involved here, it is a fact that the 
Mentawaian administration and Mentawai’s natural resources stand to lose 
while some individuals quite clearly enrich themselves over these practices.     
It is especially in the awarding of the currently plentiful development pro-
jects to the executive parties that a lot of corrupt practices ensue. Many local 
politicians have lately founded their own contractor company – whether ca-
pable of the factual implementation of the projects or not – through which they 
are able to lay their hands on the money allocated for the projects. As a result 
the projects are transferred through various befriended contractor companies 
before they are finally implemented. By that time only half of the initial bud-
get for the project may be left, which then results in projects that are only half 
finished or completed with inferior materials because after the various trans-
fers there is not enough money left to finish the project properly (Puailiggoubat 
6(May 2002):8). These practices are often referred to as diproyekkan: making 
something into a project in order to get access to (part of the) project funding. 
Collusive practices also emerged in the selection procedures for civil ser-
vants. After Edison Saleleubaja was installed district head, a large number of 
members of the Saleleubaja clan were accepted as civil servants. Although an 
official examination must be passed before one is able to become a civil ser-
vant, a personal recommendation from the district head makes the examina-
tion a mere formality. Those people not in the privileged position to obtain a 
personal recommendation from the district head himself often simply buy the 
20 Until 2002 IPK concessions up to 100 hectares could be issued by the district head personally. 
See also McCarthy in this volume. 
21 Edison was hospitalized several days after this incident. In Indonesia, sudden illness is often 
a device to avoid embarrassing situations for politicians and high officials. 
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position for either themselves or their protégés. It goes without saying that 
for those without the financial means or a personal relationship with some 
higher government official, the much sought-after civil servant positions are 
difficult to obtain. 
KKN, the Indonesian triad of corruption (korupsi), collusion (kolusi), and 
nepotism (nepotisme) has been and still is a major issue in Indonesian politics. 
While Mentawaians are now part and parcel of these practices it is difficult to 
point an accusing finger at anyone in particular. It is rewarding to behave as 
unobtrusively as possible in order not to attract negative publicity. What did, 
however, lead to a public outcry was the presumed corruption of the district 
secretary, Ridwan Siritubui. His name became a substitute for blatant corruption 
when Rp 7.6 billion (€ 760,000) of government money allocated for reforestation 
was transferred to the ‘wrong’ account number. Even before the money could 
be returned, local NGOs and the media had blown up the story to huge pro-
portions. Ridwan was openly attacked by the deputy district head, Aztarmizi, 
who also accused him of illegally transferring Rp 8.2 billion (€ 820,000) of de-
velopment money to the various departments. On the basis of oral agreements 
with Edison and the various heads of departments, Ridwan did indeed lend 
them a total sum of Rp 8.2 billion – money that was to be returned at a later 
stage. Aztarmizi, who on the basis of Ridwan’s insufficient qualifications felt 
politically bypassed by Ridwan, not only accused him of corruption, but also 
questioned his professionalism and experience. Annoyed by Aztarmizi’s ac-
cusations, Ridwan struck back at Aztarmizi by stating that Aztarmizi and his 
fellow Minangkabau friends had been in power long enough in the Mentawai 
Archipelago and that it was time for them to let go of their superior attitude. 
Since Ridwan had been brought up within the Minangkabau community, he 
seriously offended many with this statement. Aztarmizi, with the financial sup-
port of his close relative Bakrial, mobilized some of the Mentawaian civil sup-
port organizations to demand a close investigation of Ridwan’s activities. This 
triggered counter demonstrations by other parts of Mentawaian society who 
believed in Ridwan’s sincerity. The situation began to get out of hand when 
Ridwan refused to cooperate with the investigating team. Ridwan was con-
vinced of his innocence and stated that the financial transactions had been done 
with the oral approval of Edison. Both Ridwan and Edison disappeared. Some 
weeks later police arrested Ridwan in the city of Bukittinggi on the Sumatran 
mainland (Puailiggoubat 28(15-31 July 2003):3).
Ridwan was brought to trial, but it experienced serious delay as the most 
important witness, the district head, remained untraceable. When at length 
Edison had been heard – he saved his own skin by stating that he had never 
given his consent – Ridwan was sentenced to five years jail.22 Ridwan, however, 
22 Puailiggoubat 49(1-14 June 2004):3. Here we should remember that Edison was indebted to Ba-
krial, who had earlier paid for Edison’s political campaign in the race for the position of district 
head.  
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took the case to the high court, which exonerated him. At the time of writing 
Ridwan was waiting to be reinstalled as district secretary. However, with the 
relationship between him and Edison under severe pressure, Ridwan’s future 
position within the Mentawaian administration is a highly uncertain one.         
Whether corruption and money politics have increased or not is difficult 
to assess. Money politics and corruption were also perceived as a consider-
able problem when the Minangkabau were practising them and Mentawaians 
were excluded. Now that fate has given the advantage to the Mentawaians, 
corruption and money politics seem to have decentralized as well. Ordinary 
citizens are now, much more than under the Minangkabau administration, 
able to profit from ethnically instigated patron-client relationships with their 
government.
Where have critical voices gone?
With the Mentawaian politicians entangled in all kind of conspiracies, and lo-
cal communities left out of the political negotiations, the question arises why 
there is not more protest against these forms of exclusion. Where have local 
NGOs gone and why are they not able to fill the gap between local communi-
ties and their government?
Politics (politik) and politicians (politikus; sometimes replaced by the more 
friendly term politisi) have always been something of a dirty category. The 
word berpolitik (politicking) is for instance also used to describe peoples’ sneaky 
strategies to push through their own interests. And indeed, the Mentawaian 
political elite is – like their Minangkabau predecessors – often accused of act-
ing in their own interests only. Not unjustifiably, local communities feel that 
most of the political debates and decision-making processes occur beyond 
their realm. They have only the weapons  of the weak (Scott 1985), of which 
gossiping, nasty insinuations, and the threat of using black magic are the 
most common. Most local communities are, however, less informed, less in-
volved, sometimes even ignorant and this makes them more passive, quick to 
develop cynical attitudes, and sometimes believing that politics is something 
not applicable to them. 
In the more remote areas of Mentawai (the west coast of Siberut Island 
and the Rereiket area) where the majority of the population is still illiterate, 
news only trickles down on an irregular basis. Many people in these areas are 
still in the dark about the significant shift in political power that has taken 
place. Though some people in these areas are aware of the fact that Mentawai 
has obtained district status with its own district head, some people do not 
perceive Edison as their political leader because he originates from Sikakap, 
which means that he is a member of the much distrusted Sakalagat and should 
therefore not be considered capable of supporting their interests. 
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Nevertheless, regardless of the omnipresent corruption and money poli-
tics, the majority of Mentawaians believe the current political constitution to 
be much more promising than that of the previous Minangkabau adminis-
trators. With fellow Mentawaians in power it has – at least for some part of 
the population – become easier for local communities to communicate with 
their political leaders and to get privileged treatment for their businesses, 
while opportunities to enter politics have increased significantly. Corrupt and 
collusive practices are certainly not a new phenomenon. But they were per-
ceived as more disturbing during the Minangkabau administration, because 
the Mentawaians were excluded from them. Though annoying for those not 
able to partake, bribery and corruption of this kind is a commonly accepted 
form of politicking.
The sometimes prestigious infrastructural developments that the local 
government has implemented have also mitigated any negative public opin-
ion. Regardless of the disturbing side effects of these development projects 
– of which not everyone is equally aware – people tend to perceive of them 
as positive and above all adding to their modernity. With local communities 
themselves involved, they gain directly from these projects by receiving pay-
ment on a daily basis. This stands in complete contrast to the way in which 
such projects were implemented in earlier days, when projects were almost 
invariably implemented by outsiders. The fact is, local communities often 
lack a more long term perspective with regard to certain developments. As 
a result local communities often only start complaining when the negative 
impacts of certain practices have become completely visible and irreversible.
While the empowerment of civil society is at stake and hopes are high that 
local NGOs will raise political awareness and push through measures of politi-
cal accountability, they do not seem to be able to put their theoretical potential 
to full use (see also Collins 2003; Bob Sugeng Hadiwinata 2003; McVey 2003). 
The reason for their poor performance lies in the fact that the majority of local 
NGOs have recently become political strongholds themselves. While most of 
the Mentawaian elite were until recently involved in local NGOs and support 
organizations, various individuals within these local organizations now see 
no other option than to use their organization as a platform from which they 
can easily jump over to institutionalized politics. This leaves civil society ba-
sically without actors who do not have a double agenda. The shift to politics 
by Kortanius Sabeleake’, the former director of YCM, is just one example of 
this. However, Kortanius’ case is interesting. Having been the founder and 
the acting director of YCM since 1995 and the driving force behind the local 
newspaper Puailiggoubat, he created a lot of support for himself personally.23 
While YCM claims (for reasons of transparency) to have cut off all official 
23 So far Puailiggoubat is the only local newspaper made by Mentawaians meant for the 
Mentawaian public. 
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affiliation with Kortanius since he was appointed head of the DPRD late in 
2004, it cannot be denied that he still enjoys considerable support from YCM 
and he is also, not unimportantly, able to influence the local media.      
As far as local NGOs and village councils are involved in the monitoring 
of local politics they do not do so on a structural basis. Often the constitution 
of these organizations coincides with the emergence of a particular political 
issue they might favour or dislike. Not seldom, public demonstrations by 
these groups are instigated (and paid for) by people in the higher political 
echelons in search for an outcome sympathetic to their interests.24 While these 
public demonstrations thus do not necessarily ventilate the popular will, they 
do add to the general confusion and certainly influences the way in which the 
issue appears in the media. 
New colonizers?
The decentralization process in Indonesia has led to an important shift in 
local power relations in the Mentawai Archipelago. The Mentawaians have 
been able to liberate themselves from what they saw as cultural repression 
and political colonization by the mainland Minangkabau. The question re-
mains, however, whether this shift has indeed also led to a more democratic 
political system at the local level. It turns out that the local government has 
been captured by a local elite, which does not equally represent all levels of 
society. On the basis of selective ethnic sentiments, differing ethnic groups 
living in the Mentawai Archipelago are consequently excluded from politi-
cal participation. Putra asli daerah, not necessarily more competent, are being 
privileged over sasareu (non-Mentawaians). Besides, there is also still that part 
of Mentawaian society living in the more remote areas of the archipelago that 
is still unaccounted for. These people, most of them illiterate, do not take part 
in the politicking that takes place mainly outside their realm. So far there 
have been few initiatives to incorporate these people into the local political 
system. Moreover, in the opinion of the local government, these people can 
only be incorporated within the development process if they let go of their old 
fashioned forest-based lifestyles. In this respect local politicians seem to have 
slipped back into the former New Order rhetoric with regard to masyarakat 
terasing, which can be regarded as a definite step back in the empowerment of 
local communities. Apart from this disquieting development, it is striking to 
see how easily the new political elite is able to let go of their former ideals and 
rhetoric with regard to their rights to self-determination and to access natural 
resources; a rhetoric through which they in earlier days linked themselves 
to powerful, mainly overseas donor organizations campaigning on behalf of 
24 See also Vel in this volume for a description of similar events.
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indigenous peoples and nature conservation. It appears that opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the local elite, losing all interest in the wellbeing of 
the communities on whose image of indigeneity they have been preying for 
decades, is the rule rather than the exception. A situation has been created in 
which eventually all stand to lose.

jacqueline vel
campaigning for a new district  
in West Sumba
Crowd cheerfully welcomes the new district in Sumba
Thousands of people gathered on the plain of Laikaruda in the middle of 
Sumba on the 31st of January 2003 to celebrate the new district of Central 
Sumba.1 Trucks and small buses had gone early in the morning to the vil-
lages gathering passengers and spreading the word that a delegation from 
Jakarta was coming to inaugurate the new district. It would be a feast, with 
gong music and meals with meat. The honoured guests from Jakarta received 
traditional gifts, such as beautiful hand woven cloth. Traditional dance per-
formances stressed the local population’s commitment and the strong culture 
and tradition of the area that was to be a district by itself. Banners over the 
road proclaimed the creation of Central Sumba as an act of pure democracy 
– Vox populi, vox dei: Suara rakyat adalah suara Tuhan (The voice of the people 
is the voice of God) – and the slogan would locally be interpreted as a sign of 
(the Christian) God’s blessing over the campaign.
The crowd only learned afterwards that this was just one step in a very 
long process of creating a new district. They had been mobilized to assure the 
visiting delegation of the Central Parliament in Jakarta that Central Sumba 
above all rested on the genuine wishes of the people (aspirasi masyarakat). 
This chapter is about pemekaran, the creation of a new district out of old 
(sometimes called ‘redistricting’) in West Sumba.2 Current proposals aim 
to split the present district of West Sumba into three: Central Sumba, West 
Sumba and Southwest Sumba. Throughout Indonesia, the campaigning 
rhetoric always mentions three main reasons for creating a new district: it 
brings the government closer to the people, it will be beneficial to economic 
prosperity, and it is the wish of the people to have their own district. A new 
1  I would like to thank the International Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden for the affiliated 
fellowship that enabled me to work on this article.
2  See the Introduction to this volume. 
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district will have its own bureaucracy with a budget to spend according its 
own priorities, which is one good reason for new candidate bureaucrats to 
create their own district. Setting up a new district bureaucracy promises a 
large number of jobs for well-educated but presently underemployed locals.
Pemekaran is a long process, involving campaigning on Sumba, lobbying 
to the institutions and people who will take the ultimate decisions in Kupang 
and Jakarta, and lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Although the efforts for 
pemekaran in West Sumba started in 2000, four years later the campaign has 
not yet been successful. 
The case of Sumba presented here is an example of how new laws and 
institutions created at the national level are taken as opportunities by mem-
bers of the local elite, who adjust them to local political culture and use them 
to strengthen their positions or interests.
In some areas of Indonesia, the struggle for a larger share of the benefits 
from exploitation of the area’s natural resources is the main driving force 
behind pemekaran; in other areas persisting religious conflicts or ethnic dis-
tinctions make pemekaran an obvious opportunity to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. 
On Sumba, none of these conditions seem to be present. Then what were 
the social forces behind the campaign? How would the identity justifying 
the new district be constructed? Why was there so little opposition? How 
is this case specific for Sumba? Why has the campaign not been successful, 
or at least, not yet? Does the case of pemekaran on Sumba support the thesis 
that local aristocracies in the Outer Islands of Indonesia survive all changes 
in national politics and remain in power locally (Magenda 1989:61-2)? How 
does this case study contribute to understanding the processes that accom-
pany decentralization?3
This chapter describes the campaigns for two of the three new districts 
proposed in West Sumba, namely Central Sumba and Southwest Sumba.4 
Alongside these empirical parts it presents a framework to understand the 
opportunities that decentralization offers. This starts by stressing that Sumba 
is a resource poor island and that the state bureaucracy is the most important 
economic sector, receiving over 90% of its budget from Jakarta. Creating a 
new district needs actors who engage in political struggle to reach this goal. 
These people are connected to each other through networks deploying shared 
histories and cultures. For the purpose of lobbying for their cause – Central 
Sumba in this case – they create a shared political identity. Two important 
3  Jacqueline Vel’s forthcoming monograph Uma politics; Democracy and contemporary political 
culture on Sumba will include the sequel in the Sumbanese democratization process: the 2005 
direct elections for regional head (pikalda), in which some of the main actors in this chapter play 
a prominent role again.
4  The Indonesian names of the proposed districts are: Sumba Tengah, Sumba Barat and 
Sumba Barat Daya.
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elements of this political identity are the boundaries that separate ‘us’ from 
‘them’, and the stories about those boundaries (Tilly 2003:32). The third sec-
tion provides an overview of the various ways in which Sumba has been 
divided administratively in the past, since the currently proposed division 
uses arguments of historical precedent. 
The fourth section answers the question who the local rulers are, and 
concludes that they are still usually members of the Sumbanese aristocracy, 
who are well educated and have a successful professional career as well. 
Campaigning for pemekaran is part of competition between factions of the 
local elite. In this competition, elite factions have to create their own constitu-
ency. The fifth section discusses the problematic role of religion and ethnicity 
on Sumba as ingredients for creating political identity, as labels to distinguish 
‘us’ from ‘them’.
Campaigning for a new district requires strong rhetoric and attractive 
theatre. Being a successful politician on Sumba is largely a matter of being 
the best orator. The sixth section goes into this phenomenon using examples 
of the campaign for South Southwest Sumba. 
Creating a new district is not a completely local affair. It involves actors, 
institutions and decisions on all levels, from the grass root up to Jakarta. 
Studies on these decentralization practices can therefore not be limited to 
the local context. The practices on Sumba in the campaign for a new dis-
trict show the importance of networks as vehicles in political campaigns. 
Religious networks, alumni networks, kinship and marriage alliance net-
works create – much like political parties do – connections between people 
who can provide reciprocal services. The seventh section describes three 
successful Sumbanese men who reside in Jakarta or the provincial capital 
Kupang and who play a very important role in the attempt to create a new 
district in their home island. They link the region with the centre.
 
The economic importance of the state on Sumba
Sumba is an island, about 210 km long and 65 km wide, located southeast 
of the line Bali – Lombok – Sumbawa – Flores. It is part of the province of 
East Nusa Tenggara, one of the poorest in Indonesia, where between 1996 
and 2000 on average only 0.65% of the Indonesian national gross domestic 
product was generated.5 Sumba is divided into two districts, East Sumba 
and West Sumba. Both districts are resource poor and the economically most 
important sector is the state. 
5  BPS Statistics Indonesia at http://www.bps.go.id/sector/nra/grdp/table4.shtml, accessed 5-
8-2004.
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The figures clearly show a very small per capita income, but actual pover-
ty of the Sumbanese population is a matter of debate among statisticians and 
policy-makers (Betke and Ritonga 2004). The macro figures do not include 
income in kind. The larger part of the population in Sumba has income in 
kind. Especially food is either a product of one’s own cultivation or received 
through barter trade, which are invisible in the statistics (Vel 1994b:35-8). 
Despite this addition, Sumba remains a very resource poor island. Cashew 
nuts, vanilla and cacao are at present the most promising crops for export to 
other regions. Sandalwood, which used to be the island’s major commodity, 
is officially banned from trade. Informal sources confirm however that illegal 
logging and trade is finishing off the last sandalwood left on the island, just 
as in Timor (McWilliam 2001). 
The best type of employment with regard to status and monetary income 
from the Sumbanese perspective, and the common ideal for pupils starting 
their education, is to be a civil servant. The riots in 1998 in Waikabubak, 
West Sumba’s district capital, were triggered by demonstrations against the 
district government, which was accused of fraud and nepotism over the 
results of exams for candidate-civil servants (Vel 2001:154). According to 
Sumba Barat dalam angka 2002 (Sumba Barat in figures 2002, see Badan Pusat 
Statistik Kabupaten Sumba Barat 2003) there are 1,356 official civil servants 
in West Sumba, and another 3,600 people who work as school teachers or 
health workers. The total of about 5,000 people who work for the government 
is 25% of those employed outside agriculture in West Sumba. The only other 
6  BPS Statistics Indonesia at http://www.bps.go.id/ and http://ntt.bps.go.id, UNDP Human 
Development Report at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics, and World Fact Book of the CIA at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
Table 1. Sumba in figures.6
Indicator West Sumba  East Sumba Nusa Tenggara  Indonesia
   Timur 
Population
2002 (x 1000) 366 191 3,925 217,100
Per capita income
2002 (in US$**) 116 191 173 3,200
Surface area (in km2) 4,051 7,000 49,880 1,919,317
Population density
(people/km2) 90 27 83 116
** For comparative purposes the income figures are given in US$, using an exchange 
rate of 1 US$ = 9,000 rupiah.
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sector in which people on Sumba earn a good (monetary) income is trade. 
This sector on Sumba is completely dominated by Sumbanese of Chinese 
ethnic origin. Table 2 depicts the structure of the economy in West Sumba 
according to official state statistics:
By far the largest sector is agriculture. In terms of employment – or daily 
activities of the population – 87% of the economically active population 
works in agriculture. This figure includes well-educated people who have 
not succeeded in finding a job corresponding with their education, who con-
stitute an invisible, yet politically important category. The agricultural sector 
accounts for 61% of the District Gross Domestic Product, and 42% of the GDP 
is produced in food agriculture. The latter figure is highly fictive because a 
large part of food production is subsistence agriculture, which means that 
just a small part of the harvest is sold, while the bulk of it is kept for con-
sumption or enters the barter economy, where food is exchanged for serv-
ices (Vel 1994a:71). The government is much more dominant in the district 
monetary economy than these official figures suggest. Just the government 
routine expenditure is visible in the GDP accounts, 16% of GDP. The district 
government is the employer of the official civil servants, pegawai negeri sipil, 
Table 2. West Sumba’s Gross Domestic Product 2001 and its division over the major 
sectors of the district economy.
Indicator, for West Sumba 2001 Billions Percentage of
   rupiah District GDP in 2001
Gross Domestic Product (current market prices) 482  100
Government expenditures 78 17
GDP produced in Agriculture, of which: 284 61
a. food crops’ contribution to GDP 194 42
b. horticulture 34 7
c. forestry 0.8 0
d. livestock 50 11
e. fishery  1
GDP produced in:
a. trade 14 9
b. tourism 1 0
c. mining 2 1
d. industry 3.5 2
e. building and construction 7 4
f. banking and finance 6 3
g. transport and communication 8 3
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik Sumba Barat 2003.
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and of numerous other employees with a minor status. It is also the institu-
tion that issues projects in infrastructure. The district government obtains its 
revenues – 155 billion rupiah in 2001, or 32% of the GDP – for more than 90% 
from the central government, through the General Allocation Fund (Dana 
Alokasi Umum, DAU).7 A new district would have a new district govern-
ment with its own share of DAU. The campaigners in West Sumba envisaged 
great opportunities for themselves and their under-employed relatives. 
The past as a source of arguments for pemekaran
In the debate for or against the new district many historical arguments 
are put forward. What would make Central Sumba a meaningful entity? 
Administrative practice in the past could provide the answer. The history 
of administrative boundaries does not reveal what is now considered West 
Sumba as a natural social or geographical entity. The boundaries involved in 
the discussion about pemekaran were created in the past by state officials, and 
these boundaries shifted every once in a while. 
The most constant type of area in Sumba is the traditional domain. This 
has always been the area referred to if Sumbanese explain other Sumbanese’s 
identity to a third party: ‘orang Lawonda’, ‘orang Loli’. ‘Domain’ is used in the 
anthropological literature to refer to traditional regions. Rodney Needham 
(1987:7) describes the characteristics of a domain on Sumba as follows: 
Its integrating force within a domain is the hegemony of a main village and of 
the leading clan of that village. This clan owed its power to its ancestral spirits 
(marapu) and the unity of the district or domain was manifested in the attendance 
at sacrifices and ceremonies performed at the main village by the dominant clan.
From the earliest accounts, Sumba is described as an island with permanent 
internal warfare. It appears there was strong enmity between the domains. 
The object of warfare was to capture food, horses and people. In the pre-
colonial era land could have been the subject matter of internal disputes but 
not the object of warfare between two domains. The sharp borders drawn on 
maps of traditional domains are imaginary. A domain is defined by its centre 
and not by its borders.8 
Taro Goh (1991) registered 16 domains in West Sumba and another eight 
in East Sumba. Other sources mention more: Meijering, Jongbloed et al. 
(1927:8) mention 29, whereas Oemboe Hina Kapita (1976:51-3) gives a more 
detailed sub-division when he describes the history of administrative divi-
7  Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Sumba Barat 2003:252. In 2001 it was 92%.
8  This is the mandala form of polity (Anderson 1990).
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sions. While living in Lawonda I noticed that people who originate from 
the domain Umbu Ratu Nggai still make a distinction between at least four 
domains within that area, which supports the larger number mentioned by 
Oemboe Hina Kapita. 
What is important within the context of finding stories to support the 
idea of creating a new district is that districts can be made up of several 
traditional domains. Stories about the connection between these domains 
serve as an argument why they should be gathered within one administra-
tive area. In the course of history many different larger administrative units 
were constructed on Sumba. Consequently, domains shifted from one unit 
to another.
Under colonial rule, which started on Sumba in 1912, the whole island 
of Sumba was one afdeeling (similar to today’s district) of the Residency of 
Timor within the Dutch Indies administration. The colonial administrators 
considered the many traditional domains on Sumba, and chose one among 
the aristocrats (maramba) of each area to be appointed as king (raja) and this 
person subsequently acted as indirect ruler (zelfbestuurder), for the colonial 
government. Sumba was divided before 1915 into three sub-districts, named 
onderafdeelingen (see Map 1). These in turn contained smaller sub-units called, 
in colonial terms, kingdoms or territories (kerajaan or landschappen). If one 
landschap comprised more than one traditional domain, the colonial govern-
ment would appoint a raja from one domain with assistant raja from the 
other domains. Although traditional domains were autonomous, they were 
linked in various ways. Cooperation in warfare or protection against slave 
raiders from outside created bonds. Marriage alliance was the most impor-
tant traditional way of creating ties between members of various domains. 
Oemboe Hina Kapita describes how the raja of Lewa Kambera in the mid- 
nineteenth century was in control of the whole area of central and East 
Sumba, because of marriage alliances with the aristocracy of all the domains 
in that area (Oemboe Hina Kapita 1976:33). The first administrative units in 
Sumba correspond with the area of influence of the major raja at that time. In 
1915 West Sumba was split in two after Assistant Resident A. Couvreur stud-
ied the social structure in Sumba and decided to create Northwest Sumba 
and Southwest Sumba (see Map 2). In 1922 the two parts of West Sumba were 
united again, and what was called Central Sumba in those days merged into 
East Sumba (see Map 3). 
The Dutch Protestant Christian missionaries also divided the island into 
several territories for their work. In 1930 they decided to subdivide West 
Sumba into West Sumba-West and West Sumba-East (Wielenga 1949:189), 
following the linguistic boundary that divides the area where the East 
Sumbanese language Kambera is spoken from the area of the West Sumbanese 





























































































































































Map 4a. Government administration before 1915, 3 onderafdeelingen
Map 4b. Administration 1915-1922, 1 afdeeling divided into 4 onderafdeelingen
(Kapita 1976: 620)
Map 4c. Administration 1922-2004, divided into East and West Sumba
Map 4d. Christian mission districts after 1930 (Wielenga 1949): 4 onderafdeelingen,
West Sumba divided
Map 4e. West Sumba’s subdistricts in 2004, with the boundaries of the proposed 
three new districts (bold black)
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The missions area West Sumba-East corresponds most closely to what 
was intended to become the district of Central Sumba in 2002, except that 
sub-district Tana Righu is not included in the plans. Wielenga (1949:43) 
argued that the linguistic boundary separating West Sumba-West from the 
rest of the island was also the boundary east of which ‘the landscape is more 
mountainous, sparsely populated, where animal husbandry is the main eco-
nomic activity and which is less accessible for bringing the Gospel’.
After the Second World War Sumba was one of the 16 member states of 
the federation of Eastern Indonesian States, created by the colonial govern-
ment to counterbalance the nationalist movement in Indonesia. Sumba was 
at that time divided into 16 kerajaan. 
In 1950 the Eastern Indonesian States ceased to exist and became part 
of the Indonesian Republic. The former federation was divided into sev-
eral provinces. The province of which Sumba was part became Sunda Kecil, 
which was renamed Nusa Tenggara in 1954. The province consisted of Bali, 
Lombok, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores and Timor. In 1958 Nusa Tenggara was 
again divided, this time into three: Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa 
Tenggara. Simultaneously Sumba was divided into two districts (tingkat II), 
East Sumba en West Sumba, just as it had been before. 
In 1962 the Indonesian government introduced a uniform administration 
in every part of the nation. West Sumba was called Daswati II Sumba Barat 
and was subdivided into several sub-districts replacing the former kerajaan 
or landschappen (also known as swapraja). At first, there were only four sub-
districts, of which ‘Mau’ was exactly what is now proposed as the new dis-
trict of Central Sumba. Oemboe Hina Kapita (1976:74) writes that ‘for some 
reason or other this division was not making governance easier’. The sub-
district’s borders were shifted and two sub-districts added, so that Memboro 
afterwards belonged to another sub-district. 
In the New Order period the internal administrative boundaries in West 
Sumba did not change. In 1999, the six sub-districts of West Sumba were 
divided into smaller sub-districts, resulting in the present total of 15 sub-
districts.
The most recent new administrative division of West Sumba was for the 
general elections. The general election committee constructed five electoral 
areas (wilayah pemilu), each combining from two to four sub-districts, from 
which locally registered representatives would be chosen in West Sumba’s 
parliament. 
The fourth election area contains sub-districts that belong to three pro-
posed new districts: Laura and Wewewa Utara to Southwest Sumba, Tana 
Righu to West Sumba and Memboro to Central Sumba.
A conclusion from this overview of Sumbanese administrative history is 
that boundaries of administrative territories were constantly changing in his-
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tory. Therefore the idea of pemekaran as part of the decentralization discourse 
is nothing new. It seems to be just a new name for a practice that has been 
familiar for nearly a century.
Local rulers and the social forces behind pemekaran
Ancestry is the unifying principle in traditional domains. The ancestral spir-
its are called Marapu, and this term is also used to indicate the indigenous 
beliefs and ancestor divination. Spiritual specialists (ratu) are the ones who 
receive knowledge of the ancestors concerning every aspect of life. This 
knowledge appears in ritual speech, poems of paired sentences, and in ritu-
als. The ratu know the procedure for each ritual, have the ability to indicate 
an auspicious time for each stage, and indicate the objects required to fulfil 
the ritual. 
The ratu were not the political leaders of their clans. The nobility, maramba, 
held temporal power within each clan (kabihu) (Forth 1981:237), but this lead-
ership was not a hereditary attribute of all noblemen. The leader in charge 
was someone of noble descent with excellent rhetorical skills (Kruseman 
1836, in Hoskins 1993:44), and wealthy enough to be able to organize large 
feasts.
Traditionally, leaders on Sumba were only leaders within their own 
domain. This changed with colonial rule, when some of the maramba were 
appointed by the colonial government as raja or assistant raja, placing them 
into a larger structure and creating a new hierarchy.
From the earliest contacts, Europeans have taken themselves to be confronted 
with territorial political units under the leadership of rajas. These regions were 
eventually consolidated by the Dutch colonial government, in 1928, into nineteen 
independent administrative districts (landschappen); but by indigenous criteria the 
boundaries of these were artificial and disputable, and within them there were 
in some instances more numerous territorial sub-divisions which had their own 
traditional claims to separate recognition. (Needham 1987:7.)
In the area that is proposed as Central Sumba the successive raja from 
Anakalang and Lawonda are the most famous local leaders. They serve as 
icons of the glorious past and their careers as proof of the superiority of the 
people of these domains. Some of their descendants are now active leaders 
in the campaign for Central Sumba, many others are not, while some even 
oppose the idea of pemekaran. 
Umbu Tipuk Marisi is the most famous of the raja Lawonda. He was the 
first grandson of Umbu Siwa Sambawali, the first maramba appointed as raja 
Lawonda, from 1913 until 1932. Umbu Marisi studied at the Academy for 
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Government Sciences in Batavia (Jakarta). Upon his return to Sumba after the 
war he became Sumba’s highest government official, chairman of the council 
of raja, in 1949. He delegated governance over his kerajaan Umbu Ratu Nggai 
to his assistant-raja Habil Hudang, who held the position until the system 
of governance was changed in 1962 (Oemboe Hina Kapita 1976:51). One of 
Habil Hudang’s daughters is now the ‘mother’ in the lobbying committee for 
Central Sumba. The chairman of the committee for Central Sumba is linked 
to Habil Hudang’s family through marriage alliance. Umbu Marisi moved 
to the provincial capital Kupang on nearby Timor Island in 1958 to become 
deputy governor (Pembantu Kepala Daerah Tingkat I untuk Sumba). His 
children did not return to Sumba to be active in politics. 
The raja Anakalang’s rule was restricted to swapraja Anakalang, until 1962, 
when Umbu Remu Samapati was elected to be West Sumba’s district head 
(bupati). He delegated his task as raja to his brother in law Umbu Sulung 
Ibilona. Both Umbu Sulung and Umbu Remu sent their sons for education 
to Java. Umbu Sulung’s eldest son Umbu Djima was district head in West 
Sumba for ten years, from 1985 until 1995. Afterwards he was a member of 
the national parliament for Golkar, until 1999. He is not an active supporter 
of the campaign for Central Sumba. 
Umbu Remu’s son, Umbu Sappi Pateduk, came back to Sumba in 1990 
from Java. He wanted to live in his home area, to be able to combine his gov-
ernment career with his tasks as leader of his clan. He became the head of 
the district planning board (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah, 
Bappeda) in West Sumba. After the 1999 elections it was the first time since 
1958 that district heads were to be elected by the district parliament. He was 
not successful in the last elections, because he was just one among several 
Golkar candidates from Anakalang, struggling for the support of the same 
constituency. Support was divided and in the end the PDI-P candidate from 
further West in Sumba, Th. Langgar, won the position.9 Frustration that 
‘Anakalang has lost power’ is among the motives to create Central Sumba 
district. Umbu Sappi Pateduk was appointed in 2000 as member of the dis-
trict head’s staff (asisten II). He is mentioned as the top candidate for district 
head of Central Sumba, but he does not show official, open commitment to 
the campaign.
Burhan Magenda (1989:61-62) argued in his study of local aristocracies 
in the Outer Islands of Indonesia that they survive all changes in national 
politics and remain in power locally. In the recent literature on decentraliza-
tion in Indonesia, all cases of pemekaran discussed reveal the strong interests 
of local elites, who act as initiators of the secession process, head the lobby-
9  Previously Th. Langgar was district secretary (sekwilda) in the district of North Central 
Timor, had always been a Golkar member but switched in time to PDI-P. 
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ing committees, and – if successful – occupy the offices of power in the new 
provinces or districts (Quinn 2003). Yet a more detailed analysis is necessary 
to reveal which members of the local elite are involved in campaigns for 
pemekaran, and which are not. The ones active in the campaign on Sumba 
were actually a small group. Closer analysis suggests that the older partici-
pants in the campaign were marginal members of the local elite: with suffi-
cient status in traditional terms to be accepted as a leader, but with positions 
in government or the private sector that did not satisfy them, or put them 
outside the decision-making circuit. Leading people in the Central Sumba 
movement include a village head, a reverend suspended from his church 
office because of a long history of larger and smaller conflicts, and several 
retired civil servants. These are supported by a large group of well-educated, 
unemployed youths, who do not want to work in agriculture. These youths 
see the new district as an opportunity to get the jobs they hoped and stud-
ied for. In the short term the campaigning itself provides them with lots of 
excitement, which is otherwise hard to get in Sumba. They are very vocal and 
could become more powerful in their capacity to use violence and enforce 
social exclusion for political opponents.
The case of Central Sumba shows political action by a different group than 
the ruling local aristocracy, who are silent or absent in the story. That the cam-
paign – at least until January 2005 – has not succeeded could therefore be an 
indirect argument in favour of the continuity of the ruling local elite. 
Burhan Magenda (1989:50-5) distinguishes two types of regional elites: the 
commercial and landed aristocracies, of which the latter would fit an ‘inland 
state’ such as Central Sumba. This typology is very useful, especially in his-
torical studies, because it pays attention to the great importance of material 
resources as the source of power. During my fieldwork and various visits 
afterwards I learned that people in Anakalang and Lawonda use a much more 
elaborate concept of ‘local aristocracy’. In this local concept the raja dynasty is 
just one family of rulers among several. In the same area there are more noble 
families, and some of these other families are in no way – except in their his-
torical connection to the government – inferior to the family of the raja. One 
other clan in Anakalang was famous for its ritual specialists, and at present its 
best known member is Secretary General of the Protestant Christian Church 
of Sumba. Yet another clan in Anakalang claims superiority as the clan of first 
residence, therefore they are the ‘Lord of the Land’ (Mangu Tana). The present 
chairman of the General Election Committee in East Sumba, who used to be a 
university lecturer in Java, is a prominent member of this clan. The local aris-
tocracy, therefore, is not a monolithic institution, but it is a diverse group of 
local elites, who can either act in unison or compete among themselves. They 
are all connected through marriage alliances. 
The Central Sumba story hints at changes in the criteria for local leader-
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ship. The definition in the anthropological literature on Sumba emphasizes 
traditional social rank and thus defines the local elite as those of noble rank, 
the maramba. Magenda, somewhat differently, defines the local elite in an 
‘inland state’ like Sumba as the landed aristocracy, which evokes a rather 
static and singular definition of local elite, that focuses on internal sources 
of power and leaves out ties to other parts of Indonesia and influential con-
nections within other spheres of society. On Sumba, land is no longer the 
most important source of power. The state has become more important than 
land. Political disputes are about state offices and funds. A district head 
has the means to employ thousands of relatives and has access to funds for 
buying support. Local aristocrats can only survive as leaders if they acquire 
additional qualities: a good education and a professional career, preferably a 
good position in the bureaucracy. 
This argument leads to the necessity of potential leaders to create a strong 
political identity among their constituency, because kinship and marriage 
alliance might not be sufficient anymore. 
Cultural and religious arguments for creating a new district
Elsewhere in Indonesia, local identity politics are often played out in terms 
of religion and ethnicity. In Central Sumba this is not easy to do, because the 
area is rather homogeneous in both those terms. Instead, as we shall see, local 
leaders conjure up identities out of less tangible materials. To do that, they 
need to possess highly refined oratorical skills. 
Religious affiliation and ethnicity can both provide strong labels for 
creating political identity. Studies on violence in Indonesia give many exam-
ples of how these labels were used in defining the parties in violent battles 
(Colombijn and Lindblad 2002). Labels can only be helpful as markers of 
political identity when they provide a name for the shared characteristic of 
a group in opposition to other, neighbouring groups involved in contentious 
politics (D. Brown 1994:29).
Religious adherence as it is registered on the official identity card shows 
that more than 80% of the population of West Sumba adheres to one of the 
five religions officially recognized in Indonesia. According to the Statistics 
Office in West Sumba, 52% of the population was Protestant Christian in 
2002, 27% Catholic, 3% Muslim and 18% ‘other’, which in Sumba means 
that they are open adherents of the traditional Marapu religion. The his-
tory of the Protestant Christian Church dates back to 1880 with the arrival 
of the first Dutch missionaries, and is rather comparable to that of Central 
Sulawesi, as described by Lorraine Aragon (2000). In both regions ethnic 
minorities – as seen from the national perspective – were converted, and the 
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missionaries made major efforts in education and development. A difference 
between Sulawesi and Sumba however is that in Sumba there is no local 
Muslim majority, which might have stimulated a distinctive identity for the 
Christian minority. As a strategy to distinguish oneself from the inhabitants 
of the neighbouring territory, Protestant Christian identity does not make 
sense in Sumba. Christianity as a uniting characteristic of modern, educated 
Sumbanese, who are well connected to the Indonesian state, does make sense. 
Protestant Christian and later Catholic missions founded schools on Sumba, 
and the contemporary result is that the educated elite is connected through 
Christian networks without making a strong distinction between Catholics 
and Protestants. Catholics are found mostly in the western part of the island. 
If West Sumba is to be divided into three new districts, Central Sumba will 
be relatively more Protestant Christian and Southwest Sumba more Catholic. 
This argument is not used openly in the campaigns. 
Ethnicity is a useful concept when Sumba is studied within the larger 
framework of the Indonesian nation-state. In a similar effort to deal with 
ethnicity, Aragon (2000:52) speaks of ‘the fluid and concentric layering of 
self-identities’. The further from their homeland, the more ethnic identity is 
formulated in outsider’s terms. But in Sumba it is hard to make external eth-
nic labels other than ‘Sumbanese’. Exceptions to that rule are Muslim immi-
grants from other islands, and people originating from other islands living 
permanently on Sumba. For example the Savunese have their own language 
and in some villages in East Sumba they have their own hamlets, but their 
ethnic background was in 2004 not (yet) converted into a political identity.
One external definition of ethnicity on Sumba is found in the ethno-lin-
guistic literature. According to an international team of ethno-linguists at 
the Artha Wacana Christian University in Kupang, who published A guide 
to the people and languages of Nusa Tenggara, there are eight Sumbanese lan-
guages, which they associate with eight different ethnic groups (Grimes et 
al. 1997:67-75). Violence in West Sumba’s capital Waikabubak in 1998 took 
place between orang Wejewa and orang Lauli. However, these two groups are 
in the language guide both part of the Wejewa language area, where Lauli 
is mentioned as a dialect of Wejewa and its speakers consequently are not 
regarded as a different ethnic group. 
Rhetoric and theatre in campaigning for pemekaran
Being a successful politician on Sumba is largely a matter of being the best 
orator. The style of rhetoric that works best is culturally determined and 
changes constantly. In 2004, political rhetoric in local election campaigns on 
Sumba and in the lobby for creating Southwest Sumba – which was in 2003 
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referred to as Sumba Jaya – was a combination of Christian sanctimonious 
talk, New Order jargon, quasi-ritual speech, colloquial talk and fashionable 
television language.
The ‘People’s congress for Sumba Jaya’ on 29 April 2003 was the peak of 
the campaign for this new district. People from seven sub-districts gathered 
in Waitabula, West Sumba’s second town after Waikabubak, and Sumba’s 
Catholic centre. On this day representatives of all seven sub-districts deliv-
ered a declaration supporting and urging the foundation of their new district, 
Sumba Jaya. They offered the signed declaration to the members of the Jakarta 
Committee for Sumba Jaya with the request to take this ‘will of the people’ 
(aspirasi masyarakat) further upwards in the decision-making process. 
At the event no representatives from the decision-making bodies – wheth-
er in Waikabubak, Kupang or Jakarta – were present, but the ceremony was 
carefully orchestrated with these people as the audience in mind. The Sumba 
Jaya committee made a VCD of the event, serving as a modern and lasting 
proof of the strength of their social movement. The VCD perfectly captures 
the political symbols and rhetoric that politicians on Sumba use in contem-
porary campaigns. 
The documentary starts with the arrival on 25 April 2003 of the Jakarta 
delegation at the (only) airport of West Sumba, Tambolaka, which will be 
an important asset of the new district. The Jakarta Committee consisted of 
six members, four middle-aged men and two women, who were all born on 
Sumba – in the area that they hope will become Sumba Jaya. They pursued 
their education and careers on Java. The committee included an army officer 
who is a bodyguard of a recently retired general in Jakarta, a private busi-
nessman and two university lecturers. It has good strategic access to people 
in the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.10 Upon arrival they wore suit-jackets 
made of West Sumbanese hand-woven cloth that looked so similar that they 
were as if dressed in ‘uniforms of the traditional representatives’. The group 
set out to Waitabula in a convoy of jeeps, preceded by a cavalcade of motor-
cycles, a reminder of the traditional horse riders’ welcoming escort but also 
looking like a modern youth gang. The documentary shows that shortly after 
their arrival the Jakarta Committee, together with the chairman of the local 
committee for the new district, set up a meeting with representatives from all 
areas in the new district to explain the strategies and agenda for the People’s 
Congress. They reminded the audience that this was the 50th meeting in 
preparation of Sumba Jaya, a landmark, and an additional reason why the 
Jakarta Committee’s presence was justified.
When the Jakarta delegation entered the field for the event on the 29th, 
they wore traditional dress combined with modern shirt. Although in a way 
10  The next section gives a short profile of the committee chairman, Markus Dairo Talu.
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they were the hosts of the ceremony, they got a seat in front as the guests of 
honour. 
The groups from each of the seven districts arrived in trucks and small 
buses. Apparently the villagers were asked to come in traditional dress, 
and each group was preceded by dancers, who danced and shouted as if 
they were going to war. The official ceremony started with the Indonesian 
National Anthem. Then a Protestant Christian reverend explained to the 
audience in the local language that success can only come with the blessing 
of the Lord, and he said a prayer in Indonesian, in which he asked the Lord 
for support for the campaign for Sumba Jaya and his blessing on the People’s 
Congress. Representatives of each of the seven sub-districts read their decla-
ration, in Indonesian, after which there were a few minutes for dances and 
cheers, called spontanitas. 
The shared summary declaration of pursuit toward the new district of 
Sumba Jaya was the core of the event. Pemekaran is a goal that needs to be 
established within the framework of the State, and this calls for state-like pro-
cedures. A female member of the organizing committee declaimed with the 
monotonous and theatrical voice of a well-trained Indonesian school teacher. 
After each part of a sentence she paused and all sub-district representatives 
and citizens present repeated the words, as if they were saying the Lord’s 
Prayer (Paternoster) in Church.
In line with Joel Kuipers’ opening statement in his book Power in perform-
ance, that on the island of Sumba a vibrant form of ritual speech is required 
in all ceremonial events (Kuipers 1990:i), the organizing committee of the 
People Congress in Waitabula invited a specialist in ritual speech to give a 
performance after the reading of the declaration. 
The few Indonesian words incorporated into the couplet-style monologue 
indicated that the speaker had composed it especially for this occasion, to 
frame the message of the declaration in the vernacular Wejewa. On the one 
hand this was rather similar to the complete domestication of traditional 
culture familiar in the New Order, as it is described by John Bowen (1986) 
with regard to the appropriation of the concept of traditional self help, gotong 
royong. On the other hand it was also a way to add a type of rhetoric to 
the ceremony that livens up the audience and increases their commitment. 
Generally, political leaders rarely win support by rhetorical tactics and strat-
egies that employ reason and rationality. Reason is dull and rarely moves 
people to action. Instead, according to Frederick Bailey (1983), it is passion 
that sways people.
The style of ritual speech is that of an ‘angry man’ (Kuipers 1998:49). Good 
ritual speech on Sumba is (very) loud, a constant stream of words without 
hesitation. It is also orderly, as displayed in the paired sentences of ritual 
speech. The performer at the Waitabula event did not completely succeed in 
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attracting the attention of all. The audience were people from seven areas in 
West Sumba and from other areas – like Jakarta – so that many did not under-
stand the words. Usually on Sumba, the audience enjoys ‘traditional’ per-
formance invented especially for the occasion, because the performer mixes 
in lots of jokes. The Sumba Jaya ‘ritual speech’ was probably too serious. 
Most of all the People’s Congress in Waitabula was a display of the grass 
roots involvement which is formally the primary basis for pemekaran. Political 
leaders prove ‘grass roots involvement’ by getting a large crowd to attend 
the event. Leaders everywhere in the world use large crowds as the visible 
sign of support, to strengthen their political power. Kuipers (1998:74-5) calls 
this feature in the context of Sumbanese political culture ‘the ideology of 
audience completeness’. Audience completeness confirms the authority of 
the leader. Conversely, a key image of a leader’s social influence, prestige 
and status is the capacity to create a ‘complete audience’. The completeness 
shows in the number of people who attend, in their evaluation of the way 
they are received at the event – most concretely measured in how many 
heads of livestock are slaughtered for the meals served to the audience- and 
in the volume and number of the verbal responses they produce during the 
leader’s oration.
Campaigning for a new district is partly just rhetoric and theatre, set up 
by the initiators of the campaign, who need to do this to be acknowledged as 
leaders. The spectators enjoy it, it provides entertainment, good meals and 
fun. A people’s congress or any other large gathering on Sumba does not 
necessarily imply that all the people present know what the event is about, 
let alone that they come because they support the officially stated cause. 
Upward mobility and links with Jakarta
The Jakarta Lobbying Committee for the cause of Southwest Sumba is very 
important in the campaign for the western district. They organize, they initi-
ate, they provide money, they provide campaigning materials, they lobby at 
the decision-making institutions in Jakarta and they return to Sumba every 
once in a while. Who are they and why are they interested in a new district 
on Sumba? Three examples present at least part of the answer.
Dr Manasse Malo lives in Jakarta, where he is professor of sociology at the 
University of Indonesia. He was member of the national parliament (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) until October 2004. He was born on West Sumba 
(Wejewa) in 1941 as the son of the first Sumbanese reverend of the Protestant 
Christian Church. He was a bright student and received a church fellow-
ship first to study at the Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java, and 
to study theology in Jakarta. He was then lucky enough to get the chance, 
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through international church connections, to study in the United States, and 
finally he earned his PhD degree at Wisconsin University. His wife is not 
Sumbanese, but born in Manado. 
Manasse Malo has written and spoken widely on decentralization policy 
in Indonesia (Manasse Malo 1995). In 1998, fired by Reformasi, Manasse 
Malo was one of the founders of the Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB, 
Love the Nation Democratic Party), a mainly Christian Party, with a constitu-
ency predominantly in Eastern Indonesia. He was elected chairman. In the 
1999 elections PDKB won three seats out of 35 in the district parliament in 
West Sumba, and five seats in the national parliament. In 1998, I heard about 
discussions among the Kupang members of the new party indicating that 
at that time they were in favour of making Indonesia a federation again.11 
Eastern Indonesia would be one of the member states, including even East 
Timor, and – according to their hopes or dreams – PDKB would become the 
largest party. 
From 1999 up to the recent 2004 election period Manasse Malo was 
deputy chairman of the national parliament’s Sub-Commission on Domestic 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy, and a member of the parliamentary com-
mittee that deals with regional autonomy. Now he is retired. He is a strong 
supporter of turning Sumba into a province, and the law requires a province 
to have at least three districts. He is the main source of information and the 
gatekeeper to all useful contacts in the bureaucracy in Jakarta. Now that he 
is retired he would not mind returning to Sumba, and be head of one of the 
new districts, or perhaps even governor of the Province of Sumba, ‘if the 
people ask me to’.12
In 1999 Manasse Malo had a discussion with Umbu Dedu Ngara about 
their ideas on pemekaran Sumba. The latter was staff member of the provincial 
planning board Bappeda Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) in Kupang, and also 
heading for retirement. His home village is Lawonda in Central Sumba. His 
family is not the raja’s, but certainly noble. The family members of his gen-
eration and younger are well-educated, most of them in Java. Umbu Dedu 
Ngara studied in Salatiga and was a board member of the Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Kristen Indonesia (GMKI, Indonesian Christian Student Movement), just as 
Manasse Malo had been. 
Umbu Dedu Ngara conveyed the idea to create a new district of Central 
Sumba to several other provincial officials who originate from central Sumba, 
and they began together to lobby for it. They put the idea on the agenda at 
meetings of the Ikatan Keluarga asal Sumba di Kupang (IKAS, Union of 
Sumbanese residing in Kupang).13 In the new decentralized structure the 
11  Personal communication with Nico Woly, Kupang, december 1998.
12  Interview with Manasse Malo, Jakarta, 16-12-2004.
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district has budgetary autonomy, and more decision power over many issues 
has been transferred to the district level, leaving the province with a mostly 
coordinating – and less powerful and rewarding – role. So the provincial 
elite had good reasons for moving one step downwards in the administrative 
hierarchy. Moreover many Sumbanese who have reached the autumn of their 
careers look forward to returning to Sumba, where they are cared for by their 
relatives, appreciated because of their status and relative wealth, and where 
they can die in peace and be buried in accordance with the prescriptions of 
tradition. 
Markus Dairo Talu is not retired yet, since he is just in his early forties. 
He is an army officer with the modest position of adjutant, but the reward-
ing task of bodyguard for a major general, who was his master for many 
years. With his general, Markus served in the Presidential palace for some 
years. He is also a freelance security specialist, who acted as bodyguard for 
businessmen on their request, or as their ‘debt collector’, and as doorman for 
a fancy discotheque in Jakarta. This identity is not really known in Sumba. 
On Sumba, whenever Markus returns from Jakarta to his homeland in 2003 
and 2004, he was the benefactor for the campaign for Southwest Sumba, and 
chairman of its Jakarta Lobby Committee. Sumbanese spectators see his love 
for the homeland and watch his wealth when he distributes T-shirts, caps 
and money. His life history is an attractive success story for those who do 
not belong to the aristocracy. Having lost his father, he lived with his mother 
and siblings in poverty in Wejewa (Waimangura). He was able to attend 
the Catholic school, and received a scholarship to attend a course on Java. 
There he met an army officer who became his mentor and introduced him to 
the army. In Jakarta he owns 4 houses, and provides housing and work for 
around 50 boys from his home area in Sumba.
What these three main actors in campaigning for the new districts have 
in common is that they were born on Sumba, received a good education 
and, with or without a church scholarship, pursued their education in Java. 
Consequently they had a successful career, after which they wanted to return 
to their home island, where they enjoy high prestige and status and social 
security provided by their relatives. They are connected through various mod-
ern networks: the political party, student alumni organizations, the Christian 
Church or the unions of emigrant Sumbanese in cities outside Sumba. 
13  Interview with Manasse Malo, Jakarta, 16-12-2004.
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Campaigning for Central Sumba
After Umbu Dedu Ngara and two fellow provincial officials paid a visit 
to Waibakul,14 the capital of Katikutana sub-district (Anakalang), local 
elite members set up an organization to lobby for the new district, called 
‘Forum Komunikasi Pembangunan Desa’ (Consulting Committee on Village 
Development), usually called simply ‘the Forum’. Agustinus Umbu Sabarua, 
village head of Anajiaka (bordering the sub-district capital) became head 
of the forum. Its members consist of invited representatives of youth and 
women’s organizations, village and church leaders, in short ‘leaders of every 
segment of the population’. The Forum’s tasks was to obtain: a. proof of the 
aspirasi masyarakat (popular wish), and recommendations from; b. the head of 
West Sumba; c. the district parliament; d. the provincial governor; and finally 
e. from the national parliament in Jakarta.
The Forum started by inviting representatives of all kinds of civil soci-
ety organizations and local leaders around Anakalang for a workshop. The 
Forum’s chairman said that the content of the workshop was to ‘socialize 
regional autonomy’, and explained the arguments for creating a new dis-
trict. The main argument was that a new and smaller district would bring 
government services closer to the people, implicitly suggesting that those 
new services would correspond better to the population’s needs and would 
be delivered faster and more efficiently. In this first workshop the partici-
pants discussed which other sub-districts could be invited to join in the new 
district of Central Sumba, since regulations at that time required a minimum 
of three sub-districts per district. The Forum’s chairman phrased the main 
arguments for inclusion as ‘a shared culture’, which he specified as linguistic 
unity, and marriage alliances. 
To the west the linguistic border is a real barrier dividing the people that 
speak Kambera from the people who speak the different west Sumbanese 
languages. But language is not a good basis for demarcating the eastern 
border of Central Sumba, since eastwards everyone also speaks (a type of) 
Kambera. 
Marriage alliances on Sumba can be regarded as the cement between the 
(patrilineal) clans (kabihu), stating the rules and extent of social, economic 
and political solidarity (Keane 1997:51-6). Marriage alliances in Sumba are 
asymmetric, which means that a long chain of clans are tied to each other 
through marriage bonds. In this chain the bride-givers have special power 
over their bride-receivers (Keane 1997:54). All present political leaders in 
west Sumba have a known identity in terms of marriage alliances, and are 
14  Umbu Dedu Ngara (Bappeda), Umbu Giku (Livestock Service, Dinas Peternakan), Agus 
Umbu Sulung (Bappeda) from Kupang. Interview with Gany Wulang, Waihibur, 4-2-2003.
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interconnected in this sense. All the Sumbanese actors involved in the lobby 
for Central Sumba are connected by kinship and marriage alliances, includ-
ing the campaign’s most important man in Jakarta, Manase Malo, whose 
sister lives in the same village as the chairman of Central Sumba’s Forum.
The second step in the process of the ‘socialization of regional autonomy’ 
was a workshop to inform and consult the leaders of all four sub-districts, 
or in the words of the Forum’s chairman: ‘to see whether they accept the 
conclusions that we already drew in the first workshop’.15 The workshops 
were held in cooperation with NGOs working on democratization in 2001 
and 2002.16 The social work of these development organizations focuses on 
teaching local government officials and village communities about proce-
dures and rights that the decentralization law has given them. The NGO 
staff are well aware of the difference between their civil education and the 
‘political games’ of those who primarily seek personal benefit by creating 
new districts. Yet, local NGO staff are part of local society, and subject to 
pressure from the local elite. 
The third step was a seminar with provincial government officials to 
assess the feasibility of a new district. The decentralization laws, especially 
Government Regulation no. 129/2000, specify a set of measurable criteria to 
decide whether a new district can be created or not. What counts is the avail-
ability of both natural and human resources, the number of inhabitants, size 
of the surface area, economic potential, the presence of civil society institu-
tions and people’s political participation, and also the level of infrastructural 
development and social services.17 In November 2001, a Sumbanese lecturer 
at the Satiya Wacana University in Salatiga, Umbu Tagela, wrote:
Law no. 22/1999 and the Government Regulation no. 129/2000, which provide 
all the rules with regard to the number of inhabitants and the level of economic 
growth and the way this should be calculated mathematically, surely leaves 
no option for splitting up Sumba into several new districts. Yet, if the number 
of inhabitants is decisive, the Sumbanese could easily fulfil the criteria by just 
putting off the present family planning policy. [But] would not that be an offence 
against national policy? And if low economic growth is the reason for not allow-
ing a split-up, would that mean that in terms of politics Sumba is expected to 
be poor for ever? The real reason [for granting permission to new districts] is 
whether the ones in power have the political will to support the development of 
Sumba.18
15  Interview with Gany Wulang, Waihibur, 4-2-2003.
16  In the area around Anakalang workshops were organized by Yayasan Wahana Komunikasi 
Wanita (Waihibur/Waikabubak, Sumba), and Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Maumere, Flores).
17  See Chapter III of Government Regulation no. 129/2000.
18  Sabana 7(10-25 November 2001):5. 
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In July 2001 the local Sabana newspaper opened with headlines reviving the 
age-old rumour of gold resources in Mount Tanadaru, in the interior of Sumba. 
The fact that this mountain is situated in Central Sumba made the news 
favourable to the prospect of the new district. Until this presumed gold reser-
voir is actually exploited it will do nothing to alter the unfavourable conclu-
sion as regards feasibility of a new district, namely that there is no economic 
potential for Central Sumba.19 Only 3% of the government income in West 
Sumba is derived from local taxes, the rest originates from Jakarta. There is one 
phrase in Government Regulation no. 129/2000, that can still be of support to 
the Central Sumba lobby. Chapter III, section 3, which formulates the criteria 
for the formation of a new district, adds in the final sentence the possibility of 
‘other considerations that enable the execution of regional autonomy’.20
The fact that with such a bad score on feasibility the case was not closed, 
leads to the conclusion that pemekaran must not be considered merely in 
terms of the administrative execution of a set of decentralization laws, but 
should be seen as a political activity. In May 2001, the Forum wrote a peti-
tion and a proposal, added a large number of supporters’ signatures, and 
sent it to the district government of West Sumba, the Province, and to the 
national Parliament (DPR) in Jakarta. Manase Malo received the petition and 
stimulated the campaigners to continue their struggle, adding his advice on 
how to make the campaign more effective. He seemed dedicated to realize 
pemekaran on his home island. Indeed, rumour said, he dreamed of becoming 
the governor of Sumba, which would need the creation of another district 
first and afterwards a separate province. One of his pieces of advice in the 
early stage of lobbying was that the Forum should pay a visit to Jakarta to 
convince the commission’s members personally of Central Sumba’s viability. 
A group of 25 men and three women of the Forum therefore set off to Jakarta. 
At home the number of cynics was growing, but the delegation itself was 
wildly enthusiastic. 
Ibu John was one of the three women in the party heading for Jakarta.21 At 66 years 
of age she was the mother of the group. She is a daughter of the last raja Umbu Ratu 
Nggai, Habil Hudang. As a girl she was selected to be educated in the mission’s 
school in Payeti, which was the best education available at the time and a guarantee 
for membership of the Sumbanese elite. From this group of Protestant Christian 
youngsters some went for further studies to Salatiga. Ibu John and her husband 
both studied to be teachers, and after their return they set up the Christian Senior 
19  This was firmly stated in an interview with one of Waikabubak’s leading Chinese business-
men.
20  Pertimbangan lain yang memungkinkan terselenggarannya Otonomi Daerah. Government 
Regulation PP 129/2000, Chapter III, section 3, pp. 129-200.
21  This section is based on my interview with ibu John (Rambu Moha) in Waikabubak, 20-2-
2004.
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High School (SMA) in Waikabubak. Many of the current politicians, government 
officials and members of Central Sumba’s Forum are her former pupils, includ-
ing the present district head. Ibu John has known Manasse Malo since they were 
young, he is her ‘little brother’ in the Sumbanese, educated, Protestant Christian 
elite. More recently, Ibu John and Manasse Malo had been in touch because they 
were both involved in Malo’s political party PDKB. In December 2002 Ibu John 
attended the congress of this party in Jakarta and spoke about Central Sumba with 
Manasse Malo. He urged her to join the lobbying party to Jakarta.
They set off on 11 January 2003, first by ferry to Denpasar in Bali. There they 
went to Rocky Umbu Pekudjawang, a successful tourism businessman born in 
Anakalang,22 to ask him for transport money to Jakarta. Ibu John related that 
upon seeing the tourist coach full of uncles, cousins and aunts, he decided to 
sponsor more than half of the costs of the trip. The party rested in Semarang, 
Central Java, where they were received by close relatives living there. They got a 
meal and food to go and an additional contribution of 2 million rupiah.
In Jakarta Ibu John was invited to give a speech to the members of the sub-
commission on pemekaran. She told them, dressed in traditional Sumbanese style, 
about the hardship of the people living in this remote area to be named Central 
Sumba, and how far they were from essential government services, about their 
genuine wish to develop themselves, of the great potential of the land, and that 
the will of God was helping them. Touched by this emotional speech, and assured 
that their ticket would be paid, the commission members promised that their 
inspection team would pay a visit to Sumba within a short time. 
The parliamentary inspection team from Jakarta visited Sumba on 31 January 
and 1 February 2003. When they landed in the capital of East Sumba, they 
were very politely received by the district head of East Sumba. He had 
already made it clear from the start that Central Sumba could never include 
part of the present East Sumba district, with the formal argument that peme-
karan means dividing one administrative unit into two, not recombining bits 
of two districts. It was his interest to make sure that no part of his territory 
would be claimed by the new district. Subsequently the team was welcomed 
by thousands of people in Laikaruda, the event with which this chapter 
started. The Forum had ‘motivated’ the crowd to come and offer the best 
of traditional presents. The crowd’s presence reassured the Jakarta team of 
the local people’s wish for autonomy, and in traditional terms it stressed the 
Forum members’ leadership and legitimacy to represent the population. 
With the lobby straight to Jakarta, Central Sumba’s Forum by-passed 
and therefore offended the district parliament. Thus one obstacle remained, 
for the final application procedure a recommendation from all levels was 
required. Whereas the national parliament’s team was ready to give its 
approval, and the governor and parliament at provincial level were ready 
22  Rocky Umbu Pekudjawang was also number one on the Golkar list for the national parlia-
ment in Nusa Tenggara Timor (NTT) in the April 2004 elections.
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to issue the recommendation, the district parliament and the head of West 
Sumba were not. In Waikabubak, on 1 February 2004, the offended parlia-
ment of West Sumba treated the team very impolitely, without a proper 
reception, and the district head remained absent, claiming he had been sum-
moned by the governor in Kupang.
In the meantime the West Sumba district government had also received a 
proposal for pemekaran by yet another part of the district. Sumba Jaya would 
unite seven sub-districts in the western part of West Sumba.23 This part of 
West Sumba is the relatively more developed. The capital of Sumba Jaya 
would be Tambolaka, now known as the location of West Sumba’s airport. 
Sumba Jaya would also include West Sumba’s major harbour at Waikelo. The 
creation of Sumba Jaya would split the ever-feuding domains of Lauli and 
Wejewa (see Vel 2001), and would imply that very little would be left for 
the remaining part of the original West Sumba. In February 2003, Central 
Sumba’s Forum was confident that Sumba Jaya’s chances were poor, ‘since 
the 15th of October 2002 was the deadline for submitting proposals and they 
were too late’.24 Sumba Jaya’s lobby appeared to be very strong, though, and 
if the legal criteria for pemekaran were to be used to assess feasibility, this 
proposal would stand a much better chance. The proposal for Sumba Jaya 
– whose name was changed to Southwest Sumba in late 2003 – increased the 
feeling of competition in West Sumba, and behind the stage, the hopes of 
success in Central Sumba began to decline.
A second complicating factor was protest from Wanukaka, where a move-
ment sprang up to refuse participation in the proposed district of Central 
Sumba. The official arguments were that there is no history of Wanukaka 
being part of the same administrative unit with Anakalang, Umbu Ratu 
Nggai and Memboro. Trade relationships with the town of Waikabubak are 
strong. Waibakul as capital instead of Waikabubak would make the distance 
to government services for the population of Wanukaka even longer. This 
new development created tensions between Wanukaka and Central Sumba’s 
proponents. A new sub-ethnic distinction emerged to explain initial support 
for Central Sumba by some people from Wanukaka: Wanukaka atas (upper) 
versus Wanukaka bawah (lower), where Wanukaka atas refers to the 10% of 
the population residing in the mountainous area adjacent to Anakalang, 
where marriage alliances are many.25
23  The seven sub-districts are: Kodi, Kodi Bangedo, Wewewa Barat, Wewewa Timur, Wewewa 
Selatan, Palla (Wewewa Utara) and Laura.
24  Interview with Agustinus Umbu Sabaruwa, chairman of the Forum, 5-2-2003.
25  Interview with Muana Nanga, director of STIE in Waingapu, 18-02-2004.
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West Sumba‘s district head Thimoteus Langgar decided to create a committee 
to guide the pemekaran process for the proposed new districts. He appointed 
his deputy district head as chairman, and former district head Umbu Djima, 
from Anakalang, as vice chairman.26 This team invited the Nusa Cendana 
University from Kupang (‘team Undana’) to make a feasibility study on the 
potential for West Sumba to be split into more than one district using the crite-
ria from Government Regulation no. 129/2000 to measure the score of potential 
new districts. Undana’s Team recommended three options for West Sumba. 
The first option was to split West Sumba into West and Central Sumba, the 
second to split into West Sumba and Southwest Sumba, and the third was to 
create all three new districts. Apparently to remain united in one district was 
no option. 
The team formulated positive conclusions, supporting the lobby for 
creating new districts. However, two economists in Waingapu, Siliwoloe 
Djoeroemana – born in Anakalang – and Muana Nanga – born in Wanukaka 
– wrote a very critical review of the feasibility study: 
The team did not assess whether West Sumba fulfils the criteria for pemekaran, 
but instead focused on the new districts, parts of the present district. Government 
Regulation no. 129/2000 states that already existing data should be used, that 
are compiled by authorized institutions. Instead, the team gathered many new 
data, or used data from the sub-districts offices. The data themselves show a 
remarkable bias, positive towards a sufficient score for ability for splitting up the 
district. Compared to the official statistics published in Sumba Barat dalam angka 
2000 (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Sumba Barat 2001) for example the total 
length of roads has doubled. Also there seem to be 15,000 post offices and the like 
in Waikabubak only, which gives the impression the team counted the letters and 
not the post offices.27
After a number of demonstrations and a road block, organized by youth 
involved in the campaign and supported by some Forum members in Central 
Sumba on 22 May 2003, the West Sumba government finally agreed to give 
its recommendations, opting for three new districts, in what they called a 
‘win-win solution’. The district parliament added two restrictions before 
the recommendations would indeed be issued. Southwest Sumba had to 
reconsider its boundaries with West Sumba in order to make the division of 
resources, inhabitants and infrastructure more equal. Central Sumba had to 
reconcile with Wanukaka, to decide which of the latter’s sub-districts would 
be part of the new and the old district.
26  Decree of the district head of West Sumba no. 379/2002, 31-12-2002.
27  My summary of Siliwoloe Djoeroemana and Muana Nanga, ‘Catatan kritis atas draft 
laporan hasil penelitian Tim Undana tentang pemekaran kabupaten Sumba barat’, Suara Sumba 
3-6:6-7.
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By February 2004 it appeared to be very hard to publicly criticize or even 
question the idea of Central Sumba in Anakalang. Those who did – like the 
critics of the Undana report – were accused of not being loyal to their place of 
birth, and in fact were threatened with social expulsion. In Sumba there were 
not yet – as elsewhere in Indonesia – private militias who are sent to make 
people change their opinion. Less severe, but just as effective, are exclusion 
from mutual help services, and bad rumours. Being elite on Sumba makes one 
by definition dependent on the services of many kinsmen and fellow villagers. 
Those elite members who live in the capital or even outside Sumba still count 
on their relatives to provide them with space and material for ceremonies like 
weddings, and eventually to provide them with a proper grave. Rumours that 
spread bad stories about alleged illness, accusations of being too old to think 
positively or being too estranged from Sumba to appreciate aspirasi masyarakat 
are effective to reduce authority. Youth play an important role in spreading 
these rumours. At the seminar on pemekaran in Waikabubak youth delegations 
openly contested the authority of highly educated speakers who were cynical 
about Central Sumba. The youth groups in Anakalang are strong because of 
their growing number. The most active members are unemployed, well-edu-
cated – with bachelors degrees from Java or Kupang – who do not want to 
work in agriculture and cannot find suitable employment. They dream about 
new districts full of new positions in government service. 
In February 2004 it appeared as though the lobby for Central Sumba had 
turned more Christian. The lobbying group that set out to Jakarta comprised 
one Protest Christian reverend who said prayers preceding every next step in 
the process leading to the final positive decision on Central Sumba. Calling 
the creation of the new district the wish of God (kehendak Tuhan)28 makes crit-
ics of the pemekaran opponents of the Lord. This is another type of threat and 
a means of social exclusion in a community where being regarded as a good 
Christian is similar to being respected. More ritual and Christian rhetoric also 
increased the theatrical value of the campaign, which could have been a delib-
erate strategy to compensate for the absence of sound, practical arguments. 
On 26 February 2004 Manasse Malo was very pleased to receive a delega-
tion of the West Sumba district parliament, the Forum for Central Sumba, 
and one for Southwest Sumba, as well several Sumbanese from Jakarta who 
brought the last requirements for the proposal to create new districts in West 
Sumba.29 
Officially these requirements were a number of documents with the 
recommendations of all the offices involved as well as a description of 
the process of pemekaran written by the district parliament. In practice the 
28  Interview with Ibu John (Rambu Moha) in Waikabubak, 21-02-2004.
29  Sabana 52(23-28 February 2004):1. 
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requirements included bribes at all levels. For Central Sumba this was a 
serious problem. The secretary of the Youth Organization for Central Sumba 
estimated that up to 23 February 2004 the campaign for Sumba Tengah had 
spent between 800 and 900 million rupiah on air tickets, food and bribes.30 
For Sumba this was an immense amount of money, whereas by Jakarta stand-
ards it was ‘just cigarette money’.
The result of the meeting in Jakarta was that the proposal to split West 
Sumba into three – Southwest Sumba, Central Sumba and West Sumba – was 
officially put on the agenda for the plenary session of the national parliament 
to decide. 
Unfortunately for the activists from Sumba, the campaigning period for 
the national election started early that March. The Minister of Internal Affairs 
dismissed all decisions on matters of regional autonomy until after the new 
parliament was installed, probably October 2004. In Sumba, as everywhere 
else in Indonesia, political campaigns from March 2004 onwards concerned 
the elections. Central Sumba’s activists shifted their attention from pemekaran 
and concentrated on the elections for the district parliament in April, some 
of them being candidates themselves. 
A second alarming matter was the revision of Law no. 22/1999. The 
minimal number of sub-districts in a new district was now raised to seven 
districts, which had to have existed for at least five years. For some time there 
was hope in Sumba that the decision for pemekaran in West Sumba would be 
taken before the changes in Law no. 22 took effect. However, the law was 
changed on 10 May by presidential decree. This makes it hard to believe that 
Central Sumba will ever be realized, although professor Manasse Malo was 
still optimistic in December 2004.31
The campaign for Central Sumba shows that to create a new district 
involves a long process, and success is not guaranteed. In the same period, 
since 2000, many other districts were created, which raises the question 
why it took so long for Sumba. That so many people and institutions have 
to provide their recommendation or decision, and the fact that they have to 
be ‘motivated’ to do so, is one explanation for the tardiness. Once the law 
on a new district is passed, the legislative bodies (and persons) have done 
their task and lose this opportunity for extra income. It would be interesting 
to see figures that relate the amount of expenditure involved in ‘the cost of 
the campaign’ – like the 1.5 billion rupiah of Tojo Una-Una (Cohen 2003:50) 
as compared to the lesser 900 million of Central Sumba – to the speed with 
30  Interview with Adri Saba Ora, secretary of Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Peduli Sumba 
Tengah, 23-2-2004. For comparison: Margot Cohen reports that the campaign to create the district 
Tojo Una-Una in Central Sulawesi required 1,5 billion rupiah (Cohen 2003).
31  Interview with Manasse Malo, Jakarta, 16-12-2004.
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which the pemekaran process took place. The fact that Central Sumba has not 
yet succeeded in becoming a district by itself does not contradict the opinion 
that all government decisions in Indonesia are for sale, but it could be inter-
preted as a sign that a district has a minimum price, which is too high for 
poor and small areas like Central Sumba to pay.

dik roth
Many governors, no province
the struggle for a province in the Luwu-tana 
toraja area in South Sulawesi
Introduction
Pemekaran, or administrative fragmentation, formed an integral part of 
the process of decentralization and regional autonomy which unfolded 
in Indonesia since 1999.1 Pemekaran, which was specified in Government 
Regulation no. 129/2000, has created new opportunities for political actors 
in provinces, districts, sub-districts and municipalities. In 2000 alone, the 
Department of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy received requests for 
13 new provinces and 44 districts.2
Decentralization and pemekaran are, too often, seen as unproblematic 
mechanisms of administrative reform, part of a transition towards predeter-
mined structures of governance, contributing to development, democracy, 
civil society and good governance (see Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Turner et al. 
2003; World Bank 2003). Similarly, political actors themselves tend to phrase 
such complex and contingent processes in terms of mechanistic routines 
based, of course, on a developmental ‘vision and mission’ (visi dan misi) and 
rooted in the ‘aspirations of the people’ (aspirasi masyarakat). 
Others are more critical. Hadiz (2003b) criticizes mainstream decentraliza-
tion thinking as belonging to a depoliticizing neo-institutionalist approach 
to development. Many authors stress that the outcome could also be more 
chaos, local power play, localized corruption, disintegration, and the emer-
gence of ‘little kings’ (Hadiz 2003b; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; McCarthy 
1  Research for this chapter was financed with a grant from the Netherlands Organization for 
Scientific Research (NWO). Interviews with key political actors were held in Jakarta, Makassar, 
Tana Toraja and Luwu. I feel indebted to all who shared with me their views and opinions. I also 
thank Diks Pasande for his valuable assistance.
2  GTZ 2001a; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Sakai 2002; Tempo 28-4-2001; http://www.bps.
go.id/mstkab/kab-2004-UU.pdf.
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2004). They recognize the importance of analyzing such processes in their 
specific socio-cultural, political, economic and other contexts (Sakai 2002; 
Schulte Nordholt 2003). Only in this way a-priori assumptions about pur-
pose, direction, or outcome of pemekaran can be avoided.
In this chapter I discuss the struggle for a new province in the Luwu-Tana 
Toraja region in South Sulawesi. Similar movements elsewhere in Indonesia 
have been remarkably successful. Bangka-Belitung and Gorontalo, for instance, 
quickly gained autonomy, while West Sulawesi was ratified in 2004.3 Other 
autonomy movements are still struggling, with uncertain outcome. This is also 
the case with the struggle for Luwu (Raya) Province, which has generated a 
variety of lobbying activities, proposals, committees, meetings, press brief-
ings, and (self-appointed) spokesmen, but all in vain. The province seems to 
be more distant than ever before. ‘There are many governors, but no province’, 
concluded one of the people involved. Recently the process was compared to 
‘pushing a broken-down car’ (Palopo Pos 11-9-2004). 
The Luwu (Raya) case is complex: political and economic power and 
control of strategic resources merge with differing perceptions of history and 
identity, defined along lines of religious affiliation or customary traditions 
and relationships. Elizabeth Morrell (2002) and M. Nathan (2003) have ana-
lysed the case. Morell is critical of the proliferation of autonomy movements, 
and regards them as symptoms of dissatisfaction that need to be taken (more) 
seriously. Nathan (2003:38) approaches pemekaran in terms of the ‘original 
goal’ of ‘bringing the government closer to the people’ and is too optimistic 
about decentralization, pemekaran, and the role of local elites in these proc-
esses. 
Based on the Luwu case I will stress three points. First, pemekaran cannot 
be simply interpreted as the next step in a process of establishing a more 
democratic, transparent and development-oriented society. The struggle for 
a separate province is a multi-dimensional power struggle involving differ-
ent actors and interests. Second, pemekaran should not be approached in an 
a-historical manner by isolating it from its socio-historical context. Instead, it 
should be analysed as a continuation of long-term processes of socio-politi-
cal change under the new political conditions created by Reformasi. Third, 
the struggle for a province is not exclusively about political and economic 
power but is also related to processes of ethno-religious identification. These 
form legitimizing arguments in such power struggles but have, at the same 
time, their own social and historical meaning and dynamic. In the following 
section I will sketch the socio-historical context of the case and discuss ear-
lier attempts to establish a province. Then I describe and analyse the recent 
emergence of a movement for Luwu (Raya) Province and two contending 
3  Law no. 26/2004. See Morrell 2005; Kompas 25-9-04.
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factions operating within it. In the next section I discuss the dynamic inter-
action between different agendas for administrative change both at district 
and provincial level. Finally, I zoom in on the hidden agendas of the conflict 
between the two factions in the movement and discuss the role of ethno-
religious interests.
South Sulawesi, Luwu and Tana Toraja: a short history
South Sulawesi Province covers the south-western peninsula of Sulawesi. 
In 2003 it covered 62,482 km2 (42% of Sulawesi) with a population of 8 
million. It harbours four major ethnic groups: Bugis, Makassarese, Toraja 
and Mandarese. With more than six million people Bugis and Makassarese 
are the largest groups who live primarily in the southern part of the prov-
ince. Mandarese live in the northwest and Toraja in the northeast of the 
province.4 In the course of history, religion became a crucial ethnic marker. 
Common adherence to Islam among Bugis and Makassarese created an 
increasingly common identity. Bugis and Toraja identities, on the other 
hand, were deeply influenced by the different paths of socio-cultural change. 
The Toraja remained largely animist until the establishment of colonial 
rule and the arrival of Dutch Protestant Reformed Mission (Gereformeerde 
Zendingsbond) in the early twentieth century, and then massively converted 
to Christianity. Since many centuries Islam became a major formative ele-
ment of Bugis-Makassarese identity. Relationships between Bugis and Toraja 
became dichotomized in terms of a contrast between ‘pagan’ and ‘primitive’ 
upland Toraja and Islamized and ‘civilized’ inhabitants of the Bugis lowland, 
and later of Christian Toraja and Islamic Bugis (Bigalke 2005; Pelras 1996; 
Volkman 1985). 
Until 1959 Luwu was a kingdom governed by a datu (king) and is widely 
regarded as the cradle of Bugis culture. Though associated through myth 
and history with the Bugis world, Luwu is not an exclusive Bugis area. Court 
culture and language in Luwu was Bugis, but the majority of the popula-
tion of Luwu speak Tae’, the Toraja language. Based on kinship and shifting 
political alliances rather than on fixed territoriality, Luwu’s relationships 
with other areas were dynamic and flexible. Luwu used to cover large parts 
of current Central Sulawesi (Poso), Southeast Sulawesi (Kolaka) and South 
Sulawesi (including parts of current Tana Toraja District and the southern 
Bugis lowland). Around 1605 the Luwu nobility converted to Islam and from 
the seventeenth century onwards the power of the kingdom declined.  
4  Recent migration has changed these patterns. The Mandarese in West Sulawesi are no 
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Luwu and the Sa’dan highlands (current Tana Toraja District) are con-
nected through sociocultural, political, and economic ties. The character and 
scope of these ties – expressed in myths of the divine and common origin of 
the early kingdoms of South Sulawesi: Luwu, Goa (Makassar) and Sangalla 
– varied between regions and historical periods. However, Luwu’s claims 
of power over the highland population were not recognized everywhere 
(Bigalke 2005; Volkman 1985; see below). In 1905 Luwu was subdued by the 
Dutch and became a ‘self-governing territory’ (zelfbesturend landschap) under 
colonial administration. The kingdom was deeply affected by these changes: 
some existing ties with other regions were severed (for example with Wajo 
in the South and Poso in Central Sulawesi), while others were artificially cre-
ated or strengthened. The Sa’dan (Toraja) highlands were incorporated into 
Luwu and divided into the sub-disctricts Makale and Rantepao. Thus, the 
Dutch had frozen the dynamic and shifting power relations in the area into a 
fixed structure of territorially defined administrative units.
In the 1940s and 1950s the administrative status of ‘Makale-Rantepao’ had 
shifted between greater dependence on and relative autonomy from Luwu. 
In the 1950s the area had lost its previous autonomous status. The tensions 
between Luwu and the highlands were sharpened by the outbreak of the 
Darul Islam rebellion. Under the leadership of Luwu-born Kahar Muzakkar, 
Darul Islam developed into a separatist revolt that held South Sulawesi in 
thrall between 1950 and 1965. From 1953, the movement shifted from a com-
munist towards an Islamic ideology. The killing of Kahar in 1965 marked the 
end of the movement (Van Dijk 1981; Harvey 1974; Velthoen 2004). Recent 
developments in South and Central Sulawesi, like the spread of Islamic 
extremism, the entry of Kahar’s sons into politics, and the emergence of the 
sharia movement indicate a possible link between the 1950s and recent devel-
opments of decentralization and pemekaran. 
From 1953 onwards, tensions between the mainly Christian highlands 
and Islamic lowland increased and formed the context in which a broadly 
supported movement in the Toraja highlands demanded autonomy from the 
Luwu Kingdom. Highland autonomy from Luwu was finally granted in 1957 
and effectuated in 1959.5 Luwu and Tana Toraja emerged from this process as 
separate districts (kabupaten) of South Sulawesi.
Luwu has a special position in South Sulawesi. It is characterized by 
a complex mix of socio-cultural influences and ethnic identifications. 
Administratively it belongs to the Bugis-Makassarese world of South 
Sulawesi and is widely regarded as a Bugis area. However, historical ties 
with the highlands of current Tana Toraja have also formed Luwu culture, 
language and identity. Economically, Luwu is important for South Sulawesi. 
5  Emergency Law no. 3/1957.
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Before Luwu was split up in 1999, it was the largest of 21 South Sulawesi 
districts, covering almost 25% of the province. It is relatively sparsely popu-
lated, but rich in natural resources for agriculture, fisheries, forestry and 
extractive industries. These resources have attracted many migrants: Bugis 
and Makassarese from the lowlands and Toraja from the highlands. 
A major cash earner in (East) Luwu is PT International Nickel Indonesia 
(PT INCO). In 1968 it was given a 218.529 hectare concession, more than 
50% of which is situated in South Sulawesi while the remainder is located in 
Central and Southeast Sulawesi. In 1996 the contract was extended until 2025.6 
In 2003 the company produced 70,000 tons of nickel. With a growing world 
demand its economic prospects are bright. The regional income generated by 
INCO is a major trophy in connection with the politics of pemekaran. Currently 
the proceeds flow to South Sulawesi. However, if Luwu becomes a province, 
INCO proceeds will stick there. It will be clear that the province of South 
Sulawesi is not very enthusiastic about this prospect.7 
During pemekaran of Luwu District, the nickel mines changed hands sev-
eral times. In 1999 North Luwu split off from Luwu, gaining control over 
INCO. In 2003, East Luwu split off from North Luwu, taking over the mines 
(Nathan 2003). Mining, with INCO as the largest contributor by far, pro-
vided a considerable share of the Gross Regional Domestic Product (PDRB) 
of North Luwu in 2001: 57.86%. In the same year, INCO contributed Rp 4,8 
billion in taxes. Morrell (2002) mentions a Rp 10 billion contribution to the 
South Sulawesi economy from INCO royalties in 2001. Though an estimated 
60% flew back to North Luwu (where the mines were located then), the 
remainder was still of considerable importance. 
In contrast, Tana Toraja is economically not as important as Luwu, but it 
is the main symbol of South Sulawesi culture to the outside world, and the 
main reason for tourists to visit South Sulawesi. 
Decentralization and pemekaran
Government Regulation no. 129/2000 stipulates the criteria for administra-
tive change in the framework of regional autonomy.8 Formal objectives are: 
better government service, democratization, regional economic develop-
6  Kompas 7-1-2004. See K. Robinson 1986, 1999.
7  Morrell 2002; Nathan 2003. Nathan puts the importance of mining in perspective. In 2002, 
North Luwu received 20% of its revenues from local resources (90% of which INCO taxes and 
revenues). Central government allocations (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) contributed almost 60% 
of district revenues (Nathan 2003).
8  Government of Indonesia 1999, 2000. Government Regulation no. 129/2000 distinguishes 
between pembentukan daerah (the formation), pemekaran daerah (splitting), penghapusan daerah 
(abolishing) and penggabungan daerah (merging) of regions.
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ment, better use of regional capacity, more security, and more harmonious 
relationships between centre and regions. It also mentions the preconditions 
for such changes according to various categories: economic, regional capac-
ity, socio-cultural, socio-political, population, geographic area, and ‘other 
considerations’. It specifies that a new province should consist of minimally 
three districts and/or municipalities (kotamadya). A new district should con-
sist of minimally three sub-districts. 
Recently, Law no. 22 and Law no. 25/1999, as well as Government 
Regulation no. 129/2000 have been revised and replaced with Law no. 32 
and Law no. 33/2004. Throughout Indonesia lobbying movements emerged 
for new administrative regions, which were driven by the ambitions of local 
elites and did not automatically result in good governance. By posing stricter 
criteria, the revised Law no. 32/2004 reaffirms central control by throwing 
up barricades to this seemingly unlimited process of pemekaran. It does so by 
increasing the number of districts and/or municipalities minimally required 
for establishing a province (five), and the number of sub-districts required 
for establishing a new district. It also sets new time limits to prevent the 
acceleration of pemekaran: new provinces may split up after ten years, new 
districts after seven and sub-districts after five years.9 
These quantitative criteria cause pemekaran processes at various levels to 
be interdependent and interlocked. Thus, pemekaran of sub-districts create 
the necessary conditions for district pemekaran. Increase in the number of 
districts can, in turn, form the basis for a new province. The dynamic interac-
tion between these processes at various levels is also crucial in understanding 
the shifting political options, preferences, and choices in the struggle for a 
province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja area. 
Sulawesi was also deeply affected by pemekaran. In 2000, Gorontalo 
Province split off from North Sulawesi,10 while in South Sulawesi several 
movements for regional autonomy emerged.11 The strongest demands came 
from the north-western and north-eastern parts of this province. In 1999, the 
districts of Mamuju, Majene and Polewali-Mamasa demanded autonomy 
from South Sulawesi and aimed to establish a separate West Sulawesi 
Province.12 Around this time, the movement for establishing a province in 
the Luwu-Tana Toraja area also started making its demands.
9  Law no. 32/2004, chapter II, articles 4-5. Law no. 32/2004 was ratified on 15 October 2004. 
On the other hand, the law provides the new possibility for regions (whether province, district, 
or municipality) to attain the administrative status of kawasan khusus (special region).
10  Law no. 38/2000.
11  Kompas 28-10-1999 and Tempo (28-4-2001) mention five initiatives. See Morrell 2002.
12  Morrell 2002. Formally ratified by the national parliament on 22 September 2004. With 
more than one million inhabitants, it covers 16,796 km2, 26.87% of the original province (Kompas 
23-9-2004, 25-9-2004). Other initiatives emerged in the southern part of the province: Sulawesi 
Timur and Ajatappareng (Morrell 2002, 2005) ‘Sulawesi Timur’ was coined by three different 
Dik Roth128
Luwu and Tana Toraja were also affected by pemekaran. In 1999, North 
Luwu District (Kabupaten Luwu Utara) split off from Luwu.13 The new, 
reduced district of Luwu, with Palopo as capital, covers 3,247.77 km2 with 
a population of 403,931 in 2001.14 North Luwu, with Masamba as capital, 
covered 14,447.46 km2 with a population of 442,267. In 2002, Palopo gained 
the administrative status of municipality (kotamadya).15 Shortly after the 
establishment of North Luwu, lobbying started to establish a separate dis-
trict of East Luwu (Kabupaten Luwu Timur) in the north-eastern part of the 
initial district. In 2003 this district split off from North Luwu and currently 
harbours INCO.16 
Even relatively small Tana Toraja (3,205 km2; 400,000 inhabitants) became 
the object of demands for pemekaran. Panitia Pembentukan Kabupaten Toraja 
Utara  (PPKTU, Committee for Establishment of North Toraja District), rep-
resenting seven sub-districts in north Tana Toraja, was formed in 2002. In 
September 2002, the request for a district was supported by the district head 
and parliament of Tana Toraja.17 This initiative was soon followed by politi-
cal lobbying for yet another district: West Toraja (Toraja Barat). Under the 
revised law of 2004, the outcome of these initiatives is uncertain.
When Luwu started splitting up, the movement for a separate province 
emerged. In 1999 demonstrations for Tana Luwu or Luwu Raya Province 
were held in Luwu.18 According to press statements, Luwu (Raya) Province 
was intended to unify the area covered by pre-1999 Luwu and Tana Toraja. 
Unification of these areas would create a province covering 20,901 km2 with 
a population of 1,189.757.19 The emergence of this movement did not signify 
tensions between Jakarta and the regions but rather between the districts 
involved and the province of South Sulawesi (Morrell 2002).
.
political movements in South and Central Sulawesi: one in southern South Sulawesi (mentioned 
here); another in the north-eastern part of this province exploring political support for a province 
covering Luwu, Tana Toraja and Enrekang (see below); a third in Central Sulawesi, covering the 
eastern part of this province (see Morrell 2002).
13  Law no. 13/1999. 
14  The capital of Luwu will shift to Belopa. Palopo is the intended provincial capital.
15  Law no. 11/2002 (10-4-2002).
16  Law no. 7/2003 (3-5-2003).
17  Keputusan DPRD no. II/KEP/DPRD/IX/2002 and Surat Bupati no. 136/1063/PEM/UM, 26 
September 2002, tentang persetujuan pemekaran Kabupaten Tana Toraja. 
18  The land of Luwu; Greater Luwu Province.
19  This equals 33.45% of South Sulawesi (62,482.54 km2) before the establishment of West 
Sulawesi, and 15.56% of its 7.647,492 population. Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi 
Luwu (BKPPL) Jakarta, Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya, 2000. 
Many governors, no province 129
Earlier provincial ambitions: Toraja Raya and Lutat
The current struggle for a province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja region and 
the various competing options involved did not simply fall out of the blue. 
Political ideals of establishing a province have a history that goes back to the 
colonial period. The recent political processes can only be understood if they 
are placed within this broader regional historical context. In this respect, two 
political movements stand out: Toraja Raya (Greater Toraja) and Lutat.20 
Toraja Raya refers to political ambitions emerging in the context of changes 
related with the colonial period, revolution and decolonization, Darul Islam, 
the demise of the Luwu Kingdom and the fixation of administrative bounda-
ries that remained in place until the late 1990s. Toraja Raya had its roots in 
colonial transformations in the Luwu-Tana Toraja area, especially in con-
nection with the Dutch Reformed Mission (Gereformeerde Zendingsbond). 
While lowland Luwu had been under Islamic influence since the early seven-
teenth century, the highlands of current South and Central Sulawesi had an 
animist population. The colonial government stimulated missionary activity 
in the highlands out of fear for ‘advancing’ Islam, which required the forma-
tion of a Christian ‘buffer’ (Bigalke 2005). Such a buffer zone was established 
through an administrative unit covering the highlands of current South and 
Central Sulawesi called Grooter Toradja (Greater Toraja). From the 1930s, this 
idea took root among a Dutch-educated, Christianized section of the popula-
tion of current Tana Toraja, who increasingly identified as ‘Toraja people’. 
Gradually, they took up positions in the colonial and post-colonial adminis-
trative system and became politically active. Affiliated to the Toraja Church 
(Gereja Toraja) and the regional branch of the Indonesian Christian Party 
(Parkindo), they were active propagators of a Toraja identity. In the 1950s, the 
political ideal of Greater Toraja continued to influence regional politics. In its 
post-colonial form, ‘Toraja Raya’ was also an expansive movement associated 
with the search for Lebensraum, or land for densely populated Tana Toraja, 
and greater political influence in Luwu. Another major political objective was 
(mainly Christian) highland autonomy from (mainly Islamic) Bugis southern 
Sulawesi domination (Bigalke 2005; Roth 2002, 2003, 2004). 
Lutat refers to attempts in the early 1960s to establish a province combin-
ing Luwu and Tana Toraja. The Lutat concept had been developed by Java-
based intellectuals from these districts. Its political objective was also gaining 
provincial autonomy from South Sulawesi. It was based on a similar aware-
ness of the mutually supportive and complementary resources of Luwu 
(land, other resources) and Tana Toraja (labour, educated people). However, 
where Toraja Raya had been the product of processes of ethnic identification 
20  Lutat is short for Luwu Tator. Tator is short for Tana Toraja (Roth 2002, 2003, 2004). 
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along the dividing line of religion, Lutat stressed common socio-cultural and 
historical ties between highland and lowland populations across existing 
administrative boundaries. The Jakarta-based people behind Lutat were of a 
younger generation and less influenced by Lebensraum-politics. 
Lutat enjoyed broad support among the Luwu and Toraja elites. In the 
early 1960s the movement mobilized ample political support from the region 
and resolutions supporting Lutat were prepared in both districts. The move-
ment stressed the non-separatist character of Lutat and clearly distinguished 
the movement from regionalist movements like Darul Islam. Andi Jemma, 
last Datu of Luwu and pahlawan (hero) during the revolution, became the fig-
ure head of this movement. In 1963, President Soekarno had even expressed 
his sympathy and support. However, Lutat did not materialize, due to the 
political turmoil of the 1960s and probably also because of South Sulawesi’s 
resistance (Roth 2002, 2003, 2004). 
Luwu (Raya) Province: shared political ideal or bone of contention?
The political changes after 1998 sparked off provincial ambitions in Luwu. 
But the boundaries of the new province were highly contested and the 
movement was eventually deeply divided. The issue of inclusion or exclu-
sion of Tana Toraja was the cause of this disagreement, and I will analyse 
the organizations lobbying for one option or the other at different locations: 
Jakarta, Makassar, Luwu and Tana Toraja. I will also discuss the contrasting 
narratives used to legitimize the different options for the province and relate 
them to the regional context. 
According to a Luwu newspaper, Luwu Raya should encompass Luwu, 
North Luwu and Tana Toraja as ‘these three districts form from a cultural-
historical point of view still a unity. In geographical terms, the districts 
were once united in the Luwu Kingdom.’ The newspaper also stressed that 
demography, human potential and natural resources support its formation 
(Sawerigading Pos 1-11-1999). Early 2000, the Front Penuntut Pemekaran 
Kabupaten dan Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya (FPPDP-LR, Front for the 
Demand of District Autonomy and Formation of Luwu Raya Province) was 
established in Palopo.21 It stressed the need for pemekaran and the formation 
of Luwu Raya within the old boundaries of the former Luwu Kingdom. The 
document refers to earlier attempts by Andi Jemma in the 1950s to establish a 
special area (daerah istimewa), and in the 1960s to form a province. It says that 
Luwu Raya should comprise the districts emerging from pemekaran of pre-
21  Front Penuntut Pemekaran Kabupaten dan Provinsi Luwu Raya (FPPDP-LR), Rencana 
wilayah Propinsi Luwu Raya, wilayah Kerajaan Luwu 1918-1957, project proposal, 2000.
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1999 Luwu.22 In a formal request for provincial autonomy FPPDP-LR defines 
the province as ‘consisting of the districts of Luwu and North Luwu, and the 
Municipality of Palopo, separated from South Sulawesi but still under protec-
tion of the beloved unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia’.23 The proposal 
also contains several letters of support. One ‘Deklarasi Provinsi Tanah Luwu’ 
is signed by the Makassar-based chairman of the Kerukunan Keluarga Luwu 
(KKL, Association of Luwu People) and Ikatan Pelajar Mahasiswa Indonesia 
Luwu (IPMIL, Indonesian Association of Luwu Students).24 Another one, 
which uses the term ‘Luwu Raya’ rather than ‘Tanah Luwu’, is signed by the 
Datu, the district heads of Luwu and North Luwu, the chairmen of the Luwu 
and North Luwu parliaments, and (again) the chairman of KKL in Makassar. 
The letter states that the former Luwu kingdom, defined as covering pre-
1999 Luwu, should be the basis of Luwu Raya.25 Other letters, in the name 
of political parties, NGOs and other organizations in Luwu also base their 
support for ‘Luwu Raya’ on this ‘narrow’ interpretation.26 The regional press 
also regularly covered the campaign for a new province. Usually it defined 
the province as consisting of post-pemekaran Luwu and North Luwu, and 
East Luwu and Palopo (the latter two still to be formed then) (Fajar 4-11-1999, 
7-2-2000; Palopo Pos 1-5-2000). 
Thus, Tana Toraja was hardly mentioned in the first statements which 
favoured the new province (Kompas 26-2-2001). Luwu had just been split up 
into two districts, and the province stood a real chance under the new politi-
cal conditions. The first priority for reaching this objective was to further 
increase the number of districts. Primary candidates were East Luwu and 
Palopo. At this stage, the struggle for a province and lobbying for another 
new district and a municipality were mutually supportive dimensions of the 
political agenda of FPPDP-LR.27 The pemekaran of Luwu was assumed to cre-
ate ideal conditions for establishment of Luwu Province. 
22  Letter 27-1-2000. In this letter and another one dated 27-4-2000, Tana Toraja is not part of 
the plans.
23  Letter FPPDP-LR-Palopo dated 1-7-2000. Tana Toraja was not part of the proposed 
province. 
24  The KKL chairman became closely associated with the movement that rejects Tana Toraja 
(see below). IPMIL is a political lobbying organization with an Islamic identity in which 
Makassar-based Luwu students are organized.
25  The name of the Datu under a letter giving this narrow interpretation is remarkable. 
Attempts to replace it with a broader one including Tana Toraja led to a conflict within the move-
ment; see below (letter 22-1-2000).
26  Letters 22-1-2000, 22-5-2000 and 25-3-2000 respectively.
27  Later, contradictory interests became visible; see below.
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The Jakarta-based movement
A different conceptualization of the province was being developed in Jakarta. 
As in the 1960s, Luwu Raya was buzzing around among the Jakarta-based 
Luwu and Toraja communities after 1998. The older generation is still quite 
prominent: some of the current political activists had also been involved 
in the Lutat movement. The Luwu and Toraja elites in Jakarta were mainly 
guided by a vision of a province that resembled Lutat: a vision that included 
Tana Toraja. The Jakarta-based movement became organized in the Badan 
Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu-Raya (BKPPLR, Coordinating Body 
for the Formation of Luwu Raya Province).28 
In 2001 the Jakarta group presented its plans for Luwu Raya (including 
Tana Toraja) (Suara Pembaruan 1-4-2001; Media Indonesia 1-4-2001). The decla-
ration, on behalf of the Datu, was historically legitimized by reference to the 
Luwu Kingdom as an administrative unit under colonial rule which included 
current Tana Toraja and the historical ties between the areas. Further, it 
stressed that the movement emerged from the aspirations of the people of 
Luwu, North Luwu and Tana Toraja. The new province was to comprise of 
six districts and municipalities.29 If realized, it would combine a high poten-
tial of natural and human resources with other economic assets like tourism. 
It would have (in 2001) a locally raised revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, 
PAD) of Rp 45 billion, cover 20,901 km2 (33.5% of South Sulawesi), and have 
a 1.189,775 population (15% of its 2001 population). A Jakarta-based spokes-
man with a Luwu background stated:
The source of inspiration for Luwu Raya is the history of the Luwu Kingdom 
and the dedication of its Datu, Andi Jemma, to the ideal of turning Luwu into a 
special region or a province. He wanted to keep the kingdom together as much 
as possible. Even in the fifties he had conveyed his ideal to the president. Later, 
the Lutat-movement continued this struggle in the name of Andi Jemma. With 
the existing districts and municipalities we can create a province to make this 
come true. Another ideal of Andi Jemma, a nationalist, was not to discriminate on 
the basis of ethnicity or religion. If we want a province based on former afdeeling 
Luwu, both Luwu and Tana Toraja should be included. 
In Jakarta there was a more broadly shared vision among Luwu and Toraja 
people. Consensus had more or less been reached on issues like the name, 
28  Formally the coordinating body of the regional organizations in Makassar, Luwu, Tana 
Toraja and North Luwu. Its working programme assumed establishment in December 2001. 
29  ‘Deklarasi pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya’, Jakarta, 31-3-2001. Andi Achmad Opu To 
Addi Luwu, Pemangku Datu Luwu; ‘Pernyataan Andi Achmad Datu Luwu’, Makassar, 12-3-
2001. 
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capital, and regional background of the first governor of the province. But 
even here such issues proved to be sensitive. Like in South Sulawesi, compe-
tition between Luwu and Tana Toraja and anxieties associated with religious 
identities played a role in the capital as well. According to one person ‘it took 
us a year to reach an agreement about the name of a province, which was 
still beyond reach’.30 
 
The region: Tudang Sipulung
On 17 October 2001 a so-called Tudang Sipulung meeting was held in the 
‘palace of the king of Luwu’ in Palopo.31 It was attended by district heads and 
other government representatives of Luwu, North Luwu and Tana Toraja, 
chairmen of the parliaments, and representatives of various groups in soci-
ety, NGOs, students and youth organizations. Some Jakarta-based support-
ers were also present. The Datu opened the meeting:
Afdeeling (the administrative unit) Luwu covered part of Southeast Sulawesi 
(Kolaka) and Central Sulawesi (Poso). In South Sulawesi, it covered current Luwu, 
North Luwu and Tana Toraja. Law no. 22/1999 and Government Regulation no. 
129/2000 give as a criterion for the formation of a province a minimum of three 
districts or municipalities. Consisting of Luwu, Luwu Utara and Tana Toraja, 
former afdeeling Luwu certainly fulfils these criteria [...] That is why three district 
heads and chairmen of the regional parliaments of the districts that cover the area 
[...] are present at this Tudang Sipulung to sit together in a familiar atmosphere 
of togetherness and equality, and discuss the strategic steps to promote the idea 
of the formation of a province. As a person who feels the pulse of struggle, I do 
not want the land of Luwu to be torn into pieces only because of certain group 
interests.32  
Though most participants were in favour of including Tana Toraja, some 
youngsters openly voiced their objections. One young attendant objected 
because of the Christian background of the Toraja population. According 
to some participants, the opponents had been instructed by the Makassar-
based group struggling for Luwu Province, and were students of Makassar 
universities, known as tukang protes (protest experts). Despite these critical 
voices, the document summarizing the decisions states, among others, that 
agreement has been reached on formation of Luwu Raya Province consisting 
30  Naming options: ‘Lutat’ expresses inclusion of Tana Toraja. ‘Luwu Raya’ can be interpreted 
in contradictory ways (Greater Luwu/Luwu Toraya). ‘Luwu’ is Luwu-biased. Geographical 
names create confusion (for example Sulawesi Timur).
31  Tudang Sipulung is Buginese for ‘sit and discuss together’. 
32  Pidato pembukaan Pemangku Datu Luwu (Andi Achmad Opu To Addi Luwu) dalam acara 
Tudang Sipulung di istana Datu Luwu, 17-10-2001. 
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of Luwu, Luwu Utara, and Tana Toraja.33
A similar meeting had been held in Tana Toraja. In June 2001, a statement 
had been sent to the Tana Toraja parliament, mentioning socio-cultural and 
historical arguments (Lutat; the Toraja as one of twelve ethnicities of the 
Luwu kingdom) in favour of the formation of a province together with Luwu 
and Luwu Utara.34 It also pleaded for a name that clearly reflects the role of 
Tana Toraja. It mentioned two possibilities: first, Luwu-Tana Toraja (Lutat); 
second, Luwu Raya, in which the ‘Raya’ stands for Tana Toraja.35
Thus, the Tudang Sipulung process yielded a widely but not fully sup-
ported decision about Luwu and Tana Toraja merging into Luwu Raya 
Province. Point of departure was a specific vision of the history of the king-
dom under colonial rule, as an administrative division that included current 
Tana Toraja. 
Heading for conflict: ‘Committee’ and ‘Front’
Around 2001, struggle for the establishment of the province was taken up by 
a group of Makassar-based people with a Luwu background, mainly intel-
lectuals active in KKL (see above). At the initiative of the KKL, a Makassar-
based committee was established: Komite Pusat Pembentukan Provinsi 
Luwu (KP3L, Central Committee for the Formation of Luwu Province).36 
A spokesman stressed in this context the specific Luwu ethnic and cultural 
values, and the need to protect them. Another spokesman, closely affili-
ated to KKL and rector of the Universitas Muslim Indonesia  (UMI, Muslim 
University of Indonesia), also stressed the Luwu identity of the new province 
and added that ‘from a socio-cultural point of view, the people of Luwu are 
indeed disappointed with South Sulawesi’.37
So, the issue whether to include or exclude Tana Toraja started to divide 
the movement. The establishment of KP3L was a turning point for it no longer 
assumed a role for Tana Toraja as its spokesmen tend to use the terms ‘Provinsi 
Luwu’, ‘Tana(h) Luwu’ or ‘Wija To Luwu’ (the people of Luwu) rather than 
33  Tudang Sipulung rakyat Luwu Raya (rakyat Luwu, Tana Toraja dan Luwu Utara); Keputusan 
musyawarah, Palopo, 17-10-2001. 
34  Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya Wilayah Tana Toraja, 3-6-2001. See 
also Musyawarah Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya; Aspirasi masyarakat Kabupaten Tana 
Toraja tentang pembentukan propinsi baru ‘Luwu Raya’, Tana Toraja, 15-10-2001. 
35  The document stresses that ‘“Raya” is a recognition of the existence of Toraya’.
36  Kompas 26-2-2001. Though called ‘central’, KP3L is Makassar-based.
37  Kompas 26-2-2001; Tempo 28-4-2001. The Luwu-based section of KP3L is the Komite 
Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu (KP2L). In 2003 another section was formed in Palopo, also sup-
porting exclusion of Tana Toraja. Panitia Deklarasi Provinsi Luwu, Palopo, 28-6-2003.
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‘Luwu Raya’ (which is used by those who want to include Tana Toraja). In 
reaction to the emergence of the Makassar group (‘the Committee’), the Front 
Perjuangan Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu, (FP3L, Front for the Struggle for 
Formation of Luwu Province or ‘the Front’) was established in Palopo in 2003, 
in support of a province that includes Tana Toraja.38 Here follow accounts of a 
Makassar-based KP3L representative, a Luwu-based Committee spokesman, 
and a Front spokesman. First the Makassar based KP3L member:
Our point of view has to do with the past. In the fifties, the Toraja separated 
themselves off from Luwu. Now the Luwu people do not want to join with them. 
Representing the aspirations of the people, we have to listen to their opinion. In 
Jakarta it is different: they broadly agree that Luwu has to join with Tana Toraja 
[...]. We have already discussed the issue with the people in Luwu, and they 
simply do not want it. They say ‘Luwu is Luwu only’ [...]. For the old generation, 
Luwu and Tana Toraja are indeed one. But for younger generations things are 
quite different. It is a pity that there is this political background, of the Toraja stab-
bing their own brothers. Though we are regarded as ethnically the same, the peo-
ple have a different perception of that as well. But it is not a religious problem. 
The Luwu-based spokesman of the Committee:
Looking at the history of Luwu [...] we must stress that its name was the Luwu 
kingdom. This must also be the basis for the new province, there is no alternative. 
We must consider Luwu’s possible future as a province, and its advantages [...]. 
But the process should not only involve people associated with the kingdom and 
its past. This should be a more comprehensive discussion, involving religious 
leaders, leading persons in society and politicians. Nobody has more rights to 
speak than others; the spirit of change and struggle for the province are shared by 
all. The Front bases itself on the Tudang Sipulung, but this meeting did not accom-
modate all components. The Committee has gone down to the grassroots [...] 
Luwu should be the basis of the province. Luwu can build a province on its own. 
We are four now: three districts and a municipality. Later, if they wish to join the 
province, let them apply. Did anyone order them to separate themselves off from 
Luwu in 1957? We did not tell them to do so; it was their own wish to leave us! 
A Palopo-based Front member:
The Committee stresses that three districts is enough for a province. But there are 
other reasons and motivations behind it. The difference in religion is very impor-
tant. The issue of religion, though never openly mentioned, was introduced by the 
Makassar-based Committee and their Luwu-based supporters. Further, those who 
support the Committee are afraid that well-educated people from Tana Toraja 
will beat them in the competition for power, positions and resources. Counting 
the number of Toraja people in Tana Toraja and Luwu, they fear Toraja political 
victories in future elections for crucial positions in the province. 
38  Front Perjuangan Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu (FP3L), Palopo, 9-8-2003.
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Thus, a fission emerged between Committee and Front. There is common 
ground in the use of historical arguments to legitimize a new province, 
whether including or excluding Tana Toraja: the glorious past of the king-
dom, promises by President Soekarno, and the role of Andi Jemma. A 
respected nationalist, he represents the kingdom, nationalist values, and the 
ideal of Luwu Province. The stress on his nationalist spirit and values is cru-
cial in the current struggle. It is no coincidence that the lobbying for formal 
recognition of Andi Jemma as a national hero (pahlawan nasional) coincided 
with the struggle for a province.39 Presenting regional political ideals in a 
nationalist spirit of cooperation with other provinces and Jakarta rather than 
in terms of separatism is crucial, especially for South Sulawesi and Luwu, 
former basis of Darul Islam and current setting of Islamic political and mili-
tary activism. 
Another shared historical argument in favour of a new province concerns 
the neglect, exploitation and discrimination by South Sulawesi. While Luwu 
contributes considerably to the provincial income, little has been done for 
its development. Educated people from Luwu and Tana Toraja are never 
given a chance to develop a government career and climb to leading posi-
tions in Makassar (see Nathan 2003). These problems are largely blamed to 
‘BOSOWA’, the regionally powerful political and economic elites of the Bugis 
areas in South Sulawesi.40 The new province would create new opportunities 
for the population and speed up development by shortening the lines of 
governance.
Beyond these general legitimizing and, to some extent, unifying stories, 
the differences between Committee and Front stand out. Both parties actively 
engage in inventing and re-inventing history. The Front bases its view on the 
Luwu Kingdom as a colonial administrative unit that included Tana Toraja. 
Thus, the colonial definition of the kingdom, once resisted in the highlands, 
is now idealized and mobilized to support Luwu Raya. The Committee, how-
ever, stresses not so much common bonds and shared values, but rather fac-
tors that have come to divide both areas and their populations. Arguments 
about differences in culture and a history of competition for resources merge 
with an interpretation of history in which the struggle for administrative 
autonomy of Tana Toraja from Luwu in the 1950s is presented as a stab in the 
back of the Luwu people. 
Early 2004, the Badan Koordinasi Perjuangan Pembentukan Provinsi 
Luwu (BAKOR-P3L, Coordinating Body for the Formation of Luwu Province) 
39  In 2002, Andi Jemma became a national hero. Muslim Massewa 2002; Suara Merdeka 9-11-
2002.
40  BOSOWA stands for Bone Soppeng Wajo, Bugis districts in South Sulawesi. 
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was established in Palopo to bridge the gap between Front and Committee.41 
Little has changed since then, and no serious steps towards reconciliation 
have been taken. The BAKOR-P3L clearly awaited the new government 
regulations for pemekaran. Its chairman stresses that the cultural and histori-
cal relations between Luwu and Tana Toraja should be taken into account 
in discussions about the province, if only because otherwise the movement 
would lose support from the Jakarta-based group.
In October 2004, the revised law on regional autonomy was ratified. The 
BAKOR-P3L took a pragmatic stance, adapting to these new legal realities. 
Recently, Fajar quoted its chairman stressing the need for unification of the 
two contending groups into one organization representing all parties, includ-
ing Tana Toraja. He pleaded for a re-opening of discussions between Front 
and Committee (Fajar 1-12-2004). Towards the end of 2004 it seemed that the 
integrative vision was gaining ground. The chairman was quoted stating: 
‘The problem whether Toraja joins or not needs not to be debated any longer. 
It has already been solved. Toraja is part of Luwu, and therefore it cannot be 
separated from the province’ (Palopo Pos 25-11-2004). However, the future 
prospects of the province remain highly uncertain (Fajar 23-1-2005).
 
Keeping all options open
Luwu (Raya) was not the only regional option for a province. Spokesmen in 
Tana Toraja stress that they are not willing to join Luwu at any price. In 2000, 
the Badan Perjuangan Pemekaran Propinsi Sulawesi Timur (BP3ST, Body 
for the Struggle for Pemekaran of East Sulawesi Province) was established 
to lobby for a province encompassing Luwu, North Luwu, Tana Toraja and 
Enrekang (a district bordering on southern Tana Toraja and Luwu).42 Political 
activists in Tana Toraja and Enrekang formed the core of the movement, 
which was to expand to Luwu and Luwu Utara. The plans of the movement 
created not only political controversies but also confusion about the name of 
the province (Palopo Pos 3-11-2000; see note 12). 
At that time the movement for a separate province of West Sulawesi 
emerged. When discussions about Luwu Raya were stagnating, for people in 
Tana Toraja West Sulawesi became an attractive alternative, and talks between 
41  Nathan (2003:44) concluded that ‘plans for Luwu Raya have been abandoned in favour of 
Luwu province and campaigners are confident that Luwu province will be formed before the 
2004 elections’.
42  Badan Perjuangan Pemekaran Propinsi Sulawesi Timur (BP3ST) wilayah Tana Toraja, 
Enrekang, Proposal tentang pembentukan wadah perjuangan pemekaran Propinsi Sulawesi 
Timur, 2000.
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representatives of West Sulawesi and Tana Toraja were initiated. In Luwu, 
there was much resistance against the idea of merging Luwu and North Luwu 
with Tana Toraja and Enrekang into a province of East Sulawesi which implied 
the disappearance of the name ‘Luwu Raya’. Initiators of the East Sulawesi 
plan, who had also made eyes at a part of the intended province of West 
Sulawesi that has close socio-cultural links with Tana Toraja, were accused of 
having too strong ties with Tana Toraja. One Luwu politician expressed the 
fear that the difference in natural resource endowments between Luwu and 
North Luwu on one hand, and Tana Toraja and Enrekang on the other, would 
lead to ‘increased exploitation of the natural resources of Luwu by the strong 
human resources from those areas’. East Sulawesi received a cool reception in 
Luwu and was also rejected by the Enrekang elites.43
Thus, although many prefer Luwu Raya, debates in Tana Toraja about 
pemekaran were not restricted to this option only. Some older-generation 
Toraja even nostalgically mention ‘Toraja Raya’ as an alternative choice, 
which does not stand a great chance but most closely matches an identifica-
tion with Toraja. After ratification of Law no. 32/2004, Tana Toraja can even 
pursue a new option: acquiring the status of special region (kawasan khusus) 
on the basis of its cultural heritage and potential for tourism.44 
Legitimizing pemekaran
Debates on splitting up Tana Toraja were rooted in the different histories of 
its northern, southern and western parts. The issue gained in importance 
in connection with the possible formation of a new province in 2001. Toraja 
political actors stressed that the bargaining position of Tana Toraja would 
be stronger if it had more districts and political leaders, adat leaders, and 
youth organizations started to discuss pemekaran. After discussions in seven 
northern sub-districts, the Committee for Establishment of North Toraja 
District (PPKTU) was formed. In October 2004, proposal and positive recom-
mendations by the district head, parliament and governor were awaiting the 
installation of a new parliament of the province of South Sulawesi in order 
to continue the procedures.45  
A similar movement started demanding pemekaran of West Toraja. This 
demand will almost certainly not make it beyond the first feasibility studies. 
43  Fajar 27-10-2000, 31-10-2000; Palopo Pos 14-10-2000, 28-10-2000, 2-11-2000, 3-11-2000, 9-11-
2000, 10-11-2000, 13-11-2000, 15-11-2000.
44  Fajar 23-11-2004.
45  Keputusan DPRD no. II/KEP/DPRD/IX/2002 and Surat Bupati no. 136/1063/PEM/UM, 
26-9-2002, tentang persetujuan pemekaran Kabupaten Tana Toraja; SK Bupati Tana Toraja no. 
22/III/2003 8-3-2003. There were also protests; Fajar 25-1-2003. 
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Its establishment would probably become an economic burden rather than 
an opportunity for development. Some people expressed the fear that peme-
karan may even lead to the breakdown of Tana Toraja. According to such a 
scenario, West Toraja could join West Sulawesi, while South Toraja and North 
Toraja could either stay with South Sulawesi or join Luwu Raya. Especially 
the Tana Toraja elites in Jakarta regard this as a disaster. Apart from creating 
economically weak administrative units, it would mean the disappearance of 
Tana Toraja as the administrative unit that represents Toraja identity. Instead 
many Toraja in Jakarta prefer incorporation of Tana Toraja into Luwu Raya. 
 
District pemekaran versus provincial interests
Pemekaran is an extremely sensitive political process that may involve con-
tradictory interests at various levels. Tana Toraja has not yet been affected by 
pemekaran so far. However, it could become a key area in connection with the 
establishment of a new province. In the sensitive relationship between South 
Sulawesi and the Luwu-Tana Toraja region economic interests are impor-
tant. South Sulawesi risks losing income and strategic resources. Therefore, 
it wants to block the formation of new provinces. Formally, there are no 
restrictions to pemekaran as long as the preconditions specified in the law 
are fulfilled; pemekaran is based on ‘the aspirations of the people’. However, 
the North Toraja case shows that lower-level political interests in district 
formation can be played off against higher-level interests in establishing a 
province. 
Demands for pemekaran are dependent on the willingness of higher 
authorities to deal with them. Therefore, relationships of dependence and 
power differences are crucial. This contradicts simplistic views of pemekaran 
as facilitated and stimulated at all levels of governance to create a more 
democratic society based on ‘the aspirations of the people’. However, in the 
case of pemekaran of North Toraja the South Sulawesi governor demanded 
a formal statement from the Tana Toraja parliament stating that pemekaran 
will not be used as a basis for the formation of another province.46 However, 
nobody regarded the document as a constraint on future political choices for 
joining any provincial movement. 
46  Keputusan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten Tana Toraja Nomor: 1/kep/DPRD/I/2004 
tentang pernyataan sehubungan dengan pemekaran Kabupaten Tana Toraja, Makale, 8-1-2004. 
It says: ‘The parliament of Tana Toraja states that pemekaran of Tana Toraja is in no way related, 
and will not lead, to the formation of a new province’. Though the statement is not specific about 
which province is meant, people commenting upon it primarily associated it with the possible 
contribution of new districts to Luwu Raya.
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Contradictory interests in Luwu
Another example of the complex ways in which the agendas at district 
and provincial levels can be competitive is the establishment of East Luwu 
District. North Luwu came primarily into being as a result of frictions 
between two candidates for the position of district head in Luwu in 1999: 
Kamrul Kasim and Luthfi A. Mutti. Luthfi had the support of Andi Hasan, 
a member of the eastern Luwu elite, who had built a strong power base as 
Golkar leader in Luwu during the New Order. His support for Luthfi was in 
vain: Kasim won by default because of a split in the votes (see Nathan 2003) 
and became the new district head. Andi Hasan was disappointed and started 
putting his political bets on North Luwu. 
Pemekaran of North Luwu in 1999 had not caused great political tension, 
though it drained Luwu from the most qualified part of its administrative 
apparatus. Pemekaran had (passive) support among the North Luwu popula-
tion. However, it was the product of the political lobbying of elite networks 
rather than of participation and democratic processes. Luthfi, its first district 
head, was closely related to the Directorate General of Regional Autonomy 
through Ryaas Rasyid. This seems to have been an important factor in estab-
lishing North Luwu. According to one account, ‘after the Luwu district head 
election had been lost by Luthfi, Rasyid just decided to divide Luwu. It hap-
pened in a few months, without a local political movement, mass pressure, or 
much NGO influence. One could say that Luthfi was given his own district 
and dropped there.’ Despite all this personal lobbying, there were impor-
tant and widely recognized improvements in North Luwu under the Luthfi 
administration (Fajar 26-4-2005; Nathan 2003).
The elites from northeastern Luwu had supported the establishment of 
North Luwu and Luthfi’s appointment as district head. However, they also 
had their own agenda of pemekaran. The ink of the signatures under the docu-
ment that formalized North Luwu was still wet when they started demand-
ing the formation of a separate district of East Luwu (Nathan 2003). As Luthfi 
was initially unwilling to give up this resource-rich part of his new district, 
the issue generated much tension and even threatened to escalate into violent 
conflict in 2001 and 2002. According to sources in Luwu, violence between 
supporters of Luthfi and groups demanding the new East Luwu district 
could barely be avoided by mobilizing the kinship networks through which 
the contending elites are all related.
The establishment of North Luwu in 1999 and, later, East Luwu and 
Palopo brought the formation of a new province within reach. In this context 
the participation of Tana Toraja was no longer indispensable. However, rather 
than speeding up the formation of a province, pemekaran in Luwu generated 
contradictory interests. When the movement for a province emerged, North 
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Luwu had already been established but East Luwu had not yet been ratified. 
Andi Hasan represented the northeastern elite with its interests to control 
the INCO mines through the establishment of East Luwu District. The plans 
for Luwu Province were not very popular with either the former or with the 
current governor of South Sulawesi (Fajar 27-6-2003, 16-2-2004).
As the fate of East Luwu was still dependent on cooperativeness of the 
governor, it was not in the interest of the elites from eastern Luwu to support 
the plans for a new province at that moment. 
In late 2004, when the Luwu movement was in dire straits and the law 
revised, blame for postponement of Luwu Province was laid with the North 
Luwu parliament and especially its former chairman, Andi Hasan from East 
Luwu, who had failed to issue a recommendation.47 
Hidden agendas? Politics of religious and ethnic identity
Contested control over resources explains processes of pemekaran in Luwu 
only to some extent. It does not clarify the rift in the movement for a new 
province and the fault lines along which this has become manifest. In order 
to understand why the movement split, we should focus on processes of 
ethno-religious identification and the ways ethno-religious sentiments are 
mobilized. 
The history of Luwu and Tana Toraja relationships and especially earlier 
attempts to establish a province bear witness of the sensitive role of ethno-
religious identifications. During the 1940s and 1950s tensions increased as a 
result of decolonization and the Darul Islam movement, when ethnic and reli-
gious frictions determined the dividing lines along which conflicts unfolded. 
Though never openly debated under the New Order, these tensions never 
disappeared, and often played a mobilizing role in violent conflicts between 
migrants from Tana Toraja and the local population in lowland Luwu.48 These 
tensions also informed the struggle for a new province.
After the fall of the Soeharto regime, Sulawesi was hit by Islamic radi-
calism and inter-religious violence. From 1998 onwards, massive violence 
between Christians and Muslims struck Central Sulawesi (ICG 2001a, 2004) 
while several bomb attacks hit Makassar in 2002. Luwu experienced commu-
nal conflicts (Roth 2002; Nathan 2003). As before, some of these conflicts took 
shape along ethno-religious lines dividing people from Luwu and Toraja. In 
47  Fajar 10-10-2004. A Makassar Committee spokesman severely criticized the parliament. 
Palopo Pos 11-9-2004.
48  Nathan 2003. See also Kompas 15-9-1998, 14-1-1999, 15-1-1999; Suara Merdeka 16-1-1999, 11-
2-1999.
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addition, Luwu also had its share of Islamic extremist violence as illustrated 
by a bomb attack in Palopo early 2004.49 Arrests of suspects of the Makassar 
bomb attacks even yielded evidence for the existence of military training 
camps in Luwu.50 
The establishment of the Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam 
(KPPSI, Preparatory Committee for the Upholding of Islamic Law) in 2000 
caused unrest in Sulawesi.51 Its main objective was special autonomy for South 
Sulawesi in order to facilitate the introduction of sharia law. In December 2001 
KPPSI announced a draft law on the introduction of sharia in South Sulawesi, 
and proposed to give the province a status similar to Aceh. The political 
agenda of KPPSI and the links with extremist Islam have given rise to a grow-
ing concern about the ambitions of political Islam in Sulawesi (ICG 2002a; 
Dias Pradadimara and Burhaman Junedding 2002). The Makassar meeting of 
KPPSI was strictly guarded by a paramilitary group called Laskar Jundullah 
(Army of God), which had become the regular security force of KPPSI.52 When 
linkages between Laskar Jundullah and violent Islam extremism became pub-
licly known, KPPSI distanced itself from the organization.53 
The emergence of three children of the legendary Luwu-born Darul Islam 
leader Kahar Muzakkar on the regional political scene is in this respect inter-
esting, as they are also involved in debates on the administrative status of 
Luwu. This fits in with a revival of the political agenda of Darul Islam and 
Kahar (Velthoen 2004), which is referred to as neo-Kaharisme. These develop-
ments are closely related to the emergence of KPPSI in South Sulawesi politics. 
A KPPSI spokesman has stated that many members regard this movement as 
a continuation of Darul Islam by constitutional means (ICG 2002a:17).
Dias Pradadimara and Burhaman Junedding (2002) have identified the 
social basis of the movement that supports KPPSI as male, urban (Makassar)-
49  BBC Indonesia 10-1-2004: http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesian/news/story/2004/01/040110_pal-
opoblast.shtml; Kompas 11-1-2004; Suara Merdeka 11-1-2004.
50  ICG 2003a, 2004. Near Enrekang and in East Luwu. Another camp was in Central Sulawesi 
(ICG 2004). 
51  KPPSI was founded after introduction of the regional autonomy laws in 1999. It was for-
mally established during a meeting of the Islamic Congress in Makassar in October 2000, after an 
earlier congress in Yogyakarta of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Mujahedeen 
for Islamic Law Enforcement). Later, KPPSI became KPSI.
52  Headed by Agus Dwikarna, it had been established in Makassar in September 2000. 
Dwikarna was member of the executive committee of MMI. He was arrested in the Philippines 
in 2002 on the charge of possessing explosives and belonging to an Al Qaeda-related network 
(ICG 2002a; Kompas 20-3-2002).
53  ICG 2003a, 2004; Dias Pradadimara and Burhaman Junedding 2002; see Van Bruinessen 
2002. Laskar Jundullah is also associated with the military training camps found in Luwu and 
Central Sulawesi, and has been accused of recruiting Muslim troops for and bringing weapons 
into Poso. Laskar Jundullah also executed violent ‘sweepings’ in Makassar (ICG 2001a; Jakarta 
Post 22-4-2002).
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based, highly educated. Members tend to support Golkar and a New Order 
type of modernization, and are often affiliated to universities. Through their 
academic networks they mobilize support for political Islam, especially from 
young South Sulawesi males. 
There are strong links between KPPSI and the Makassar-based Committee 
that advocates a Luwu province. Important activists of the Committee are 
Islamic people with a Luwu background, who are affiliated to a Makassar 
university. They are closely linked to other Makassar-based organizations 
like KKL and KPPSI. The chairman of KKL and leading figure and main 
spokesmen of the Committee is also member of the advisory board of KPPSI. 
The secretary general of KPPSI is also secretary of KKL, actively involved in 
the Committee and one of its spokesmen. The secretary of the Committee, 
one of the sons of Kahar Muzakkar, is a vocal supporter of KPPSI in Sulawesi 
Selatan. The chairman of KPPSI has an advisory function in the Committee. 
There are also Committee linkages to Luwu. A Luwu-based spokesman for 
the Committee, who recently died, former rector of Andi Jemma University 
in Palopo, was also affiliated to KPPSI. Other active Committee members in 
Palopo, among which the rector of the Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri 
(STAIN, National Islamic High School) and secretary of the Palopo branch 
of the Committee, are also members of the advisory board of KPPSI in 
Makassar. Thus religious identity plays an important role in the struggle for 
Luwu Province.54 A Committee spokesman:
The Committee wants to build something with a specifically Luwu identity. Luwu 
will get lost in a province with Tana Toraja. We must defend the specific character-
istics and values of Luwu and Luwu-ness (keluwuan). That is the ideology of the 
Committee. There are people who cry out ‘that is Islamization’ but that is not true. 
Our basis is idealism for Luwu, not only religious idealism. This is a struggle for 
the people of Luwu; an ethnic, not a religious struggle.
This opinion is criticized by an Islamic member of the Jakarta-based group 
from Luwu:
Some people have a narrow-minded opinion on the province. If you ask them 
about their stance they stress that they are ‘nationalists’ and want good relation-
ships between religions. But practice is different: they discriminate along lines of 
religion and ethnic identity. They use vague arguments about history, cultural dif-
ferences or habits like drinking and gambling, but what they mean is differences 
in religion. They differ widely from those who want to include Tana Toraja in the 
new province, and who know the history of the kingdom. People from the Luwu 
54  This does, however, not imply that there is a link with radical Islam. Several people have 
stressed that, whatever struggle may be involved, it will be a constitutional and legal one 
(Republika 1-4-2005).
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nobility are much more tolerant towards other religions. The group of intolerant 
people is small but potentially dangerous. They never speak their minds, and get 
mad if you call them extremists. But they do not accept a province which com-
prises of Christians and Muslims. What will this extremist thinking lead to? It 
damages our religion and obstructs the province movement. 
The province as a symbol of Luwu ethnic identity 
The struggle for a new province has turned into a struggle about ethno-
religious identity in which ethnicity and religion are intertwined. There is 
no formally recognized ethnic group, or ‘suku Luwu’. The term ‘Luwu Raya’ 
refers to a province including Tana Toraja, whereas the terms ‘Tana Luwu’ 
and ‘Provinsi Luwu’ exclude Tana Toraja. Terms like ‘Wija To Luwu’ (the 
people of Luwu), ‘keluwuan’ (‘Luwu-ness’) and ‘kejayaan Luwu’ (the greatness 
of Luwu) denote attempts to construct a specifically Luwu identity that con-
trasts rather than overlaps with Toraja identity, and that ties Luwu to South 
Sulawesi or legitimizes a separate administrative status. This discourse is 
used by the Committee.55 
Attempts to construct a distinct Luwu ethnic identity are not new. During 
the late New Order the (re-)construction of Luwu identity was expressed in 
terms of the history of the Luwu kingdom – the heritage of Andi Jemma and 
Lutat – and manifested in the ‘royal palace’ in Palopo. In this reconstruction 
of ‘the kingdom’ ties with Tana Toraja took a prominent place. And this rep-
resentation of history was propagated by the Front in its struggles for Luwu 
Raya. 
In opposition to the Front, a restricted conception of Luwu-ness is advo-
cated by Committee. Many motives are involved here: the wish to give the 
new province an Islamic identity (to facilitate the introduction of sharia), fear 
among the Luwu elite for well educated and dynamic Toraja who might 
occupy key positions in the new province, and the ambition to reinforce a 
Luwu identity that has been marginalized by Toraja who have successfully 
put their own culture on the map and attracted tourists, while the memory 
of the glorious past of the Luwu kingdom withered away. 
History, again, serves as source of legitimacy. On 23 January 2004, Luwu 
celebrated its 737th birtday (Hari Jadi Luwu) with military and adat ceremo-
nies. The day vaguely refers to a mix of anti-colonial struggle, the coming 
of Islam (stressing the Islamic character of Luwu identity), and the origins 
of Luwu kingship. The celebration emphasizes the unity of Wija To Luwu 
and the mayor of Palopo stressed in his speech that Tana Luwu still forms 
55  Kompas 26-2-2001.
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an inseparable unity and that ‘its glue is the circulation of the blood of the 
people of Luwu’.56  
Conspiracy theories surround the province struggle as well. It is said 
that the Committee is an instrument of the South Sulawesi political elites to 
divide the Luwu movement in order to obstruct the formation of a new prov-
ince. This theory was underscored by the close relationship between Jusuf 
Kalla (a Buginese, and known to be not very enthusiastic about pemekaran) 
and prominent Committee members, but further evidence is lacking. A com-
peting Buginese definition of Luwu identity, which represents the political 
interests of the current province of South Sulawesi, focuses on Luwu as the 
core of Bugis culture, implying that Luwu belongs to South Sulawesi and 
that restoring the greatness of Luwu as a kingdom (kejayaan Luwu) within 
the confines of South Sulawesi is more important than province politics. 
According to the governor of South Sulawesi, Amin Syam,
the formation of Luwu Province […] will mean separation from South Sulawesi 
[...] During his speech [...] he asked elements of Luwu society to restore the great-
ness of Luwu when it was a kingdom, hundreds of years ago. In front of thou-
sands of inhabitants of Luwu [...] Amin recalled the past greatness of Luwu. He 
mentioned Sawerigading as the human figure able to turn Luwu into a cultural 
barometer of South Sulawesi.57 Presently, according to the governor, Luwu will 
be able to rediscover its greatness [...]. Yet the governor did not spend a word on 
Luwu Province, he only talked about ‘restoring the greatness of Luwu’. (Fajar 
14-2-2004.) 
In this section I have related the province struggle to issues of ethno-religious 
identity in Luwu and South Sulawesi. The characteristics and affiliations 
of key actors in the Committee against the background of South Sulawesi 
politics and the conflict about Tana Toraja make it likely that the province 
struggle merges with, and is captured by, broader agendas and objectives 
of political Islam. The province movement is also related to attempts to con-
struct specific images of Luwu and to use these either as the basis for a new 
province or to legitimize the status quo.
56  Fajar 23-1-2005. In the late Soeharto period, when it was introduced, the district government 
tried to increase its legitimacy by using such symbols of Luwu’s past. After pemekaran the celebra-
tion ceremony reflects fragmentation by exhibiting dances from the new administrative regions: 
Luwu, North Luwu, East Luwu and Palopo.




In the preceding pages I have described the struggle for Luwu (Raya) 
Province and the conflicts it has generated. Supporters of the restricted option 
are organized in the Committee, while those favouring the inclusion of Tana 
Toraja have formed the Front. While the Luwu and Toraja communities in 
Jakarta tend to support the Front, the Committee reigns in Makassar. At the 
district level, Front views are prominent in Tana Toraja, while Committee 
and Front are competing for power in Luwu. A mixture of motives and inter-
ests play a role, including competition for political positions and economic 
resources, ethno-religious identity politics, historical nostalgia for the old 
kingdom, and resentment against South Sulawesi, as well as a genuine con-
cern for a more equitable, socially just, and democratic society.
Until now the province has not materialized. This does not mean that 
there are only losers, because the winners are South Sulawesi Province and 
the provincial elites in Makassar with an interest in the status quo. Two fac-
tors came in handy: first, the rift in the Luwu movement, and second the 
revised Law no. 32/2004 which created a new blockade.
The failure to establish a new province clearly illustrates the three points 
mentioned in the Introduction. First, rather than a pre-planned turn to 
democracy, transparency and good governance, pemekaran is a struggle for 
power, influence and resources between elite groups. ‘New’ values like 
‘aspirations of the people’ and ‘development from below’ are not the driv-
ing forces but merely legitimizing arguments.58 The rift between Front and 
Committee shows that processes of pemekaran can be captured by particular 
interest groups.
Second, to understand these processes it is crucial to take the historical 
context into account. The re-awakening of the province movement, the rift 
between Front and Committee, the historical arguments used to legitimize 
conflicting viewpoints, and the sensitive relationships between the districts 
and Makassar as well as between Luwu and Tana Toraja can only be under-
stood in a broader socio-historical perspective. Pemekaran is, to a large extent, 
the continuation of a long history of changing administrative relationships 
between Luwu, Tana Toraja, and Makassar, and of shifting boundaries and 
identifications. 
Third, the role of ethno-religious identifications is important. It is not 
possible to accord to the factors of ethnicity and religion the place of either 
merely ideology and legitimizing narratives, or of one of the ‘real interests’ 
in the struggle. While acknowledging the crucial role of political control over 
58  Note that, in a way, pemekaran is counter-developmental, as it usually involves redistribu-
tion of resources from poorer to richer areas.
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strategic positions and resources, I would not go as far as seeing issues of 
identity merely as legitimizing language that hides the ‘real’ interests, as Vedi 
Hadiz (2003b:13) seems to imply. Rather than merely being secondary to stra-
tegic material interests, identity politics became a major issue that has even 
caused the movement to split. Perhaps we have identified the main root of 
the struggle: conflicting views of the moral and normative basis of society.
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Shadow states and the black economy

john f mccarthy
Sold down the river
renegotiating public power over nature  
in central Kalimantan
In April 2004 a timber broker in Banjarmasin described joining a timber ship-
ment down the Barito River earlier that month. An actor known as an ekspe-
disi took responsibility for a huge raft of timber complete with custom built 
shelters for those taking the three week trip along this major river. The ship-
ment itself was also often known as ekspedisi. Stretching over two kilometers 
long, and comprising of 123,000 m3 of timber, the ekspedisi required several 
tug boats to pull the logs, each costing 60 million rupiah to hire. Three hun-
dred gangsters (preman) armed with machine guns protected it. To entertain 
brokers accompanying the timber shipment, preman, rogue officials (oknum) 
and others occupying key posts along the watercourse, the actor behind the 
shipment provided prostitutes, marijuana, ecstasy and other drugs. These 
ekspedisi shipments are extremely expensive to operate, and given their size 
and the length of their journey, difficult to hide from local officialdom. Yet, 
the ekspedisi only had documents for 30,000 m3 of timber.1 Like virtually eve-
ryone active in the resource sector, the ekspedisi necessarily negotiated its way 
in the twilight zone between legality and illegality. 
The ekspedisi system came to the attention of the national press in May 
2002. At this time, in the district of Barito Selatan, a team of provincial police 
confiscated a consignment of 200,000 m3 timber – over 54,000 logs worth 
approximately 100 billion rupiah (approximately US$ 10 million) – being 
shipped down the Barito River without a full set of official documents 
(Kompas 20-6-2002). Press reports focused on the illegality of the ekspedisi, car-
rying allegations of collusion between the district governments found along 
the river and the ekspedisi (Banjarmasin Post 30-5-2002). For the newspapers at 
1  Interview with a timber broker, Banjarmasin, 26-4-2004. The most common meaning of 
ekspedisi is as in English, an excursion undertaken for a specific purpose, but it is also a technical 
term for (a business that does) cargo forwarding, such as sending parcels by ship.
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least, these stories were confirmed when the head of the district issued post-
facto transport permits (SKSHH, Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan or 
susulan) and a letter (surat sakti) to the head of the provincial police requesting 
the release of the timber. However, rumours in the district contended that the 
police only confiscated the timber because the head of the provincial police 
deemed that the payments from the ekspedisi were insufficient. Finally, amid 
further insinuations of behind the scenes intrigue, the governor supported 
the district lobbying, even though releasing the timber in this fashion was 
technically in contravention of forestry regulations. To intimidate the police, 
or possibly provide a legitimate reason to release the logs, the timber inter-
ests behind the ekspedisi mobilized 1,500 ‘demonstrators’ who descended on 
the shipment. In face of this show of force and a letter from the governor, 
the police finally allowed most of the logs to proceed (Kompas 13-6-2002). In 
a symbolic nod towards laws for processing ‘illegal timber’, the police auc-
tioned a small amount of the logs.
While this story pointed to the struggle over access to the extensive 
benefits to be gained from this province’s extensive forest resources, it only 
touched upon the extent and unremitting nature of this struggle. In addition 
to the district government agencies and the police, business interests, preman, 
indigenous entrepreneurs and remote villagers vied with or accommodated 
each other in attempting to maximize their benefits. While this struggle sharp-
ened as Indonesia embarked upon a rapid decentralization process in 1999, 
it shifted with subsequent political, economic and legal changes, reaching a 
turning point when, after 2002, the central government recentralized areas of 
administration, especially with respect to forest management. 
This chapter examines how decentralization and the subsequent recen-
tralization affected the exercise of public powers over nature in Central 
Kalimantan. As actors attempted to shape these fluctuating conditions for 
their own ends, some actors have managed the transition well, others have 
seen the initial gains of 1999-2000 washed away. The central analytical 
problem requires analyzing the connection between changes in the modes 
of resource control under regional autonomy and the changing patterns of 
political representation, participation, and power. This involves connecting 
recent theoretical understanding of the mechanisms, the structures and the 
processes at work in the control of natural resources and the wider literature 
concerned with civil society, the state and power. My objective is to draw 
some conclusions concerning the functioning of civil society, the state and 
the exercise of power and the prospects for successful decentralization in this 
particular context. 
This chapter advances two related arguments. First, the turn to and away 
from decentralization in the forestry sector over 1998-2004 involved a strug-
gle over resources that reveals the particular course of politico-legal change 
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over this period. During the high season of regional autonomy pre-existing 
localized modes of exchange and accommodation became more autonomous 
of the previously dominant centralized mode of resource control. As these 
decentralized modes of access flourished under regional autonomy, rents 
were more widely spread. While this allowed a wider range of strategi-
cally situated local actors to benefit, due to the structural disadvantages they 
faced, poor rural actors only gained short term and limited benefits. Over 
time the older system became more apparent: as corporate interests adjusted, 
they incorporated district elites and administrative structures as well as key 
rural actors into their processes of resource access. Just as colonial regimes 
inevitably incorporated local elites, predominant economic interests found 
ways to cooperate with and incorporate local strongmen, administrative 
and village elites. In this way the decentralized modes of resource extrac-
tion which have received so much bad press articulated with still dominant 
centralized modes. 
Second, the constellation of actors benefiting from this system of resource 
access was highly changeable as the system was subject to shifts in power, 
political position, and legal authority. As district and upriver actors depend 
on personalistic, clientalist ties to officials occupying positions in various 
state agencies and to outside financiers and timber interests, they are particu-
larly vulnerable to legal-administrative and political changes, particularly 
those that affect state based patrons in an administration under transition. 
The nature of these changes over 1998-2002 led to considerable changes in 
the constellation of actors benefiting from the system. While district actors 
and administrators had exceptional opportunities to gain benefits during 
1999-2002, since 2002 the pendulum has swung back the other way as cen-
tral government has slowly reconstituted its authority. This began when 
the police gained authority to apply sanctions in the forestry area. Under a 
command structure, still under the control of the central government, they 
increasingly deployed this against nonconforming district administrations. 
At the same time the Ministry of Forestry successfully recentralized areas of 
forest administration with Government Regulation no. 34/2002. Central gov-
ernment authority was again confirmed with the passing of a new regional 
government act (Law no. 32/2004) that stressed the authority of provincial 
governors just at the time when the political system was consolidating 
under the new president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his vice-president 
Yusuf Kalla. These changes meant that once again actors with strong links 
in Jakarta and reaching down to governors and provincial police chiefs are 
once again in the best position to benefit from resources. While they have 
lost many of their formal powers they enjoyed over 1999-2002, state based 
actors in the local domain still retain an informal capacity to manipulate 
other actors access to market.
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In discussing developments in Central Kalimantan, I will analyse how 
the mechanisms, structures and processes at work in the control and main-
tenance of access to benefits have changed (Ribot 1998). For convenience, I 
will do this by dividing up the discussion into three sections, covering, first, 
the period immediately before regional autonomy, second, the high season of 
autonomy (2000-2002), and third, tracing developments from 2002. But first, 
I will discuss some theoretical considerations.
To understand the impact of regional autonomy on patterns of resource 
use, the concept of ‘access’ is central. Access has been defined as the ability to 
derive benefits from natural resources (see Ribot 1998:308). As actors struggle 
to benefit from the productive use of natural resources, they make use of a 
range of social, economic, and legal mechanisms. Legal frameworks, institu-
tional power, group membership, social or ethnic identity, social status, the 
dynamics within a resource-controlling group, access to the state, to capital, to 
material resources, to customary authority, to markets, to knowledge and the 
ability to use institutional mechanisms are all factors that affect the process of 
gaining access to resources (Berry 1989; Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2002).
The main point is not whether access is considered legal or extra-legal, or 
legitimate or illegitimate according to various normative views (Ribot 1998). 
Access primarily depends on an actor’s ability to dominate or influence other 
actors. Patterns of resource access can ultimately be understood in terms of 
how power is allocated and exercised within a society (compare Berry 1989). 
Central to this analysis then will be an analysis of how regional autonomy in 
Central Kalimantan has affected relations of power, encompassing both the 
legal and de facto loci of control. This means it is important to trace first, the 
changing prescriptions of law regarding property, permits, licenses and titles 
and official structures of authority, and second, changes to the whole ensem-
ble of mechanisms shaping access – ‘the structural and relational forces’ – that 
exist ‘prior and parallel to’ socially recognized sets of rules (Ribot 1998:310).
Consequently, we need to understand how the changes associated with 
decentralization or regional autonomy have affected the structure of politi-
cal, economic and legal relations that govern conditions of access. For, as 
the dominant discourses and the structures of power change, institutional-
ized mechanisms governing resource access are adjusted. When the existing 
institutional arrangements and social relations are restructured, new modes 
of identity and action are created, and new categories of people may rise to 
pre-eminence (Berry 1989:43-4). Yet, such a structural analysis needs to be 
supplemented by an actor oriented approach, because, within the chang-
ing patterns of political representation, participation, and power under 
regional autonomy, actors take up new strategies. As they attempt to shape 
conditions for their own ends, this in turn affects patterns of access and use. 
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The late New Order
The New Order system of governance has been analysed in terms of horizon-
tal and vertically integrated networks of power and interest largely financed 
with extra-legal revenues, including those derived from the timber sector.2 
Under this system powerful politico-bureaucrats pursued entrepreneurial 
activities and extracted rents where possible, either for self enrichment, to 
command the loyalty of others both within and outside the pecking order, 
and/or to sustain the political interests of the institutions in which they were 
embedded. 
This was particularly apparent in the forestry sector where an appar-
ently centralized state system controlled access to resources. Under the Basic 
Forestry Act (no. 5/1967) the State – namely the Ministry of Forestry and 
its line agencies – controlled access to benefits via a concession licensing 
system (McCarthy 2000). As is well known, actors with access to key deci-
sion-makers within the regime, such as top military officials or cronies of the 
president, obtained legalized timber concession permits (Hak Pengusahaan 
Hutan, HPH). Given the close relations between the politico-bureaucrats 
controlling access and the corporate actors mining the forests, during field 
operations the legal strictures pertaining to state control over forest access 
remained primary to obtaining access. In parallel with these legal rules 
there existed a well established but unwritten set of rules regarding how the 
benefits of resource access were divided in the process of obtaining various 
licenses and permits, in working forest areas, in transporting logs downriver, 
and exporting timber overseas. 
During this time Central Kalimantan became, as a local academic described 
it, the ‘kitchen’ of the concession system. To open the area to exploitation, a 
state forest mapping exercise (Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan, TGHK) clas-
sified 75% of the province’s surface area (20.2 million hectares) as national 
forest estate (kawasan hutan) and some 9 million hectares of this area as 
‘production forest’. Disregarding indigenous property rights in these areas, 
the ministry of forestry granted 108 timber concessions (HPH) of 20 year 
duration to exploit these areas. Accordingly to one estimate, concessions 
operating in these areas at one point supplied an estimated 40% of national 
log supply each year (Kompas 18-6-2001). 
At this time companies holding timber exploitation licenses paid the cost 
of processing the required licenses and permits and the formal taxes and 
duties that needed to be paid on legal timber. Even if they processed the 
requisite permits, they still faced the expense of making well-established 
2  For discussion of this phenomenon, see C. Barr 1998, 2002; Robison and Rosser 1998; 
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payments to police, military, forestry and local government officials whose 
concurrence was needed for smooth operations in the field or along the river 
as they transported timber to market. To maximize profits, timber opera-
tors sought to minimize formal taxes and duties and the cost of obtaining 
permits. Mostly they extracted timber beyond their legal quotas and in areas 
adjacent to their legal areas. This meant that they needed to transport timber 
downriver well in excess of the amount for which they had documents. 
Under the concession system, companies with official HPH conces-
sion licenses along the Barito River usually ran integrated operations that 
encompassed logging large areas, transporting timber downriver, and finally 
exporting sawn timber or plywood. However, the actor holding a concession 
license might also sub-contract various functions to other operators. In par-
allel with the vertically integrated concession system, other actors sold their 
services to concessionaires, such as shipping timber downriver. According 
to sources involved in these shipping operations, if the concessionaire had 
full documents for a shipment, they would use company barges (tongkang). 
However, if the shipment lacked full documentation they would engage 
the services to what had become known as ekspedisi, a sub-contractor ship-
ping timber downriver. On average, ekspedisi would only obtain permits for 
approximately 30% of the timber they transported. Given the significant 
taxes thereby avoided, ample funds were left over to make the payments 
required to navigate the informal system.3
In parallel with the institutional order working down from Jakarta, as I 
have described elsewhere (McCarthy, forthcoming), during the New Order a 
system of resource extraction operated in outer island Indonesia that demon-
strated the primary institutional arrangements characteristic of these areas. 
These consisted of self-regulating networks of exchange and accommoda-
tion that determined access to and use of key local resources which formed 
the most serious obstacle to the operation of formal state policy at least as it 
appears in policy documents and laws. The logic of this system is clear: over 
long periods of time state decision-makers in distant Jakarta have developed 
nation wide organizational rules pertaining to the local domain – specifically 
with regard to state forest. Yet, these rules failed to accommodate the inter-
ests of diverse actors and the variety of situations found in the local area (see 
Ostrom 1992). These interests included the extra-budgetary needs of local 
political actors and officials to maintain the local state apparatus, to sustain 
political loyalties, and to meet their personal economic ambitions. The state 
order also failed to meet the ambitions of local entrepreneurs disadvantaged 
by regulations that privileged those able to obtain forest exploitation per-
3  Interview, Buntok, 24-7-2002.
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mits in distant Jakarta, as well as the requirements for labour and economic 
opportunities for villagers disadvantaged by a state concessions system that 
allowed the logging customary lands in a fashion widely held to be unjust 
and inequitable.
Under the localized system of resource extraction that emerged, local 
entrepreneurs handled quasi-legal timber operations, sometimes in coop-
eration with outside concessionaires. They could do so as long as they con-
formed to a system of reciprocities that involved extra-legal gifts, payments 
and political support and other exchanges with key local politicians and state 
functionaries. These systems of extraction worked under the blind eye of local 
officials who were otherwise loyal to the regime. As they evolved, they grew 
into encompassing webs of exchange and accommodation that included for-
estry staff, army personnel and other key local functionaries while reaching 
out into the wider society to encompass village and adat heads. In many cases 
local bosses with access to capital and contacts and kinship relations within 
state agencies, with the agents of centralized concession operators and local 
police and military officials played key roles within these arrangements. 
While legal state sanctions would not be applied against those conforming 
to the reciprocities regulating this system, the legal domain of the state and 
those empowered by it remained central to the system. Officials within these 
networks derived their power from their capacity to issue permits, enforce 
state regulations and apply state sanctions. While this involves state power, 
these arrangements are not coincident with the state. Within complex evolv-
ing situations, to varying degrees the institutional arrangements governing 
access to resources both reflected and refracted customary local notions of 
rights, clientelist patterns of exchange and accommodation, and state laws 
within an institutional matrix working in an overlapping, and complicated 
fashion across these three institutional orders (McCarthy, forthcoming). 
Consequently, as Barbara Harriss-White (2003) has noted when discussing 
similar systems in India, the precise boundaries of the state remain blurred. 
Viewed from this angle, the state appears as a system or a set of bureaucra-
cies ‘that resists straightforward analytical closure’ (Gupta 1995:392). Thus, 
the power of actors occupying positions in the state lies in their ability to 
manipulate other actors’ access to market (see Reno 1995). 
This became particularly evident in Central Kalimantan during the 1990s, 
when Soeharto pushed a peat project, the notorious Peat Land Development 
Project (Project Pembangunan Lahan Gambut, PLG). As this mega-project 
aimed to convert one million hectares of peat swamp forest in southern 
Central Kalimantan to rice and other crops, it allowed for the wholesale clear 
felling of the peat swamp forests of southern Central Kalimantan. During 
this process, timber brokers connected to companies with valid permits to 
log particular areas would provide advances to loggers in the form of food 
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or cash, or buy the timber directly from villagers working in surround-
ing areas. After purchasing logs, they would sell them on to sawmills that 
opened along the banks of the major rivers, or directly down to Banjarmasin, 
the major port for South-Central Kalimantan and the seat of major plywood 
and timber exporting factories, making considerable profits along the way. 
This system was operated by financiers from the timber companies who had 
placed orders with the local entrepreneurs and brokers, organizing for ship-
ments of logs to be sent to Banjarmasin or further a field to Surabaya and 
Jakarta. These transactions occurred in collusion with district and provincial 
forestry staff, local military officers, the police and other local government 
staff. These officials received extra-legal payments on a regular basis. This 
meant that loggers received early warning of law enforcement, and cases of 
illegal logging were ‘solved’ in local coffee shops.4
With the police still under the armed forces, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) was a leading agen-
cy in these processes. According to one source, the regional commander 
(danrem) appointed individual district commanders (kodim), taking into 
account their promises regarding the amount of money they would ‘store’ 
upwards to the military command. This was just one of the unofficial 
ways the military obtained additional income. In Central Kalimantan well 
before regional autonomy, well-connected entrepreneurs and local tim-
ber interests at the district level in the interstices of the New Order state. 
 
Regional autonomy
Even before the key autonomy law (Law no. 22/1999) had come into effect, 
district governments had gained greater legal authority in the forestry sec-
tor. They were, for example, entitled to grant small scale logging licenses.5 
Under regional autonomy districts set up district forestry offices (dinas) that 
were accountable only to the district head and these now operated according 
to new district regulations (perda) rather than the directives of the Ministry 
4  Tim Pemantuan Kawasan Konservasi Air Hitam, Kabupaten Barito Selatan, Kalimantan 
Tengah, lindungilah ekosistem air hitam dari ancaman Proyek Lahan Gambut (PLG) satu juta 
hektar di Kalimantan Tengah, laporan lapangan pemantauan kawasan konservasi air hitam di 
Kecamatan Dusun Hilir dan sekitarnya, 1997.
5  In 1999 a Ministry of Forestry initiative encouraged community groups to form cooperatives 
to obtain thirty-five year ‘community forestry leases’ (Hak Pengusahan Hutan Kemasyarakatan, 
HPHKM) which could be issued by district governments. A government regulation (no. 6/1999) 
also established the concept of Forest Product Harvest Concessions (Hak Pemungutan Hasil 
Hutan, HPHH), giving the bupati power to issue permits for HPHH in areas of ‘production forest’ 
of up to 100 ha. 
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of Forestry in distant Jakarta. These formal changes, combined with the 
discretionary powers gained by district administrations following regional 
autonomy, meant that districts gained a large degree of de facto control over 
the way resource policy worked in their districts. From 1999 onwards dis-
trict administrations in Central Kalimantan began to issue timber licenses to 
local people operating in their own name or in the name a community group 
incorporated into a cooperative or ‘farming group’ (kelompok tani). District 
entrepreneurs also began to formalize their operations by obtaining more 
extensive licenses for timber mills which had until then to various degrees 
worked outside the law.6
Under this system, the national forestry department lost its capacity to 
operate as a vertically integrated agency with full technical responsibility for 
forests.7 In this way, regional autonomy entailed a significant change in the 
locus where those wishing to gain access had to invest, pay a fee or exchange 
a service. To the mortification of the Ministry of Forestry, after 1999 district 
officials became important gatekeepers governing access to forest resources 
found in their district.8
Yet, many permits could still be obtained from provincial and central 
government agencies, ensuring that decentralization led to the diversifica-
tion of control over access to forest areas and markets. Competition intensi-
fied between different agencies and different levels of government to control 
access, as well as between actors who had invested in relationships at a par-
ticular level.9 Consequently, the state was less able to maintain the pretence 
of operating as a unitary actor, as it had now emerged in a more plural guise 
(McCarthy 2004).
In Central Kalimantan the New Order had acted like a predatory state, 
extracting large rents from the province’s forests, despoiling the patrimony of 
the indigenous people while providing very little in way of collective goods, 
especially in remote rural hamlets.10 After the demise of Jakarta’s author-
6  For descriptions, see McCarthy 2001a, 2001b.
7  Under Law no. 22/1999 the provincial forestry office (kanwil) were abolished and, after 
the formal commencement of regional autonomy in 2001, the dinas at the district level became 
primarily responsible to the district head. For, as Article 4 of the new law stated, autonomous 
regions ‘shall respectively be independent and shall not have a hierarchical relationship to each 
other’ (Law no. 22/1999, Article 4). As the dinas at the district level no longer reported to dinas at 
the provincial level, the Ministry now had to rely on the dinas at the provincial level to pursue 
their objectives. 
8  See McCarthy 2001a, 2001b.
9  See McCarthy 2004.
10  This is exemplified by the poor infrastructure in the new district of Gunung Mas. While the 
extensive timber resources found here were extracted for decades, the state had yet to develop 
the most basic communications, transport, health and other facilities. In 2001, virtually all vil-
lages lacked electricity or telephone, and there were only 23 kilometres of sealed road in the 
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ity in law and public discourse, rural people and district elites alike openly 
challenged the mining of the forests by outside actors. Now local group 
membership, social and ethnic identity became more important in deter-
mining who could legitimately gain access to resources in the local domain. 
For a long time villagers had resented the way outside interests – especially 
timber and mining companies close to the regime – had extracted resources 
without respecting their adat property. In villages across the province anger 
at the way outside interests had over-ridden adat property rights, at the role 
of in-migrants in extractive industries, and at the minimal benefits enjoyed 
by local people boiled to the surface (ICG 2001b; McCarthy 2001a, 2001b). In 
numerous disputes in remote areas those claiming adat rights exerted physi-
cal control over particular areas. These putra daerah (‘children of the region’) 
sentiments worked against outsiders exploiting resources subject to adat 
claims. Villagers asserted adat claims over local resources via demonstra-
tions, blockades, and the threat of physical violence and asserted physical 
control over access to resources in areas around their villages, swiddens and 
forest gardens. 
At the same time local elites railed against the way Jakarta based actors 
had over-stepped the local administration in gaining permits, and the fact 
that the lucrative process of resource extraction occurred without providing 
sufficient funding for the development of local infrastructure, while failing to 
allow local entrepreneurs to gain sufficient benefits from resource extraction. 
Antipathy against outsiders holding key positions within the local bureauc-
racy translated into moves to indigenize key positions in the bureaucracy. 
Local politicians used ‘putra daerah resentments’ to legitimize decisions that 
were seen to favour local interests. District elites, who felt they had not 
enjoyed a fair share of resource extraction during the New Order, now saw 
this as their turn to benefit.11 
Those putra daerah close to officials or with the means of winning their 
favour gained prominence, using kinship, village or other contacts in the 
administration, exchanging favours and offering money to obtain small 
scale exploitation permits, permits to transport timber and sawmill licenses. 
District regulations (perda) and policies explicitly or implicitly favoured peo-
ple with putra daerah status in granting formal exploitation permits.12 If these 
brokers and small scale entrepreneurs could work with groups of villagers, 
helping them to incorporate as cooperatives or merely enlisting their names 
whole area of 10,804 square kilometres (McCarthy 2001). In contrast, one of the first acts of the 
new district of Gunung Mas was to build an effective road link down to the provincial capital of 
Palangkaraya.
11  This phenomenon was also found in other areas of Kalimantan. See for good example 
‘Rencana Menhutbun tidak disetujui wakil rakyat Kutai’, Suara Kaltim 20-11-2000.
12  McCarthy 2001. See Peluso and Harwell 2001.
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on permit applications, they could process small scale timber concessions in 
the name of village collectivities. 
With the explosion of resentment and demands by villagers upriver 
against conglomerates, a large number of disputes emerged between con-
cessionaires and villagers. As concessionaires and outside financiers faced 
increased threats from local actors, with regional autonomy, timber con-
glomerates found they needed to renegotiate renewed access to resources. 
At least formally, they could still obtain permits in the old way, but it was 
no longer sufficient to just obtain exploitation licenses via the central gov-
ernment. Having gained more extensive powers under regional autonomy, 
assertive district heads began to issue short term exploitation permits to 
local interests inside concession areas, typically favouring putra daerah with 
kinship affiliations, or with political or economic ties, from the same area. 
In these and other ways, district heads could put pressure on conglomer-
ates to negotiate access via district administrations. In Central Kalimantan, 
working with local businessmen, many concessionaires began to invest in 
other extraction strategies. Extending the system that had operated during 
the PLG period, conglomerates worked with local businessmen and brokers, 
with informal support from district heads and the governor.13 For example, 
Djajanti, one of largest timber conglomerates in Central Kalimantan, allowed 
local companies to harvest its concession areas, according to one of its com-
missioners, ‘on the condition that they only sell to us’.
We worked out what our costs would have been if we had been working the 
areas ourselves. And that’s what we’ve paid the companies now working our 
concessions’, said Sudrajat. Sudrajat decided to take this course of action because 
it seemed more advantageous than having to strong-arm it with the district head. 
With their current powers, it is very difficult to get the district heads to back 
down. (Tempo 46, 24-7-2001.)
The conglomerates also needed to negotiate taxation and levies – formal or 
otherwise – imposed by the local government (Kompas 16-8-2001). The system 
had the virtue of raising significant district taxes (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, 
PAD) that benefited local government. Given corruption and collusion in the 
way the system operated, unofficially it also enriched those occupying key 
positions in the district administration. 
Apart from incorporating district elites and administrative structures into 
their processes of resource access, entrepreneurs and outside companies also 
sought to integrate key rural actors. They preferred for instance to operate 
through a villager, a local cooperative registered with the district government, 
13  Timber interests also contributed large amounts of funds for the governor of Kalteng at the 
time of the last elections (McCarthy 2001a, 2001b).
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or a community group who could obtain operating permits from the district 
government. In Central Kalimantan ethnic identity had become important: 
belonging to a particular village, ethnic or adat group gave an actor a sense of 
entitlement. By operating behind a person or group with putra daerah status, 
outside actors could more readily legitimize their operations. This also had 
an added advantage: with many villagers recruited into timber operations in 
one way or another, many benefited under this system, and this tended to 
dissipate many emergent ‘vertical’ conflicts. In a number of cases individual 
villagers worked as the front men of concessionaires, operating cooperatives 
in villages areas without involving fellow villagers or making sufficient com-
pensation for exploiting their adat property. Conflicts between companies 
and villagers were often transmuted into conflicts between villagers engaged 
in cutting timber in their adat territories and those who felt left out.14 If extra-
legal activities were involved, the actors behind the permit protected their 
good name and avoided the risk of legal sanctions. If the actor behind the 
permit was an official, a person with several permits, an outside concession-
aire, or someone who might wish to disguise the extent of their operations, 
this strategy helped to avoid scrutiny. 
The system offered additional economic advantages. Government agen-
cies found it difficult to effectively tax informal logging operations that did 
not have an office and were not formally registered as a company. Village 
logging teams, or those acting in the name of communities, did not pay cen-
tral government taxes such as the PSDH.15 Yet, as their timber lacked official 
documentation necessary to take it to market, they would have to sell it to 
the first available buyer, usually ‘bosses’ such as owners of small sawmills or 
timber collectors. While these operators might be able to obtain documents 
that would enable them to transport timber within the district, they lacked 
the documentation necessary to market the timber outside the area. As tim-
ber without a full legal status had a lower price, conglomerates that could 
use production permits obtained from the central government to render 
the timber legal, could buy the timber cheaply from poor villagers, making 
considerable profits in the process. Further, given the long-standing over the 
harvesting of timber inside concession areas, concessionaires faced difficul-
ties meeting their production targets (Kompol Eddy Hermanto 2004). By 
subcontracting village teams to log surrounding areas, concessionaires could 
avoid the appearance of illegality, access other sources of timber subject to 
adat rights, and co-opt villagers all at the same time. Consequently, villagers 
remained in a weak position after regional autonomy. Even if they could 
14  Interview Dinas Kooperasi, Kapuas, 27-4-2004.
15  Provisi Sumber Daya Hutan, Forest Resource Royalty. Interview, Dispenda, Kuala Kapuas, 
27-4-2004.
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muster the money to obtain forest exploitation permits from the district gov-
ernment, they needed to obtain exploitation or transportation permits, and 
these expenses were cumulatively beyond the means of village actors and 
small time brokers. Local brokers and villagers lacked the capital required 
to use heavy machinery, run a saw mill, or obtain the permits required to 
transport the timber to the market.16 Villagers might log village areas under 
exploitation permits granted by district administrations in the name of indi-
vidual villagers or cooperatives set up in the name of community groups. 
Yet, this logging took place under the coordination of brokers financed from 
outside, or on behalf of concessionaires. Even after decentralization, those 
with control over capital and permits that allowed them to take timber 
through key nodes in the commodity chain where value was added, accrued 
the largest share of the profits (Zerner 2000). 
We can see these changes affecting the operation of the ekspedisi discussed 
earlier. By 2000 the Barito River had become an insecure place. With up to 30 
gangs of river pirates operating along the river, timber shipments faced the 
hazard of hijacking. At the same time government agencies were competing 
more extensively to extract benefits from the system. By 2004 there were 480 
posts from Puruk Cauh down to Banjarmasin. A variety of state agencies 
including Polsek, Koramil, Forestry, local government revenue collection 
agencies (dispenda), village posts, and the River Police, the police unit for 
ports and the navy ran these posts to levy ‘taxes’ on passing timber.17 
Faced with an uncertain business environment, these interests found it 
easier to mobilize local strongmen to organize operations upriver. Timber 
companies now more extensively used ekspedisi who could guarantee the 
arrival of timber downstream, which involved sharing profits to minimize 
risks. 
The actors running these operations required considerable skills and 
audacity, with the amount of profit depending on how they handled these 
risks. This encompassed arranging all the payments and negotiations with 
the various administrative areas found along the river. The amount of money 
involved was not trivial: an ekspedisi might provide hundreds of millions of 
rupiah to the head of the security forces in a riverside district each time the 
ekspedisi passed (Kompol Eddy Hermanto 2004). The reasons for this were 
clear: law enforcement authorities who felt affronted by the level of payment 
had the capacity to seize a shipment or arrest the ekspedisi leader. District 
government leaders also derived large profits from ekspedisi. They could hold 
16  Even under regional autonomy, those wishing to obtain a permit required considerable 
capital. In 2002 a recommendation for a HPHH permit could (informally) cost 10 million rupiah. 
In addition, other investments were required, for example to pay for aerial photographs and field 
surveys.
17  Interview with a timber broker, Banjarmasin, 26-4-2004.
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up a shipment, for instance if payments were not made. Shipments could 
therefore only proceed with the tacit agreement of district leaders.
Moreover, if the timber was confiscated, district heads could arrange for it 
to be processed according to the legal fiction that it had no owner and ‘auc-
tion’ it back to the ekspedisi (Kompol Eddy Hermanto 2004). Alternatively, as 
a shipment could be lost to hijackers or fall prey to an extortion racket run 
by a rival underworld gang, payments were required to rival preman work-
ing along the river. On occasion disputes led to casualties, if for instance the 
armed preman protecting a shipment became involved in a shoot out with 
river pirates, or the police and river preman engaged in a gun battle. 
Given their capacity to bridge this crucial space in the commodity chain 
ekspedisi accumulated large amounts of capital. By 2002, in addition to work-
ing for concessionaires and Banjarmasin based timber mills, ekspedisi carried 
timber for freelance brokers who went upriver to place orders. Further, eks-
pedisi worked as entrepreneurs in their own right, overseeing timber opera-
tions upriver and taking timber from scores of local timber brokers. At the 
peak of the ekspedisi system, shipments could be over 3 kilometres in length 
(Banjarmasin Post 8-7-2002). 
The risks involved in the system meant that only the strongest ekspedisi 
could survive. In 1995, according to one source, there were approximately six 
actors working as ekspedisi. By 2002, only four key figures straddled the link 
between local timber operators and buyers upriver and the market downri-
ver in Banjarmasin, thereby becoming the key players in the forest sector for 
this area. As this process of ‘natural selection’ proceeded, in 2004 only two 
continued to work the river.
Power, civil society and accountability under regional autonomy
There are further issues to consider with respect to this system, the first 
of which concerns the nature of power in this out-of-the-way and long 
neglected province. Under regional autonomy the local administration had 
gained authority over licenses and permits, while the police retained power 
to enforce the law. At the same time, entrepreneurs, brokers and agents 
of Jakarta based conglomerates maintained a hold over productive proc-
esses through their control over capital and access to outside markets. While 
the wheels of this system were oiled by a range of accommodations and 
exchanges between actors, these arrangements extended way beyond simple 
transactions between the actors involved. If the system was to continue to 
operate with such a high degree of corruption and illegality, it needed to 
protect itself from unwanted scrutiny. Exposure outside the province could 
lead to law enforcement activities from external actors, or the demand for 
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payments in exchange for turning a blind eye. With a national campaign 
against illegal logging, those with most to lose from the exposure of their 
operations were prepared to intimidate or take violent action against actors 
who might expose it. Consequently, in Central Kalimantan power is often 
naked in its expression. 
In 2002, when I visited an upriver area with a large number of timber 
operations working outside the law, thugs (preman) followed my movements. 
Here an NGO activist described how some of these preman had tried to kill 
him by running his motorcycle off a remote road into some trees. While it 
is possible to discover who is benefiting and how, it is not always good for 
one’s health or career to unravel the connections between modes of resource 
control and political power.18 
Villagers remained relatively disadvantaged under decentralization. Yet, 
the system that flourished at this time led to a much wider distribution of 
benefits than the earlier centralized system. Ironically, this wider distribu-
tion of benefits also encompassed the key agents of what is often considered 
civil society. This became apparent when a reporter told me how all jour-
nalists in the provincial capital, Palangkaraya, received monthly payments 
from a major timber mill not to report on their activities. When villagers 
had burnt down the mill after a long festering dispute, the local press failed 
to carry the story.19 During a journey upriver, another journalist told me of 
a range of illegalities and corrupt activities he had uncovered in the area. 
After he left, others present described him as a ‘journalist without a paper’ 
(wartawan tanpa surat kabar or WTS, a word play on the Indonesian term for 
a prostitute). This freelance journalist travelled around with a press card 
uncovering illegalities and extracting blackmail money in exchange for sup-
pressing publication. According to one report, a timber operator could face 
forty journalists visiting his office, asking for one hundred to two hundred 
thousand rupiah in exchange for not exposing illegalities. In a district along 
the Barito River, each time an ekspedisi passed, the ekspedisi would be given 
a list of the names of journalists who would need to be paid between five 
hundred thousand and five million rupiah not to report the ekspedisi (Kompol 
Eddy Hermanto 2004).
District officials and journalists also discussed a similar phenomena 
among NGOs, which they jokingly referred to as ‘organizations that like to 
make requests’ (Lembaga Suka Minta, a wordplay on the Indonesian term 
for NGOs, LSM or Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat). With hundreds of NGOs 
18  These realities also prevent the type of commodity chain analysis advocated by Ribot 
(1998), making it difficult to quantify the division of benefits from resource extraction pre- and 
post-decentralization.
19  Interview, Palangkaraya, 22-4-2004.
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emerging after the end of the New Order period, many NGOs in the prov-
ince also collected information in upriver areas, extracting money from those 
involved in exchange for silence.20 According to a DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah, District Assembly) member interviewed in Buntok, the 
capital of Barito Selatan district, every time an illegal timber shipment passed 
through Buntok, several NGOs received a payment.
NGOs and the press may be considered the key protagonists of modern 
civil society. Yet, rather than acting as the torch bearers of ‘a moral commu-
nity, a legitimate political order’ (Khilnani 2001), many of the key actors in 
civil society acted like just another group of rent-seekers. With journalists 
and NGOs often in the pockets of commercial interests, it was hard to envis-
age the press taking on a critical role. There are also obstacles to the healthy 
development of what Jürgen Habermas (1992) has called a ‘public sphere’ 
– where public opinion formed through free discussion in the press informs 
and controls the activities of the state.
If democratic decentralization is about devolving powers to downwardly 
accountable actors (Agrawal and Ribot 1999), we can understand outcomes 
in terms of the way accountability relations encompass local government. 
Indeed, the main mechanisms of accountability set out in both Law no. 
22/1999 and Law no. 25/1999 operated primarily through elected district 
assemblies (DPRD) that have the capacity to hold executive accountable.21 
The underpinning assumption seems to have been that the legislative would 
use mechanisms at its disposal to police and punish government officials 
– including the head of the region – who misbehaved. But, with only a weak 
link between DPRD members and their constituencies through a poorly 
designed electoral system. According to DPRD members interviewed in the 
course of this research, collusion between elected representatives and the 
chief executive office, under the laws of 1999 still elected by the legislative, 
has distorted the operation of accountability mechanisms. 
These problems become particularly evident at two key moments each 
year. In order to enhance the monitoring of executive behaviour and hence 
improve government performance, Indonesia’s decentralization laws provide 
the DPRD with the power to reject the annual accountability report of the 
head of the region. In theory, if this report is not accepted, the district head 
20  According to informants, only a few NGOs and journalists in Palangkaraya remained free 
of these corrupt influences.
21  Law no. 22/1999 speaks of the ‘role of the DPRD in performing its function as the moni-
toring body in the implementation of regional autonomy’, and the DPRD is meant to monitor 
and to improve government performance. For example, the head of the region is accountable 
to the DPRD (see Law no. 22/1999,  Article 44 and 45), and the DPRD has the authority to reject 
the accountability report of the head of the region and even dismiss the regional head (Law no. 
22/1999, Article 3). 
John F. McCarthy168
can be forced to resign.22 According to a number of accounts from Central 
Kalimantan, the district heads pay money to members of DPRD to ensure 
the acceptance of their accountability report. Within the system of exchange 
that dominates district politics, the accountability report becomes a lever 
to extract business and other concessions from a district head, with DPRD 
members refusing to pass reports until agreement is reached regarding how 
district projects will be divided out.23 Expensive deal making also affects the 
arrangement of the annual budget. The head of the district assembly, the dis-
trict head, the secretary of the district (sekda), heads of district agencies (kepala 
dinas), and heads of factions in the DPRD, are the major players in arranging 
the budget (RAPBD), obtaining projects worth millions of rupiah. In return 
for their acquiescence, DPRD members obtain projects and sums of money 
allocated ‘for lobbying’.24
According to a disillusioned DPRD member interviewed in 2004, a career 
in the DPRD has become an object of accumulation both for personal and 
political ends. Candidates for the legislature need to invest in the party to 
become a candidate, and once a candidate is elected they need to earn money 
for the party to support re-election.25 To this end, they need to obtain lots of 
projects. Consequently, ‘people are very disillusioned with politicians, they 
just see them as being after their own interests’. Given the dominant power 
of the executive in policy processes and the way collusive practices have cor-
rupted the DPRD, community aspirations fail to be taken up by DPRD. It is 
hardly surprising that villagers have little expectations and, according to one 
DPRD member, they are not interested in meeting DPRD members visiting 
their constituencies.26 
Members of the DPRD have also been involved in the timber trade, using 
their status within networks of exchange and accommodation encompass-
ing the executive to provide operations with a degree of immunity from law 
enforcement. DPRD members have provided recommendations for timber to 
pass through their districts or supported the statements of timber interests in 
the name of the DPRD. More directly, it has been estimated that more than 60 
DPRD members in Central Kalimantan have been directly involved in tim-
22  In late 2004 Law no. 32/2004 took away the power of the DPRD to hold the district head 
accountable in this way.
23  Interview, 11-8-2002. Interview DPRD member, Palangkaraya, 24-4-2004.
24  Interview DPRD functionary, Kapuas, 27-4-2004.
25  Under this electoral system, the position of a candidate on the ballot paper determines the 
likelihood of obtaining a seat in DPRD. Candidates who failed to gain a seat typically complain of 
collusive, corrupt practices determining the position the party allocated them on the ballot paper.
26  Interview DPRD functionary, Kapuas, 27-4-2004; Interview DPRD member, Palangkaraya, 
24-4-2004; Interview NGO employee, Palangkaraya, 23-4-2004. Yet, given the lack of transpar-
ency, it is very difficult to know the political deals that take place, how projects are divided up, 
and how much an accountability report costs to get through the legislative.
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ber enterprises.27 This points to the reality that formal mechanisms of public 
participation and representation bear little resemblance to the actual mecha-
nisms determining who gains access to resources and how they do so. 
Post autonomy: changes after 2002 
From 2000 two significant changes occurred that were to have far reaching 
consequences after 2002. First, in July 2000 Abdurrahman Wahid separated 
the police from the armed forces, a decision that took effect as of 1 January 
2001 (ICG 2001b; Kompol Eddy Hermanto 2004). Prior to the restructuring of 
the military, the military and police were integrated into a unitary command 
structure. As the military was the lead agency, ‘the police could be leant on by 
ABRI, and so they weren’t so brave’.28 After the reforms the police reported 
directly to the president under a national police chief. As the head of the pro-
vincial police (kapolda) now had a rank of brigadier general while the head 
of the local military command (danrem) remained a colonel, the local police 
commander was superior in rank. Yet, like the military, the police remained 
under-funded and, according to one report, obtained only 30% of their oper-
ating budget from the government. At the same time the central government 
made no steps to improve accountability within the force, and – despite 
regional autonomy – there was no formal means of holding police down-
wardly accountable to the local population.29 To be sure, the provincial police 
chief (kapolda) remained accountable upwards to the central government. As 
the kapolda could be moved if Jakarta was dissatisfied with his performance, 
he remained in a subordinate position to the governor, the representative of 
Jakarta in the regions. Yet, with the governor’s support, Jakarta reappointed 
the same person to the position three times, suggesting that the governor and 
the kapolda had worked out mutually agreeable arrangements. Consequently, 
as long as the kapolda tied in decisions with the governor, the district police 
chief (kapolres) could operate on his behalf outside the matrix of district 
accountability relations.30 
27  The decision was formalized with the promulgation of the new police law in January 2002; 
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 Tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia. 
28  Interview, Forestry Official Kuala Barito, 25-4-2004. Within the regional hierarchy, the head 
of the regional military command (dandem) was a colonel with a higher rank (class c) than the 
head of the provincial police (kapolda) who was colonel with a rank of class g. 
29  USINDO Open Forum Challenges to Police Reform in Indonesia, with Adrianus Meliala, 
lecturer at the University of Indonesia, 26 September 2002, Washington DC. Http://www.usindo.
org/Briefs/Police%20Reform.htm.
30  Interview, Palangkaraya, 22-4-2004.
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In 2000, an institutionalized committee (the Muspida) that included the 
local head of the administration, the local military and police chiefs – with 
the forestry agency handling operational matters – used to coordinate district 
policy as well as the distribution of revenue across agencies. At this time, 
given the history of military pre-eminence, a number of timber businesses still 
operated in this region under military protection.31
After 2002, making use of their new powers, the police began to work 
more autonomously of district civil and military commands. As the technical 
agency concerned with forests, forestry agencies had long competed with 
the police to control law enforcement in the forestry sector. While forestry 
officials had investigatory powers, they needed to report infringements of 
forestry law to the police whose responsibility it was to process the case 
until it reached court.32 Armed with their extended authority, now the police 
increasingly came down to confiscate timber without involving district 
forestry agencies. Although this left district forestry agencies primarily in 
control of permits and licenses, there was little district administrations could 
do. As district forestry agencies – and the wider district administration – saw 
the police usurping their authority and the revenue that followed from its 
application, jealousy increased between the police and the other agencies, 
including the military and the district forestry agencies. 
The second change occurred when the Megawati administration began 
to reassert the control of Jakarta over far-flung provinces. Responding to the 
competition over control of forest resources, the national government moved 
to reassert vertical control with a key regulation that effectively worked 
against district timber regimes. In July 2002 the central government issued a 
new Government Regulation (no. 34/2002) pertaining to the forestry sector. 
Before this time, the authority of the ministry of forestry had been disaggre-
gated. With a political struggle occurring in the centre, the laws pertaining 
to natural resource use and regional autonomy remained uncoordinated, 
inconsistent and contradictory.33 During this time there were serious dis-
31  McCarthy 2001a, 2001b. Primarily the Muspida (musyawarah pimpinan daerah) at the district 
level, but also the Muspika (musyawarah pimpinan kabupaten) at the sub-district level.
32  According to the criminal law (Law no. 81/1981), the police had the primary investigatory 
powers (penyidik tunggal). However, forestry laws (such as Law no. 41/1999) gave forestry offi-
cials investigatory powers for forestry related matters. These areas of law set the scene for long 
standing institutional competition between police and forestry officials.
33  In January 1999 a government regulation (no. 6/1999) established the concept of Forest 
Product Harvest Concessions (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, HPHH), giving the district head 
power to issue permits for HPHH in areas of ‘production forest’ of up to 100 hectare. On 13 
November 1999, the new Minister of Forestry attempted to reverse the implementation of this 
policy. In 2000, another ministerial decision (Kepmenhut no. 051/Kpts/2000) once again gave 
regional governments the power to allocate concessions licenses. Kepmenhut no. 541/Kpts-
II/2002 then cancelled this earlier decision. Finally, in 2002 with the passing of a more binding 
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putes within the districts and among central and provincial authorities over 
natural resource decision-making. Finally, the Forestry Ministry regained 
control over the permit system, timber transport licences, and the collection 
of taxes on forestry activities, effectively rescinding district authority to issue 
100 ha exploitation permits and raise district taxes in the sector.34 While 
the central government did not immediately repeal district regulations that 
contradicted the new regulation, district heads who continued with earlier 
policies faced legal sanctions. 
With a national campaign against illegal logging, the police began to make 
law enforcement efforts that also made for excellent public consumption. Raids 
by the police concentrated on small scale sawmills and timber shipments run 
by local entrepreneurs and brokers, along with larger timber operations and 
some ekspedisi operating without full legal documents. Over time the police 
and the provincial courts began to act more aggressively against ‘illegal log-
ging’, leading to their effective control over the forestry sector. District offi-
cials involved in administering district regimes were faced with arrest by the 
police for breaking national law. In a well known case, in 2003 the head of 
the forestry agency, the district head, the head of the DPRD in the district of 
Barito Utara all faced legal charges for providing transportation documents 
to an ekspedisi containing uncertified timber. They allegedly issued the docu-
ments according to a district decision in contradiction of national forestry 
laws that provide that timber without documents should be confiscated and 
auctioned. Provincial rumour held it that the case involved political competi-
tion and unhappiness regarding the division of revenues with other actors. 
Meanwhile, two senior officials in a neighbouring district faced charges for 
the fictive auctioning of timber, and the deputy head of the forestry agency in 
a third district also faced charges (Banjarmasin Post 3-3-2003).
Yet despite this apparent crackdown, according to one forestry official on 
the Barito River, ‘if timber passes through with “the flag of kapolda on it”, no-
one is brave enough to touch it’. ‘Police can arrest us’, he said, ‘but we can’t 
do anything to them’.35 According to a number of sources, a broker close to 
the provincial police chief was now the key gatekeeper in the province. Only 
Government Regulation (no. 34/2002) did the Ministry successfully begin to curtail the capacity 
of districts to allocate concession licenses, but not before some districts granted a cache of new 
10,000 hectare IPHK licenses within their territories. 
34  The most stringent restrictions introduced by Government Regulation no. 34/2002 were 
that districts could only give permits for up to 20 m3; at the same time the provincial forestry 
agency tightened procedures for transporting timber, in effect taking back over timber transport 
permits. Interviews in Kapuas during 2004 revealed that, taken together, these changes stopped 
districts independently issuing new permits and made timber operations uneconomical for local 
businesses.
35  Interview, Forestry Official Kuala Barito, 25-4-2004.
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timber syndicates linked and making payments to this broker and with the 
informal blessing of the provincial police chief could continue to operate. 
This had led to a further round of ‘natural selection’, with actors lacking an 
excellent working relationship with this gatekeeper, or either failing to make 
speedy or adequate payments, facing legal sanctions.36
These developments led to several changes in the field. Before, with 
competition between the police and the forestry agencies, law enforcement 
remained somewhat unpredictable. But now, the extraction of timber became 
easier and more ‘manageable’ for the few syndicates that now were able to 
operate. Second, the district bureaucracy could no longer guarantee access to 
resources as they used to. With small scale timber licenses (HPHH) expiring, 
many small scale district operators found that they could no longer negotiate 
new permits. Third, after Government Regulation no. 34/2002, in a similar 
fashion as before regional autonomy, permits needed to be processed at 
the provincial level and in Jakarta.37 This increased the dependence of local 
operators on actors who could process permits (HPH with valid licences) 
or guarantee taking timber out. Fourth, as districts could no longer apply 
district regulations, a number of administrative practices for raising PAD 
(Locally Raised Revenues) and laundering timber could no longer be used.38 
Accordingly, district revenues from the forest sector fell into decline. And so 
the high tide of regional autonomy in the forestry sector ebbed.
36  Interview journalist, Palangkaraya, 22-4-2004.
37  Interview second assistant district head, Kantor Bupati, 25-4-2004.
38  For example, prior to Government Regulation no. 34/2002, districts had at least two ways 
of dealing with timber. Timber lacking the required permits could be ‘caught’ and handled 
according to a legal fiction that it had no owner. It would be ‘auctioned’ and sold on, and if the 
actor behind the shipment could negotiate this, the timber would be sold back to them. As the 
administration then issued legal documents, the timber (known as kayu temuan) then had a legal 
status. Alternatively, if an actor did not make these arrangements in advance, the timber could 
be confiscated (known as kayu tangkapan). Although the person making the shipment would be 
listed in the legal documents (berita acara), after sufficient lobbying with the district administra-
tion, the timber might be released to the owner, and legal documents would be issued after pay-
ment of district and (perhaps) central government taxes. Typically, the case would not proceed 
because of ‘lack of evidence’. In the rare occasion that a case was taken to court, the offender 
would usually be instructed to pay PSDH without the application of criminal sanctions. While 
these methods generated revenue, they in effect laundered timber lacking the required docu-
ments. After Government Regulation no. 34/2002, the kayu temuan practice ended, while kayu 
tangkapan continued if the actor concerned could not make speedy and sufficient payments, or 
otherwise secure their operations via the dominant timber syndicates.
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Conclusions
Under the New Order cliques of politico-businessmen and their crony capi-
talist partners with access to the highest levels of the regime could deploy 
considerable power encompassing finance and business opportunities in far-
off places. For instance, actors wired into networks of power in Jakarta could 
work concessions for themselves, fixing things upriver in due course. In doing 
so they could rely on the vertically integrated command-and-control struc-
tures that existed within state agencies such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
the Ministry of Forestry and the Military which found their apex in the circle 
around Soeharto. This vertical integration, together with the enduring nature 
of the regime and the rewards offered to those who remained loyal to the sys-
tem, gave the New Order a sense of corporate coherence and autonomy seen 
as characteristic of developmental states (compare Evans 1995). 
At the same time, before regional autonomy there were well established 
localized modes of resource control. As exemplified by the PLG project in 
Central Kalimantan, exchange relationships between district level officials 
and law enforcement agencies, entrepreneurs, brokers and strongmen formed 
a ‘decentralized’ system of resource access and control. In facilitating the 
extraction of forest resources from the area and its transport to markets con-
trolled by financiers and corporate interests in far away Jakarta, this ‘decen-
tralized’ mode of resource control articulated with the centralized mode.39 
After the passing of the key decentralization law (Law no. 22/1999), politi-
cal competition and conflicts over policy undermined horizontal ties within 
the state in Jakarta. At the same time, the decentralization laws hewed at 
the vertical connections within the state (McCarthy 2004). Between 1999 
and 2002 district governments were freed from the command-and-control 
structures that had held them (to varying degrees) accountable upwards 
under the old regime. Institutional arrangements within the state became 
fragmented and contested, which reduced the capacity of the centre to set 
the rules and to enforce them. 
Yet, despite the apparently drastic changes in the system after 1998, there 
was a great deal of continuity in the modes of resource access and control. 
Political decentralization had merely rearranged pre-existing ‘decentralized’ 
ways of organizing production and allowed them to flourish. With larger 
groups of actors involved in production and enjoying benefits, routes of 
access initially became more diverse. 
To avoid the risk and hassle involved in running a business under these 
unpredictable conditions, outside financiers and business interests increas-
39  See Obidzinski (2003) for an extended analysis of how this mode of resource extraction 
operated over a long period of time in another area of Kalimantan.
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ingly subcontracted elements of their operations to local brokers, financiers 
and entrepreneurs. Given the importance of ethnic identity, these tended to 
be either putra daerah themselves, or actors who could involve putra daerah 
to arrange permits or operations in the villages and smooth relations with 
district elites. Over time local strongmen who could help guarantee the field 
operations of downstream conglomerates became more prominent, dominat-
ing the transport of timber out of the area. These figures gained a key role 
as intermediates between small scale brokers, entrepreneurs and loggers 
upstream and the financiers and industries downstream. Over time this led to 
a local centralization of control and benefit distribution around these strong-
men. Ironically, decentralization had led to local centralization of this key 
node of resource control, a process which became more explicit after 2002.
A series of changes in the structure of state authority began to affect this 
system from 2001. With the strengthening of the status and institutional 
position of the police, the provincial police chief (kapolda) became more pow-
erful. This allowed district police to operate under central control outside 
the matrix of district accountability relations. As the national government 
pushed for more rigorous law enforcement against ‘illegal logging’, the 
police began to apply the law against district and provincial actors involved 
in the sector. Yet, there were exceptions: a few syndicates with ties – via dis-
creet gatekeepers – to the provincial police command continued to operate. 
At the same time, with the transition to the Megawati presidency, the central 
government wished to iron out the fragmented and contested state institu-
tional arrangements. With a stated interest in reviving the unitary state, the 
administration set out to address some of the problems that had reduced 
the capacity of the central government to set the rules. In this context, the 
administration passed a key government regulation that reasserted the role 
of the ministry of forestry. This signified the end of effective district author-
ity over forest permits. Consequently, the system for extracting resources 
became ever more centralized. These changes mark the re-establishment of 
a more vertically integrated system, where financiers and timber interests 
could expect greater predictability.
Over the 1998-2004 period, local actors faced a very fluid situation. 
Entrepreneurs, brokers, license holders and sawmill owners who had risen 
to prominence during the PLG period had to ride successive waves of legal, 
economic and personnel changes if they were to continue to prosper. After 
regional autonomy, change in politics and economics affected the personal 
situation of official sitting in the public sector agencies. The restructuring of 
the district and provincial agencies, changes in leadership, and the creation 
of new districts, were accompanied by a high degree of mobility in the public 
sector and changes in the authority and relative power of military, forestry, 
district and police agencies. This led to a process of ‘natural selection’, where 
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only the strongest and most capable figures could survive. Those actors who 
could adjust, such as key local strongmen, needed to be able to use their 
multiple assets to insulate themselves from any particular change in the 
legal-political constellation.
Even if the logic of state action had been undermined during the messy 
process of implementing the decentralization reforms, the state remained 
important. Within public discourse, the application of state power still need-
ed to be legitimated through the law. Yet at this time the legal system was 
contradictory. Consequently, state agencies at different levels of government 
relied on different areas of law within an inconsistent, rapidly changing legal 
framework. Here legality was first a matter of interpretation and perspective, 
which (as ever) was shaped for personal and institutional ends. The mean-
ing of a law was coloured by shifting and contested interpretations of state 
regulations between competing agencies within a bureaucracy that was no 
longer so vertically integrated. 
Localized matrices of power relations characteristic of these regions pri-
marily regulated access and use of resources. The local state in its changing 
relations with provincial and centralized state authority remains primary to 
these networks. Above all, this is because those with the capacity to use state 
power locally necessarily will have to play the prominent roles within these 
networks of exchange and accommodation. Yet, given the informal nature of 
these institutional arrangements, they are best considered as neither coinci-
dent with nor independent of the local state. 
Beyond the question of legal interpretation, a state agency – such as a dis-
trict government, the ministry of forestry, or the police – needed to impose its 
interpretation in the field. A law could be used – through the threat or applica-
tion of legal powers by a state law enforcement agency – to extract payments, 
to force an accommodation, to render an operation uneconomical, or to shut 
it down altogether. This depended on who had the authority or capacity to 
issue, obtain or manipulate documents, and who had the will or ability to 
enforce regulations at a particular time, and when, why and how they chose 
to do this. These applications of power in the field effectively regulated actors’ 
capacity to extract resources from the system. By using this power, state actors 
in various ways controlled other actors’ access to market, to various degrees 
accumulating revenue and enriching themselves in the process. 
Initially district administrations set up district regulations that creatively 
used the centrally created legal system. At the high point of regional autono-
my, well positioned district entrepreneurs and brokers improvised within the 
framework provided by these rules and the way they were applied, gaining 
windfall profits. The de facto control of villages over surrounding territories 
in the field meant that, for the first time in many years, conglomerates and 
financiers had to pay those claiming customary rights for access to resources. 
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Moreover, the development of a permit system that allowed local people 
to legally extract resources gave upriver actors a chance to market timber 
resources within the law for the first time. To be sure these benefits were 
unfairly distributed in villages, and the rural poor remained disadvantaged. 
Nonetheless, the allocation of permits to local actors combined with the de 
facto control of villagers over surrounding areas strengthened the bargain-
ing position of villagers, contributing to a wider sharing of benefits. This 
increased the relative value that local people gained from the mining of their 
forests. For villagers, entrepreneurs and district officials the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of the system of resource extraction depended on its capacity 
to distribute benefits, rather than to any abstract notion of accountability or 
state legality. Here political, legal or physical activities of actors focused on 
ensuring their own participation in the clientelist system for distributing ben-
efits rather than on the formal policy-setting functions of government. 
Like the New Order before it, local government during the regional 
autonomy period set about raising revenue and extracting as much benefits 
from the forests as possible for political and other reasons while ignoring 
the ecological limits of Central Kalimantan’s forests. Unfortunately, regional 
autonomy reforms also failed to establish the rights of local users in any 
enduring way (see Ribot and Peluso 2002:163). Consequently, with changes 
in state laws from 2002 onwards, recentralization abolished these district 
regimes and the capacity of a range of local people to benefit. The new decen-
tralization laws (Law no. 32/2004 and Law no. 33/2004) further institutional-
ized this direction. The high season of regional autonomy had ended.
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Deregulation of the tin trade and creation 
of a local Shadow State
a Bangka case study 
Introduction
Can tin swim to Singapore by itself? This was the angry question of a local 
journalist from Bangka Pos about smuggling tin-bearing sands. Smuggling of 
Bangka’s tin sand, known as ‘Bangka coffee’ (kopi Bangka)1 has increased since 
the deregulation of the tin sand trade was withdrawn and a ban was imposed 
on its export by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Rini Soewandi, in early 
June 2002. Tin may only be exported in smelted form or tin bars, which are 
far more profitable both for Regionally-Generated Revenue (Pendapatan 
Asli Daerah, PAD) and for the business operators. Even so, the smuggling of 
tin sand has never stopped; the government finds it difficult to control this 
mafia. 
 The deregulation of the tin trade that accompanied the introduction of 
regional autonomy in January 2001 signalled a new era in the history of 
Indonesia’s tin mining management. The region’s response to the transfer of 
authority for tin management from the centre to the regions, and its search for 
sources of regional revenue, were both rapid and radical. Regional autonomy 
actually brought about new conflicts, which were business and power con-
flicts rather than cultural or political ones. 
 This chapter will attempt to examine how power was transferred from 
the old tin regime to the new, and to what extent the practices of the tin 
business are under the control of the local government. What benefit does 
this business bring the people of Bangka? Why did the tin smuggling mafia 
1  ‘Bangka coffee’ is the term used by the Bangka tin sand mafia in Singapore. When ships 
carrying kopi bangka arrive in Singapore, the receivers of the smuggled goods (mostly ethnic 
Chinese), who are often also lenders to the small tin miners in Bangka, handle it right away 
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emerge, and why is it so difficult to prevent? To what extent are local state 
actors involved? 
Mining tin is not terribly difficult. From its simplest form to its most tech-
nologically advanced, it can use a simple pan, other non-mechanical methods, 
pumps powered by 20 HP engines, or dredging ships that operate offshore. 
Once the tin has been dug up, it is washed, either with the panning system in 
the river or using spraying machinery, to separate the tin sand from the soil. 
The tailings, a yellowish mud, flow into the rivers, which are so important for 
the residents’ day-to-day needs. If the mines are located along the coast, the 
sea water is likely to become turbid. 
The old tin mining regime 
Monopoly and centralization were the earmarks of Bangka’s tin industry 
throughout its long history, from its eighteenth century beginnings in the 
time of the VOC (Vos 1993), throughout the Dutch colonial period, and con-
tinued by the government of Indonesia, both the Old Order and the New 
Order (Erwiza Erman 1995). The profits flowed to the centre, whether in 
the Netherlands, Batavia, or Jakarta. This placed the local government elite 
and the community in a disadvantageous position, except in terms of certain 
facilities that were built. 
Development of the administrative and governmental region of Bangka 
was closely tied to, and highly dependent upon, the expansion of the tin min-
ing area and the presence of a labour force. The Dutch state companies were 
nationalized between 1953 and 1960. From that time, Indonesia’s tin mining 
region – the islands of Bangka, Belitung, and Singkep – was combined under 
a state company called PN Tambang Timah. The Indonesian government, 
both in the Old Order and the New Order, followed the mineral policy of the 
colonial government, which considered tin, like coal and oil, a strategic com-
modity that had to be supervised by the state, both in its exploitation and in 
its trade (Erwiza Erman 1994). 
During the New Order era, the government reorganized and restruc-
tured state companies to become more efficient and free of corruption. 
This was done during the oil boom (1973-1981) and the early collapse of oil 
prices (1982-1985) (Mari Pangestu 1996:67-96; Robison and Hadiz 2004:9). In 
1976, PN Tambang Timah Indonesia became a Limited Company called PT 
Tambang Timah (Persero). This was intended to eliminate corruption; it was 
also hoped that the new company would be financially more independent. 
The New Order government also invited foreign investment. In 1973, the 
Australian Kajuara Mining Company joined with PN Timah to establish PT 
Koba Tin. PT Tambang Timah produced 10% of the world’s tin output in 1983, 
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the largest in the world. 
During the period of collapsing oil prices (1982-1985), when the govern-
ment no longer had funds to subsidize the state-owned companies, there 
was a new policy: privatization. In the coal mining industry, privatization 
was signalled by the opening of Kalimantan to private foreign and domestic 
companies under several generations of Contracts of Work. PT Tambang 
Timah Indonesia did the same, by entering into contracts with private par-
ties to carry out mining in the less productive regions and in smaller mines, 
with their production surrendered to the parent company. These mines were 
called Contract of Work Mines (Tambang Kontrak Karya, TKK) or simply 
Work Mines (Tambang Karya). In 1985, there were 152 TKK operating under 
contracts with PT Tambang Timah, 87 of which were on the island of Bangka 
(Tambang Timah 1986:8). Most of the contractors were ethnic Chinese, and 
half of the state’s mining production came from TKK. Some of this produc-
tion was smuggled to Singapore. A rough estimate states that around 3,000 
to 5,000 tons of tin concentrate arrived in Singapore each year from these 
mines in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Baldwin 1983:176). One source 
from Tambang Timah claimed that small-scale panning tin miners tended to 
engage in this smuggling. The calculation is that these TKK produced 26% to 
32% of the total tin production from 1983 to 1986, using spray mining. 
 Despite liberalization, the government continued to treat tin, like coal 
and oil, as a strategic commodity whose mining and trade were supervised 
by the state. Jakarta’s control was tight. PT Tambang Timah used the military 
to protect mining areas, and prohibited local residents from mining tin, from 
keeping it in their homes, even if only one kilogram, and especially from 
trading it to outside Bangka. Anyone who violated these regulations would 
face an immediate prison sentence.2 The incident when many village resi-
dents were arrested and shot by the military because of tin smuggling near 
the town of Jebus remains covered up. The harsh regulations of the New 
Order regime made the populace mere spectators of the PT Tambang Timah 
tin business. 
 Excessive bureaucracy and centralization were the main characteristics of 
the tin industry during the New Order era. The procedure for private invest-
ment was complex; it required approval from the Minister of Mining and 
Energy, the Investment Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman 
Modal, BKPM), the People’s Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR), and the President. The local government had no authority, and 
tin royalties went to the centre and to Palembang, rather than to Bangka. The 
local government was in a weak position, while PT Tambang Timah, as an 
extension of the central government, was all-powerful. 
2  Interview with Sugono, 6-6-2004.
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Decentralization and the new tin mining regime 
The 1997 economic crisis and the post-Soeharto period brought important 
changes in the political system, in the management of tin mining, and in 
the status of Bangka. The most basic change was the local (district or city) 
governments’ claim to authority over management of mining with the intro-
duction of regional autonomy in early January 2001. Local governments now 
felt that they had the authority to issue mining permits to private parties, 
or to manage tin through local government companies. In fiscal terms, this 
reform provided a better allocation for the regions, even though the author-
ity remained with the central government. Mining companies pay royalties 
to the government that grants their permits, that is to say the central govern-
ment. Of the 80% of the royalty that is passed to the province where the mine 
is located, 32% is split between the districts/cities within the province, 32% 
goes to the district that actually produces the commodity, and the remaining 
16% goes to the provincial government. This does not yet include the vari-
ous taxes, such as land lease, property tax, and other taxes. But it seemed 
that the central government, in this case the Department of Mining and 
Energy, wanted to retain its authority. This is evident from a statement by 
the Minister that the mining industry would remain under Jakarta’s control 
for the coming five years. 
 Bangka had long been keen on regional autonomy. The struggle to 
establish a province of Bangka Belitung, separate from South Sumatra, goes 
back to 1956.3 Starting in 1999, the Bangka district government demanded 
ownership of shares in PT Timah Bangka, first 10% and later 25% from the 
65% state share of the company’s stock (Bangka Pos 15-2-2001, 16-2-2001). 
This struggle continued until 2001, and was eventually discussed in Jakarta 
by Commission VIII of the DPR-RI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia), then chaired by Darmansyah Husein, now district head of East 
Belitung. The demand even got as far as President Abdurrahman Wahid, but 
failed. The struggle for share ownership became even fiercer in early 2001, 
when there was a rumour that PT Tambang Timah was to be privatized, as 
one of the requirements from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when 
the Indonesian government signed the Letter of Intent in January 2001. The 
demand for share ownership then shifted to a demand for replacement of the 
company’s Director, a Javanese, Erry Riana Hardja Pamungkas, with a ‘native 
son’ (putra daerah), a common tendency in many regions in the era of regional 
autonomy. There were also criticisms about the lack of transparency in the 
3  See Sakai 2003a. The province Bangka-Belitung was established in 2000 and has seven 
districts (kabupaten): Bangka, Pangkal Pinang, Belitung, Bangka Barat, Bangka Tengah, Bangka 
Selatan, and Belitung Timur.
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company’s management and the insensitivity of PT Tambang Timah Bangka 
toward the interests of local residents.
The efforts pioneered by the district head of Bangka to obtain shares in 
PT Tambang Timah were aided by Bangka preman (small-time hoodlums) 
and social organizations such as NGOs, mobilized by, among others, a 
Bangka preman and descendant of pirates, Johan Murod, who exposed cases 
of manipulation and corruption within PT Timah. He then mobilized the 
masses to demonstrate for the replacement of Erry Riana Hardja Pamungkas 
with a native son.4 The outcome was that the struggle to obtain shares in 
PT Tambang Timah failed yet again, but the ‘native son’ issue succeeded, 
as Thobrani Alwi was appointed as Director of PT Tambang Timah. Under 
pressure from the local government, PT Tambang Timah granted several 
relatively uneconomical mining concession areas to the local government. In 
July 2001, the local government also established a Regional Company operat-
ing in the tin mining business, Bangka Global Mandiri (PT BGM), with a total 
mining concession area of 10 hectares. This company also has a subsidiary, 
PT Bangka Multi Niaga (PT BMN), which exports tin. The share ownership 
in PT BMN is 30% from PT BGM and 70% from PMK Niaga Jakarta. The 
implementation of regional autonomy was the start of a new tin mining 
regime in Bangka, which in turn created complex social and economic prob-
lems that persist to this day. 
The new tin mining regime was signalled by deregulation of the tin trade. 
Decree of the Minister of Trade and Industry no. 146/1999 was issued by 
Minister Rini Soewandi in 2001.5 It declared that tin was no longer considered 
a strategic commodity whose mining and trade had to be supervised by the 
central government. This was an important decision, because it weakened a 
monopoly the state had held since colonial times. It reflected the Indonesian 
government’s increasing commitments, since the 1998 economic crisis, to IMF 
free market ideology (Robison and Hadiz 2004).
Not only tin, but also other commodities such as sugar and rice, were 
deregulated through the trade policies issued by this Minister. The local 
government seized on tin deregulation as an opportunity to issue licenses, 
to regulate export, and to stipulate a decentralized management system. The 
district head of Bangka issued District Regulation no. 21/2001 (8 May 2001) 
on implementation of general mining in Bangka, and District Regulation no. 
2/2001 (1 July 2001) permitting the export of tin sand. According to the dis-
trict head, these local ordinances were intended to increase locally-generated 
revenue (PAD). Local revenues from pepper exports were declining, as the 
price of pepper fell from Rp 90,000 per kilogram during the 1998 economic 
4  Bangka Pos 6-6-2001; interview with Johan Murod, 13-2-2004.
5  ‘Chaos rebuffed’, Far Eastern Economic Review 18-2-2001.
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crisis to Rp 30,000 in 2001 and then Rp 19,000 in April 2005. 
It was now possible for anyone to engage in tin mining or trade. There 
were soon 21 companies operating there, in addition to the Regional 
Company and PT Tambang Timah. Most businessmen were former owners 
of Contract of Work mines contracted to PT Tambang Timah, mostly ethnic 
Chinese. Business was good, prices were high, and they were able to elimi-
nate the marketing bureaucracy. The difference between the price paid by PT 
Tambang Timah for tin sand and the price on the open market in Singapore, 
was high, around Rp 24,000 per kilogram of tin sand.6 
The small-scale mines called ‘unconventional’ or ‘informal mining’ (tam-
bang inkonvensional, TI) that had already emerged since the start of reform 
in 1998 became even more numerous, with financing from capitalists in 
Pangkal Pinang (Bangka), Jakarta, or even from Singapore and other areas, 
using trusted counterparts. These financiers are known as cukong. The cukong 
have an extensive tin marketing chain that runs from the city of Pangkal 
Pinang down to the villages. The fall in the pepper price to below the cost of 
production (Rp 12,000 per kilogram) in early 2003 caused many residents to 
switch from pepper farming to tin mining. With mining, cash was available 
immediately, as soon as the tin sand was collected, unlike when cultivating 
pepper plants, which requires extraordinary patience. These tin miners were 
not just residents of Bangka, but also newcomers from other regions who 
came to seek their fortunes in the new province. Informal tin miners received 
cash immediately when they handed their tin sand over to the village cukong 
(cukong desa) or the ‘city tin collectors’ (kota kolektor timah) who came from the 
city to buy the sand directly on site (Erwiza Erman 2003). 
According to a rough calculation in December 2001, there were around 
1,320 informal mining operations with business entity status, plus another 
4,671 individual businesses (Kompas 10-12-2001, 18-12-2001). Another calcu-
lation, from January 2002, indicated around 10,000 units of unconventional 
mining machinery, and an estimated 130,000 miners (Kompas 6-1-2002). By 
way of comparison, according to findings by PT Timah in October 2003, in 
the district of West Bangka there were around 871 units of informal mines 
(Detik.com 16-12-2003). By early 2004, the number of informal miners had 
risen by 400% compared with the previous year. Although there are still 
no firm statistical data, this huge increase can be extrapolated from the fact 
that dealers in Chinese-produced mining machinery have opened branches 
in every city in Bangka, and even down to the district level throughout the 
island (Bangka Pos 27-4-2004). 
6  This price difference was the main reason mentioned by smugglers and others in Bangka 
when discussing the smuggling of tin sand. Interview with former tin sand exporter Hongky 
Listiadi, 13-2-2004.
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As the district head hoped, the new tin mining regime seemed to provide 
a greater contribution to Bangka’s PAD. The contribution from January to 
September 2001 came to Rp 9 billion, far greater than the Rp 2 to 3 billion per 
year contributed to the regional government by PT Tambang Timah Bangka 
(Bangka Pos 16-9-2003). On the other hand, the presence of informal miners 
and new tin sand exporters created new competition for PT Tambang Timah, 
because the tin production from the informal miners was far greater. PT 
Tambang Timah no longer had a monopoly in Bangka. PT Timah held that 
this excessive supply of tin sand from the informal miners was responsible 
for the fall in the tin price on the international market. According to data 
from the Central Statistical Bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), tin sand 
exports were 8.26 thousand tons, with a value of US$ 9.8 million, in 2001, and 
rose to 8.79 thousand tons, with a value of US$ 12.5 million, in 2002. The state 
company blamed the district regulation and the Decree of the Minister of 
Trade and Industry for its collapse. Discussions on the collapse of PT Timah 
were carried in the capital’s mass media to the end of 2001. 
PT Tambang Timah’s balance sheet from July to December 2001 showed a 
deficit of Rp 250 billion. It would lose Rp 50 billion per month as long as the 
tin price did not improve (Kompas 20-12-2001). To try to overcome this prob-
lem, the company undertook an efficiency strategy. Around 1,440 dredging 
vessel personnel were laid off, because 13 of the 20 operational units were 
no longer in operation. In early December 2001, the company was forced to 
lay off 3,000 employees. This led to a decline in money in circulation from 
PT Timah employees’ salaries, which came to Rp 10 billion per month, of 
which 50% was spent in Bangka Belitung. The company had debts of Rp 9.3 
billion, comprised of property taxes, tin export fees, and other fees owed to 
the district. Another efficiency strategy was to limit the electric power supply 
in the Belinyu area to 10 hours per day. The caretaker governor calculated 
the losses suffered by Bangka at Rp 470 billion per year, compared with if tin 
sand were exported in the form of metal (that is, if it were first smelted and 
then exported in the form of tin bars).
Although they were not the only cause of PT Tambang Timah’s near-
collapse, sharp criticism was directed by PT Tambang Timah, the caretaker 
governor, and the members of the level I and level II local assemblies (DPRD 
I and DPRD II)7 from the Golkar Party and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(PPP, Unity and Development Party) at the district regulation, the Decree of 
the Minister of Industry and Trade and at the informal miners (Bangka Pos 1-
8-2001). The governor, PT Tambang Timah, and their allies made efforts with 
the central government to cancel the tin sand export licenses. 
7  Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Rakyat, Provincial assembly (DPRD I) or District assembly 
(DPRD II).
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However, others attacked the Director of PT Timah, including criticism 
from within the profession itself. Ladjiman Damanik, former Chairman 
of the All-Indonesia Association of Mining Engineers (Perhimpunan Ahli 
Pertambangan Seluruh Indonesia, PAPSI), explained that the damage to 
the state company was due not only to the widespread illegal mining and 
exports and the sharp fall in the tin price, but even more to portfolio manipu-
lation and the company’s lack of concern for local communities. The portfolio 
manipulation had been going on for around five years. Profits were seldom 
reinvested in tin mine exploration as capital for the future, but were put into 
other activities. Ladjiman also condemned the company’s New Order-style 
approach, which tended to use security actions, rather than a humane and 
persuasive approach, in dealing with informal miners (Kompas 8-12-2001).
 From October 2001 to January 2002 members of the DPR-RI and officials 
from the Department of Trade and Industry visited to see for themselves the 
severe environmental impact caused by informal mining.8 These meetings 
resulted in an agreement to urge the Minister of Trade and Industry to with-
draw the deregulation of the tin sand trade. However, the district head and his 
allies in the party Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle) dug in their heels. They argued that the dis-
trict regulation was important to the local economy. Preman gangs, groups 
humorously known as the ‘alliance of the misled’ (perkeliruan), some NGOs, 
as well as PDI-P members in the regional assemblies (DPRD I and II) again 
questioned PT Tambang Timah’s miniscule contributions to development of 
Bangka’s economy, and mobilized the masses of the miners to demonstrate.9 
This was, indirectly, an ideological conflict between Golkar, represented by 
the old regime of PT Timah, the governor, and his allies, against the PDI-P, 
represented by the district head and his allies, including the preman. 
 Finally, a regulation prohibiting tin sand exports was issued by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry on 17 April 2002 and came into force from 1 
June 2002 (Bisnis Indonesia 21-5-2002). Tin sand must first be smelted on the 
island. Tin exporters must have mining concession areas. The period from 
April to June 2002 was a grace period granted by the central government to 
the region to implement the new regulation. The local government demanded 
an extension of the grace period, claiming that financiers and tin exporting 
companies were building tin smelting plants in Bangka. However, as of the 
end of 2003, no one had actually established such a tin smelting business.
This ban on tin exports met with resistance from the district head’s 
allies, who based their argument on issues of the ‘people’s economy’. The 
President Director of the Regional Company Bangka Global Mandiri, Yusuf 
8  Interview with Abrun, 13-2-2004.
9  Interview with Johan Murod, 12-2-2004.
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Faisal,10 said that the decree cancelling tin sand export licenses created great 
unrest among the 11,000 smallholder miners. Dasuki, a PDI-P member of the 
Provincial DPRD, and also a tin businessman who was no longer in partner-
ship with PT Tambang Timah, also stressed the ban’s negative impact on the 
people’s economy. 
The ban on tin sand exports lasted only six months. In January 2003, 
the district head of Bangka issued Inter-Region Trading Licenses, or SIPAD 
(Surat Izin Perdagangan Antar Daerah), through District Regulation no. 
20/2003. According to the district head, the intention of issuing the SIPAD 
was to reduce the amount of tin sand smuggling to Singapore and Malaysia. 
Basically, it gave tin exporters the opportunity to trade in tin between regions, 
provided that the exporters had mining concession areas and sent the tin sand 
to another region where there was a tin smelting company. Exporters must also 
pay a tax on each kilogram of tin sand traded between regions. A total of 98 
SIPAD were issued by the local Industry, Trade, Cooperatives, and Investment 
Service (Dinas Perindustrian Perdagangan Koperasi dan Penanaman Modal, 
Indagkopem). Of these, 51 were issued to three companies: CV Basuki, CV 
Bayu Mandiri Pratama, and PT Kranji Jaya Utama (KJU) (Bangka Pos 28-9-
2003). The other 41 SIPAD were issued to CV Donna Kembara Jaya. 
CV Basuki is owned by Hendrie Lie and his two younger brothers, Bangka 
Chinese who live in Jakarta. He is known as a ‘strong man’ in Bangka, a 
smuggler king, owner of an airline (Sriwijaya Air) and gambling venues, but 
also a philanthropist who donates to social organizations, both Chinese and 
non-Chinese. CV Bayu Mandiri Pratama is led by H. Eling Sutikno, a native of 
Bangka, a former journalist in the capital with strong ties to the bureaucratic 
and political elites in Bangka and Jakarta. CV Donna Kembara Jaya is owned 
by Ernawati Rebuin, sister of the Mayor of Pangkal Pinang, Syofyan Rebuin. 
The two types of SIPAD that were issued have yielded production of 4,689 
tons, and the regional government has reaped revenue of Rp 561,494,700, 
derived from the fees collected under District Regulation no. 20/2001 (Bangka 
Pos 16-12-2003). Examining more closely, we find that of the four companies 
holding the district head’s SIPAD, CV Bayu Mandiri Pratama made the great-
est contribution, Rp 323,500,000. CV Basuki and PT Kranji Jaya Utama, in con-
trast, stopped exporting tin sand in May 2003, due to lack of raw material. 
Just like the earlier district regulation on tin export licenses, the SIPAD 
also created a new conflict between the district head and his allies on the one 
hand, and PT Timah and the new, definitive governor of Bangka Belitung 
10  Yusuf Faisal, also Chairman of the Mineral Industry Association (Asosiasi Industri Mineral) 
in Bangka, is from Sulawesi. This association was founded after the issuance of the district head’s 
district regulation on export of tin sand from Bangka. Most Bangka tin sand exporters are mem-
bers of this association. Interview with Pak Abrun, 12-2-2004. 
Deregulation of the tin trade and creation of a local Shadow State 187
on the other. Accusations from the district head’s foes came fast and furi-
ous, from members of the Golkar and PPP factions at both the district and 
the provincial levels. In meetings at the Provincial DPRD, efforts were 
evident by Golkar representatives to corner the district head, for example 
by Mustadja Santoso (Golkar), and Taufik Rani, who is in the tin business 
with PT Timah. They said that the district head’s SIPAD were being used as 
an excuse to increase tin sand smuggling and unlicensed tin mining. These 
accusations were rebuffed by the district head’s clique, including an officer 
from the Trade and Industry Service. He said that tin smuggling was already 
widespread long before regional autonomy, and could be traced back to the 
time of the VOC. 
HA Hudarni Rani, a descendant of Mentok nobility and a Golkar party 
member, who was chosen as the first elected governor of Bangka in early 2002, 
started to take over regulation of the tin business at the provincial level, argu-
ing the districts were incompetent. With the partitioning of the district, effec-
tive from February 2003, the debates on regulation of the tin business never 
yielded any decision, and the problem actually became even more complex, as 
there was now the added issue of regionally-generated revenue (PAD) for each 
of the districts, and a struggle between them for their economic interests. 
Starting in October 2003, the issue of the district head’s SIPAD was taken 
up at the provincial level. Mustadja Santoso, from Golkar, was chosen to 
head the Special Committee on the Draft District Regulation on Management 
of General Mining (Bangka Pos 21-2-2004). This Special Committee worked 
until January 2004, when a district regulation was passed by the provin-
cial DPRD and came into force. This district regulation was more complex, 
regulating export taxes, reclamation, mining exploitation, transportation, 
smelting, and trade in tin both within and between districts. Under the new 
procedure, mining concessions were not simply issued by the Mining Service 
but also required approval from the DPRD. To prevent abuse of this regula-
tion, and so that various agencies would not blame each other, integrated 
control involving the various related agencies was established in January 
2004. Control over mining locations, use of heavy equipment, and the pay-
ment of taxes on tin sand that was to be smelted in tin smelting plants in 
Bangka, was much stricter than before. But will this tighter control produce 
higher local revenue and reduce the illegal trade in tin to outside Bangka? It 
is difficult to answer this question without first examining the methods used 
to control mining and the marketing system. The Deputy Chairman of the 
Bangka district DPRD, Samsumin Sagap from the Golkar Party, said that the 
more complex the regulations were, the more smuggling there would be, and 
the less responsible the mining system.11
11  Interview with Pak Samsumin Sagap, 14-2-2004.
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The deregulation and subsequent reregulation of the tin trade, both by 
the central and the local governments, showed, first, a rapid response from 
the region to the transfer of authority over tin mining and the tin trade from 
the centre to the regions. The district head of Bangka played an important 
role in issuing district regulations, both the first one that gave form to the 
deregulation of the tin trade by the Minister of Industry, and the later district 
regulation on SIPAD. Even though the old regime operated from Jakarta 
seemed to have the formal powers to prevent an irresponsible and environ-
ment-unfriendly mining system, this regime was unable, or failed, to exer-
cise this power, because the informal market, or black market, continued to 
operate. And although the governor has taken over duties from the district 
head and regulated the tin business in greater detail, the stricter the regula-
tions, the more the smuggling. The next section will examine the emergence 
of the Shadow State at the local level and how it operates, making the black 
economy in Bangka so difficult to prevent.
The tin business and the emergence of a local Shadow State
The district head has become the centre of a new tin mining regime and has 
the authority to control natural resources in Bangka. The old tin centralized 
management regime has been unable to maintain its authority and its formal 
powers, because even though regulation has now been reimposed on tin 
sand exports, a ‘black economy’ has emerged in Bangka. The district head 
is a graduate of the military university, Universitas Veteran ABRI (Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Indonesian Armed Forces) in Yogyakarta. 
He received a naval military education and last served as a lieutenant. He 
has also received a master’s degree from a university in Australia. He was at 
first a member of Golkar, but – according to several Bangka political figures 
– was not greatly involved in politics. In the run-up to the 1999 election, he 
switched to PDI-P and served as district head for the 2000-2004 period. He 
was a vocal figure in the struggle to establish the new province, and collected 
Rp 2 billion in funds from smallholder miners and from PT Tambang Timah 
Bangka and PT Koba Tin. He also arranged navy warships to carry residents 
from Bangka to attend the official inauguration of the new province. When 
candidates for governor of the new province of Bangka-Belitung started to 
be nominated in early 2001, the district head was nominated in a meeting of 
the PDI-P’s Bangka and Belitung branch in Tanjung Pandan in May 2001. He 
was a strong candidate; but he later seemed reluctant to give up his position 
as district head and withdrew. But since January 2004 he began gathering 
support to run for governor in 2007. Many in Bangka still see him as the only 
strong candidate. Since then, there has been an undercover struggle between 
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the district head and the governor. Whenever there is a demonstration 
against the district head by the public and NGOs, there is a counter-demon-
stration against the governor and his clique, as we will see. 
To examine the practices under the district head’s tin ordinances, this 
section will analyse two cases, involving people known in Bangka as the Tin 
Kings (Raja Timah); here I refer to them as Tin King I and Tin King II. We will 
see how their business practices involve bureaucrats, politicians, the police, 
the military, preman, and NGOs. This collaboration has created a ‘Shadow 
State’. There are many definitions of the Shadow State, for example those in 
William Reno’s study (1995) in Sierra Leone, and in Barbara Harris-White’s 
(2003) in India. Reno said that the existence of the Shadow State was insepa-
rable from the practices of the jewel smuggling market and the informal 
market. This occurred because of erosion of the functioning of formal state 
institutions. This situation becomes even worse when this erosion coincides 
with a serious economic crisis (Reno 1995:2-3). This spurs state actors to build 
alliances with various elements in society to gain short-term economic and 
political advantages through the informal market. State actors invite inves-
tors to join in the shadow state network they build, and provide them with 
protection using their formal authority. Barbara Harris-White prefers the 
term ‘informal economy’ to ‘informal market’ when examining the practices 
of the Shadow State. This refers not to the small-scale economic sector of the 
common people, but to the use of formal institutions (public and private) for 
private ends, including tax lenience, abuse of public authority, corruption, 
collusion, and forced privatization of state assets (Harriss-White 2003:6). 
This second form of ‘informal economy’ belongs to the ‘big guys’ and large 
business operators. A study by Pasuk Phongpaichit (Phongpaichit et al. 1998) 
examined the smuggling of weapons, women, and illegal drugs – or the 
‘black market’ – in Thailand. In the case of Indonesia, Henk Schulte Nordholt 
(2003:579) has shown that the process of administrative decentralization has 
created opportunities for regional leaders, or ‘bossism’ as in the Philippines, 
to operate through an alliance between bureaucrats, the bosses of business-
oriented parties, the military, and criminals. Such alliances are also found in 
Thailand (Phongpaichit et al. 1998; McVey 2000). 
Tin King I is an important businessman from Jakarta, whose business 
contacts cross national boundaries and who has diversified into many sec-
tors. Tin King II is a typical local businessman at the district level with long 
experience in the tin business as a partner of PT Tambang Timah. Despite the 
difference in scale and business networks between these two businessmen, 
the methods through which they do business are similar: collaboration and 
informal actions in formal business.
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Tin King I
At 2.00 a.m. on 13 February 2003, residents of Sadai village captured trucks 
carrying around 42,750 tons of tin sand, packed in wooden crates which were 
covered with sacks of pepper. This tin sand was to be taken to Java on the 
passenger ship Tri Star via the port of Ciwandan, Cilegon, West Java (Bangka 
Pos 13-2-2003). The tin sand belonged to CV Tin King I, a local tin company 
owned by Tin King I, a Bangka Chinese in Jakarta who was looking for busi-
ness opportunities in Bangka. CV Tin King I is located in Sungai Liat, in the 
area of his birthplace, the capital of Bangka Induk district, and the turf of the 
district head who issued the district regulation on tin sand exports. The tin 
sand was to be sent to PT Tambora Mandiri in Jakarta, and to a tin smelting 
company in Surabaya with an unclear address, to be smelted. The shipment 
was made after the district head’s SIPAD permits were issued. 
Just as CV Tin King I’s trucks were about to unload the tin sand at the port 
of Sadai, Toboali, they were stopped by PT Timah’s security unit, and then 
the NGO Lintas 99 brought village residents to help impound the tin sand 
that was about to be shipped. Several in the crowd threatened the employees 
of CV Tin King I and tried to force CV Tin King I to pay a ransom of around 
Rp 500 million to the Sadai village community to release the tin. Bargaining 
between CV Tin King I and the local community ensued. At first, a number 
of people claiming to speak on behalf of the community demanded a con-
tribution from CV Tin King I to the residents of Sadai village. After tough 
negotiations, CV Tin King I eventually donated Rp 30 million to Sadai village 
(Bangka Pos 14-2-2003), and the sand was released. Even so, apparently some 
data were manipulated, as only five of the nine trucks that were carrying the 
tin sand were in fact exported to the destinations. According to an activist of 
Lintas 99 in Toboali, the district head’s Decree was legally flawed, as it con-
flicted with the ban on tin sand exports issued by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (Bangka Pos 16-2-2003). Following the interrogation of the PT Timah 
security guards and three employees of CV Tin King I (Bangka Pos 19-2-2003, 
23-2-2003), several NGOs in Toboali agreed to send letters to various Jakarta 
authorities to check whether the tin sand shipment was in line with the pro-
visions of the district regulation on SIPAD (Bangka Pos 20-2-2003). 
CV Tin King I had complied with all the formal requirements of the 
district regulation on tin exports, such as holding a 200-hectare Mining 
Concession at Air Gegas village, South Bangka. Tin King I was called a 
‘strong man of Bangka’ and a smuggling and gambling king, but he also 
helped many social activities, for both the ethnic Chinese and the Malays 
of Bangka. He had other businesses in the transport and plantation sectors, 
in Bangka and elsewhere. Together with his two younger brothers, he even 
had a new airline, Sriwijaya Air, of which the local government was very 
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proud.12 Tin King I was at first close to the governor of South Sumatra, and 
was known to be unenthusiastic about establishing a new province. But once 
the new province was established, he became close to the district head. When 
the definitive governor of Bangka-Belitung was appointed, from Golkar, he 
again changed his clique to the governor and contributed funds to support 
the governor’s campaign in the 2004 election. Tin King I is also known to be 
close to one of Bangka’s top lawyers, a figure in the PDI-P, who has defended 
him in his tin smuggling cases. 
As soon as the district regulation on tin sand export licenses came into 
force, CV Tin King I started business. We do not know how business opera-
tors may have influenced the district head’s ordinance. It is also not possible 
to obtain accurate figures on the tin exports, as some of it is done legitimately 
and some through smuggling. But when tin sand exports were licensed, the 
data on official tin sand exports was as follows. From January to February 
2002, the company exported 100 tons of tin sand abroad (Bangka Pos 13-2-
2003). After the ban on tin sand exports came into force on 1 June 2002, CV 
Tin King I still obtained a permit to export 135 tons of tin sand on 2 June 
2002, complete with export license documents, although this shipment was 
the subject of much criticism from local government officials (Bangka Pos 3-6-
2002). PPP and Golkar members of the district DPRD therefore say that CV 
Tin King I’s business is somewhere ‘between official and unofficial’.13
Since the ban on tin sand exports came into force, nothing more has been 
heard of the company’s business activities. Nevertheless, from reports in 
both local and national newspapers and interviews with several informants 
in Bangka, it is known that Tin King I continues to export tin sand abroad, 
but now through smuggling. The local mass media carry reports on his 
smuggling trade, but the reporters are never transparent about this; they 
always refer to the company’s owner by using initials.14 Furthermore, the 
cases of the tin sand that was impounded have never been taken to court for 
trial, and so the cases of tin sand exports to Jakarta and Surabaya as quoted 
above have led to protracted debate in the DPR. 
CV Tin King I used its district head’s SIPAD permit as justification for 
12  According to one local source, after his success in tin sand smuggling, Tin King I estab-
lished a consortium of Chinese tauke (bosses) for the legitimate business of Sriwijaya Air and 
arranged a strategy for the various losses and profits from their smuggling business. He was 
then able to persuade the bank to give him a loan, which was used to rent used aircrafts, then 
named Sriwjaya Air, for Rp 300 million per month. He is the official owner of Sriwijaya Air. The 
inauguration of the airline’s maiden flight was attended by all Bangka’s top officials. He has now 
become a respected citizen in Bangka and plans to add to Sriwijaya Air’s fleet in the near future. 
Interview with informant X, Pangkal Pinang, 19-2-2005. 
13  Interview with member of the Bangka District DPRD, 12-2-2004.
14  Interview with Bangka Pos journalist, 8-8-2002.
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exporting tin sand outside Bangka. The case was examined in sessions of the 
DPRD-II. A special committee was then formed, with the task of investigat-
ing the case of tin sand exports by CV Tin King I to Jakarta and Surabaya 
involving PT Timah.15 The results of the investigation revealed that in the 
destination locations, the companies that received the tin sand did not in 
fact have smelting plants. The tin sand shipments were also not found in 
the records of the officers of the ports of Tanjung Priok and Merak (Bangka 
Pos 7-3-2003, 9-3-2003). Tin King I, when invited to give evidence about the 
smelter in Surabaya, did not attend the meeting of commission B of the dis-
trict DPRD; he sent a deputy instead. From this, it is evident that Tin King 
I, as a powerful figure in Bangka, has greater authority than the members of 
the legislature (Bangka Pos 9-3-2003). Furthermore, the PDI-P members of the 
DPR, like the district head, who was also being investigated, chose to remain 
silent during the sessions on the CV Tin King I case. In contrast, the repre-
sentatives from Golkar, PPP, and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, Party of the 
National Message), the big parties in Bangka, continued to try to corner Tin 
King I and to make an issue of the district head’s SIPAD. 
The case of the tin sand exports by Tin King I, which were protected by 
the regional police chief and the district head, were in fact an instance of 
business rivalry between PT Timah and CV Tin King I, and at the same time 
of political rivalry between the district head, from PDI-P, and his legislative 
opponents. In April 2003, the district head had to present his accountability 
report to the DPRD, a critical time that provided an opportunity for the dis-
trict head’s political opponents to try to bring him down. Criticism of infor-
mal mining came fast and furious to corner the district head. This included 
the case of the impounded tin sand, heated discussions in the DPRD about 
CV Tin King I’s tin sand exports, the strong reprimand from the governor to 
the district head of Bangka about the uncontrolled mining by informal min-
ers, and counter demonstrations and letters to the editor both supporting and 
attacking the district head and PT Timah. It became clear that the interests 
of the most vocal parliamentarian, named Osfindinar, lay with those of PT 
Timah and the governor, while the district head’s interests were in line with 
those of CV Tin King 1, which was protected by the regional police chief. 
Among the district head’s other allies were the NGOs and preman in the 
‘perkeliruan’ group.16 They mobilized the masses to demonstrate at the DPR 
15  As well as its investigation of the CV Tin King I case, the special committee also conducted 
a similar investigation of tin sand exports using SIPAD permits to Tanjung Pinang. The result 
was the same; there were fictitious manipulations in the sand exports.
16  The word perkeliruan is derived from the word keliru meaning ‘mistaken, confused, errone-
ous’. I have not been able to discover why they are called this. The term appeared with the start 
of reform (Reformasi) in Bangka. This group consists of preman and NGO members, who are 
outsiders, relative to the bureaucracy and the representative institutions. The members of the 
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in support of tin sand exports by CV Tin King I and mining by informal 
miners. The preman, led by J.M., found it easy to mobilize large numbers of 
people, because he had been the chairman of numerous associations – for 
karate and other sports, and fishermen’s associations – and was also close to 
the regional police chief.17 Coffee shops became important venues for meet-
ings between actors from state institutions, businessmen, preman, and NGOs 
to discuss the ‘projects’ they planned to undertake. Close relationships were 
forged there, thus shaping a genuine local Shadow State, a negara perkeliruan, 
if we may be allowed to use a term that has been popular in Bangka since the 
start of regional autonomy. 
The business and political opponents of the district head and CV Tin 
King I also had allies. Demonstrations against the district head and CV Tin 
King I began with the NGO 99 in Toboali Selatan. This NGO attacked CV 
Tin King I, the district head’s SIPAD permits, the behaviour of the regional 
police chief, and the informal miners who were destroying the environment. 
But counter-demonstrations in support of the district head were just as 
strong. In March 2003, 200 residents of Toboali, Mentok, and Kelapa districts, 
and former tin workers joined together in the Perhimpunan Pengelola dan 
Pekerja Tambang Timah Rakyat Bangka (P3TTRB, Association of Bangka 
Small-Scale Tin Miners and Operators) came to the Bangka DPRD building.18 
They demanded the mining concessions that PT Timah had not yet granted 
to the local government. Threatening posters were displayed with slogans 
such as ‘Closing informal mines is murdering us’, and ‘Return tin mining 
concessions to the state to be managed by the people’. P3TTRB’s Deputy 
Chairman Tito Rahadi said that the mining community would ‘do a calcula-
tion’ if the governor’s letter to the district head to close the informal mines 
were implemented (Bangka Pos 30-3-2003). Evidently the issue of the common 
people was being used to maintain the tin business, a common trend since 
Reformasi, especially in the sector of small-scale mining financed by shad-
owy cukong. At the same time, university students in the Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Nasional Indonesia (GMNI, Indonesian National Student Movement) also 
demonstrated in front of the DPRD office, demanding that the DPRD reject 
the district head’s Accountability Report for 2002. But then a number of 
housewives from the Pengajian Al Mafiroh prayer group in Sungai Liat, in 
which the district head’s wife was active, also swarmed into the DPRD office 
courtyard and demanded that the members of the Bangka DPRD act fairly. 
perkeliruan have been able to expose the corruption of government officials and lend their sup-
port to certain groups within the bureaucracy.
17  Interviews with J.M., 8-10-2003 and 12-2-2004.
18  It should be noted that the district head was very firm in struggling for the demands of 
former tin employees against PT Timah, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Mining and 
Energy for their severance payments that they had not received.
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Arguments broke out between the two groups of demonstrators. 
The case of CV Tin King I has never been resolved. While the CV Tin 
King I case was being debated in the DPRD, Tin King I was formulating a 
new strategy: to request a permit from the local government to build a tin 
ore smelting plant that could handle from 100 to 200 tons of tin sand (Bangka 
Pos 6-3-2003). A permit was quickly obtained. This CV Tin King I tin smelting 
plant would be the second privately-owned one in Bangka Belitung, as there 
was already one owned by PT Koba Tin. Oddly, at the same time, a proposal 
from PT Koba Tin to build an additional smelter did not receive a permit 
from the government. It remains unknown exactly what kind of lobbying 
Tin King I did with local government officials, such that even while his com-
pany was being attacked by members of the legislature and he was clearly 
engaging in manipulation by using the district head’s SIPAD permit, he was 
still able to obtain a permit from the government to build a smelting plant. 
Tin King I owns four tin smelting plants, which are operated by his younger 
brother C.L., with the actual management done by Malaysians. 
We can draw several conclusions. First, it is evident that the business was 
protected by the police, and that there was secret cooperation in the granting 
of the district head’s SIPAD permit. Second, the way that the CV Tin King 
I case was taken up in the DPRD illustrates the concurrent business and 
political conflicts between Osfindinar and his allies against the district head 
and his allies, and between PT Timah and CV Tin King I. In this conflict, the 
serving district head came out the winner, because his accountability report 
in May 2003 was accepted by the DPR. 
Tin King II
Tin King II is also well known in Bangka, although he is still relatively young. 
He was born in 1970 in Mentok, West Bangka, to an ordinary ethnic Chinese 
family. His father was a truck driver, and his mother a housewife and mother 
of nine. Because of the family’s difficult economic circumstances, he did not 
finish school; he only went as far as the second year of junior high school in 
Mentok. He then worked in the shop of a Bangka Chinese family in Jakarta 
that sold automotive equipment. Returning to Mentok, Tin King II tried 
many different types of business: he traded in corn and in livestock feed, 
was contractor for a pipe factory, and eventually went into the tin business. 
Tin King II now has a luxurious house in Mentok and spends his free time 
playing with his pet dogs. 
He first became interested in tin mining in 1994, when he saw the tin 
panners in the rivers in Mentok, which was operated by PT Koba Tin. He 
learned the ins and outs of tin mining, from finding locations to assaying 
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the tin content of the ore obtained. He then went into partnership with PT 
Timah, using the name of a friend’s company. He claims that he succeeded 
in changing PT Timah’s prohibition on keeping tin at home, something that 
was strictly prohibited by the New Order government, although he did this 
unofficially at first. His tin business grew swiftly, from eight employees at the 
start to 70 employees. He established his own company, called CV Wijaya, 
and paid his employees an average of over Rp 1 million a month. The com-
pany has branches in many small towns throughout Bangka. In addition to 
the tin business, he also operates buses and a bottled gas business. Bangka 
people call him the ‘strong man of Mentok’, whose business interests are 
unshakable, even though his mining area encroaches on protected forest. The 
authorities can do nothing to stop this, nor can the environmental NGOs. 
And the small-scale miners who are mining in the prohibited areas declare 
that their mines are legitimate, because they have paid ‘tribute’ to govern-
ment officials.
Tin King II did not actually have much capital when he entered the tin 
business. His main capital was the trust he received from many sectors, from 
businessmen in Jakarta to bureaucrats in Bangka. He is known to be close 
to the district head. Two months before the district head issued the district 
regulation on tin sand exports, Tin King II terminated his contract as a part-
ner of PT Timah. When the district regulation was issued, he was the first 
person to export tin sand, officially recorded as 4,000 tons, and contributed 
Rp 4.8 billion in taxes to Bangka district coffers. When the ban on tin sand 
exports was imposed, he joined with the district head and the new director 
of PT Timah, a native of Bangka, to build a tin smelter at Liat. According to 
an unconfirmed rumour, the capital for its construction was embezzled from 
the Regional Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD). 
When PT Timah and local and central government officials started to 
raise criticisms of the negative impact of the district regulation in the form 
of environmentally irresponsible mining activities, Tin King II was no longer 
exporting tin officially. In late 2001, he smuggled 600 tons of tin sand through 
Singapore, which was then seized by the police, together with another 500 
tons of tin sand owned by two other businessmen. He and the other two 
smugglers were taken into custody. An interview with a Bangka Pos journalist 
revealed that before engaging in smuggling, he would first survey the safe 
and strategic locations from which to smuggle tin sand. He contacted the cus-
toms and excise service, obtained a recommendation, and ‘reported’ to port 
officers and other related agencies, including the security forces. Apparently, 
the smuggling was safer when it was witnessed by the security forces. 
Was this arrest then processed in the courts? All three cases simply faded 
from public view. The tin that had been impounded was returned to Tin 
King II’s warehouse for safekeeping, because the police could not afford 
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the Rp 150 million warehouse bill, as was the tin belonging to the other two 
businessmen. 
The arrest of Tin King II and the seizure of the tin sand he was smuggling 
had a strong impact on the price of tin sand, and therefore on the informal 
miners. The price of tin fell sharply from Rp 18,000 to Rp 12,000 per kilo-
gram, and marketing tin sand became difficult. The miners grew restless, and 
held demonstrations against the local government. The miners depended 
heavily on Tin King II, not only because he controlled the marketing of the 
tin sand from the miners, especially in West Bangka, but also because of his 
social work for the poor. He donated to many social activities and provided 
scholarships to Bangka families that could not afford their children’s school 
fees, regardless of whether they were Chinese or Malay. Tin King II’s arrest 
also led the perkeliruan group to exert pressure by issuing several statements 
that basically strengthened the position of Tin King II in the eyes of the pub-
lic. There was a rumour that funds of Rp 1.5 billion were ready to ensure that 
Tin King II’s case would not go to court. The impounded tin would remain 
‘safe’, in the sense that Tin King II himself and other parties who guarded it 
would receive a ‘share’ (Bangka Pos 6-1-2002). Another rumour spread by the 
perkeliruan group was a defiant attitude with the comment that ‘right after 
the raid at Pangkal Balam, the very next day we exported that tin sand to 
Singapore’ (Bangka Pos 6-1-2002). 
These two cases illustrate the practices of the new tin mining business 
regime under the authority of the district head of Bangka. Actors from govern-
ment agencies, whether from the local government or the legal apparatus, are 
involved. Government actors issue permits, provide protection, and manipu-
late data, as in the tin sand export case of CV Tin King I. Unfortunately, I have 
had difficulty in uncovering the actual transactions between the actors from 
local-level state institutions and these two Bangka Tin Kings, such as what 
rewards were received by bureaucrats, politicians, the military and police, 
and other state actors involved in the business, whether directly or indirectly, 
and what these profits were used for.
The level of protection provided by law enforcement officials seems 
to vary, in line with the interests of the business operators. In the tin sand 
export case of CV Tin King I, the territorial police chief (kapolres) immediately 
claimed that the tin was legal, while in the case of Tin King II, the police 
arrested the owner and seized the tin sand that was being smuggled. But this 
turned out to be a charade, since the impounded tin sand was later returned 
and Tin King II’s tin sand smuggling case has never gone to court. 
The protection from law enforcement officials for the tin sand smuggling 
cases, which has never ended, is an open secret on this island of tin. A smug-
gler who could be categorized as a mid-level Tin King related his experiences 
when he needed protection. He said that tin smuggling on shore is not that 
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difficult, because he can get through by handing out money to certain per-
sons. Furthermore, he knows exactly what locations along the coast are not 
monitored. For example, two kilometres from the pier, the smuggled tin will 
slip through, because the security forces do not operate 24 hours a day.19 At 
sea, smuggling is done in two ways. The first is to use boats owned by Buton 
fishermen, who are not connected to the onshore tin business network. These 
Butonese know the routes to use to evade detection by navy patrols. The sec-
ond is to ‘entice the officials to play in the open seas’. This method involves 
chartering a larger ship, but with a cargo of only two tons, while also renting 
five smaller ships from Buton fishermen, with a total cargo of 50 tons of tin 
sand. He knows that the Bangka navy patrol is very limited and can only 
catch one or two smuggling ships. According to this smuggler, the security 
forces are also pleased when they can catch one or two ships. The capture of 
one big smuggling ship with a relatively small cargo is not a problem for the 
smugglers, as they still make a good profit from the others. If a ship with a 
large cargo is caught, then the smugglers ask the security forces to protect 
them and not arrest them, by offering them a ‘share’. If the security forces 
refuse to grant such protection, there is an understanding that everyone 
involved in smuggling will remain silent during interrogation. This is unlike 
the top ranks of smugglers, who require the protection of the security forces, 
whether army or navy, who escort the smuggled tin from the port in Bangka 
to the edge of Singapore waters.20 It is therefore not surprising that one often 
hears in Bangka: ‘How can Bangka be safe and secure when even the security 
forces are involved in the mafia with the Chinese cukong?’ 
And this protection, collaboration, or even active involvement in the tin 
business is not entirely denied by the law enforcement officials. Their low 
salaries encourage them to seek additional income from such enterprises. 
Furthermore, the security forces’ impotence in deterring smuggling is a 
reflection of the general weakness of state institutions, with limited numbers 
and quality of personnel, facilities, and compensation (Bangka Pos 2-7-2002). 
At the same time, there are demands for the law enforcers to act swiftly and 
firmly in preventing and handling violations. It is in this condition of a weak 
official state that ‘people’s justice’ sets an ultimatum demanding firm action 
from the government apparatus. 
How do these practices affect the community and the environment? It 
19  I would like to thank Zaiyardam Zubir from the Faculty of Literature of Andalas University, 
Padang, who helped in observing the tin smuggling process at night, at the time of the first round 
of the presidential election. After quite a long approach, he was eventually accepted and allowed 
by the smugglers to follow the tin smuggling from the land, navigating rivers at night, and then 
pushing the motor boat off from the coast. The smuggled tin sand was taken offshore by motor 
boat and then transferred to a waiting ship. The kopi bangka was then taken to Singapore. 
20  Interview with a smuggler, 4-6-2004.
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is generally acknowledged that the new tin mining regime has made an 
extraordinary contribution to locally-generated revenue, and has created 
new jobs for the unemployed, especially those who were dismissed from PT 
Tambang Timah Bangka and PT Koba Tin, pepper farmers who were suf-
fering losses due to the low pepper price, and even newcomers just arrived 
in the new province. However, it has had a grave impact on the public and 
on the environment, which the district head could never have imagined. 
The district head faced the aggressiveness of money, greed, and violence in 
the new tin mining business. The ‘people’s economy’ that he had hoped to 
encourage was buried by a vicious economy interested only in short-term 
profits with no concern for the living conditions of the miners or the serious 
environmental impact on Bangka. This aggressive economy has given rise to 
numerous conflicts, between the public and the government, and within and 
between the mining and non-mining communities.
The characteristics of the informal miners’ economy can be seen from 
their total lack of concern for regions that, according to the government, 
are off limits to mining. Hoping to reap immediate profits, financiers and 
tauke (foremen), tin collectors, and the miners themselves are racing to find 
tin deposit areas, whether on land, in the rivers, along the coast, or in the 
middle of the ocean. On land, the miners encroach on protected forests on 
the slopes of mountains, residential areas, plantations, near public facilities 
such as roads, bridges, and public water processing plants, and right next to 
local residents’ rice fields. The informal miners also encroach on the former 
mining locations of PT Tambang Timah that have been reclaimed. At sea, 
the informal miners, called ‘floating informal miners’, work the whole area, 
starting from the coasts of Sungai Liat and Blinyu, and now along nearly the 
entire coast of the island.
Although the district regulation contains a provision requiring recla-
mation, this is apparently never done. Areas that have been mined out 
are simply left as gaping pits. The exact number of these pits remains 
unknown, but is clearly rising steadily. According to research by Sriwijaya 
University, Palembang, in 1998/1999 there were 887 pits in the province of 
Bangka-Belitung, 544 of which were on Bangka, with an estimated area of 
1,035.51 hectares, or 1% of the total land area of Bangka (Kompas 27-6-2001). 
Obviously we cannot claim that these pits were created solely by informal 
mining; PT Tambang Timah is also responsible for many pits that have not 
been filled in.
The encroachment of informal mining into prohibited areas has had a tre-
mendous impact on the residents of Bangka. Fishermen have lost their liveli-
hoods, since they cannot catch fish in the coastal waters contaminated with 
tailings. This is why around 1,120 residents of Air Anyut village, Sungai Liat 
district, made an agreement to reject the presence of informal miners in their 
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region, because they damage the river waters. The community asked the gov-
ernment not to grant any permits, and the district head summoned the min-
ing operators, but there was no response (Bangka Pos 18-9-2003). Operators 
of service industries, such as hotels, which were expected to help raise PAD, 
now complain that the beaches that were previously tourism attractions 
have become dirty (Bangka Pos 3-10-2003). Village residents complain that 
clean water from the rivers has become scarce. The rivers can no longer be 
used to soak pepper, and the water can no longer be used for daily needs. 
The municipal water supply (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, PDAM) is also 
starting to become contaminated, or even shut off entirely, as was experi-
enced by the residents of Toboali, South Bangka (Bangka Pos 11-11-2003). The 
Rangkui River, which flows through the provincial capital, Pangkal Pinang, 
is also polluted from informal mining that takes place upstream. Residents 
of Rias village, where the government was increasing Bangka’s food self-reli-
ance through rice planting, complain that the water for the rice fields is pol-
luted. Owners of palm oil plantations complain that their areas are riddled 
with small pits. Forests are disappearing, because even the pepper farmers 
have converted their pepper plantations into ‘tin plantations’. 
Protests from fishermen and housewives to the DPRD II (district level) 
have not gone unheeded. Public officials have responded quickly; they have 
visited mining locations, and innumerable discussions have been held in 
the legislature, but the results remain unsatisfactory. The problem is not a 
simple one. First, there are problems with control over, and the penalties to 
be imposed on, the uncontrolled mining, because the agencies involved – the 
forestry, agriculture, and mining services, and the various local governments 
(village heads, sub-district heads, and district heads) – are all pulling in differ-
ent directions. Second, the government faces a dilemma: closing the informal 
mines without providing alternative livelihoods will have bad consequences, 
especially when the pepper price is low; but on the other hand, leaving the 
informal miners to operate uncontrolled brings even greater risks. 
The government also faces a range of social problems emerging within 
the informal mining community itself. Problems with alcohol, gambling, and 
women are inevitable. This has been so since the colonial era. Competition 
to obtain mining areas often turn into mob violence between one group and 
another. Reports of crimes such as fights between tin bosses, between groups 
of miners, and even between villages, and cases of tin theft, have become 
commonplace among the informal mining community in Bangka. Informal 
mining is full of violence. 
The government has made some efforts to set things in order, from warn-
ings to repressive action against informal miners that are damaging the envi-
ronment. For example, in November 2003 a formal notice was issued to halt 
‘floating’ informal mining activities along the coasts of Rebo, Teluk Uber, and 
Erwiza Erman200
Rambak, Sungai Liat district, following previous oral and written warnings 
(Bangka Pos 4-11-2003, 12-11-2003, 24-11-2003). The owners of the informal 
mines ignored these warnings. An integrated team of 72 personnel, com-
prised of army, navy, police and officials of the relevant agencies, then seized 
the illegal mining operations, using force when necessary. Some of these 
efforts to restore order have succeeded, while others have not. Demolition 
of informal miners’ machinery and equipment has, for example, been done 
successfully along the coastal areas of Tikus and Rambak, which are in the 
territory of Bangka Induk district. 
In early 2004, law enforcement was taken over by the provincial govern-
ment. This was done in connection with the partitioning of districts in the 
province of Bangka-Belitung. However, large numbers of informal miners 
continue to violate the regulations.
Efforts to put the mining business in order are executed in various ways. 
Aside from often being discriminatory, mine clearance efforts are also com-
plex, because of the involvement of state actors in the mining business. The 
territorial police chief says that even before the officers go into the field, the 
plans for the raids have been leaked. He says that even within the police 
force itself, ‘it is difficult to tell friend from foe’ (Bangka Pos 2-7-2004). As a 
result, the police fail to find evidence of illegal mining in prohibited areas; 
the equipment has already been removed, and the place is deserted. But the 
miners swarm back once the team has left. The plans are leaked because the 
team members themselves own mining businesses. The mining clean-up sys-
tem used by the government is also discriminatory. The only mines cleared 
out are those of small-scale miners, and rarely those owned by large-scale 
informal miners, those owned by the tauke (Bangka Pos 13-11-2004). 
Working conditions for the miners themselves are also far from satis-
factory. There are no social guarantees. There are no reliable data on the 
number of mining accidents that cause injury, disability, and death. Figures 
collected from local media reports from January to October 2003 mentioned 
39 accident cases, with 23 serious injuries (in the sense of requiring hospital 
treatment) and 16 deaths. Accidents were caused by landslides and by get-
ting caught in machinery, resulting in permanent disabilities (Bangka Pos 15-
10-2003). Between January and July 2004, 27 informal miners died when they 
were buried in landslides. Many injuries or deaths are not taken to hospitals, 
or otherwise escape reporting in the mass media, or are deliberately covered 
up by the miners themselves. Most of the miners are not mine owners, but 
either ‘sharecroppers’ or wage labourers, who work in terrible conditions 
with no guarantees. 
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Decentralization, deregulation, and the Shadow State: a discussion
Who holds the dominant power in this local Shadow State? A tin business-
man and smuggler said: 
The power in Bangka is not the district head, not the governor, not the members 
of the DPR, but money, money, money. Its exhilarating scent extends everywhere. 
The NGOs? They are the easiest – shouting in the morning, just give them some 
money and they’re quiet by the afternoon.21 
The involvement of state actors in this informal economy is closely related to 
their need to defend their political power from other competing forces who 
seek to wrest the authority to control natural resources. The voices for and 
against deregulation of the tin trade, and for and against the district head’s 
SIPAD, are a reflection of the business and political competition between 
PT Timah and the local tin companies, between the centre and the regions, 
between the province and the district, and between Golkar, which wishes to 
regain power, and PDI-P, which won the 1999 elections in Bangka.
The case of Bangka shows similarities to Sierra Leone, in that the emer-
gence and survival of the Shadow State reflects the weakness of formal state 
control, evident in the consistent failure to impose order and security in 
the tin industry, which is concerned only with short-term profits. Although 
decentralization of power is meant to be an effort to bring the state (cen-
tral government) closer to the regions (Syarif Hidayat 2003), in the case of 
Bangka, exactly the opposite is seen. In reality, the district head and his allies 
are simply carrying on the work of the New Order. Although the people of 
Bangka are now permitted to mine, in general they remain nothing more 
than miners (sharing the proceeds, or day labourers in the case of newcom-
ers) in working conditions that are far from satisfactory. The serious envi-
ronmental damage that has resulted has actually made it more difficult to 
improve the region’s economy. Thus, the new province of Bangka-Belitung 
or Babel, is re-experiencing the brutal economic practices of the New Order 
period, operating with a new face. 




Business and politics in the province of Banten
Our knowledge of the nature of local political leadership in modern democ-
racies based on systematic comparative scholarship is limited. This makes 
it difficult to generalise across political systems. […] Political scientists just 
have been more interested in their own political system, and in interviewing 
national politicians than in comparative studies of local leaders. (Eldersveld 
et al. 1995:1.)
The informal market role in rulers’ construction of parallel political authority 
in the wake of the near total decay of formal state institutions – a Shadow 
State – is less well known. (William Reno 1995:1.)
Introduction
The quotations above indicate how few comprehensive studies there are 
on local politics. Observers tend to focus on the national level. Yet in the 
Indonesian context, local power relations cannot be understood simply 
through a formal approach, as they also involve informal networks, includ-
ing relations between power holders and business. Therefore, a fuller under-
standing requires an approach that can simultaneously comprehend the 
formal and informal relations.
Motivated by a desire to understand more fully the power relations in the 
conduct of local governance in Indonesia, especially in the post-Soeharto era, 
I decided to undertake this research, with the theme ‘Business and politics in 
the province of Banten’. My interest grew when one day I found an article in 
the ‘Nusantara’ column of Kompas daily (4-7-2003), entitled ‘If you’re going 
to Banten, don’t forget your black clothes’. The writer, ‘Zal’, described the 
influence of the jawara in the conduct of local government in Banten.1 The 
1  Raffles (1965) and M. Williams (1990:45-6) define the jawara in Banten as people who do 

























black clothes that he referred to are the official uniform of the jawara, now bet-
ter known as pendekar. These black-clad pendekar, Zal wrote, have awesome 
power and influence. They control projects and intervene in local government 
policies:
Black clothes are the favourite of the Chief of Banten’s pendekar, Chassan Sochib 
(74). Wherever he goes, this community figure always wears only black. Chassan 
has dozens of black garments. Banten’s public considers him an important local 
personage and, indeed, an important actor in the province’s history. Chassan is 
seen as having served the development of Banten’s infrastructure through his 
numerous contracting companies. However, he is also often the object of pub-
lic criticism; he is accused of excessive intervention in local government policy. 
‘Especially when it comes to projects, nearly all of them are controlled by the 
(group dressed in) black’, says one Banten Provincial Government official. 
Chassan denies these allegations. On several occasions Chassan has said that 
these misguided charges are simply due to jealousy. He claims that his contract-
ing companies and the trust he has gained from the government are thanks to his 
many years of hard work. 
It is undeniable that Chassan is considered a ‘strong man’ in Banten. Many 
national figures are known to be close to him, such as General (retired) Wiranto. It 
also happens that one of Chassan’s daughters, Ratu Atut Chosiyah (39), was elect-
ed as Banten’s first deputy governor, on a ticket with governor Djoko Munandar.
This journalistic information inspired me to examine the role of the jawara in 
Banten in its initial period as a separate province. Not all jawara in Banten are 
‘pure’ jawara, who rely solely on their martial arts ability and their powers of 
invulnerability. Some are businessmen, with a tremendous interest in obtain-
ing access to the resources controlled by the local government. They will 
make maximum use of this dual status. As businessmen, they will maximize 
their financial resources, and as jawara, they can use their resources of force.
The provisional suspicion of the existence of ‘dual-status jawara’ then 
inspired the writer to develop a number of questions: Is it true that the 
jawara in Banten also have status as business operators? If so, how great is 
their influence in the conduct of government in Banten? Is there a correlation 
between their role in the establishment of Banten province (especially in the 
election of governor and deputy governor) and their role in the post-election 
period? How was this access to the local government built? And how do these 
‘jawara-entrepreneurs’ and local government officials interact?
group of persons who have a source of physical power (and the supernatural knowledge that 
accompanies it), who dare to oppose injustice, and who protect weaker individuals or commu-
nity groups. 
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Historical background, social characteristics, and economic profile of Banten
Banten is one of five new provinces established since the passage of Law 
no. 22/1999 and Law no. 25/1999. Banten was the first and opened the door 
for the creation of the other new provinces through partitioning of existing 
ones – Bangka Belitung, Gorontalo, North Maluku, and the Riau Islands. 
Banten had a long history as an autonomous region during the Sultanate 
(1552-1809). But during the Dutch colonial occupation, with the abolition 
of the Sultanate of Banten, the area lost its autonomy (in 1817). It became a 
Residency (Khatib Mansur 2001:531). With the enactment of Law no. 5/1974 
on Government in the Regions, the Soeharto regime reduced Banten to one of 
several regencies under the Province of West Java. This brought with it many 
disadvantages. Until the end of the New Order, Banten had West Java’s low-
est levels of education and public welfare. Banten also had a high number of 
‘backward villages’ (Khatib Mansur 2001:166-7). All these things help explain 
the movement to establish a separate province of Banten, which apparently 
began in the late 1950s.2
After laying buried throughout the New Order, the will to establish a 
province resurfaced in early 1999. Numerous organizations were estab-
lished. Three important ones were the Komite Pembentukan Propinsi Banten 
(KPPB, Committee for the Establishment of the Province of Banten) led by 
Uwes Qorny; Kelompok Kerja Pembentukan Propinsi Banten (Pokja PBB, 
the Working Group for the Establishment of the Province of Banten) led by 
H. Irsyad Djuwaeli; and Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi Banten 
(BAKOR PBB, the Coordination Body for the Establishment of the Province 
of Banten) led by H.Tb. Tryana Sjam’un. Public figures and other elements 
of the community including jawara and entrepreneurs joined together, and 
strategies both formal and informal were put in play. The long journey of the 
people of Banten to achieve their ambition reached its climax on 4 October 
2000, when the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia, DPR-RI) passed the Law on Establishment of the Province of 
Banten (Law no. 23/2000). 
Moch. Aly Yahya was a key ‘figure of struggle’ who worked on many 
levels. As a ‘son of Banten’, he was a member of the steering committees of 
several of the organizations in the movement, including KPPB and BAKOR 
PPB. At the same time, as a young Golkar politician, he sat in the national 
parliament. It was in his capacity as a DPR-RI member that he drafted the 
2  Interviews with Hasan Alayrus, 3-6-2004; Djamaludin, 18-6-2004; and UU Mangkusasmita, 
1-7-2004. See also the ‘Remarks from a Banten public figure’ written by Kiyai-Haji Tubagus 
Chasan Sochib and the Prologue written by H. Uwes Qorny in the book by Khatib Mansur 
(2001).
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DPR Initiative Bill (Rencana Undang Undang, RUU) on Establishment of the 
Province of Banten, which was later passed as Law no. 23/2000. 
The new province of Banten comprises four regencies and two cities: 
Serang, Pandeglang, Lebak, Tangerang, the City of Tangerang, and the City 
of Cilegon. Serang was designated the capital. One unique aspect of Banten 
is the harmonious relations between jawara and Ulama (religious leaders). 
In most people’s understanding, Ulama and jawara are two diametrically 
opposed worlds; yet in Banten they live together in a harmonious synergy. 
It is therefore quite right when M. Tihami (a historian in Banten), says that 
‘Ulama and jawara in Banten have always worked hand in hand – since the 
period of the Sultanate, in the struggle to expel the colonialists, and in the 
period of Indonesian independence’.3 Yet their roles have diverged in history 
(M. Williams 1990; Sartono Kartodirdjo 1966; Raffles 1965). The jawara have 
continued to play a dominant role as informal political force, from the time 
of the Sultanate to the present day, while the official role of the Ulama in the 
conduct of government affairs has all but disappeared. 
Turning now to the economy, three main sectors play an important role. 
In 2000 the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) of Banten was divided 
as follows: 50.41% for the Processing Industry sector; 17.36% for the Trade, 
Hotel, and Restaurant sector; and 9.49% for the Agriculture sector, with 
several other smaller sectors.4 Thus, around 50% of Banten’s economy is 
dominated by manufacturing, which includes textile, finished clothing and 
leather, chemicals, and metal goods. However, this does not position manu-
facturing as the main target of the government development programs. As a 
newly established province, over the past four years (2001-2004) most of the 
development programs in Banten have been geared toward upgrading eco-
nomic infrastructure and basic services, especially in Education and Health. 
In 2001 the budget allocation for construction of roads/transportation facili-
ties and other physical structures came to around Rp 116 billion (54.7% of the 
total Regional Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD)).5 
In 2002, this rose to Rp 130 billion (30%),6 in 2003 to Rp 150 billion (34%),7 
and in 2004 to a phenomenal Rp 216 billion (49%).8 The execution of these 
large-scale physical construction projects has become one of the main objects 
of attention from business people in their ‘informal economy’ practices with 
local government officials.
3  Interview, 24-6-2004.
4  Badan Perencanaan Daerah Propinsi Banten 2002. Similar figures can be read for the years 
2001 through 2003 (Badan Perencanaan Daerah Propinsi Banten 2003).
5  Results of Discussion of Bill on Revision of the Banten Provincial Budget, 2001.
6  Banten Provincial Regulation no. 37/2002 on Revision of Banten Provincial Budget for 2002.
7  Banten Provincial Regulation no. 10/2003 on Revision of Banten Provincial Budget for 2003.
8  Banten Provincial Regulation no. 3/2004 on Revision of Banten Provincial Budget for 2004.
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‘Jawara-entrepreneurs’ is one of the terms popularly used among observ-
ers in Banten to label those businessmen, whether individuals or groups, 
who now have such a dominant influence over the provincial government’s 
top officials.9 ‘Tuan Besar’, who will be the chief protagonist in this study, 
is an important figure in this jawara-entrepreneur network.10 He has been 
a businessman of the first rank, especially in construction, since the 1980s. 
Before Banten became a province, Tuan Besar had many dealings with the 
West Java Provincial Government and was frequently entrusted to handle 
large-scale construction projects. At the same time, Tuan Besar’s status as a 
prominent jawara is another, but inseparable, side of his identity. This status 
is not simply hereditary; for he was the founder of one of Banten’s foremost 
jawara organizations. Tuan Besar is also a senior politician in Golkar.
Formal and informal governance: empirical reality and the approach of this study 
in Banten
As soon as Banten was established as a province, several steps were taken to 
complete its formal government apparatus. In early March 2001, the Panitia 
Pengisian Keanggotaan (PKK, Committee to Select the Membership) of the 
Banten Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah  (DPRD, Provincial Parliament) 
was established, under the chairmanship of Hassan Alaydrus.11 This com-
mittee, later known simply as the Banten PPK-DPRD, or the Team of Five, 
was appointed by the Minister of the Interior in Jakarta. The team’s main 
duties were to determine the numbers of seats attained by each political 
party in the provincial DPRD, based on the results of the June 1999 election; 
to draft, establish, and announce the Daftar Calon Sementara Baru (DCSB, 
Provisional List of New Candidates); to accommodate and follow up on pub-
lic objections to the DCSB; to draft, establish, and announce the Daftar Calon 
Tetap Baru (DCTB, Definitive List of New Candidates); and finally, to des-
ignate the selected candidates. The PPK-DPRD worked quickly. Less than a 
week after it was established, the PPK-DPRD had set out its working agenda 
(Agus Sutisna 2001:48). By July 2001, only two months later, it had completed 
9  This information was obtained from interviews with Iwan Kusuma Hamdan, 1-6-2004 and 
Boyke Pribadi, 7-6-2004, among others.
10  Tuan Besar is a nickname I am using to protect his privacy. Tuan is an honorific term of 
address roughly equivalent to sir, boss or master, while besar, literally ‘big’, indicates his influ-
ence. 
11  The establishment of the Committee to Select the Membership of the Provincial DPRD was 
stipulated through Decree of the Minister of the Interior no. 162-35/2001 dated 2 March 2001. 
Hasan Alaydrus, who was appointed as the Committee’s Chairman, was a leading figure in the 
struggle to establish the province of Banten.
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the last item on its agenda, the selection of the definitive candidates for mem-
bers of the Banten provincial DPRD.12 The Banten provincial DPRD has 75 
seats, but 8 were allocated to the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) 
and police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Polri). Thus, the total number of 
seats to be allocated among the political parties was only 67. 
The Banten provincial DPRD for the 2001-2004 term was headed by 
Dharmono K. Lawi (Chairman), a politician from Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (PDI-P, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). The three 
deputy Chairmen were Muslim Jamaluddin (Golkar), Infantry Col. Rohman 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Darat, TNI-AD, the Indonesian 
National Army – Ground Forces), and Mufrodi Muchsin (PPP, Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party).13 Thus the DPRD was 
dominated by three major political parties: PDI-P, Golkar, and PPP. Of the 67 
seats, 24 seats were held by PDI-P, 12 by Golkar, and 12 by PPP. The DPRD 
was not dominated by one party. In such a situation, it was virtually unavoid-
able that informal practices such as lobbying and compromises would colour 
decision-making processes.
The next step, and the first duty of the DPRD, was to elect the governor 
and deputy governor for the 2001-2006 term. The election process began on 
16 September 2001 and ended on 3 December 2001, when the ticket of Djoko 
Munandar and Ratu Atut Chosiyah was elected as the winner.
Djoko Munandar is a native of Solo, Central Java. His most recent posi-
tion was deputy mayor of Cilegon. When he registered as a prospective 
candidate for governor of Banten, Djoko allied himself with the PPP. Ratu 
Atut Chosiyah is a businesswoman from Serang and daughter of Kiyai 
Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib.14 Atut was nominated for deputy governor of 
Banten by Golkar. 
The institutional apparatus was now complete. Hopes for the immediate 
creation of a more prosperous, democratic, and religious Banten were con-
centrated on these two important provincial institutions, and particularly 
on the newly-elected governor and deputy governor. Similar hopes at first 
accompanied me when I began my research in Banten in April 2004 (three 
months after Banten was established). But during the first two months I was 
surprised by the attitudes of a majority of the informants, who tended to be 
12  The chronology and dynamics of the process of selecting the membership of the Banten 
Provincial DPRD are described in detail in Agus Sutisna (2001:43-54).
13  Decree of the Minister of the Interior no. 161/2001 dated 24 August 2001 on Inauguration of 
the Leadership of the Banten Provincial People’s Representative Assembly.
14  Chairman of the Indonesian Association of Champions of Banten Martial Arts, Art and 
Culture, Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia, PPPSBBI; senior 
politician in the Golkar Party; and Chairman of the Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(Kamar Dagang Indonesia, Kadin) (Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. 2004).
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pessimistic when evaluating the performance of the provincial government, 
and seemed unenthusiastic about the future. 
Several of my informants said the provincial government was almost 
‘totally crippled’ in carrying out its formal functions, because informal 
forces were able to control the governor.15 HOS, a member of the provincial 
DPRD, said Banten had a sort of ‘private government’ headed by the Tuan 
Besar mentioned previously.16 This private government had tremendous 
influence over the provincial government’s economic dealings. He alleged 
it monopolized nearly all local government projects, and pressured the pro-
vincial government to accommodate its interests when drafting the annual 
project development budget. Even more interesting information was put 
forward by BOB, an academic at Tirtayasa University.17 Agreeing with HOS, 
he also described informal practices within the local bureaucracy. BOB tried 
to persuade me of Tuan Besar’s power in determining bureaucratic transfers. 
Ayip Muchfi was the first district secretary (sekretaris daerah, sekda) of the 
Province of Banten. He was appointed immediately after Hakamudin Jamal 
was appointed acting governor of Banten. But once Djoko Munandar and 
Atut Chosiyah became governor and deputy governor, Ayip was dismissed, 
without going through the proper procedure. Apparently, BOB continued, 
the replacement of the regional secretary was related to a long-standing per-
sonal conflict between Ayip and Tuan Besar. 
The initial indications suggest that informal political and economic forces 
dominate local governance in Banten. In studies of state-society relations, 
such practices of informal governance, or Shadow States, are nothing new. In 
the Indonesian context there have been few critical analyses of Shadow State 
practices. But Henk Schulte Nordholt (2003:558, 579) explicitly mentioned 
Shadow State practices in connection with the decentralization and regional 
autonomy policies in the post-Soeharto period: 
New ways of looking at ‘the state’ are necessary in order to trace continuities in 
patrimonial patterns and to incorporate various arrangements that link formal 
institutions with informal networks, which help to undermine artificial distinc-
tions between ‘state’, ‘society’, and ‘market’. […] Decentralization in Indonesia 
does not necessarily result in democratization, good governance, and the strength-
ening of civil society at the regional level. Instead, we witness a decentralization of 
corruption, collusion, and political violence that once belonged to the centralized 
regime of the New Order but is now moulded in existing patrimonial patterns 
at the regional level. […] On the whole, regional leadership may take the shape 
15  Among the informants interviewed were HKI (academic and NGO activist), 1-5-2004; 
MUM (member of the Banten Provincial DPRD), 30-5-2004; TNT (high Serang Regency official) 
14-5-2004; and MAA (Banten journalist), 15-5-2004.
16  HOS is a member of the Banten Provincial DPRD. Interview, 9-5-2004.
17  Interview with BOB, 7-5-2004.
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of what John Sidel (1999) has called bossism, which operates in regional shadow 
regimes characterized by alliances of bureaucrats, party bosses, businesspeople, 
military, and criminals.
Barbara Harriss-White has provided a more comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical discussion about the informal economy and Shadow State prac-
tices in India. According to Harriss-White, there are at least two definitions 
for the term ‘informal economy’. First, business activities of an individual, 
and/or of a company not registered with the government, for which taxes are 
not paid. Second, the behaviour of formal institutions (public or private) to 
evade regulatory control. The forms of this second type of informal economy 
include tax exemptions, abuse of public policy, corruption, collusion, and 
forced privatization of state assets (Harriss-White 2003:4-6). It is clear that 
the first type of informal economy is the arena of ‘the little guys’ (small farm-
ers and small business operators), while the second is the domain of ‘the big 
guys’ (large-scale business operators and state officials).
Barbara Harriss-White has applied an approach called ‘social structure of 
accumulation’ (SSA), in which social structures are one of the determinant 
factors for economic accumulation. She identified four such dimensions of 
social structure: class, caste, gender, and space. A majority of economic trans-
actions in India take place through the informal economy. They proceed in a 
familial atmosphere, based more on reputation than on formal law, but also 
often with elements of (the threat of) violence:
Some roles in the ‘shadow’ state are played simultaneously by the bureaucrats 
of the official state; for instance, accepting tribute, patronage and/or clientelage. 
Other ‘shadow’ state livelihoods are a form of self employment, although they 
depend on state employees, politicians and other interested social forces for 
their incomes; for example, private armies enforcing black or corrupt contracts, 
intermediaries, technical fixers, gatekeepers, adjudicators of disputes, confidants, 
contractors and consultants. Hence the real state, including its shadow, is bigger 
than the formal state, and has a vested interest in the perpetuation of a stricken 
and porous formal state [...] By the end of the 1990s in some parts of India, notably 
Bihar, up to 40 percent of the development budget was said to be creamed off by 
contractors. The ‘shadow’ state spills spatially into the lanes surrounding state 
offices and into the private (some would argue, the ‘female’) domestic space of 
officials’ residences. This must be the most vivid image of the blurred boundaries 
between state and society. (Harriss-White 2003:89.) 
We can note four general characteristics of the practices of the informal mar-
ket and the Shadow State. First, they develop as a consequence of the decay 
of the formal (state) institutions, especially when accompanied by an acute 
economic crisis. Second, accumulation of short-term political and economic 
benefits outside the framework of formal regulations is the primary aim of 
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transactions through the informal market. Each party maximizes its resources 
to then trade on them in the informal market. Third, the modus operandi, or 
working mechanisms, of the informal market and the Shadow State fall into 
two categories: manipulation of public policy, and use of networks of indi-
vidual alliances or institutional alliances. Fourth, the actors involved come 
from both the state and society. Among the latter H. Schulte Nordholt (2003) 
mentions business operators, party politicians, and even criminal gangs. 
This approach is relevant for ‘reading’ the practices of local governance in 
Banten. The following section will describe the election of the governor and 
deputy governor, followed by a discussion of the practices of the ‘Informal 
Government’. 
The election of the governor and deputy governor 
The process of electing the governor and deputy governor revealed the vari-
ous social, economic, and political forces (especially the jawara businessmen) 
at work. This was obviously an important moment for them. 
Several Banten community figures who had earlier been the main players 
in the struggle to establish the province of Banten disappeared during the 
election process. Among them were Tryana Sjam’un (Chairman of BAKOR 
PPB), Uwes Qorni (a pioneer in the movement to establish a province of 
Banten, and Chairman of KPPB), and Moch. Ali Yahya (drafter and proposer 
of the DPR Initiative Bill on Establishment of the Province of Banten). In 
contrast, the previously discussed Tuan Besar (a jawara-businessman figure), 
who during the period of the struggle to establish the province of Banten had 
played mostly a behind-the-scenes role, emerged as a dominant force. 
In technical terms, the election of governor and deputy governor of 
Banten comprised five stages: initial registration of prospective candidates; 
screening of prospective candidates, stage I; screening stage II; selection of 
the definitive tickets of candidates for governor and deputy governor; and 
finally, the election of the ticket of governor and deputy governor (‘D-day’). 
Initial registration of prospective candidates for governor and deputy governor
The initial registration of prospective candidates for governor and deputy 
governor began on 16 September 2001. The local political dynamics from the 
opening of registration to D-day – the election of the ticket of governor and 
deputy governor – were unpredictable. PDI-P nominated Mamas Chaeruddin 
(Chairman of the Banten DPD-PDI-P) as its candidate for governor. Golkar 
put forward Moch. Aly Yahya (member of the Golkar Faction in the DPR-
RI) as its candidate for governor and Hj. Ratu Atut Chosiyah (a business-
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woman) for deputy governor. PPP nominated Djoko Munandar (Chairman 
of PPP’s Banten Regional Leadership Board) as its candidate for governor. In 
addition, an alliance of three other parties – the Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice 
Party), the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) and the 
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Moon and Star Party) nominated Tryana Sjam’un 
(businessman and figure in the struggle for the province of Banten) as their 
candidate for governor (Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. 2004:119-20). 
Tuan Besar was not among the prospective candidates. This was part of 
the game-winning strategy. Rumours had long been spreading that Tuan 
Besar had ambitions to hold the post of ‘Banten Number One’ (governor).18 
To disprove this rumour, Tuan Besar did not formally register as a prospec-
tive candidate for governor. However, behind the scenes, he had mobilized 
his resources behind a certain ticket of candidates. As a senior figure in the 
Banten Golkar Party, Tuan Besar had a clear obligation to support its candi-
dates for governor (Moch. Aly Yahya) and deputy governor (Atut Chosiyah). 
But he had an even greater interest in ensuring the nomination of Atut, as 
Tuan Besar and Atut share a very close family relationship. 
Little ‘money politics’ activity was going on at this early stage. But various 
community elements came out in favour of this or that candidate. A ‘Letter of 
Support’ for Atut Chosiyah came from the martial arts association Persatuan 
Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia  (PPPSBBI, Indonesian 
Association of Champions of Banten Martial Arts) on 18 September 2001 (two 
days after the opening of registration of prospective candidates for governor 
and deputy governor). It was signed by the Chairman of PPPSBBI, H.Tb. 
Chasan Sochib, and its deputy secretary-general, M. Suminta Idris,19 
We of the Executive Committee of the Indonesian Association of Champions of 
Banten Martial Arts, Art and Culture (PPPSBBI), in connection with the Election 
of the governor and deputy governor of the Province of Banten for the period 
2001-2006, feel called [to declare that] it is necessary to select the right leaders, 
who understand the character and culture of Banten’s society and have a sense of 
the unity and integrity of the people of Banten. 
Therefore, we of the PPPSBBI herewith declare our full support for Mrs. Hj. 
Ratu Atut Chosiyah as candidate for deputy governor of the Province of Banten 
for the period 2001-2006 in the coming election for governor and deputy gover-
nor.
The letter signalled that the jawara sided with Atut Chosiyah as candidate for 
deputy governor, and therefore also with whoever would be the candidate 
for governor on the same ticket with her. And it reflected an initial form of the 
jawara’s involvement in the election process. Later, their involvement tended 
18  Interviews with HKI, 1-6-2004; DLM, 18-6-2004; and HAI, 6-7-2004.
19  The writer has a photocopy of this letter. 
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towards mass mobilization with the theme of ‘protecting and safeguarding’ 
the election, and towards intimidating supporters of other candidates. There 
are indications that these activities of the jawara were closely related to Tuan 
Besar’s winning strategy.20
Screening of candidates 
The first round had resulted in 22 prospective candidates for governor and 
7 for deputy governor. These were now ‘screened’ to produce 12 candidates 
for governor and deputy governor of Banten. Up to this stage, the candidates 
were not yet assigned to pairs, or tickets. In the third round, screening stage 
II, the 12 candidates were paired up into ‘tickets’, each ticket being nominated 
by one of the 6 factions in the Banten Provincial DPRD. In its plenary session 
on 25 September 2001, through a secret vote, the DPRD designated 12 can-
didates for governor and deputy governor.21 In the next stage of screening, 
the factions in the Banten Provincial DPRD nominated 5 tickets of candidates 
for governor and deputy governor (Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. 2004:122). 
These 5 tickets were: 1. Djoko Munandar and Ratu Atut Chosiyah (nominat-
ed by the Golkar and PPP Factions); 2. Herman Haeruman and Tb. Mamas 
Chaerudin (nominated by the PDI-P Faction); 3. Ace Suhaedi Madsupi and 
Tb. Mamas Chaerudin, nominated by the ABK Faction (Fraksi Amanat 
Bintang Keadilan, Mandate-Star-Justice Faction); 4. Herman Haeruman and 
Hilman Indra (nominated by the ABK Faction); and 5. Herman Haeruman 
and Ade Sudirman (nominated by the Al Bantani Faction). 
The most striking point to note is the disappearance of Moch. Aly Yahya 
as candidate for governor during screening stage II. This prominent figure in 
the struggle to establish the province had received only 28 votes in screening 
stage I. But there are also strong indications that the disappearance of Yahya’s 
name from the ‘market’ of candidates was closely related to the political sce-
nario crafted by Tuan Besar and his ‘Success Team’. As explained by several 
informants, from the outset Tuan Besar had a greater interest in the position 
of ‘Banten II’ (deputy governor), as this was the position relevant to Atut 
20  Interviews with HKI (academic and NGO activist), 1-6-2004; MAA (Banten journalist), 15-
6-2004; and HOS (member of Banten Provincial DPRD), 9-6-2004.
21  Harian Banten 26-9-2001. The 12 candidates for governor were Herman Saerens Sudiro (53 
votes), H.M. Ali Muchtar (45 votes), Endjat Sudrajat (42 votes), H. Ace Suhaedi Madsupi (56 
votes), Sagaf Usman (54 votes), Prof Dr Herman Haeruman (53 votes), Azril Azhari (47 votes), 
Susila Budi Mufreni (50 votes), M. Wasal Falah (37 votes), H. Suhaemi (52 votes), H.M. Aly Yahya 
(28 votes), and Djoko Munandar (54 votes), while the 12 candidates for deputy governor were 
Tri Mulyono (62 votes), H. Ade Sudirman (55 votes), H. Abdul Halim Amir (48 votes), Hj. Ratu 
Atut Chosiyah (61 votes), H.M. Masduki (50 votes), H. Djakaria Mahmud (43 votes), Gusti Bagja 
Mulyadi (53 votes), Tb. Mamas Chaerudin (42 votes), H. Makmun Suchari (51 votes), Mukhlisin 
Arief (45 votes), H.M. Sofwat Hadi (50 votes), and Hilman Indra (56 votes).
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Chosiyah, whom he was championing. The position of governor was too 
‘heavy’ for Atut;22 too heavy in terms of her own experience and personal 
capability, and too heavy for Golkar, which hoped to effect her victory.23 Yet 
Golkar had already nominated Aly Yahya for governor and Atut Chosiyah 
for deputy governor. To resolve this problem, things were ‘arranged’ so that 
Golkar decided only to seek the position of deputy governor. This was clearly 
one reason for Aly Yahya’s withdrawal from the race, since from the start he 
was only interested in being nominated for governor.24 
The challenge for Golkar, and for Tuan Besar, was to choose another can-
didate for governor to be paired with Atut Chosiyah. This was a complex job, 
which required heavy political and economic ‘ammunition’, as nearly all the 
candidates for governor who had passed through screening stage I already 
had partners to run for deputy governor. But in this situation they displayed 
their skills. After careful calculation, it was decided that Golkar must form 
a coalition with one or more other parties. The choice was between PPP and 
PDI-P. PPP had not yet determined the name of its candidate for deputy gov-
ernor to be paired with Djoko Munandar (its candidate for governor). After 
various approaches and compromises, a Golkar-PPP coalition was formed, 
and the PPP’s candidate for governor, Djoko Munandar, was paired with 
Ratu Atut Chosiyah as candidate for deputy governor.25 It appears that Tuan 
Besar was the main contributor to finance the election of this ticket.26
Selection of the tickets of candidates 
The next stage was to determine the three tickets of candidates who would 
run in the final round, the election itself. On 3 October 2001 the three tickets 
selected were: 1. Djoko Munandar and Atut Chosiyah (nominated by PPP 
and Golkar); 2. Ace Suhaedi Madsupi and Tb. Mamas Chaerudin (nomi-
nated by PDI-P); and 3. Herman Haeruman and Ade Sudirman (Al Bantani 
Faction) (see Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. 2004:122). The selection of these 
three tickets of candidates elicited both positive and negative reactions from 
the public. For example, on the day after the three tickets were selected the 
22  Interviews with HAI, 6-7-2004; HKI, 1-6-2004; and THA, 24-6-2004.
23  As explained in the earlier discussion, the Golkar Party had only 12 of the 75 seats in the 
Banten Provincial DPRD. 
24  This decision by the Banten Golkar Party DPD was acknowledged by Aly Yahya when this 
writer interviewed him. When asked about his feelings regarding the Golkar DPD’s decision, Aly 
Yahya diplomatically stated, ‘as a good senior Golkar Party cadre, I had to respect and abide by 
the DPD’s decision’ (interview, 6-7-2004).
25  This information was obtained from an interview with HAI, 6-7-2004.
26  This information was obtained from interviews with several informants, including SME 
(business operator), 9-6-2004; THA (former BAKOR officer), 24-6-2004; HKI, 13-6-2004; BOB 
(academic), 7-6-2004; and MAA, 15-6-2004.
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NGO Aliansi Martabat Perempuan Banten (AMPB, Alliance for the Dignity of 
Banten Women) submitted a letter rejecting the candidacy of Atut Chosiyah 
for deputy governor of Banten. Signed by Hj. Ratu Syarifa Usmah Wahid 
(Chairwoman) and addressed to the members of the Banten Provincial DPRD, 
it said:
The presence of the name of Ratu Atut Chosiyah among the candidates for 
governor and deputy governor of Banten for 2001-2006 is deeply shocking and 
disappointing to the Alliance for the Dignity of Banten Women. This woman 
named Ratu Atut Chosiyah is extremely depraved in terms of her morality and 
behaviour, and unsuited to represent the women of Banten.
In our opinion, Ratu Atut Chosiyah is totally unsuited to represent women in 
this honoured position in the province of Banten. Ratu Atut Chosiayah is well 
known primarily as a businesswoman who will use any means to promote the 
success of her businesses. She is shamelessly having affairs with those she plans 
to do business with, [...]. Among those who work in the Public Works Service in 
Bandung, she is very well known. [...]
Therefore, we as the Board and the members of the Alliance for the Dignity of 
Banten Women herewith ‘reject the candidacy of Ratu Atut Chosiyah for deputy 
governor of Banten’.27
The next day (5 October 2001), Perguruan Paku Jung Kulon, a martial 
arts school in South Banten, responded with a letter of support for Atut 
Chosiyah’s candidacy. This letter, signed by M. Suwarta SMHK (Chairman) 
and addressed to the Chairmen of the Factions in the Banten Provincial 
DPRD, said:
We, from the Community Organization ‘Perguruan Paku Jung Kulon’ of South 
Banten, in selecting a candidate for deputy governor of the Province of Banten 
for the period 2001-2006, follow the call of our hearts in supporting Mrs Hj. Ratu 
Atut Chosiyah, the daughter of a great Banten personage, as the partner for the 
governor soon to be elected. 
Our reasons for choosing Mrs Hj. Ratu Atut Chosiyah, daughter of this great 
Banten figure, for deputy governor of Banten are as follows: She is known by the 
community of Banten; She has extensive understanding of the region and culture 
of Banten […]. She has experience in the administrative technicalities of develop-
ment in and community activities, as a successful national-scale business opera-
tor; […]. She is the one and only ‘Srikandi of Banten’ who wishes to improve the 
role of women in the various aspects of development.28
27  This statement of rejection is quoted from Statement of the Alliance for the Dignity of 
Banten Women no. 66/AMPB/X/01, 4-10-2001 (the writer has a photocopy of the letter).
28  This statement of support is excerpted from letter of ‘Perguruan Paku Jung Kulon’ no. 
01/PPJBS/2001, 5 October 2001, regarding Support for deputy governor Candidate Hj. Rt. Atut 
Chosiyah (the writer has a photocopy of this letter).
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Postponement of the election 
The waves of support and rejection continued to swell and became increas-
ingly difficult to hold back. Although the DPRD tried to fend off the vari-
ous demands, protests, and statements of rejection submitted by various 
elements of the Banten community, it was difficult to cover up the devia-
tions that had occurred in the process. According to Law no. 22/1999 and 
Government Regulation no. 151/2000, the pairing of candidates for governor 
and deputy governor should have been done by the candidates themselves, 
and not by the DPRD factions as had happened here. Another violation had 
to do with the administrative requirements of Tb. Mamas Chaerudin, the 
candidate for deputy governor who was paired with Ace Suhaedi Madsupi; 
it was suspected that he did not actually have a high school diploma or the 
equivalent, as required by Law no. 22/1999 and Government Regulation no. 
151/2000 (Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. 2004:122).
To resolve these problems, the Banten Provincial DPRD consulted the 
Department of the Interior, which felt that the rules used in Banten were 
in need of correction. So on 12 November 2001 the DPRD held a plenary 
session to discuss revision of the rules of order for election of the governor 
and deputy governor.29 The results of this revision were then submitted to 
the Department of the Interior for review, and at the same time, informal 
approaches were undertaken to complement this. It is reported by one 
member of the Banten Provincial DPRD that Tuan Besar took part in this 
informal political process by making the most of his personal relationship 
with the Minister of the Interior.30 On 24 November 2001 the Minister of the 
Interior, Hari Sabarno, sent a letter of approval.31 Consequently a meeting of 
the Steering Committee (Panitia Musyawarah, Panmus) of the Banten DPRD 
decided on 26 November 2001 that the final round, the election of the gover-
nor and deputy governor of Banten, would be held on 3 December 2001.
‘D-day’: election of the governor and deputy governor 
The long-awaited day finally arrived. The atmosphere was increasingly tense, 
because even though the DPRD had granted full authority to the police and 
military to handle security for the election session, and asked them to clear 
the area within a 4-kilometre radius of the DPRD building of jawara, this ele-
29  Invitation Letter of the Banten Provincial DPRD (signed by H. Muslim Jamaluddin), no. 
162.4/DPRD/157/X/2001, dated 9-11-2001, regarding plenary session.
30  Interview, 9-6-2004.
31  Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Chairman of the Banten Provincial DPRD, no. 
121/2402/SJ dated 24-11-2001 (the writer has a photocopy of this letter).
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ment of the community continued to mobilize its masses. The jawara, wrote 
Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. (2004:126), were on guard as early as 06.00 a.m., 
claiming to safeguard the election process. They were even swarming inside 
the building in regular civilian clothing.32 In this rather tense atmosphere, the 
DPRD held the final election round. Sixty-nine of the 75 assembly members 
were present. After a vote by secret ballot, the final count showed that the 
ticket of Djoko Munandar and Atut Chosiyah had emerged as the winners, 
with 37 votes (Iwan Kusuma Hamdan et al. 2004:126). Apparently,33 the 
defeat of the PDI-P ticket was due not only to money politics and intimida-
tion but also to political compromises between the Golkar Party and the 
PDI-P to allocate the leadership positions in the regional legislature and 
executive. It must be remembered that the Chairman of the Banten Provincial 
DPRD, Dharmono K. Lawi, was from the PDI-P.
Among those who were most pleased and able to breathe a sigh of relief 
after this final round of the election were Tuan Besar and his Success Team. 
After navigating a highly complex election process that took up great politi-
cal and economic resources, finally their candidates had achieved victory. 
The next question was how Tuan Besar would now be compensated for the 
political and economic ‘sweat’ expended in the electoral process. 
Tuan Besar and practices of informal government: the case of project racketeering 
As briefly described in the previous discussion, the cases of ‘project racket-
eering’ (premanisme proyek) had their roots in the monopolistic practices in 
the execution of physical infrastructure projects for the Banten provincial 
government during fiscal year 2003. From the information written in the 
Dokumen Anggaran Satuan Kerja (DASK, Work Unit Budget Document) 
of Banten’s regional budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, 
APBD), it is known that the total value of the construction budget for Banten 
in fiscal year 2003, both that financed from the APBD and from the state 
budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara, APBN), was approximately 
Rp 35 billion.34 From this budget, the Banten provincial government financed 
numerous physical and non-physical development projects. According to 
Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden, Keppres) no. 18/2000 on Guidelines 
for Procurement of Goods and Services for Government Agencies, specifi-
32  Interview with HOS, 18-6-2004.
33  Interviews with HKI, 1-5-2004, and HOS, 9-5-2004.
34  Decree of the governor Banten no. 902/Kep 45-Hak/2003, on Determination of the Work 
Unit Budget Document (DASK) of the Banten Provincial Budget (APBD). The writer has a pho-
tocopy of this document.
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cally in Article 12(2), procurement of contracting goods/services and other 
services shall be done through:
a. Tender, that is, a series of activities to supply the needed goods/services 
by creating healthy competition among equal suppliers of goods/services 
that meet the requirements, based on certain established methods and 
procedures that are consistently followed by the parties concerned, so 
that the best supplier is selected.
b. Direct selection, if the Tender method is difficult to implement, or will not 
ensure achievement of the target. [Direct selection] is done by comparing 
the bids from several qualified suppliers of goods/services through price 
quotations, or technical and price quotations, followed by competitive 
negotiations, both on technical aspects and on price, to obtain a reason-
able and technically justifiable price.
Indeed in formal terms nearly all the Banten provincial government’s 
development projects during fiscal year 2003 were implemented through 
tender. However, as indicated by HOS,35 many of these tenders were simply 
formalities to comply with the administrative procedures. In reality, HOS 
continued, the tender winner had already been determined. Tuan Besar 
played an important role in influencing the Tender Committee and other 
important personages. His modus operandi varied from informal lobby-
ing with local officials and distribution of ‘envelopes’ (bribes), to physical 
intimidation. It is difficult to know the precise value of the projects managed 
directly by Tuan Besar. He owns several companies not registered in his 
name, and often uses other companies that he does not own as a strategy 
for winning tenders. Even so, as HOS pointed out, in general Tuan Besar 
is interested mostly in physical construction projects. Tuan Besar is among 
the top entrepreneurs in the lucrative construction sector. In 2003 the total 
value of physical development and/or construction projects was approxi-
mately Rp 18 billion (51.4% of the province’s total development budget for 
that year).36 Most of these projects were concentrated in six institutions that 
carry out local government projects: Dinas Bina Marga (road and highway 
construction and maintenance, around Rp 3 billion);37 Dinas Cipta Karya 
(housing, building, and urban development, around Rp 4 billion);38 the 
35  Interview with HOS, 9-5-2004.
36  Decree of the governor Banten no. 902/Kep 45-Hak/2003, on Determination of the Work 
Unit Budget Document (DASK) of the Banten Provincial Budget (APBD), Books 1, 2, and 3. The 
writer has photocopies of these documents.
37  Road and Bridge Supervision Projects, and Road and Bridge Planning Projects.
38  Project for Design of the Education and Training Campus of the Province of Banten, Project 
for Technical Design of Banten Provincial Government Administrative Buildings, Project for 
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Irrigation Service (around Rp 2.5 billion);39 the Health Service (around 
Rp 430 million);40 the General Services Bureau (around Rp 4.6 billion);41 and 
the Equipment Bureau (around Rp 2 billion).42
It seems competitors for Tuan Besar were burdened with an extra fee. For 
projects not performed by Tuan Besar himself or allocated to business opera-
tors in his group, a project fee of 10% to 11% of the project value was levied. 
The percentages of these project fees, by category of activity and source of 
financing, can be seen in the following table:
How did the issue of ‘project racketeering’ come to the fore? According 
to information from several DPRD members who were interviewed,43 sus-
picions of malpractice in the management of Banten provincial government 
projects first arose with an official report from the Badan Pemeriksaan 
Keuangan (BPK, Supreme Audit Agency) to the Chairman of the DPR-RI on 
19 February 2003, which stated:
Project fees by category of activity and source of funds
Project classification
 Project fees by source of 
 funds (%)
 APBD APBN
Road and highway projects 10 11
Irrigation projects 11 11
Building construction projects 10 10
Procurement projects 10 10
Source: This information is quoted from a circular letter sent on 12 April 2002 to a 
business operator who was to perform a project with classification K-1.
Housing and Residential Accommodation Development in the Province of Banten (P2P), Project 
for Development of Residential Facilities and Infrastructure (Technical Assistance for Guidance 
of Construction).
39  Project to Supervise Execution of the Work of Projects for River Rehabilitation and 
Normalization Projects, Irrigation Network Projects, and Lakes Overlapping Regency/City 
Boundaries, Project for Technical Planning of Execution of Pond Construction Projects, Rural 
Unfiltered Water Cistern Projects, and Water Resource Planning Projects. 
40  Project for the Establishment of Malingping Hospital.
41  Project for Rehabilitation of State Buildings, Expansion of General Services Bureau Offices, 
Employee Offices, Government Bureaus, Rejuvenation and Upgrading of Parks, and Utilization 
of Bus Parking Areas at the Regional Secretariats; and Project for Facility and Infrastructure 
Upgrading, 2004.
42  Project for Development of Dormitory Support Infrastructure.
43  Interview with HOS, 9-5-2004.
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The results of the audit revealed 14 findings with a value of Rp 24,207.67 million 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (through October), which are categorized into indications of 
losses to the region/state of Rp 5,497.46 million, reduction to regional/ state rev-
enues of Rp 333.33 million, wastage of Rp 10,191.02 million, [in]effectiveness of 
Rp 8,09.81 million, and others in the amount of Rp 94.05 million (Audit document 
for the second semester of Fiscal Year 2002, pages 1-2).
The preliminary suspicions of practices of project racketeering then sur-
faced on 26 August 2003, when the Fraksi Amanat Bintang Keadilan (ABK, 
Mandate-Star-Justice Faction) of the Banten Provincial DPRD submitted a 
Faction’s Final Note in response to the governor’s Financial Note on revision 
of the Regional Budget for 2003. In presenting the ABK Faction’s Final Note, 
the faction leader said:
We would also like to express our thanks to all members of the Banten commu-
nity, as we all share the same perceptions regarding project racketeering. Only by 
tearing out this loathsome practice by its roots can our beloved province’s journey 
toward development proceed as desired. As long as this project racketeering 
behaviour persists, no matter how great the budget that is allocated to develop 
our beloved province, the results will never reach the target. The people of Banten 
will never be able to enjoy true progress and prosperity.
These project racketeering practices are a form of corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme, KKN), and eradicating them must be the first 
priority in this era of reform. Only with sincerity and courage from all parties will 
we be able to completely eliminate these dirty practices.44
Although the text of the Final Note from the ABK Faction did not explicitly 
state that such project racketeering practices had occurred in the province 
of Banten, and did not directly accuse any specific institutions or actors 
involved in this constellation, this oral and written statement from the ABK 
Faction served as the trigger factor for further discussion of the project rack-
eteering issue within the DPRD building, which later developed into a topic 
for public consumption. Just one day after the ABK Faction presented its 
Final Note in the plenary session of the Banten Provincial DPRD, discussion 
of the practices of project racketeering spread to outside the DPRD building, 
and a polemic in the mass media between Tuan Besar and the ABK Faction 
was unavoidable. 
On 27 August 2003 Fajar Banten, one of Banten’s leading newspapers, 
carried a report with the headline ‘Tuan Besar denies existence of project 
racketeering’. Tuan Besar was reported as saying that the accusations of 
project racketeering put forward by the ABK Faction were defamatory. The 
44  This quotation was excerpted from the text of the Final Note of the Mandate-Star-Justice 
Faction of the DPRD Banten on governor’s Financial Note on Revision of the 2003 Regional 
Budget (Serang, 26 August 2003). The writer has a photocopy of this text.
Syarif Hidayat222
statement by the ABK Faction was destructive toward Banten, he continued, 
and a deviation from Banten’s religious culture. Tuan Besar went on to say 
that the allegations were equivalent to an accusation that all business opera-
tors in Banten were guilty of it: 
The statement by the ABK Faction about Project Racketeering will not only divide 
the community, but will also have the effect of destroying Banten’s religious cul-
ture. Base accusations such as this will only lead to slander, injustice, and slaugh-
ter of the charisma and aims of the community of Banten. Such members of the 
Assembly (who launched this statement) are unsuited to serve as representatives 
of the public. Actually, if there is anything lacking in the implementation of devel-
opment in Banten, (this can) be improved collectively, and if there are any devia-
tions, these can be straightened out through consultation. (Fajar Banten 27-8-2003.)
While Tuan Besar and his group were attempting to create a counter-opinion 
movement regarding project racketeering, support for the ABK Faction con-
tinued to flow in. On 28 August 2003 five members of the Presidium for a 
Clean Community (PCC) visited the Banten Provincial DPRD to declare their 
support for the ABK Faction. The PCC declared their readiness to work with 
the ABK Faction to resolve the cases of project racketeering through legal 
channels. The PCC advised the ABK Faction to submit its evidence to the 
prosecutor’s office and the police (Fajar Banten 28-8-2003).
The polemic about project racketeering heated up when Tuan Besar said 
that the members of the Banten Provincial DPRD were like ‘thieves shouting 
thief’:
We would like to ask the members of the assembly, specifically from the ABK 
Faction, to point out exactly who they are referring to as (project) racketeers. I 
see something very odd here: Thieves shouting thief. […] We have evidence that 
certain individuals in the legislature (members of the Banten Provincial DPRD) 
have requested projects from project leaders or from professional associations and 
organizations. (Fajar Banten 3-9-2003.) 
The polemic reached its culmination on 9 September 2003, when Tuan Besar, 
together with around 100 other Banten business operators, came to the 
Banten Provincial DPRD building to hold a dialogue with the DPRD mem-
bers, and specifically with the members from the ABK Faction (Fajar Banten 
4-9-2003). The business operators asked the ABK Faction to show concrete 
evidence about the existence of project racketeering practices, and to state 
directly exactly which business operators were involved. They demanded 
that the ABK Faction withdraw its statement, which they felt had created 
unrest among the business community and the public. The ABK Faction was 
asked to make a public apology, to be carried in all the local mass media. If 
they did not comply, the business operators would go through the estab-
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But this dialogue, which went on for around two and a half hours, did not 
attain the desired results, because the ABK Faction managed to avoid a con-
frontational stance. It said that ‘as an extension of the political parties, we can-
not comply with the business operators’ demand that the ABK Faction with-
draw its statement. We will provide a reply as soon as we have held meetings 
with the political parties’. This was a sensible response, given the increasing 
‘heat’ of the dialogue within the DPRD building and the presence of a large 
number of pendekar, both inside and outside the building. A report in Fajar 
Banten (4-9-2003), said that there were around 50 black-uniformed pendekar 
Banten gathered outside the Banten Provincial DPRD building at the time. 
Next, Bueti Nasir (a member of the ABK Faction from the PBB) said 
that the ABK Faction would not withdraw the statement it had made about 
project racketeering. Racketeering (premanisme politik) was a relatively polite 
expression compared with other words with the same general meaning. 
A similar statement was made by Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Banten 
Justice and Prosperity Party), which said, ‘there is no way that the parties will 
approve the ABK Faction’s apologizing and withdrawing its statement about 
project racketeering, because the statement did not point to anyone (specific 
institutions or individuals)’ (Fajar Banten 5-9-2003). 
These indirect replies from the ABK Faction brought a strong reaction 
from Tuan Besar specifically and from Banten entrepreneurs in general. The 
Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) issued a ‘Summons’ 
(somasi) to the ABK Faction through letter no. 149/Kadin-Banten/IX/2003 
dated 7 September 2003. The basis given for issuing this Summons was that 
the term ‘project racketeering’ implies that unethical practices are used by 
business operators in Banten to win projects. On this basis, the Summons 
explicitly demanded that the ABK Faction withdraw its statement about 
project racketeering and apologize to Kadin and to the public of Banten. If 
the ABK Faction ignored this demand, the Banten Kadin threatened to report 
the problem to the police (Fajar Banten 8-9-2003). 
Responding to this threat, the Chairman of the ABK Faction (Mudjahid 
Chudori) stated that his side was ‘not afraid of the Banten Kadin’s threat to 
report this to the police’ (Fajar Banten 8-9-2003). The ABK Faction had solid 
evidence and enjoyed broad support from various parties. After this the 
polemic faded away. Apparently, it was difficult for the hopes of Banten’s 
public for a thorough investigation to be realized through the ABK Faction. 
Numerous technical and political obstacles stalled any resolution of the case 
through legal channels. As noted by HOS (a member of the ABK Faction),45 
even though their Faction had sufficient evidence, to follow up on this through 
45  Interview with HOS, 9-5-2004.
Syarif Hidayat224
legal channels they would really need support from the regional executive, 
and specifically from the governor. But, HOS continued, they did not obtain 
this support, even though HOS himself tried to persuade the governor.
For myself, at the end of my field research in Banten, I was left with two 
questions. Why was the ABK Faction never willing to show or reveal its 
evidence of project racketeering practices committed by Tuan Besar and his 
group? And why didn’t the governor of Banten give his crucially necessary 
support to the ABK Faction? 
Conclusion
Some academics have responded to situations such as those described in this 
chapter by suggesting re-centralization of power in the hands of the central 
government. Such suggestions overlook the fact that not all the problems in 
the regions are the result of decentralization and regional autonomy poli-
cies. It is more accurate to see them as a consequence of the shift in patterns 
of interaction between state and society in the post-Soeharto era. The public 
(society) is no longer totally marginalized, either in the decision-making 
process or in implementation. However, this does not mean that we are now 
living in a fully civil society, for society is represented mostly by the elite. 
Decision-making at both the national and the local levels is coloured by coali-
tions and bargaining of interests between the societal and state actors.
The case of project racketeering in the province of Banten demonstrates 
that the conduct of regional government is far more complex than has been 
portrayed in the literature to date. Decision-making and policy implementa-
tion in the regions are now flavoured with ‘collusion’ and bargaining of inter-
ests among the local government executive elite and the jawara-entrepreneurs. 
If this empirical reality is related to the shift in patterns of state-society inter-
actions, as mentioned above, then the Banten case shows that post-Soeharto 
decentralization and regional autonomy has created greater space for societal 
elites to build and develop informal networks with local state actors. Can the 
operation of these informal networks be considered practices of a ‘Shadow 
State’? The project racketeering occurred together with a weakness in the for-
mal institutions of local government in Banten. This resembles what William 
Reno (1995) has referred to as a ‘Shadow State’. The governor and deputy 
governor faced great difficulty in getting the formal institutions of the local 
government to function properly, partly because Tuan Besar, as the main 
figure in the Shadow State, played a role as financial and political sponsor in 
getting these two top leaders elected. Tuan Besar’s dominant influence over 
the conduct of local government represents the ‘costs in return’ for the politi-
cal and economic investment he made at the time of the election. 
m. isa sulaiman and gerry van klinken
The rise and fall of governor Puteh
This chapter started life with only one author, M. Isa Sulaiman. Four days after 
presenting it at the authors’ conference in Jakarta on 22 December 2004, he was 
among those who died in the great tsunami that struck Aceh (see in memoriam in 
this volume). Henk Schulte Nordholt and I decided as editors that the orphaned 
chapter should pass into my foster-care for the final phase. Isa had lived at our house 
in Leiden for five months in 2003, where he and I talked often about Aceh. I dare to 
think he would agree with the way it has been taken forward. He is responsible for 
all the factual material (drawn from local news clippings and interviews with many 
of those named). My part has mainly been to step back from it and say why it was 
important to write this, as well as to make explicit some theoretical understandings 
that lay hidden between the lines. He was particularly impressed with a chapter on 
Aceh in David Brown’s ‘The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia’ (1994). 




Understandably enough, most media reporting on Aceh before the tsunami 
was about the war. It focussed on the two armed parties, Indonesia’s armed 
forces TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and the Acehnese liberation army 
GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). This has also been true of scholarly work 
on Aceh. This chapter aims to complement these other studies by describ-
ing the politics around the civilian administration. Although it retreated to 
its strongholds in the towns at the height of the insurgency before martial 
law was declared in May 2003, Aceh’s civilian administration has never 
disappeared. At the time of writing it has once again expanded into the 
countryside, where it penetrates everyday life to a high degree. Indeed, it has 
grown. Special autonomy beginning in July 2001 has meant a considerably 
enlarged budget for the administration. It is important not to leave it out of 
1  Aspinall 2002; Aspinall and Crouch 2003; ICG 2003b; Kell 1995, Reid 2003; Robinson and 
Rosser 1998; Schulze 2004.
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account. Studying the administration helps us to understand the continuities 
with the New Order. Reformasi has not brought as much change to Aceh as 
might be supposed. The military may come and go, but government goes on 
forever. Moreover, popular disenchantment comes as much from everyday 
administrative failures as from acts of exceptional military brutality. We can-
not understand the armed resistance movement, the most extreme form of 
popular resentment, without understanding the corrupt factionalism of the 
civilian bosses. This chapter suggests that Aceh’s main problem lies less in 
policy emanating from Jakarta than in a pattern of local government that is 
as deeply rooted in Aceh as it is elsewhere in Indonesia. When government 
is run along the lines of personalized elite favouritism – technically known 
as neo-patrimonialism – the resulting nepotism clashes so fundamentally 
with what people have a right to expect from the modern state that protest is 
almost unavoidable. 
David Brown’s (1994:112-57) clear-sighted chapter on neo-patrimonialism 
in Indonesia, written during the New Order, took Aceh as its case study. Max 
Weber defined a patrimonial system as one in which ‘the object of obedience 
is the personal authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his 
traditional status [...] What determines the relations of the administrative staff 
to the chief is not the impersonal obligations of office, but personal loyalty 
to the chief’. In today’s world, traditional deference of this kind has become 
rare. People expect to participate in politics and to receive the benefits of 
economic development. Personal relations between patrons and their clients 
are still important, especially when state institutions are weak, but the rela-
tionship is now more pragmatic. Instead of providing protection in exchange 
for loyalty, the patron gives money in order to obtain political support. 
Hence the term ‘neo’ patrimonialism. One of those who rediscovered Weber 
was Eisenstadt. His paper, which itself became a classic, quoted Indonesian 
examples (Eisenstadt 1973:11-8). This approach was then widely adopted by 
Indonesianists such as Harold Crouch (1979) and Don Emmerson (1983) to 
analyse the New Order government under President Soeharto. It remains a 
useful framework for analysis and has been applied to Aceh in this chapter. 
A polity run along neo-patrimonial lines is inherently nepotistic, and 
its politics tend to be communal. This does not have to mean instability is 
inevitable, but Brown (1994:121) points out that it does face three inherent 
tensions. First is the tension between a cohesive patrimonial elite and elite 
factional disunity. The personalized nature of relationships makes it almost 
impossible to be inclusive, thus leaving dangerously dissatisfied factions on 
the margins. Second is the tension between the claim to universalistic admin-
istration and the practice of political favouritism. People today expect the 
government to be there for everyone. They become annoyed if it is not. Third 
is the tension between the concern of the patrimonial elites to exclude mass 
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political participation, and their countervailing interest in mobilizing mass 
political support without, at the same time, creating channels for opposi-
tionist participation. In other words, patrimonial elites need to mobilize the 
masses to win their support, but they don’t want things to get out of hand. 
At moments of transition, all three tensions can come together to create 
instability. The story of the rise and fall of Aceh’s governor Abdullah Puteh 
illustrates the value of these observations. 
This chapter begins with a sketch of social stratification in Aceh, which 
is then used to explain the political restructuring that took place in the 1999 
elections. The second part describes the election for governor. This was an 
occasion for intense competition by local groups. The third part concerns 
the favouristic conduct of government under governor Puteh. The fourth 
is about reactions from society, ranging from the provincial parliament, to 
various marginal groups including the liberationist movement GAM. The 
chapter closes with conclusions.
State formation and the new middle class
It is a mistake to view neo-patrimonial politics as simply a continuation of 
pre-colonial patterns. The ‘neo’ in neo-patrimonial is important. The modern 
state has had a profound effect on society in the twentieth century. It created 
a new middle class out of a predominantly agrarian population, one that 
was highly dependent on the state’s resources. This middle class consists of 
bureaucrats, state-dependent ‘contractors’, and independent professionals. 
Only the last group stands somewhat outside the patronage networks of 
state elites. 
The Dutch brought an end to the sultanate of Aceh early in the twenti-
eth century after they exiled the last sultan to Ambon and then to Batavia, 
where he died in 1903. They retained his princes, the hulubalang, because they 
needed them as intermediaries between government and people. However, 
these landed aristocrats were destroyed by popular militias led by Tgk 
Daud Beureueh in 1946 (Reid 1979:135-90; M. Isa Sulaiman 1997:114-64). 
Commercial plantations and oil wells begun in colonial times continue to be 
owned by outside capitalists with the support of government. Gas discov-
ered in the 1970s contributed US$ 2-3 billion a year by the 1980s (Dawood 
and Sjafrizal 1989). Most Acehnese, meanwhile, remain farmers. So the 
economy is divided between traditional farming on the one hand, and large 
plantations, timber and hydrocarbon exploitation, and industry on the other. 
The latter are owned by the state or by large capital outside Aceh. In the 
absence of local capitalists, a class of businesspeople arose who supplied 
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and large capital. Most people simply call them ‘contractors, since they are 
dependent on government contracts. Since most economic resources are 
controlled by the state and channeled to Aceh through the national budget 
(Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara, APBN) or the provincial budget 
(Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD), it is easy to imagine that 
these people have a high stake in local politics. Contractors number in the 
thousands and are found in the provincial capital and every district capital. 
They have organized themselves into a number of associations.2 The chair-
person of the provincial chamber of commerce (Kamar Dagang Indonesia, 
Kadin) always comes from their circles. Bureaucrats are also an important 
category. Like the contractors they come from every layer within society and 
are found everywhere. Of course they also have an enormous stake in local 
politics, since their livelihoods depend on the state. Military officers also 
belong to this group. Retired military were politically influential under the 
New Order because they controlled the government party Golkar. 
As elsewhere, a group of people not dependent on the government has 
also arisen. Especially since the 1980s they have been conducting advocacy 
on behalf of the poorer section of the population. They tend to be educated 
and include lawyers, journalists, and NGO activists. They too have numer-
ous associations. 
Religious teachers (ulema) occupy a respected position in this majority 
Islamic area. They are not a closed caste, since the entry requirement looks 
more to qualifications than descent. Some run religious schools in the village, 
others are paid by the state as teachers or religious judges. So only some 
(those who work for the Department of Religion or the ulema council Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, MUI) depend on the government for a living. 
The 1999 election
Despite the state’s economic dominance, its institutions are not strong in 
the sense of being able to impose its will regardless of personalities. Instead 
the state has built its authority on personal alliances with local elites, who 
remain factionalized, mainly by district of origin. This became evident when 
political change – democratization and decentralization – swept Indonesia 
after the end of the New Order in 1998. First we look at the effect of demo-
cratic competition in Aceh. This led to the election of a new governor in Aceh. 
The governor is extremely important to Aceh’s middle class. The election 
2  Of the 16 associations, some are local like Asosiasi Kontraktor Aceh (AKA, Acehnese 
Contractor Association), while others are branches of national associations like Gabungan 
Pengusaha Konstruksi Nasional (Gapeknas, Federation of National Contractor Enterprises). 
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procedure demonstrated not only the great skill of the key players at pre-
dicting and manipulating outcomes, but also the emergence of district-based 
alliances that cut across political party lines. 
Reformasi offered new freedoms to speak and to organize politically. 
Since most of the middle class lives in town, while the bulk of the population 
is rural, they depended on party organizers at the level of the district and 
subdistrict towns to reach their constituencies. Golkar had been the largest 
political force in Aceh since the 1987 election. Before that, it had been pipped 
to the post by the Islamic party PPP. The dominant figure in Golkar’s Aceh 
branch was Maj-Gen (retired) T. Johan (1937-2001), who became provincial 
chairperson in 1993. He came from an aristocratic family in Seulimeum, 
Aceh Besar, and had been chief of staff of the Iskandar Muda military area 
command (1984-1985) and deputy governor of Aceh (1988-1993). From 1997 
to 1999 he chaired the provincial parliament, where Golkar had 23 of the 45 
seats against PPP’s 12. In the 1999 election he stood for the national parlia-
ment (Serambi Indonesia 18-2-2001).
The national elections on 7 June 1999 were seriously disrupted by GAM. 
After the government ended the special military operation (Daerah Operasi 
Militer, DOM) in August 1998, many of its leaders had returned from exile in 
Malaysia to rebuild the separatist organization amid the new freedoms (M. 
Isa Sulaiman 2000:165-94). GAM intimidation meant almost no-one voted 
in the districts Pidie and North Aceh, and only half voted in East Aceh. The 
government was forced to estimate what the result might have been based 
on party votes outside these areas. The new provincial parliament formed 
on 5 October 1999 had 14 PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Unity and 
Development Party) seats, nine PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, Party of the 
National Message), eight Golkar, six PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), eleven for smaller 
parties, and six allocated to the army and police. 
Clearly, the election had failed to generate an absolute majority. Decisions 
were bound to be difficult. This immediately proved true when it had to 
decide who would occupy the chair and three deputy chairs, normally 
reserved for the largest parties in the election. PAN and an alliance of smaller 
parties made the first move, one that would have advantaged themselves. 
But this was cut short by Golkar leader T. Johan, who put together a deal 
whereby the chair went to PPP, and the deputy chairs respectively to PDI-P, 
Golkar and the army/police faction. At this, PAN and its allies staged a walk-
out (Kontras 58(10-16 November 1999):12). 
The altered composition of the provincial parliament immediately threat-
ened the position of the governor, Syamsuddin Mahmud (1936-). He had just 
been reelected to a second term by a parliament still dominated by Golkar 
and the military. Claiming the governor was not doing enough to resolve the 
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Aceh conflict, lacked reformist zeal, and was corrupt, two PPP members col-
lected enough signatures from fellow parliamentarians to put up a motion 
on 22 April 2000 calling for his dismissal (Kontras 86(24-30 May 2000):8). 
The motion passed. President Wahid responded by sacking Syamsuddin 
Mahmud the following month. He appointed a caretaker named Ramli 
Ridwan (1941-), who till then had been a senior official in the directorate for 
regional autonomy (Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah, PUOD) in 
the Interior Ministry in Jakarta. 
Governor’s election and the communal patron
Having won the chair of the provincial parliament, and having successfully 
manoeuvred the governor out of office, the once (mildly) oppositional party 
PPP naturally felt itself in a strong position to win the governorship. That 
they were to be outwitted by Golkar strongman and former soldier T. Johan 
had as much to do with district-based patron-client politics in Aceh as with 
Johan’s considerable skills. Aceh in 2000 had eight districts, of which the 
richest and most populous were these three: Great Aceh (including Banda 
Aceh), North Aceh (Lhokseumawe), and East Aceh (Langsa).3 Provincial 
parliamentarians from each district gathered regularly in a ‘caucus’ of their 
own, regardless of party origins. 
Of course money played a role in the governor’s election. The ‘success 
teams’ of each of the three pairs of contenders for the province’s highest office 
spent money particularly to persuade indecisive members. This took place 
in the greatest secrecy so it is difficult to be sure.4 However, the key to the 
successful election of Abdullah Puteh lay not in the money he spent but in 
the skill with which he was able to play one district off against another. In 
particular he was able to split the vote from the key district of Great Aceh. 
Abdullah Puteh was elected in two rounds of voting at a special session 
of the provincial parliament held on 4 November 2000. In the first round 
Puteh and his running mate Azwar Abubakar won 25 votes, just short of the 
required 50% plus one. The two other pairs won respectively 14 and nine 
votes, with five invalid votes and one abstention. This disqualified the weak-
3  The others were Pidie, Central Aceh, South Aceh, Southeast Aceh, and West Aceh.
4  My (M. Isa Sulaiman – ed.) interviews with several members and success teams indicate 
that only one member of parliament refused to accept the money. The amount of money handed 
out by each success team was between Rp 50 and Rp 150 million per member. Some candidates 
handed out cheques that could only be cashed after he was elected. Several members received 
money from more than one candidate. The issue of bribery nearly became big news in Aceh in 
January 2001 when Serambi Indonesia newspaper picked up grumbles from the success team of a 
losing candidate about the cheques they themselves had given to various honourable members. 
However, the rumour disappeared after the Aceh Public Prosecutor promised to investigate.
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est of the three candidate pairs. In the second round Puteh’s vote went up to 
33, enough to declare him the winner. His supporters hugged each other in 
joy, while the losers slumped in their seats, unable to believe what they had 
just seen. 
How did Puteh do it? The rules in the new electoral law (Law no. 22/1999) 
specified that candidates for governor and deputy governor should go 
together in one packet, to ensure they could work together. Any two people 
who satisfied basic selection criteria were allowed to register as potential 
candidate pairs. The parliamentary party factions then chose from among 
these potential candidates those pairs they wished to support as candidates. 
This reduced number of pairs then submitted to a secret ballot in parliament 
to determine the winning pair. Each pair had a ‘success team’, normally 
consisting of politicians, businesspeople and bureaucrats, who would try 
to lobby the parliamentarians on their behalf at each stage of the process. 
By the time selection of potential candidates closed in September 1999 there 
were six names for governor on the table, or five serious names since one (T. 
Syaukani Markam) lacked supporters in parliament. All five were bureau-
crats or former bureaucrats, who had built a following in Acehnese society 
while in office. They were these:
1. Ir Abdullah Puteh (1948-) from East Aceh, Golkar activist
2. Drs A. Malik Raden (1945-), from Great Aceh, senior Education Department 
official (Kepala Kanwil)
3. Drs M. Kayosyah (1940-), from North Aceh, PPP activist
4. Ir Iskandar Husin (1946-), from Pidie, secretary-general in the State 
Ministry of Human Rights
5. Ramli Ridwan (1942-), from North Aceh, acting governor
Only two of the five were active in political parties (the others being pre-
vented by their official positions), but strangely enough this did not trans-
late to greater political support for them. Only PPP and PAN put forward 
candidates from their own ranks. PPP had the most seats in parliament, and 
this should have put PPP activist Kaoysyah in a good position. But party 
support was split along district lines. It failed to unite behind Kaoysyah, 
who was from North Aceh. Five PPP members from Great Aceh all belonged 
to the Great Aceh caucus, and they supported Malik Raden, who was from 
their own district. Another PPP parliamentarian, from East Aceh, supported 
Abdullah Puteh for a similar reason. Puteh also managed to attract the sup-
port of another PPP parliamentarian from West Aceh. Thus the PPP vote was 
divided among three candidates. Kaoysyah’s position was further weakened 
by Ramli Ridwan, the ambitious acting governor, who also came from North 
Aceh. Thus the already meagre six parliamentarians from North Aceh divid-
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ed their votes between two candidates. 
PAN, the second largest party in parliament, was bedevilled by similar 
problems. Too small to aim for governor, this party hoped at least to score 
deputy governor, and initially prepared four of its members to step forward 
(later reduced to two). Disagreements developed over which gubernatorial 
candidate they should be teamed with. Some members favoured Abdullah 
Puteh, others Kaoysyah, others again Iskandar Husin. District considerations 
again played the major role. The resulting proliferation of PAN-supported 
pairs divided the PAN vote the way the PPP vote had also been divided.
PDI-P and the alliance of small parties were too small to take initiative but 
supported Abdullah Puteh, Malik Raden, and Iskandar Husin. 
Golkar members similarly supported different candidates depending on 
their respective district of origin. Some wanted the acting governor Ramli 
Ridwan, others the Education Department official Malik Raden. But provin-
cial Golkar chairperson T. Johan supported Abdullah Puteh, and took advan-
tage of his own party’s divisions to pair Puteh with a deputy gubernatorial 
candidate from his own district of Great Aceh. 
The chances of the other candidates were imperilled by the same district-
based considerations. Malik Raden, for example, would have won friends 
by giving facilities to contractors and politicians through his position at the 
Education Department, and he had been active in various Islamic organiza-
tions in the 1970s. But the fractured PPP vote, and the presence of two other 
Great Aceh candidates, weakened his support. Iskandar Husin, too, had a 
wide network through his earlier work in the Transmigration Department 
and his social involvement as chairman of the provincial football association 
among others. But his Pidie support base of only six Pidie parliamentarians 
was too narrow for success in a parliament numbering 54.
All this worked in favour of Abdullah Puteh. Puteh was born into a com-
moner family in Idi, East Aceh. He graduated from the prestigious Bandung 
Technical Institute (Institut Teknologi Bandung, ITB) and had been living in 
Jakarta since he became chairman of the government-minded youth organi-
zation Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI, National Indonesian 
Youth Committee) in 1984-1989, where he succeeded the later Golkar strong-
man Ir Akbar Tanjung. Between 1992-1997 he served in national parliament 
as representative of Golkar for his birth district. In 1998 he became deputy 
secretary-general of the national Golkar executive. He had a business in 
Jakarta recruiting workers to send overseas, and another together with 
Abdul Ghafur developing oil palm in West Aceh. These ventures generated 
a wide network of connections. He had challenged for the Aceh governorship 
in 1998, but Syamsuddin Mahmud won a second term instead. However, he 
nurtured relations with an array of people from various districts who were 
dissatisfied with Syamsuddin Mahmud. The East Aceh caucus also sup-
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ported their local boy. And Akbar Tanjung was able to lean on Golkar’s Aceh 
members to give Puteh a hand. This last source of support became decisive 
when T. Johan swung behind Puteh, as we shall see. 
At its first pleno session on 30 September 2000, parliament voted on the 
five pairs of potential candidates led by the names above, in order to select 
three pairs. Kaoysyah and Ramli Ridwan were eliminated in this round. This 
left Abdullah Puteh, Malik Raden, and Iskandar Husin, each with their part-
ner. They enjoyed the most cross-party support. Five of the six factions voted 
for Puteh (the military/police abstained), while only four and three voted for 
the other two respectively. 
Ramli Ridwan, the disappointed acting governor, at this stage tried to 
use his powers to persuade the Interior Minister and the President to cancel 
the next round of voting, on the grounds of irregularities in this round. As a 
result President Wahid told a visiting parliamentary delegation on 23 October 
to postpone the gubernatorial election and concentrate on a negotiated peace 
with GAM (Serambi Indonesia 24-10-2000). But the other parliamentarians 
objected angrily that no peace could be built by a governor lacking legiti-
macy, and parliament went ahead with its next meeting on 4 November as 
planned regardless of the President’s feelings (Serambi Indonesia 30-10-2000; 
Kontras 109(1-7 November 2000):13). This latter course of action would have 
been impossible under the New Order, when provincial parliaments merely 
rubber-stamped President Soeharto’s wishes as conveyed along military and 
Golkar channels. 
Puteh already enjoyed the strongest cross-party support, but now T. 
Johan’s strategy of selecting a running mate for Puteh began to pay off. First, 
this deputy gubernatorial candidate came from Great Aceh, thus pulling in 
votes from other Great Aceh members regardless of party affiliation once 
the field had narrowed. Second, both he and Johan himself were retired 
soldiers, and this won the support of the assembly’s military and police 
members. Combined with the various contradictions that made life difficult 
for the other remaining candidates, this ensured Puteh’s quick success on 4 
November. 
The administrative structure that governor Puteh had to work with was 
quite different to that of his predecessors. Regional autonomy laws (Law 
no. 22/1999 and Law no. 25/1999) gave greater powers to districts than the 
province, separated the legislative from the executive and thus from the gov-
ernor’s control, and passed more control over money to the regions. The con-
flict in Aceh had also given rise to two special laws for Aceh (Law no. 44/1999 
and Law no. 18/2001), which returned greater powers to the province, and 
increased the influence of religious ulema on local government. These laws 
also increased Aceh’s oil and gas receipts by respectively 55% and 40% over 
the provisions in Law no. 25/1999, though only for eight years. 
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Scholars have doubted whether giving greater powers to districts has 
made them more effective and democratic. A district head with more control 
over money can become a ‘little king’ if they can strike a deal with the local 
parliamentary chairperson, business, and military commander (H. Schulte 
Nordholt 2003:572). Syarif Hidayat (2002:47) has shown in Riau, Banten and 
West Nusa Tenggara how the regional autonomy laws have primarily bene-
fited local elite interests. Hadiz (2003c:603) similarly showed that democratic 
institutions in mayoral elections in Medan and Jakarta in 2000 were hijacked 
by parasitic interests incubated by the New Order government. How would 
Aceh fare, where autonomy was focussed more on the provincial level? 
Officials and their affiliations
Governor Abdullah Puteh and deputy governor Azwar Abubakar were 
sworn in by the Interior Minister on 25 November 2000. The deputy’s role was 
restricted to disaster relief (Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksana Penanggulangan 
Bencana Alam, Satkorlak), and otherwise mainly ceremonial, though he did 
have a say in the distribution of important positions. The governor’s first task 
was to reorganize his administrative structure in accordance with the new 
laws, as well as to make fresh appointments in the bureaucracy. He owed his 
‘success team’ a favour, especially T. Johan. When the incumbent provincial 
secretary retired, Puteh replaced him with one of the assistant provincial sec-
retaries, a man from Great Aceh, Johan’s home district. He also embraced his 
political rival Malik Raden, the gubernatorial candidate from Great Aceh, by 
appointing him as head of the provincial training board (Badan Pendidikan 
dan Pelatihan, Badan Diklat). Malik Raden would otherwise have retired 
from his position at the Education Department, which was to be dissolved in 
favour of a provincial Education Service. Several of Raden’s former Education 
Department colleagues, one from Great Aceh and one from East Aceh, were 
also given positions. Thus governor Puteh, himself from East Aceh, built an 
alliance with the Great Aceh elite, and with the Islamic network Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Islamic Students Organization) by placing Malik 
Raden’s followers in some important posts. These allies were essential if he 
was to face up to his challengers. His other key appointments, made in the 
course of 2001-2003, mainly came from his own district of East Aceh, as well 
as from those in other districts who had supported his election.4 
4  For example, the provincial planning board (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan 
Daerah,  Bappeda) went to economist Prof. Dr T. Iskandar Daud, university lecturer from East 
Aceh, while the Assistant for Aceh Specialness was filled by Drs Zainudin Saman, formerly at 
the religion office (Kanwil Departemen Agama Aceh) and also from East Aceh.
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Favouritism in development projects
Financial autonomy took effect the month after Abdullah Puteh took office. 
Whereas in the New Order most government money passed down to the 
regions through provincial offices of central government departments, now 
all but two of these offices were dissolved in favour of provincial services 
(dinas) or boards under the control of the provincial governor. (The excep-
tions were Religion and Justice.) The governor was compensated for the extra 
salary burden through an annual block grant of around Rp 300 billion (Dana 
Alokasi Umum, DAU, General Allocation Grant), while special tasks such 
as education and health were funded through another grant (Dana Alokasi 
Khusus, DAK, Special Allocation Grant). 
Of the greatest importance were oil and gas receipts, which increased 
enormously under Law no. 25/1999. As a result, the provincial budget 
(APBD) more than doubled to Rp 542 billion between 2000 and 2001 (see 
Table 1). Law no. 18/2001 added even more to these hydrocarbon receipts, 
reaching Rp 2.1 trillion in 2002 and Rp 2.3 trillion in 2003.6 The latter were 
divided up between the province and various districts, especially the two 
producing districts North Aceh and East Aceh. Governor Puteh placed 30% 
of it into a provincial education fund. This meant that the provincial budget 
in 2002 went up nearly three times again in 2002 over the previous year, 
and it reached Rp 1.573 trillion in 2003. Most of this came from oil and gas. 
Of course Aceh also still received funds from the national budget (APBN) 
through the remaining offices of the national departments. But most of this 
large pot of money was under the control of the governor. 
6  Serambi Indonesia 20-3-2001; T. Rivolsa Ismail 2004.
Table 1. Provincial budget (APBD) and national budget (APBN) spent in Aceh (bil-
lions of rupiah)
 1993/1994 2001 2002 2003
APBD 4,058 542,753 1,572,094 1,579,000
APBN* 460,358 760,000 888,000 1,024,000
Inpres 145,313 – – –
Total 659,729 1,302,753 2,460,094 2,603,000
* In 1993/1994 sectoral projects funded out of the national budget APBN were gen-
erally spent by the relevant provincial office (Kanwil) of the national department, 
so-called ‘vertical’ units. Since 2001 only about 15% of these funds were still spent 
by the vertical unit, namely Religion, Justice, Police, Public Prosecutor and the State 
University. Source: Biro Keuangan and Bappeda.
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The huge increase in funds at the governor’s behest did not go uncontested. 
Especially the district heads of East Aceh and North Aceh (who themselves also 
enjoyed vastly increased budgets) questioned the size of the amount held back 
at the province for education. Puteh silenced them by promising the money 
would still be spent in the various districts. Nevertheless, this tremendous 
increase in financial autonomy, unbalanced by a proportionately tightened 
control regime, turned the governor and his team of officials into veritable 
money-spending machines. One consequence was the questionable electricity 
project described below. The governor and deputy governor also allocated 
themselves greatly increased ‘routine expenditure’ budgets (Table 2). 
The pyramidal power relations between the governor and his heads of 
services (kepala dinas, asisten, biro, and badan) allowed the governor to inter-
vene in large projects carried out by these subordinate agencies and turn 
them to his own personal advantage or that of his cronies. Law no. 18/2000 
permitted the governor to directly allocate projects, that is, without tender-
ing. He made use of that to allocate billions of rupiah worth of contracts in 
2001 and 2002. One example of a project that fell to his cronies was a printing 
machine worth Rp 4.2 billion for the Infokom Service. The contract went to 
a brother of Rusli Bintang, a contractor from Great Aceh who had supported 
Puteh. Tragically, the machine turned out to be second-hand, whereas the 
price had been marked up even above the real new price (Modus 19 (January/
February 2003):6; Serambi Indonesia 28-2-2003). All these facilities bought 
Puteh valuable loyalty against his rivals. 
It would take too long to describe all the instances of collusion one by one. 
Here we will only take two cases, namely the airline PT Seulawah NAD Air, 
and the development ‘NGO’ YPAB Nur Raudha. In both cases we will see 
how public interests overlapped with personal ones, how unclear the bound-
ary was between the ‘formal’ and the informal in the conduct of government, 
and how a symbiotic relationship grew up for the mutual protection of gov-
ernor Puteh and his closest officials and business colleagues.
Table 2. Routine Expenditure Budgets (billions of rupiah)
 2001 2002 2003
Governor 2,245 4,090 6,560
Deputy governor 1,230 1,750 2,960
Total 3,475 5,840 9,520
Source: Aceh parliament secretariat.
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PT Seulawah NAD Air
From this moment, things began to go wrong. Or rather, at first they went 
very well, before taking the inevitable nosedive. Troubled security after 
mid-1999 repeatedly disrupted road travel between Aceh and the outside 
world. The New Order had made Aceh nothing more than a ‘hinterland’ 
for Medan in North Sumatra. The cheapest safe alternative routes to Medan 
were the thrice-weekly Pelni ship, and the once-daily Garuda Boeing 737-
300 flight. Seats on the flight to and from Medan were always hard to get. 
From Medan onward, flights were numerous. Wanting only the best for his 
region, Governor Abdullah Puteh took the option, not of opening the Medan 
air route to some private airline – though Bayu Airlines had already made 
an offer – but of setting up a provincial air carrier. His close colleague Sam 
A. Walean, an adventurous businessman from Menado who lived in Jakarta, 
in mid-April 2001 introduced Puteh to Datuk Mat Safuan, owner of Safuan 
Group Bhd. in Kuala Lumpur. Puteh talked to him about investing in an 
Aceh air service. Datuk Mat Safuan initially responded enthusiastically. 
He imagined not only flying Banda Aceh-Medan-Jakarta and Banda Aceh-
Penang-Kuala Lumpur, but also taking Acehnese haji to Mecca, of whom 
there are more than 5,000 every year.7 Governor Puteh then instructed his 
confidante and Assistant for Finance and Development, Ir Usman Budiman, 
as well as Sam A. Walean and a contractor named Ramzi Tharfi who had 
supported him in hard times, to start building the company.
On 28 June 2001 PT Seulawah Air was registered in Jakarta with the 
notary Mrs Chairunnisa Said. The name was derived from Mount Seulawah, 
which rises up to form a backdrop for the provincial capital Banda Aceh, 
flanked on either side by Great Aceh and Pidie, the birthplaces of Acehnese 
culture. It was also the name of the Dakota aircraft the Acehnese people 
donated to President Soekarno representing the Indonesian government dur-
ing the national revolution in 1948, and which is still regarded as the begin-
ning of Garuda Indonesia Airways. Seven months later, on 28 January 2002, 
it officially changed its name to PT Seulawah NAD Air, for unclear reasons 
except that Safuan Group was no longer part of the project. Its initial capital 
had been planned to consist of six million shares with a nominal value of Rp 
10,000 each. But the official announcement only mentioned about a million 
shares owned by the Aceh provincial government (NAD, Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam), 700 thousand by Sam Walean (director of PT Wawasan Sakti 
7  Sam Walean said Datuk Safuan put down Rp 2 billion in July 2001 as an initial investment 
for PT Seulawah Air (Modus 3(14-24 May 2003):10). In fact the annual haj is organized through 
the Department of Religion, so Datuk Safuan’s hopes of using Seulawah aircraft for this purpose 
were unrealistic.
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Informindo Nusa), and 300 thousand by Ramzi Tharfi (director of PT Benzi 
Prima).8 Abdullah Puteh appointed Usman Budiman chief commissioner of 
the new airline. Provincial secretary Thantawi Ishak became a commissioner. 
Executive director was Sam Walean, with his office in Astha Building, Kebun 
Sirih, Jakarta. Ramli Tharfi was deputy director. 
The next thing to do was obtain an Air Operation Certificate from the 
Transport Department, do a feasibility study, recruit 27 cabin staff, and find 
an aircraft. Since Safuan Group Bhd had withdrawn, they rented a Boeing 
737-300 from Transmile Group Bhd, based in Kuala Lumpur (Kontras 251(30 
July-5 August 2003):15).
In September 2002 the Transport Department issued an operational cer-
tificate. Governor Puteh felt it was time to present his achievement to Aceh’s 
parliament as the representatives of the people. The problem was that in 
accordance with its deed, the one million shares or Rp 10 billion the provin-
cial government had invested had to come from the provincial budget. By 
September 2002 Rp 6 billion of that amount had already been put in. But the 
law does not allow the governor to invest in a private company. The gover-
nor may invest only in a state-owned regional company, which can only be 
formed by parliamentary legislation. But PT Seulawah NAD Air was a pri-
vate company. Two of the commissioners were key provincial officials, but 
the identity cards quoted in the charter only listed them as private individu-
als, not in their official capacity. So while Puteh announced on 23 September 
that he had taken Rp 6 billion out of the provincial budget for the carrier, a 
few months later it appeared that the government shares were listed in the 
name of the Aceh Regional Development Company (Perusahaan Daerah 
Pembangunan Aceh, PDPA) (Serambi Indonesia 24-9-2001).
With parliament satisfied, governor Puteh set about organizing the inau-
gural flight from Blang Bintang airport Banda Aceh. A spectacular ceremony 
on 25 September 2002 included 300 dancers to welcome President Megawati, 
who had come to cut the tape. Five hundred invitees from all over Aceh and 
beyond came in their traditional finery. Governor Puteh felt he wanted to 
make up to President Megawati, because on her first visit on 8 September 
8  This statement by Usman Budiman is not consistent. In an interview on 3 December 2001, 
before the official name change, he said the Safuan Group Bhd owned Rp 20 billion in shares, the 
Aceh province 20%, and a private company 20% (Kontras 168(12-18 December 2001):13). But in 
the public presentation at the Infokom Hall on 23 September 2002 he no longer mentioned Safuan 
Group Bhd, but said the province owned 1 million shares, Transmile Group Bhd 1 million, PT 
Wawasan Sakti Infonusa 700 thousand, and PT Benzi Prima 300 thousand shares (Suara Aceh no. 
174(15-30 September 2002):4). Later, when disagreement had broken out with Sam Walean, he 
never again mentioned shares owned by Transmile Group Bhd. Sam Walean said that Usman 
Budiman, witnessed by Abdullah Puteh, asked for 25% of the shares owned by PT Wawasan 
Sakti Infonusa, but Sam Walean refused to give them to him (Modus 3(14-24 May 2003):11).
M. Isa Sulaiman and Gerry van Klinken240
2001 she had grown furious when someone in the audience had interrupted 
her. Being so highly dependent on the goodwill of government at the centre 
made regional officials bend over backwards to preserve harmonious rela-
tions. So it was not surprising to see a huge banner over the stage with the 
words: ‘Mbak Mega... Smile, for you have brought ‘Seulawah’ back again’. 
The ceremony cost hundreds of millions of rupiah, perforce taken by gover-
nor Puteh from other projects since this was an unbudgeted activity. 
Commercial flights commenced two days later, twice daily to Medan 
Aceh and twice weekly to Jakarta. Tickets were priced a little under those 
of Garuda. The rush for cheap tickets made Seulawah NAD a sought-after 
name among Banda Aceh travel agents. Agam Patra, a contractor and close 
colleague of governor Puteh, was soon awarded the sole agency on Seulawah 
NAD ticket sales in the provincial capital. This was the beginning of trouble 
with Sam Walean, whose promises to another business to make them sole 
agents had to go unfulfilled. Indeed the haste and untransparent collusion 
with which the company had been set up soon began to cause more conflicts. 
Passengers turned up with the same seat number. Shareholders began to 
grow suspicious of each other. For of the three shareholders, only the provin-
cial government had actually put money into the venture, whereas the board 
of directors was dominated by a private company led by Sam Walean. On 
31 October 2002, barely a month after operations had commenced, governor 
Puteh wrote Sam Walean effectively asking him to transfer his ticket sale 
funds to the private account of himself and that of Usman Budiman, at Bank 
Bukopin Jakarta account no. 1015736.01 55. Sam Walean apparently took no 
notice of the letter, so governor Puteh organized a meeting with the commis-
sioners and directors at the Jakarta Hilton Hotel three days later. Participants 
were invited only by phone, but the meeting turned into a Shareholders 
General Meeting, which decided to terminate Sam Walean as executive direc-
tor and replace him with former Garuda director M. Suparno, who knew 
governor Puteh well. Suparno soon fired Sam Walean’s closest associates in 
the company, thus locking Walean out (Modus 1(16 April 2003):4). 
Infuriated and claiming his rights as shareholder and founder had been 
abused, Sam Walean took Usman Budiman and Thantawi Ishak to court 
in Banda Aceh for falsely identifying themselves in the company’s official 
charter as privately employed and not as civil servants. He also accused 
Abdullah Puteh and Usman Budiman of illegally ordering company money 
to be transferred to their private accounts, and alleged that the Shareholders 
General Meeting fell short of the requirements of commercial law.
This was a great embarrassment to governor Puteh and his cronies, 
and made them afraid. They sprouted loud rhetoric and began to lobby. 
They revealed that of all the shareholders only Aceh had put money on 
the table, while the identity card business had been the lawyer’s oversight. 
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They privately asked Sam Walean to withdraw the case (Modus 1(16 April 
2003):6). Feeling the wind in his back, Sam Walean evidently asked for Rp 3 
billion compensation to settle out of court (Modus 9(29 August-9 September 
2003):22). Whether there was a connection with his suit against the top pro-
vincial officeholder is unclear, but at the end of November 2002 police broke 
into Sam Walean’s hotel room in Banda Aceh and arrested him for fornication 
(Serambi Indonesia 25-11-2002). Anyhow, Sam Walean’s suit did intimidate 
governor Puteh, because after a meeting in Medan on 11 March 2003 both 
sides agreed to stop legal proceedings, while Sam Walean and Ramzi Tharfi, 
who had still not paid for their shares, were reinstated in the company 
(Serambi Indonesia 25-11-2002).
In Suparno’s hands the carrier grew even more inefficient than it had 
been under Sam Walean. The wages bill blew out from Rp 150 million to 
Rp 450 million a month, while Ramzi Tharfi failed to store about Rp 200 
million in Medan ticket sales. The company also faced intense competition 
on the Medan-Jakarta route. By early March 2003 outstanding payments to 
Transmile Group Bhd for aircraft lease and to Pertamina for fuel reached 
almost Rp 10 billion, despite parliament having earlier agreed to inject an 
additional Rp 4 billion (Serambi Indonesia 25-11-2002). As a result, Transmile 
Group Bhd took its aircraft back and Seulawah NAD ceased to fly after only 
six months in the air. 
Stung by the crisis, parliament called the company management to give 
an accounting of itself on 20 March 2003. Sam Walean, strangely, was not 
called to testify. Since he knew more than anyone, the report presented to 
parliament was in the nature of an internal review, not an audit. The director 
of the Aceh Regional Development Company (PDPA), when asked to explain 
how Seulawah NAD shares came to be on its books, denied all knowledge of 
it. This in turn made governor Puteh and Usman Budiman all the more irate. 
They said PDPA was just an extension of the provincial government (Kontras 
251(30 July-5 August 2003):16). 
Clearly Seulawah NAD Air was now too debt-laden to operate again. 
It also still owed compensation to Sam Walean for dropping the court case 
against Abdullah Puteh and co. Nor was it possible any more to shift the 
billions of rupiah in debt to the provincial budget, as had happened earlier. 
Parliamentarians, and Abdullah Puteh’s rivals, had run out of patience with 
the company. PT Seulawah NAD Air was bankrupt.
One avenue that did remain open was to charge the debt to some spe-
cial or emergency project. This should be easy to do, since two of the com-
missioners, Thantawi Ishak dan Usman Budiman, held key positions in 
the provincial bureaucracy. Signs in that direction became evident when 
Usman Budiman took the ‘eternal fund’ of the Naval Commander’s Institute 
(Lembaga Panglima Laut) worth Rp 8.4 billion in the government’s posses-
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sion and put it up as a guarantee for the Pertamina fuel bill. However, this 
came to nought when the institute and outside critics got wind of it (Kontras 
251(30 July-5 August 2003):16).
A similar manoeuvre seemed to lie behind the emergency electricity sup-
ply project, undertaken by the provincial government to raise the supply by 
12 Megawatts in 2003 at a cost of Rp 30 billion. Aceh gets much of its electrici-
ty from Medan via a high-tension line, but GAM militias repeatedly attacked 
the pylons carrying the cable. This was another opportunity to close the 
Seulawah NAD debt. After several meetings with governor Puteh, William 
Taylor from electrical supplier CV Sari Alam generously agreed to ‘lend’ Rp 
3 billion via Usman Budiman to Suparno, the director of the bankrupt air 
carrier. William got a contract to supply 25 generators, but 14 of them were 
second-hand and three were seriously inoperable.9 As a result, Banda Aceh’s 
on-again off-again electricity supply did not improve despite the generators 
project. This provided more material for Abdullah Puteh’s rivals, who used 
it to demand that he be sacked. 
YPAB Nur Raudha charity organization
Marlinda Purnomo (1964-), Abdullah Puteh’s second wife, felt she must 
not sit idly by but should help her husband and do something for the peo-
ple of Aceh. She felt the formal positions she held, as chairperson of the 
Family Welfare Program (Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK) and of 
the Provincial Handicraft Council (Dewan Kerajinan Daerah), did not give 
her enough room to ‘do more’ to help relieve the suffering of this afflicted 
society. As a woman, she was moved by the plight of women and children, 
initially those who lived around the governor’s official residence. She talked 
about her ideas with colleagues within the same powerful circles. Of course 
they welcomed them, and soon she had declared a movement of concern 
for the nation’s children. This was on 27 January 2001, when the wife of the 
Interior Minister installed her in the PKK and Handicrafts positions (Serambi 
Indonesia 28-1-2001). To give it concrete shape, she set up a legal body called 
the Yayasan Peduli Anak Bangsa Nur Raudha (YPAB Nur Raudha, Nur 
Raudha Foundation of Concern for the Nation’s Children). The name was 
that of her daughter by Abdullah Puteh and meant ‘light of Raudha’, where 
Raudha is a holy place in Mecca in which prayers are surely answered. Linda 
Purnomo took the chair, and she was assisted by a number of provincial offi-
cials or (mainly) their wives (Kontras 167(5-11 December 2001):9).
For security reasons, and to bring the governor’s palace closer to the 
9  Media Indonesia 2-5-2004. Questioned by the police, William acknowledged he had negotiated 
with the governor several times to obtain the electricity project (Serambi Indonesia 4-6-2004).
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people, the NGO opened an office just behind the governor’s complex. A 
service centre and health clinic was set up for mothers and children to attend 
every Monday and Thursday. At first it aimed only to help those from the 
two kampong next to the governor’s complex. Operational funds came from 
the flood relief fund chaired by deputy governor Azwar Abubakar (Rp 220 
million), from the Industry Service (Rp 50 million) and from the Women’s 
Empowerment Bureau (about Rp 50 million) (Kontras 167(5-11 December 
2001):7). Pretty soon many people heard about the social work being done 
by YPAB Nur Raudha, and requests for funding assistance began to flow in 
from various directions. This naturally inspired Linda Purnomo to increase 
her fundraising efforts, and to expand her service network to more people. 
Using her position of influence, she lobbied heads of services and contractors 
to donate or make facilities available. District heads and mayors were asked 
to open branches of the organization in their respective districts and towns. 
In July 2001 she auctioned paintings before government officials and 
contractors to raise funds for her foundation, and at her birthday party on 
15 October 2001, in front of officials, she installed the wives of 12 district 
heads and mayors as heads of YPAB branches in their respective districts and 
towns (Serambi Indonesia 16-10-2001).
In short, donations in kind and in money soon became a steady stream 
into the foundation’s coffers. Some of these were government programs 
transferred to the foundation, among them the mass circumcision for 1000 
boys worth Rp 100 million from the Aceh Disaster Relief Fund (Satkorlak), 
the gift of an ambulance worth Rp 60 million from the Health Service and 
the handicraft skills course for school drop-outs worth Rp 25 million from 
the Education Service.10
Linda Purnomo’s activism through YPAB Nur Raudha demonstrates 
clearly how fuzzy the boundary was between official and private business. 
This drew criticism from NGO activists with long experience at the grass-
roots. Moreover they learned that the mass circumcision exercise, which 
should have been for 1000 people, was only given to 400 (Kontras 167(5-11 
December 2001):5-11, 20). When they exposed what they knew through 
the mass media, it not only angered Linda Purnomo but also her husband 
Abdullah Puteh. He accused the newspaper that carried the expose of slan-
dering his wife’s organization (Serambi Indonesia 9-12-2001). The criticism did 
have an influence on YPAB Nur Raudha. Its secretariat moved to a humbler 
10  It is difficult to know exactly how much money YPAB Nur Raudha obtained by means 
of government transfers or from contractors. The anti-corruption NGO Samak estimated Rp 9 
billion worth of government projects in the 2001 provincial budget were implemented by YPAB 
Nur Raudha. Marlinda denies the figure is as high as this (Kontras 167(5-11 December 2001):7; 
Kontras 168(12-18 December 2001):24).
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address in Tgk.Chik Di Tiro Street, and its social welfare activities were 
drastically scaled down from those of its first eight months. All the district 
branches closed down. 
Collaborating with parliament
Governor Puteh’s corruption and abuse of office could really only continue 
because Aceh’s parliament exercised weak control. Although the recent 
legislative changes had given parliament greater powers, in other respects 
it continued to be burdened with the legacy of the New Order. Parliament 
remained a collective entity that lacked an opposition as is normal in a 
democracy. Even PAN and the alliance of small parties, despite walking out 
at a critical stage, still took their place on important commissions. Decisions 
were also still taken in a hierarchical fashion, beginning with the Leaders 
Consultative Body (Badan Musyawarah Pimpinan) then down through the 
commission and factional meetings. Governor Puteh often made use of this 
hierarchy to ask parliamentary leaders to approve his ‘emergency’ or ‘urgent’ 
measures, including the PT Seulawah NAD company and the helicopter 
purchase to be analysed below. At the end of 2000 he obtained ‘in principle’ 
agreement letters from the parliamentary speaker for the next year’s budget 
and for the supply of new cars, even though parliament had not yet debated 
the budget. Moreover parliamentarians abused their power of veto over the 
governor’s annual report to wring concessions out of him, thus building col-
lusive links between governor Puteh and parliamentary speaker Muhammad 
Yus. 
Parliamentarians are not rich, and they also have to contribute to party 
coffers out of their own salaries. The large increase in the provincial budget 
following special autonomy gave parliament a lot more money to spend on 
itself. Routine parliamentary expenditure more than tripled to Rp 18.9 bil-
lion over the three years to 2003. The speaker’s house, only built in 1998, was 
expensively renovated in 2002 at a cost of Rp 800 million. Each new project 
was an opportunity for commission chairpersons and their contractor friends 
to siphon money into their own pockets. Governor Puteh knew how to turn 
these material temptations into support for his own plans. The electrical gen-
erators scandal, for example, involved a ‘loan’ of Rp 750 million to the deputy 
speaker at that time, T. Bakhrum Manyak, as ‘thanks’ for services provided 
(Serambi Indonesia 28-1-2001). 
When a small number of critical parliamentarians tried to challenge this 
collaboration between the speaker and the governor, they paid for it dearly. 
In November 2001 several members from the smaller parties tried to put 
together a motion of no confidence in the speaker Muhammad Yus. They 
had enough signatures, but Muhammad Yus crushed it by simply refusing 
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to put it on the agenda (Serambi Indonesia 6-12-2001). They then tried another 
tack, namely to propose that direct elections for governor be implemented 
immediately. A new law (Law no. 18/2001) envisaged direct elections in five 
years time, but did permit a faster implementation (Kontras 224(8-14 January 
2003):14). When, under public pressure and with sufficient numbers in parlia-
ment, it was finally discussed in January 2003, Muhammad Yus rejected the 
proposal as un-Islamic, and the military/police faction said Aceh was not safe 
for elections (Serambi Indonesia 7-1-2003; Kontras 226(22-28 January 2003):3). 
It took more than a year before a direct elections measure was approved, by 
which time Aceh was no longer ahead of the rest. For their trouble, the two 
parliamentarians who had been most vocal in their opposition to Speaker 
Muhammad Yus were evicted from parliament. They were Mukhlis Mukhtar 
and Hasbi Bustamam, both members of the PPP of which Muhammad Yus 
was provincial chair. Thus parliament was robbed of two of its critical voice. 
Reactions from GAM and other marginal groups
In this section we see another of David Brown’s three tensions, namely the 
tension between the claim to universalistic administration and the practice 
of political favouritism. There are always going to be those for whom nepo-
tism and collusion are completely unacceptable. The anger such practices 
generate lies at the heart of the oppositional agenda. Indeed one might say 
the emotions around corruption allegations are the main resource used in 
inter-elite competition in Indonesia. At the extreme end of the oppositional 
spectrum stood the separatist movement GAM. At its other end stood a 
group of critical professionals who remained engaged with the game played 
by the establishment.
Unlike the bureaucrats, politicians and contractors, GAM remained entire-
ly cynical about the special autonomy package offered by the central govern-
ment. GAM spokesperson Sofyan Daud said in July 2001 that special autono-
my was merely a trick to turn the area beyond Java into an Indonesian colony. 
The oil royalties, too, were no extraordinary generosity, since the govern-
ment had long enjoyed Aceh’s riches while returning only about 1% to Aceh 
(Kontras 144(4-10 July 2001):5; Kontras 163(7-13 November 2001):5). GAM 
wanted a referendum on Aceh’s future association with Indonesia (Serambi 
Indonesia 28-2-1999, 20-2-2000). GAM had no interest in who became the next 
governor, and its commanders were satisfied merely to collect revolutionary 
taxes (hak sabil and pajak nanggroe), especially from government offices, con-
tractors and politicians, in order to finance their struggle. Recalcitrants faced 
terror or intimidation. Since GAM effectively controlled most of the coun-
tryside at this time, all candidates for governor took care to make personal 
contact with its leaders in order to avoid intimidation. A bomb caused some 
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damage at parliament house on 11 September 2000, just as candidates were 
being selected. Neither as candidate nor as governor did Abdullah Puteh dare 
to confront GAM. He always said diplomatically that GAM activists were not 
enemies but ‘our brothers’, though there remained some differences between 
them about Aceh’s status within Indonesia.11
With most local elites having been co-opted, social control over the gov-
ernment passed to ‘liberal’ professionals whose livelihoods did not depend 
on the government, especially NGO activists, lawyers and journalists. They 
included journalist Kamal J. Farza and Akhirudin, who both coordinated 
Sorak (Solidaritas Rakyat Anti Korupsi, People’s Anti-Corruption Solidarity), 
human rights activist Dr Humam Hamid, his younger activist brother Farhan 
Hamid who taught at Syah Kuala University, and M. Saleh who wrote for 
the national weekly Forum Keadilan and led the local Modus tabloid. Some 
were new to the political arena, others supported alternative gubernatorial 
candidates in 2000. This ‘critical group’ (kelompok kritis) raised issues such as 
dishonesty in the gubernatorial elections, abuse of office, illegality and cor-
ruption under governor Puteh. Sometimes they mobilized the masses to pro-
test outside the provincial parliament, and they took corruptors to court.12 
Puteh was not an easy target to bring down. He had such a close relation-
ship with parliament that the activists’ colleague Mukhlis Mukhtar there was 
kicked out, as we saw. He had the power to veto the appointment of Public 
Prosecutor and Police Chief, and plenty of money to spend on renovat-
ing the Prosecutor’s home. Unsurprisingly therefore, the Public Prosecutor 
rejected the corruption suit they entered on the grounds that it was unproven 
(Serambi Indonesia 19-11-2002; Modus 3(14-24 May 2003):4).
Blocked at home, the critical group then took their demands to the nation-
al level, since they too had elite connections in Jakarta. A 2002 decision of the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) on 
the implementation of special autonomy in Papua and Aceh (TAP MPR-RI 
no. IV/2002) said government had a responsibility to bring peace to Aceh. 
They took this as their legal basis to demand Abdullah Puteh be sacked. 
Kamal Farza took a petition signed by 40 Acehnese NGOs to the Interior 
Minister. The effort got a hearing from an influential ‘Team of Five for Aceh’, 
and from President Megawati herself on 4 September 2002, briefly turning it 
into a national news item.13 
11  Kontras 121(24-30 January 2001):22-3. Acting governor Ramli Ridwan also met secretly with 
GAM in the interior of Great Aceh between June and November 2000. 
12  For example, Serambi Indonesia 8-10-2002.
13  It consisted of Muhammadiyah chairperson Syafii Maarif, MUI chairperson KH Ali Yafi, 
Islamic intellectual Nurcholis Majid, former Interior Minister Suryadi Sudirja, and former 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Syafii Maarif supported the petition (Forum Hukum dan Keadilan 22 
(15 September 2002)).
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Although Abdullah Puteh responded defiantly and threatened to stop 
anyone who disturbed his government (Serambi Indonesia 16-11-2002), the 
issue continued to gather momentum in Jakarta. It was noticed by the new 
Aceh Desk at the office of the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security 
(Menko Polkam) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. One of the staff there was 
Kaoysyah, the candidate for governor who lost out to Puteh. A high pro-
file workshop on conflict resolution in Aceh at the prestigious Indonesian 
Academy of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) on 23 
April 2003 included a recommendation to replace the governor (Modus 
3(14-24 May 2003):20). Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was about to 
bring these considerations to a cabinet meeting when they were brought 
into the open by a Metro TV news item on 25 April. Governor Puteh swung 
into action and began phoning his Golkar contacts. As a result Golkar chair-
person and House of Representatives Speaker Akbar Tanjung declared that 
governor Puteh had been democratically elected and the central government 
had no right to intervene (Serambi Indonesia 27-4-2003). Back in Aceh, Puteh’s 
loyalists in parliament and the bureaucracy also spoke out in his support 
(Modus 3(14-24 May 2003):19). Mixed signals from Aceh led Jakarta to take 
a middle course. On 28 April 2003 Interior Minister Hari Sabarno said no 
decision had been taken on dismissing governor Puteh but he would send 
a team to investigate the corruption allegations (Serambi Indonesia 29-4-2003, 
3-5-2003, 4-5-2003). 
Governor Puteh had won a reprieve. He issued some rather general state-
ments in his defence, for example reminding his hearers that only a quarter 
of the money from Jakarta stayed at the province while the rest flowed to 
districts beyond his control, but avoided addressing specific issues (Kontras 
226(22-28 January 2003):9). Indeed, the promised corruption investigation 
against him had to pass through one of two official finance watchdogs, but 
only after receiving permission from the governor. This as good as guaran-
teed that the investigation would fail.14 For public consumption, governor 
Puteh moved Usman Budiman, of the PT Seulawah NAD Air scandal, side-
ways into another job. He also sent his closest cronies to plead with the senior 
journalist M. Saleh, who had exposed one scandal after another, to ease up 
on the governor, while offering to ‘help out’ his lightly funded Modus tabloid. 
In July he took the lecturer and activist Farhan Hamid to court in Jakarta 
for defamation over a story about a road in the Mount Leuser National 
Park, demanding Rp 100 billion in compensation (Kompas 27-3-2003; Serambi 
Indonesia 22-7-2003; Modus 6(20-30 July 2003):10).
In the midst of these elite tussles the central government declared a 
14  The two agencies were BPKP, authorized to audit projects funded from the national budget, 
and Bawasda, for provincial projects.
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military emergency on 19 May 2003. The Iskandar Muda military area 
commander Maj-Gen Endang Suwarsa became martial law administrator, 
while governor Puteh was a member of his council. Fifty thousand police 
and soldiers began operations to hunt down GAM and seize back terri-
tory. Hundreds of NGO activists from the critical group fled the province. 
Bureaucrats, parliamentarians and contractors warmly welcomed the opera-
tion, because it relieved them from GAM intimidation and extortion as well 
as from annoying criticism by the liberals. Thus governor Puteh, who had 
previously spoken about GAM as his ‘brothers’, told a meeting in his native 
East Aceh he was offering a Rp 50 million reward for information leading to 
the arrest of the controversial GAM commander Ishak Daud, something he 
would not have dared to do earlier. He now stood shoulder to shoulder with 
the military to eliminate GAM (Serambi Indonesia 3-8-2003).
The third tension of neo-patrimonialism, according to David Brown, is the 
risk associated with mass mobilization. Governor Puteh had to take this risk, 
since GAM and the critical group had been doing the same beyond his reach. 
But he was always cautious in this regard, choosing to address audiences on 
cultural and religious themes rather than social ones. A week after becom-
ing governor he held a Quranic celebration in his official residence, inviting 
religious teachers from all over Aceh. On 19 December 2000 President Wahid 
himself came to Banda Aceh to declare the implementation of Islamic law 
(syariat Islam), which was later followed up with several institutional inno-
vations. A good portion of the windfall oil and gas money passed into these 
new religious institutions, to keep them busy with various activities.15 In 
short, religion and custom were manipulated to support the government’s 
conflict resolution strategies, while the elite was smothered with money and 
facilities to keep them on side. Satisfied he had won the upper hand, gover-
nor Puteh reminded his rivals to be patient until he completed his term in 
office. ‘The desire to be governor is natural and legitimate. Do not let it stoop 
to unhealthy means [...] It’s a good thing my ‘martial arts’ are up to the job, 
otherwise I would have been finished long ago. When a blow comes from the 
left, I know exactly how to avoid it.’ He described his rivals as ‘mere learners’ 
in the martial arts arena (Kontras 242(21-27 May 2003):12-3).
However, governor Puteh’s rhetoric was not sufficient to silence the criti-
cal group. They argued that the martial law operation was not merely about 
military matters but about upholding the law, and asked Maj-Gen Endang 
15 In July 2001 the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) was replaced by a less Indonesian-
sounding Ulema Consultative Council (Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama), and a provincial 
Syariat Islam Service (Dinas Syariat Islam) was established the year after. The Dinas received Rp 
42 billion from the special educational fund in 2002, and the MPU increased its budget manyfold 
to Rp 4 billion.
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Suwarya to process corruption cases such as the purchase of the printing 
machine, the purchase of helicopters, and the electrical generators project. 
Activists who had fled to Jakarta joined forces with anti-corruption groups 
there such as Indonesia Corruption Watch.16 Whether moved by these 
criticisms or not, Maj-Gen Endang Suwaryo interrogated William Taylor, the 
electrical supplier, in mid-April 2004, and along with him several associated 
officials. The issue was that some of the generators had been second-hand, 
and the supplier had paid project money to the bankrupt PT Seulawah NAD 
director M. Suparno. William Taylor, Usman Budiman and another official 
were even detained for a while. 
Aware he was the real target of these investigations, governor Puteh 
flew to Jakarta, contacted a famous lawyer, and once more complained to 
Golkar’s Akbar Tanjung. As a result he was invited to meet with an important 
parliamentary commission on 30 May 2004. Akbar Tanjung and some other 
politicians said the martial law administrator was going beyond his author-
ity in pursuing Puteh.17 On 5 May, national parliament advised the govern-
ment to downgrade martial law in Aceh to a ‘civil emergency’ that would 
restore governor Puteh’s powers (Serambi Indonesia 25-4-2004, 6-5-2004; Media 
Indonesia 2-5-2004; Kompas 29-4-2004). President Megawati followed this 
advice on 19 May 2004. Feeling vindicated, Puteh repeated his earlier asser-
tions to the press that he had always acted within the bounds of the law.18 
Although the corruption cases taken up by the martial law administrator 
were not dropped, Puteh felt confident enough to strike back with a corrup-
tion case of his own against one of the martial law officers. It concerned 17 
vehicles, which had been smuggled in as part of a humanitarian assistance 
shipment. President Megawati ordered the police to investigate (Serambi 
Indonesia 22-6-2004). 
In the meantime the critical group did everything in their power to press 
the government to persist with the corruption allegations against Puteh 
raised by the martial law administrator. So President Megawati on 27 May 
2004 gave the police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) permission to examine governor Puteh. The 
allegation only focussed on a smaller problem, namely a project to pur-
chase a Russian MI-2 PLC Rostov helicopter at a price of Rp 12.6 billion. 
16  Others were Gerakan Rakyat Anti Korupsi (Gerak, People’s Anti-Corruption Movement) 
and Persatuan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (PBHI, Indonesian Legal Aid Association).
17  According to rumour, governor Puteh’s cronies attempted to strike back at Maj-Gen Endang 
Suwayro by means of a sex scandal. A month earlier Metro TV aired an exclusive interview with 
a beautiful actress in Bandung who said she had been given a Mercedes with an ‘NA’ number 
plate (from Sabang, Aceh) by an important military officer in Aceh.
18  Exclusive interview with Abdullah Puteh in Media Indonesia 2-5-2004 and Kompas 20-5-
2004.
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KPK found that the contractor directly appointed by governor Puteh, Bram 
Manoppo from PT Putra Pobiagan Mandiri, had marked up the helicopter’s 
price (Media Indonesia 2-5-2004; Serambi Indonesia 20-7-2004). The electrical 
generators case proved difficult to bring to court, since the transfer of Rp 3 
billion to M. Suparno of PT Seulawah NAD looked like an inter-company 
loan, although the contractor had only done it under pressure from Puteh. 
Nevertheless, the KPK investigation was sufficient to make Puteh a suspect, 
and President Megawati was forced on 20 July 2004 to instruct Abdullah 
Puteh to hand over his responsibilities to the Coordinating Minister for 
Politics and Security.19 
Still, Puteh was not out of friends. The Coordinating Minister for Politics 
at this time was Hari Sabarno, who also held the Interior Ministry, and he 
had declared a year earlier that Puteh could only be removed by means 
of the normal legal, administrative and political channels. He viewed the 
Presidential Instruction as valid only during the investigating phase.20 Akbar 
Tanjung too (himself also a corruption suspect) tried hard to protect Puteh, 
saying he should not be relieved of duties until convicted (Kompas 21-7-2004; 
Serambi Indonesia 20-7-2004, 21-7-2004). 
Yet the law was taking its course. In September 2004 Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, who as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security had lis-
tened to Puteh’s critics, was popularly elected president on an anti-corruption 
platform. A special Anti-corruption Court had been established in the last 
months of Megawati’s presidency, part of a package with the Anti-corruption 
Commission. This now became the main instrument for implementing 
Yudhoyono’s election promises. On 11 April 2005 the court convicted Abdullah 
Puteh of corruption and handed down a ten-year suspended sentence. At the 
time of writing (May 2005) it seemed possible the sentence would be over-
turned on appeal. Puteh’s lawyers argued that the Anti-corruption Court had 
no retroactive powers, while the alleged offence had occurred before the court 
was established. Nevertheless the decision was widely praised as adding to 
the credibility of the new government’s anticorruption drive.
Conclusion
The sharp and sometimes dirty competition during and after the governor’s 
election in Aceh in 2000 has demonstrated all the characteristics of a conflict 
among district-based communal patrons for access to the governor’s office. 
19  Inpres no. 2/2004.
20  See the explanation of Hari Sabarno (Serambi Indonesia 6-7-2004; Serambi Indonesia 28-7-
2004).
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The issue was local resources, not ideology. Where political parties are sup-
posed to act as a single unit, here they were divided up around a series of 
communal patrons. These patrons maintained personal ties of loyalty and 
material obligations with their clients. Thus unlike the money politics and 
thuggery that coloured local politics in some other places, Abdullah Puteh’s 
victory had more to do with his skills of manipulation, which he used to 
accommodate dissatisfied elements before his election.21 After taking office 
he built alliances with local strongmen in and outside parliament, including 
with his former rivals, and thus created political stability, at least for a time. 
He placed around him a set of followers chosen on the basis of personal 
loyalty rather than merit, so that he sat in the middle of a network of patron-
client relations. How parasitic this network was became obvious among oth-
ers in the PT Seulawah NAD Air and YPAB Nur Raudha scandals. He also 
built alliances with national elites to protect him against the local attacks that 
plagued him repeatedly. 
Decentralization brought changes in the form of more money from oil and 
gas and greater independence for parliament, but other structural legacies 
from the New Order permitted the governor to engage in political crimi-
nality. Autonomy has not yet brought more democratic, cleaner and better 
government to Aceh. The kind of patrimonial politics practised by governor 
Puteh have been a traditional pattern in Aceh for a long time (Hurgronje 
1893-95; Langen 1888; Lombard 1967). The sultan and his hulubalang ruled 
by the use of force, and through personalized cliques in which politics and 
economics were indivisible. The colonial Dutch introduced administrative 
renewal once the sultanate was removed, by paying regular salaries to the 
hulubalang and setting up customary courts. But under indirect rule the hulu-
balang continued to exercise their power in traditional ways (M. Isa Sulaiman 
1997). Even today, national integration comes less from a unification of 
economy or culture than from the integration of elites. Communal patrons 
build alliances with elites at the centre both to gain access to resources and to 
increase their own legitimacy as local patrons, while central elites need them 
to gain access to the grassroots. 
Of course these bonds of power are not unimportant to the smooth func-
tioning of government, but as long as they remain inadequately balanced by 
popular participation they become an opportunity for local actors to persist 
in their destructive patrimonial ways. This in turn increases social inequality 
and creates unrest. Once a free space for civil society opens up, NGO activ-
ists and other reformist movements rise up to fight for the elimination of 
such patterns. In this context the GAM separatist movement is merely the 
most extreme form of this negation of an existing pattern of power. The local 
21  Contrast the Medan mayoral election observed by Vedi Hadiz (Hadiz 2003a).
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communal patrons in Aceh are not as wealthy as the big landowning ‘bosses’ 
Sidel (1999) describes in the Philippines, nor as crass as the casino, prostitu-
tion and marihuana mafia in Thailand (Ockey 1992; Phongpaichit et al. 1998). 
Aceh’s economy is much more controlled by the state and large outside 
capital, and its culture perhaps somewhat less abrasive. Yet the upwardly 
mobile bureaucrats, contractors and ulema of Aceh build their followings, 
and their personal wealth, in similar ways and are thus as parasitic as their 
counterparts elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The big difference with the past 
is that today such ways of operating are increasingly under challenge from 
popular democratic forces.
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Fear and the failure of security

arianto sangaji
the security forces and regional violence 
in Poso
Introduction
The term ‘security forces’ in this chapter refers to the Indonesian national 
military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), the Indonesian national police 
(Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Polri), and intelligence institutions such as 
the national intelligence agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) – in short, the 
three institutions that carry out the security and order functions in Indonesia.1 
By ‘regional violence’, I mean violence that is limited to a particular region 
within the archipelago. It may take the form of vertical violence, as in Aceh, 
where we find conflict between the state and people fighting for independ-
ence, or of horizontal violence, such as the violence with ethnic and religious 
dimensions in Ambon and Poso. Ideally, the security forces should carry 
out their duties in a way that does not conflict with democratic norms and 
is subject to the authority of the civilian government. The use of TNI forces 
should be limited to facing threats from external enemies and providing sup-
port to the legitimate institution for handling domestic emergencies. It is the 
police who have the authority to maintain domestic order, while the state 
intelligence service secretly gathers information to assist the other security 
forces. Actions by the security forces within these bounds are legitimate and 
satisfy citizens’ expectations of safety. However, quite apart from the various, 
complex, and possibly mutually contradictory hidden motives of the security 
forces during Indonesia’s current political transition, I intend to demonstrate 
that the security forces actually reap benefits from the regional violence in 
Poso by engaging in a series of actions outside the limits of their legitimate 
functions. 
1  I would like to express my special thanks to Gerry van Klinken for his useful criticism and 




































Map 10. Central Sulawesi (2)
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The security forces and regional violence 
Links between the security forces (in particular the army, Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia-Angkatan Darat, TNI-AD) and regional violence have been a 
staple of Indonesian politics since the 1950s. In the cases of the Pemerintah 
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, the Revolutionary Government 
of the Indonesian Republic) and Permesta rebellions, the strife was related 
to internal conflicts within the TNI itself and to the dissatisfaction of TNI 
commanders in the regions with the central government (Leirissa 1991). 
The response to this regional violence then provided an entry for the TNI 
to participate in managing governmental and economic affairs once the 
state of military emergency was declared in March 1957 (Sundhaussen 1988; 
Crouch 1978). Using this foothold, and especially after the 30 September 1965 
incident, the security forces consolidated their presence in the political and 
economic spheres, as well as in their legitimate domain of security. 
The Reformasi of 1998 was a turning point. The security forces could no 
longer enjoy the many political privileges they had held during the New 
Order era. This change was signalled by the elimination of the positions 
of chief of social and political staff (Kasospol) and chief of territorial staff 
(Kaster), the elimination of the military’s dual function (dwifungsi), the liqui-
dation of kekaryaan (posting of military personnel to civilian positions) and 
the social-political function, and the removal of the TNI/Polri factions from 
legislative institutions by 2009 (Departemen Pertahanan RI 2003:14). The 
Coordinating Board for Consolidation of National Stability (Bakorstanas) 
and the Special Investigation Institution (Litsus) were also liquidated through 
Presidential Decree no. 38/2000. As a consequence, the military’s control over 
political life declined sharply. 
Yet Reformasi did not dismantle all the military’s privileges. Two impor-
tant aspects remained untouched. First, despite criticisms, military busi-
ness activities continued, both ‘institutional’ and ‘non-institutional’ business-
es,2 and economic crimes (Singh 2001; McCulloch 2000:28-32). The military 
has been involved in economic activity since the early 1950s, primarily to 
earn extra-budgetary income. This activity has included collection of illegal 
taxes from the business community and more organized activity, such as 
2  Institutionally, there are three forms of military involvement in business: First, cooperatives 
aimed at the welfare of their members and their families; second, business units managed by 
foundations for the purpose of welfare and education; and third, miltary involvement in state-
owned companies, such as Pertamina, Bulog, and Berdikari (Indria Samego 1998:67-8). 
The definition of non-institutional military businesses is businesses conducted by retired military 
personnel, by family of military personnel, or by military personnel themselves outside official 
channels (for example the other foundations or business entities affiliated with armed forces or 
the police) (Indria Samego 1998:97).
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 smuggling. This involvement increased significantly in 1958-1959, when 
the military acquired control over Dutch companies that were nationalized 
(Robison 1986:250-1). 
Second, the TNI’s Territorial Commands (Komando teritorial, Koter), 
which have existed since the 1950s, were maintained (Sundhaussen 1988:248-
50). Even after Reformasi, the Koter, which played a very important role dur-
ing the New Order era, comprising the Military Area Commands (Komando 
daerah militer, Kodam), Military Sub-Area Commands (Komando resort 
militer, Korem), Military District Commands (Komando distrik militer, 
Kodim), Military Precinct Commands (Komando rayon militer, Koramil), 
and Village Management NCOs (Bintara pembina desa, Babinsa), were all 
retained. In the past, these Koter had been the military’s main political instru-
ment to rein in citizens’ political activity. This situation means that the mili-
tary still has a strong footing from which to control the life of the citizenry.
The regional violence since the Reformasi of 1998 has, in any case, actu-
ally improved the security forces’ bargaining position vis-à-vis the civilian 
government. In response to regional violence, the military has mobilized 
large numbers of troops from year to year. This implies that the civilian elite 
has failed to impose civilian supremacy over the military or to provide non-
military solutions to solve regional problems (Kammen and Chandra 2003). 
At the regional level, local governments will again turn to the TNI to find an 
element that can stabilize the unpredictable political climate, and the military 
will continue to enjoy access to economic resources in the regions and to 
maintain its organizational autonomy (Mietzner 2003:256-7). 
With reference to regional violence, at the national level the TNI has 
taken the initiative to force its interests on the civilian government. The 
proposed Bill on TNI, which was full of ‘political’ articles, was evidence of 
TNI’s unwillingness to abandon practical politics. The inclusion of a clause 
on placement of actively-serving TNI personnel in departmental and non-
departmental structures is evidence of this.3 One article in the draft Bill first 
proposed by TNI headquarters granted the TNI commander the authority 
to take military action without the president’s consent (Tempo 16-3-2003). In 
the end, however, Law no. 34/2004 put the authority and responsibility for 
mobilizing TNI forces in the hands of the president.
It is generally agreed that the regional violence in Poso has taken place in 
several episodes since December 1998. The public uses the term Poso I for the 
incidents that occurred in December 1998, Poso II for April 2000, and Poso 
III for May-June 2000; Poso IV broke out in early July 2001, and Poso V with 
the attacks on several villages in sub-district (kecamatan) Poso Pesisir in late 
November 2001 (Ecip, Darwis Waru and Alip Yog Kunandar 2002:8-40). Since 
3  See Article 47 of Law no. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Military (TNI).
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the Malino Meeting in December 2001, sporadic violence has continued in 
the form of mysterious attacks.
Perpetuation of conflict
I believe that the security forces, both institutionally and as individuals, 
have sustained the conflict in Poso. This perpetuation of the conflict can 
be observed in several aspects: toleration of violence, engaging in violence 
outside the limits of their duties, distribution of firearms and ammunition, 
mysterious shootings/killings, rivalry between armed units, mobilization of 
troops, and relations between the security forces and laskar (partisan mili-
tias).
Toleration of violence
The term ‘toleration of violence’ refers to situations in which the security 
authorities do not take the necessary legitimate and professional preventive 
and repressive action to end conflict. It takes the form of simply allowing 
open physical contact between disputing parties, or of mobilizing troops to 
the location of the violence but too late to properly intervene.
The humanitarian tragedy in Poso indicates how deep this toleration 
has been. In the case of the mass slaughter of Muslim residents in Sintuwu 
Lemba Village (Lage sub-district) in May 2000, the Crisis Centre of the 
Central Sulawesi Christian Church (CC GKST) produced a report on the 
chronology of the case.4 The report stated that members of the security forces 
allowed the battle between the two sides to take place. When armed conflict 
broke out between residents in Sintuwu Lemba Village on 28 May 2000, the 
security forces who were at the location actually left the scene. However, 
three sources from among residents who survived the Sintuwu Lemba inci-
dent confirm that not all the security forces left the scene of the incidents; 
some of them were directly involved in the fighting. 
If they had wanted to prevent the violence at Sintuwu Lemba, the security 
forces could easily have done so. The headquarters of Company B, Infantry 
Battalion 711 (Kompi B Yonif 711/Raksatama) in Kawua is only around 7 
kilometres, or five minutes, from the scene of the incident. And the Lage 
police sector (polsek) station in Tagolu Village is only around 1 kilometre from 
Sintuwu Lemba. Yet it is known that a number of village residents were tor-
tured and killed near the Tagolu village administration building.
The actions of soldiers in the field seem to have reflected the attitudes 
4  www.gkst.org (accessed 28-8-2002).
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of their commanders. The commander of Korem 132 Tadulako, Colonel 
Hamdan Z. Nasution, behaved very strangely when an attorney, Karman 
Karim, brought one of the Sintuwu Lemba victims to meet him. When the 
victim, Ilham, told of the torture he had experienced, the commander lightly 
replied, ‘Why didn’t you resist?’ And when Ilham said that a soldier from 
Company 711 Raksatama just sat and watched the torture of the Sintuwu 
Lemba residents, Hamdan simply listened cynically (Mingguan Alchairaat 91, 
June 2000).
Toleration of violence also occurred when armed conflict broke out 
between Muslim and Christian groups at Bridge II between Kawua and 
Ronononcu Villages in Poso Kota on 12 November 2001. The armed conflict 
began at around 7.15 a.m., but the security forces only arrived at the location 
at around 12.15 p.m. Yet much earlier, at 8.05 a.m., Pastor Damanik from 
CC GKST had contacted Lt. Col. (Inf.) Syamsurizal Harahap, commander of 
Kodim 1307 Poso, to stop the violence. This is very strange, since it is only 
around 5 kilometres from the Kodim 1307 Poso headquarters to the scene, 
and around 1 kilometre from the headquarters of Yonif 711/Raksatama 
(Damanik 2003:71-2). 
Engaging directly in conflict
Security forces are known to have been directly involved in violence in Poso 
outside their legitimate duties. During Poso III (May-June 2000), in which 
hundreds died, many army and police personnel are suspected of direct 
involvement. No fewer than 29 army and police personnel were interrogated 
by the military police. Of seven individuals identified as being seriously 
involved, two were army officers with the rank of captain (Surya 7-7-2000; 
Formasi 48, July 2000). Then, following investigations, two NCOs and one 
enlisted man from Kodim 1307 Poso were declared suspects by the Military 
Police Detachment (Detasemen Polisi Militer, Denpom) VII/2 Palu.5
Earlier, the commander of Korem 132/Tadulako, Infantry Colonel Hamdan 
Z Nasution, stated that the involvement of the military and police personnel 
was limited to supplying instant noodles and rice (Detik.com 23-6-2000). But 
this statement was only intended to avert a greater responsibility following 
the emergence of various accusations of involvement by military personnel. 
In their testimony to the Palu Military Police Detachment, the three army per-
sonnel, with the initials MR, CP and AT, admitted supplying ten rounds of 
ammunition to one of the parties to the conflict in Poso. Furthermore, during 
the TNI’s month-long Operation Love of Peace (Operasi Cinta Damai), the 
5  Fajar 7-7-2000; Pedoman Rakyat 7-7-2000; Fajar 21-6-2000; Surya 22-6-2000; Kompas 21-6-2000; 
Fajar 28-6-2000.
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security forces seized thousands of bullets from civilians (Detik.com 7-7-2000). 
Many of these civilians stated that they had received the ammunition from 
military and police personnel.
Involvement of police personnel is also acknowledged. During the 
humanitarian tragedy of Poso III, the Central Sulawesi regional police chief 
(Kepala kepolisian daerah, Kapolda) reported that he planned to take four of 
his personnel to court, as they were suspected of involvement in the unrest. 
Two of them, with the initials HP and SS, were members of the Poso police 
Subregion. They assisted a certain group when it carried out attacks in sev-
eral places in Poso Pesisir sub-district (Pedoman Rakyat 21-7-2000).
From reports of official sources – both Muslim and Christian – it is very 
clear how deeply army and police personnel were involved. For example, the 
official publication of Laskar Jihad – one of the Muslim militia groups fight-
ing in Poso – Buletin Laskar Jihad (Edition 15, year I) reported that individuals 
from Army Company B, Infantry Battalion 711/Raksatama in Kawua, Poso 
abducted and shot dead seven residents of Toyado village. One of the corpses 
was thrown off a military truck in Ronononcu Village, Lage, clearly to make 
it appear that the murder had been committed by a Christian group. 
Perhaps because they were so blatantly involved in the violence, these 
TNI personnel were caught by the legal system. The National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM) considered their acts to be human rights viola-
tions (Kompas Cyber Media 11-12-2001). From these cases, the commander of 
Denpom VII/-2 Palu, MP Lt. Col. Wempi Hapan, later stated that 14 personnel 
from TNI Company B Infantry Battalion 711/Raksatama had been designated 
as suspects. Two of them were officers (second lieutenants) and the remain-
der enlisted men. They were charged with abduction, shooting, murder, and 
torture and were to be tried in Military Court 17, Manado, North Sulawesi 
(Radar Sulteng 16-7-2003; Sinar Harapan 17-7-2003).
On the other side, reports from CC GKST stated that personnel from 
Brimob – the Mobile Police Brigade, or special combat forces – engaged 
in shooting on 27 July 2001 that killed three Christian residents. Later, the 
secretary of CC GKST stated that 17 Brimob personnel attacked Batugencu 
Village on the evening of 12 August 2002. Following the attack, residents 
found many cartridge cases from organic weapons (Suara Pembaruan 14-8-
2002; MAL, week II, August 2002). Five persons were killed and 500 houses 
burned in the attack. 
Direct involvement in violence also occurred in the 12 November 2001 
incident at Jembatan II, Poso. During armed contact between Muslim and 
Christian groups, three men in TNI uniforms suddenly appeared on a hilltop 
and let loose a volley of shots directed at the Muslim forces. Around 15 min-
utes later, the three came down the hill and left the location by motorcycle, 
heading toward Lage. Pastor Damanik from CC GKST, who had come to help 
Arianto Sangaji262
evacuate residents, witnessed this incident (Damanik 2003:72).
Violence committed by the security forces has taken other forms as well. 
For example, Brimob Private First Class Zakeus (Jack) Juan (who was drunk 
at the time) shot at a ‘Honda Jaya’ intercity bus heading toward Luwuk, 
capital of district (kabupaten) Banggai (6 February 2003), killing a passenger 
from Toili, the main transmigration area in Banggai district (Radar Sulteng 
8-2-2003, 30-4-2004). 
Distribution of firearms and ammunition
One reason the violence in Poso has been so protracted is the security author-
ities’ loss of control over the spread of small arms. The security forces are 
completely unable to stem the traffic in firearms and ammunition, whether 
from illegal sales and barter, smuggling in from abroad, or support from cer-
tain parties within the country. In fact, the security authorities are themselves 
often connected with the traffic in firearms and ammunition.
For the general public, the only satisfactory answer to explain the spread 
of organic weapons and ammunition into the hands of civilians must be a 
connection with the official security institutions, since they hold the exclu-
sive right to control the distribution of arms and ammunition throughout 
the nation. Furthermore, it is the duty of the security forces to investigate 
the sources for the spread of organic arms and ammunition; a properly con-
ducted internal investigation would surely reveal their origin. No concrete 
steps have yet been taken to trace the ultimate sources for the spread of 
arms and ammunition. Consider, for example, the seizure of 2,846 rounds of 
ammunition sent to Poso on the Pelni passenger ship KM Ngapulu, which 
arrived from Java at the port of Pantoloan, Palu on 3 October 2002. The plastic 
ammunition box was labelled PT Pindad (Kompas 5-10-2002; Nuansa Pos 5-
10-2002; Jakarta Post 9-10-2002). In this case, the police only arrested the field 
operators, Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir and Anto (Nuansa Pos 5-10-2002). 
The police should have further investigated how the ammunition changed 
hands from PT Pindad to Farihin and his associates. 
Much earlier, in the attack on Sepe Village (Lage subdistrict), on the 
evening of Sunday, 1 December 2001, a case of 5.56 mm calibre bullets was 
found. The box, with the PT Pindad logo and a capacity of 1,400 bullets, was 
labelled ‘Poso’ in marker and ‘B’ with paint. It can therefore be surmised 
that this 25-kilogram case of bullets was allocated to Company B, Infantry 
Battalion 711 Raksatama in Kawua, Poso, but ‘somehow’ found its way 
into the hands of the insurgents in the village. According to the data on the 
munitions case, the ammunition was made by PT Pindad in March 1989 
under contract no. KJB/004/DN/M/1988 dated 12 March 1988 (Aditjondro 
2004b:42).
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There have been many such cases of distribution of these illicit materials in 
Poso. In a police operation in mid May 2004 in Poso Kota, Poso Pesisir, Lage, 
Pamona Utara, and Pamona Selatan sub-districts, the security forces found 
three crates of 5.56 mm calibre ammunition produced by PT Pindad. They 
also found 11 homemade rifles, one revolver, 200 rounds of 5.56 mm, 12.7 
mm, and 7.76 mm calibre ammunition, walkie-talkies, ski masks, knapsacks, 
and a bullet-proof vest reading ‘Kopassus’ (Komando Pasukan Khusus, the 
Army Special Forces) (Detik.com 14-5-2004).
The spread of firearms and ammunition in Poso (and also in Palu) is like 
an iceberg. The successful sweeps by the security forces uncover only the 
topmost layer, while below the surface, there is far more that remains unseen. 
Many residents possess firearms and ammunition, store them in PVC pipes, 
and hide them underground. Several informants are certain that many busi-
ness operators in Poso possess illegal firearms.
So where did all these guns come from? It is undeniable that the laskar 
(partisan fighters) who came to Poso brought in some of them. Two separate 
laskar primary sources confirm that they brought various types of firearms 
into Poso starting in 2000, including revolvers, AK-47s, M16s and SKS.6 
Furthermore, Agus Dwikarna – leader of Laskar Jundullah – said that he 
obtained four AK-47s from Ambon to be used in Central Sulawesi. Agus 
revealed this at Darul Jalal mosque on 24 December 2001 and was monitored 
by BIN (Conboy 2004:228, 231). Another primary source who admitted tak-
ing part in the attack on the Brimob headquarters in Tantui, Ambon said that 
a number of SKS, revolvers, and US army carbines – perhaps he meant US 
M1 Carbines – were taken to Poso.7 It is well known that this attack led to the 
loss of hundreds of organic weapons belonging to the police. 
But it is also possible that members of the security forces, both active and 
retired, sell weapons to civilians. One source in Poso confessed that in March 
2001 he had been offered M-16s for Rp 7 million apiece (around US$ 700 at 
that time), SS-1s for Rp 5 million and FN-45s for Rp 2.5 million. If he agreed, 
the broker would put him in touch with a source in the security forces.
The most blatant abuse has to do with the traffic in ammunition. Many 
residents admit that they have obtained various types of ammunition directly 
from the security forces. A 5.56 mm calibre bullet can be bought from an indi-
vidual in the security forces for between Rp 3,000 and Rp 5,000. Typically, 
whenever ‘BKO’ troops (Bawah Kendali Operasi, Under Operational Control; 
for example troops brought in from another region) are withdrawn, residents 
can obtain bullets easily – through purchase, barter for deer antlers, or even 
for free.
6  Interviews, 29-10-2003 and 8-11-2003.
7  Interview, 28-6-2004.
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Not all the firearms and ammunition in circulation come from the secu-
rity forces or related institutions. Another important source is smuggling 
from the nearby southern Philippines. Typically, M-16 weapons are smug-
gled in using the ‘leapfrog’ method, that is, from island to island in the 
Sangihe Talaud island chain of North Sulawesi, and eventually brought to 
Poso (Radar Sulteng 27-10-2003). Smugglers also bring weapons from the 
southern Philippines through Tawao (Malaysia) and then to Nunukan (East 
Kalimantan), and then on to Poso. When the security situation heats up, the 
weapons are brought into Poso by sea, often at night using fishing boats. In 
contrast, when the situation is relatively calm and the security forces slacken 
their checks of vehicles coming in and out of Poso, it becomes easy to smug-
gle in weapons by car or even motorcycle. 
The smuggling routes through Nunukan and Sangihe Talaud are com-
mon knowledge. In early 2000, the North Sulawesi sub-district police foiled 
an attempt to smuggle weapons on the motor vessel KM Daya Sakti, which 
sails the route between Bitung (North Sulawesi) and General Santos City 
(Philippines), in the waters off Pulau Buang, Sangihe Talaud (Gamma 28-3-
2000). The Philippines’ National Security Advisor, Roilo Golez, has acknowl-
edged that weapons are smuggled from the southern Philippines to Indonesia 
(Sinar Harapan 28-8-2001). National police Chief General Da’i Bachtiar stated 
that the southern Philippines was the source of the weapons used by the 
armed group that attacked in Beteleme in October 2003 (Jakarta Post 3-11-
2003). And Nasir Abbas, an accused Jemaah Islamiyah figure, stated in court 
in Palu on 4 October 2003 that the Jemaah Islamiyah network had smuggled 
weapons through the Tawao-Nunukan route. All this indicates that the secu-
rity forces certainly have sufficient information to fight weapons smuggling. 
In any case, without efforts to trace the sources of weapons and ammuni-
tion, the security restoration operations that take place in Poso are no more 
than a joke. If nothing is done to investigate, prevent, and crack down on the 
sources of the weapons in circulation, violence can erupt at any time. As a 
result, in these operations, the security forces are simply acting as firemen; 
they come and put out the fire, leave, and get ready to be called again when 
the violence resumes. 
Admittedly, it is very difficult to stem the flow of home-made weapons. 
And given the protracted nature of the violence, local residents have become 
increasingly skilled at producing such weapons. Even though tens of thou-
sands of homemade firearms have been seized from residents, it is very 
easy for them to produce new ones. Workshops in Poso, Ampana, Parigi, 
Tentena, Kolonodale, and Palu have stepped up their output as producers of 
locally-made firearms. Home-made arms started to be produced on a large 
scale during Poso phase III (May-June 2000), when Poso residents suddenly 
The security forces and regional violence in Poso 265
received photocopies containing patterns for guns, both long and short bar-
rel, from an unknown source.
According to the Head of Matako Village, just one day after the attack 
on the village on 22 July 2001, the commander of the Poso Military Area 
Command,  Lt. Col. Syamsurizal Harahap, came to the village. Speaking to 
the village head and a number of residents, he advised the residents to arm 
themselves. The weapons should not be used to attack, but only for self-
defence. Residents immediately responded by buying or making firearms. 
They then obtained ammunition easily by buying it from the security forces 
posted in their village. 
Mysterious shootings/ killings
One dominant form of violence since the Malino Declaration in December 
2001 has included shootings, bombings, and murders with sharp weapons 
by unknown persons. This pattern signals a major change from the previous 
forms of violence, which were characterized by open attacks involving large 
numbers of people. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to these mysteri-
ous attacks as ‘Petrus’ (from the Indonesian penembakan misterius, mysterious 
shootings), a term widely used in Central Sulawesi to describe the events in 
Poso. However, the term is not limited to shootings by unknown persons 
and other murders by unknown persons, but refers also to mysterious bomb-
ings. The term therefore has a far broader application than the ‘Petrus’ of the 
1980s.8
In any case, Petrus has certainly become a frightening spectre for the pub-
lic, both in Poso and in Palu, the capital of the province of Central Sulawesi. 
Since 2002, Petrus has claimed many victims (see Table 1). One shocking case 
occurred on 18 July 2004, when a Petrus attack killed Pastor Susianti Tinulele 
and injured four of her congregation during services at the Effata Church, 
Jalan Banteng, Palu municipality. 
The Petrus cases always employ more or less the same pattern. The killers 
use guns (long or short barrelled), knives, or machetes. The perpetrators are 
small groups of two to four persons. They use motorcycles, usually Yamaha 
RX King, if the target is in a densely populated or crowded area. In many 
cases, the shooters/killers wear masks (and are popularly known as ‘ninja’), 
but in other cases they make no effort to hide their faces. Killings have taken 
place in residents’ gardens or fields. Petrus operates both night and day. 
The killings are rightly called mysterious, because the security forces 
8  At that time, the iron fist of the Soeharto government killed between 5,000 and 10,000 
alleged members of criminal gangs. Although this Petrus was related to eradication of crimi-
nals, it also signalled a conflict within the elite of the security forces (Cribb 2000:191; Bourchier 
1990:186).
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never succeed in shedding any light on the Petrus cases. Typically, the police 
use their standard answers about the perpetrators: ‘The perpetrators have 
been identified’, ‘The authorities are conducting a hunt’, ‘From evidence 
uncovered at the scene of the crime, the authorities know what type of weap-
ons were used’, or ‘The authorities have blocked all approaches in and out 
of Poso/Palu’. Or perhaps, slightly better, they may release sketches of the 
alleged perpetrators. But aside from this, the security forces do nothing.
In mid June 2004, in the midst of the election campaign, the police in 
Ambon arrested four people who were involved in mysterious shooting 
cases there. One of them had two identity cards (KTP). On his KTP from Palu, 
he used the name Rizky, while on his KTP from Batumerah, Ambon, he used 
the name Salman. As well as ID cards and bullets, the police also seized a 
Lion Air ticket from Makassar to Ambon dated 31 May 2004 and Rp 500,000 
in cash. This man, with a crew cut and athletic build, chose to remain silent 
during the interrogation (Radar Sulteng 15-6-2004). At the very least, this case 
indicates that the mysterious shooters have high mobility between Poso, Palu 
and Ambon. Strangely, however, the police did not investigate the possible 
connections between this person and the several previous mysterious shoot-
ing cases in Poso and Palu.
Another form of violence has been attacks by armed groups. Generally, 
these attacks are done in an organized way, using organic weapons. This was 
the pattern, for example, in the nearly simultaneous attacks that took place at 
several different locations in mid October 2003. In Beteleme Village (Lembo 
sub-district, Morowali district), the attack killed three and injured 20, and the 
resulting fire destroyed 30 houses, seven motorcycles, and three cars. In this 
attack, the security forces shot dead some perpetrators and arrested others.9
9  In session on 28 August 2004, the Palu Sub-district Court sentenced 12 of the accused to 
prison terms from two to four years each, while one other was acquitted (Radar Sulteng 30-8-
2004).
Table 1. ‘Petrus’ cases after the Malino Declaration
Period Shootings Murders Bombings
 Number D I Number D I Number  D I
 of cases  of cases  of cases
2002 30 21 11 1 1 – 17 5 4
2003 11 7 9 3 4 – 9 – 7
2004 11 7 17 3 3 – 5 6 3
Total 50 35 34 7 8 – 31 11 14
Source: Clippings from local newspapers and Central Sulawesi Regional police
D: Dead; I: Injured.
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The most dramatic incident occurred in Saatu Village and Pantangolemba 
Village, (Poso Pesisir sub-district). In this attack, the armed group killed ten 
persons. In this case, the security forces were unable to discover the iden-
tity of the perpetrators, though a person named Iwan was later arrested in 
Luwuk, on charges of involvement in the attack. All that was recovered from 
the field following the attack was 20 5.56 mm calibre bullets manufactured 
by PT Pindad (Kompas Cyber Media 12-10-2003). 
The mysterious thing about these two cases is the statement by the deputy 
head of the BIN, As’at Said. He said that the intelligence personnel in the 
region knew about the possibility of an attack, but the information was late 
arriving at the centre (Tempo Interaktif 13-10-2003). This statement is not only 
very strange, but also quite suspicious. How could the security forces know 
beforehand about an armed attack, yet do nothing about it?
Another interesting point is the strong indications of involvement by the 
security forces in a number of cases of mysterious shootings in Poso and 
Palu. The first such incident was the shooting at Bethany Church, Jalan Pulau 
Kalimantan, Poso on the night of 20 October 2004. This shooting incident, 
in which Hans Lanipi was shot in the back, was related to the rental of a 
gun by First Police Brigadier Ray Fendy. A source in the Central Sulawesi 
regional police stated that Ray had rented his gun for Rp 1.5 million to 
Andi Makassau, a suspect in a case involving malfeasance in distribution 
of humanitarian funds for refugees in Poso. The results of ballistic testing 
showed that Ray’s gun was used in this shooting.
Another case involved Deputy Police Commissioner Iskandar Rauf, when 
there was an attack on the Immanuel GKST Church on Jalan Mesjid Raya, 
Palu. This shooting and bombing incident on 12 December 2004, which 
injured Bintijaya, was linked to Iskandar, an officer in the Traffic Directorate 
of the Central Sulawesi regional police. Central Sulawesi regional police chief 
Aryanto Sutadi confirmed that the attackers had used a gun that was later 
identified as belonging to Iskandar. It is not known how the gun fell into 
the hands of the attackers, because at the time Iskandar was on duty outside 
Palu.
Thus the sources of the ethnic and religious violence in Poso and Palu 
are not solely within the community; rather, it is clear that the conflict is also 
intrinsic to the security forces themselves.
Mobilization of forces
The mobilization of forces for security restoration operations in Poso is 
officially under the control of Polri. The involvement of TNI troops is part 
of their assistance function, generally known in administrative terms as 
mobilization of forces ‘under operational control’ of Polri. This is in line with 
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the perspective of the national security strategy, in which the Poso violence 
is categorized as ‘low-intensity conflict’. In this situation, TNI involvement 
is a part of ‘military operations other than war’ (Department Pertahanan RI 
2003:52-3).
The Poso violence was followed by mobilization of large numbers of secu-
rity troops. Large-scale mobilizations especially began following the violence 
in May-June 2000. The troops came both from ‘organic’ (locally based) police 
and army forces, from the Central Sulawesi regional police and Korem 132/
Tadulako, and from ‘non-organic’ forces from outside the immediate region. 
As things developed, the number of troops deployed depended on the level 
of escalation of the violence.
As usual, the troop mobilizations in Poso used operational code names: 
Operasi Sadar Maleo, Operasi Cinta Damai, and Operasi Sintuwu Maroso. 
During the May-June 2000 incident, the Central Sulawesi regional police 
conducted Operasi Sadar Maleo, while Kodam VII Wirabuana conducted 
Operasi Cinta Damai, which was under the operational control of the Central 
Sulawesi police. At that time, the regional police’s Operasi Sadar Maleo was 
led by police Colonel Drs Zainal Abidin Ishak, who was concurrently deputy 
police chief of the Central Sulawesi regional police. The army’s Operasi Cinta 
Damai Task Force was led by Infantry Colonel Moch. Slamet, who was also 
territorial assistant of Kodam VII Wirabuana. Later, Zainal Abidin and Moch. 
Slamet were promoted, respectively, to Central Sulawesi police chief and 
commander of Korem 132/Tadulako.
After the Malino Declaration in December 2001, the government again 
deployed a security restoration operation. Code named ‘Operasi Sintuwu 
Maroso’, it was to be conducted for a certain period, which could be extend-
ed as needed. As things have turned out, Operasi Sintuwu Maroso has now 
entered Chapter VI; the operation has been repeatedly extended each time 
new violence breaks out. It seems to have become a regular pattern: each 
extension of the operation is preceded by a (planned) troop withdrawal. 
Immediately before or after the withdrawal, new violence occurs – myste-
rious shootings, killings, bombings, or sporadic attacks. In such cases, the 
option chosen is to mobilize new troops and/or extend the security restora-
tion operation. 
The humanitarian tragedy in Poso has upgraded the status of the army 
and police presence in Central Sulawesi. Previously, the chief of the Central 
Sulawesi regional police held the rank of colonel; now it has become briga-
dier general, because the Central Sulawesi regional police has had its status 
raised from C to B. In addition, in 2002 the Air Force established a detach-
ment in Palu. 
Poso has also become an operational area of Kopassus. Earlier, there 
were many reports that a number of Kopassus personnel had been posted 
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to Tentena and Poso, but this was difficult to confirm. But after a mysteri-
ous shooting that killed Lorenzo Taddey, an Italian tourist, near Pendolo 
(Pamona Selatan sub-district) on 8 August 2002, Wirabuana Military Area 
Commander Major General Amirul Isnaeni confirmed that Kopassus had 
sent 12 security personnel to investigate the presence of foreign citizens liv-
ing in Poso (Jakarta Post 10-8-2002). These personnel had been posted there 
since mid July 2002 (Kompas Cyber Media 15-9-2002). The Central Sulawesi 
regional police stated that six Kopassus personnel were posted in Tentena 
and six others in Poso Kota (Kompas Cyber Media 4-8-2002). But Kopassus was 
there not only to investigate the presence of foreigners. An official source at 
the military’s Poso National Unity and Public Protection (Kesbang Linmas) 
Office stated that the 12 Kopassus Special Mission (Sandi Yudha) personnel 
were in Poso to conduct an intelligence operation. 
Later, following a number of incidents of armed conflict in Palu, two 
Kopassus personnel were placed there as well. Their intelligence operation 
activities were not limited to gathering information about the violence, but 
also extended to other issues, such as cases involving land ownership and 
misappropriation of humanitarian funds intended for Poso.
Thus, the protracted violence in Poso has led to an increased penetration 
by the security forces into the community. Such opportunities for penetration 
are in fact now relatively rare in Indonesia, as the country makes its transi-
tion to democracy. Suspicions have therefore arisen among the public, which 
has had such a long experience with militarization of government, that this 
penetration may itself have given rise to new violence, precisely so that it can 
become institutionalized.
Rivalry between armed units
The separation of Polri from the TNI, since 1 April 1999, has led to a type of 
rivalry between them. The Poso conflict provides an illustration of this. This 
can be seen from the conflicting statements of the TNI and Polri leaderships 
in the security restoration operations in Poso. When the Central Sulawesi 
regional police deployed its Operasi Sadar Maleo starting 1 July 2000, at 
the same time the Wirabuana Kodam VII began its Operasi Cinta Damai. 
Strangely, the Central Sulawesi Regional police chief Colonel Drs Soeroso, 
could not explain the administrative relationship between these two opera-
tions. He acknowledged that Operasi Cinta Damai was under the operational 
control (BKO) of the Central Sulawesi police, but this was done only by 
telephone. In fact, any such operational control relationship for troops must 
have a formal administrative basis.
Contradictory statements also appeared in connection with the placement 
of a  Kopassus unit in Poso. The statements by the Wirabuana Military Area 
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VII commander and the Central Sulawesi regional police chief were com-
pletely opposite. It was known that a dozen Kopassus personnel were posted 
to Poso, under the direct control of the Wirabuana Military Area commander, 
and not under the operational control of the Central Sulawesi regional 
police. The Wirabuana Military Commander, Major General Amirul Isnaeni 
– a former Kopassus general commander – stated that his organization had 
coordinated this with the Central Sulawesi regional police. 
In contrast, the Central Sulawesi regional police chief Brigadier General 
Zainal Abidin Ishak, stated that there had been no coordination, but only 
information (Mingguan Alchairaat, week II, August 2002). Even stranger, the 
posting of these Kopassus personnel was not acknowledged by their main 
force. Kopassus’s Head of Information, Captain Farid Ma’ruf, denied that any 
Special Mission (Sandi Yudha) personnel had been sent to Poso. However, 
the Head of the Army’s Information Service, Brigadier General Ratyono, 
stated that the presence of this intelligence unit was directly responsible to 
the TNI commander through the assistant for intelligence and the assistant 
for operations at TNI headquarters (Tempo 25-8-2002).
The commander of Korem 132 Tadulako, Colonel Suwahyuhadji then set-
tled the matter of the Kopassus presence in Poso. He said that at first, these 
elite troops were brought in without the knowledge of the Central Sulawesi 
regional police chief, as their arrival was under the direct instructions of 
TNI headquarters. Later, however, TNI coordinated this with the Central 
Sulawesi regional police (Kompas Cyber Media 4-8-2002). 
Differences of views between the security forces on the violence in Poso 
are also seen on the issue of involvement of international terrorist networks. 
The Head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), Lieutenant General 
A.M. Hendropriyono, indicated that the Al Qaeda network was involved in 
the Poso conflict. In an interview with Buletin Laskar Jihad (Edition 15, year I), 
Hendropriyono stated that this information came from Spanish intelligence, 
from their interrogation of captured Al Qaeda members. The captives said 
that they had trained in Poso (see also Kompas 13-12-2001). But the Central 
Sulawesi police chief denied this and said that there were no indications 
of involvement of the Al Qaeda network led by Osama Bin Laden in Poso 
(Jakarta Post 14-12-2001). The commander of  Korem 132/Tadulako, Colonel 
Suwahyuhadji, also rejected speculation about terrorist training camps in 
Poso (Kompas 23-10-2003; Jakarta Post 29-10-2002).
Security forces and laskar
The onset of violence in Poso was followed by the presence of laskar, or armed 
militias. On the Muslim side, for example, there were Laskar Jihad and 
Laskar Mujahidin, and on the Christian side, Brigade Manguni. These groups 
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employed religious or ethnic sentiments, or a combination of the two. They 
were relatively well trained in the use of various types of standard combat 
weapons, in bomb making, and in carrying out attacks on their opponents. 
The presence of the laskar signalled an important change in the violence in 
Poso. Up to April 2000, the conflict still used traditional weapons. But with 
the presence of the various laskar, the nature of the armed violence sharply 
increased, as signalled by the use of standard combat firearms, home-made 
firearms, and bombs. 
There has long been a relationship between the security forces and laskar 
or armed groups of civilians in Indonesia. The killings of anywhere between 
tens of thousands and two million people accused of being Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) members or sympathizers following the 30 September 
1965 incident is, of course, the most important example of this (Cribb 1990). 
The cases of East Timor and Aceh provide other examples of how groups 
allegedly ‘sprang up spontaneously’ from within the civilian community, 
when it was obvious that they were in fact deliberately organized, trained, 
and supported by the military authorities, with the support of the civilian 
authorities (G. Robinson 2001). The same pattern occurred with the case 
of the pam swakarsa (local security forces), in which the military mobilized 
civilian groups to face the large protest actions being carried out by students 
following Reformasi in 1998 (Zen 2004:92-8). Central Sulawesi, and especially 
Poso, has had a similar experience. During the Permesta rebellion in the 
1950s (Harvey 1977), youths united in the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement 
(Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah, GPST) worked shoulder to shoulder 
with the military in eradicating the rebellion. The Indonesian military trained 
this militia and supplied it with weapons and ammunition.
This pattern of violence has at least two clear aims. First, it provides a 
shield for the security forces, enabling them to claim that the political vio-
lence that occurs is not connected only to them, but also involves civilian 
groups who happen to share their political views. Second, the security forces 
can reap political, and of course economic, advantage from situations of 
instability.
Unlike in the cases of vertical violence such as in East Timor, when the 
security forces openly support the militias, in cases of horizontal conflict such 
support is closely concealed. The logic behind this is clear: in vertical conflicts, 
the security forces can easily mobilize sentiment based on the ideology of the 
NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia) to justify their actions. In contrast, in cases of horizontal violence, 
there is no ideological justification for the security forces to support armed 
militias. This type of concealed support is evident in the case of the Laskar 
Jihad. Certainly, from the start, the security authorities tolerated the existence 
of this armed militia group, for example when the Laskar Jihad conducted 
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its National Joint Training exercise in Bogor in April 2000. There are even 
reports that Kopassus personnel provided training to Laskar Jihad members 
(Kingsbury 2003:208). More fatally, the military failed to take any action 
against Laskar Jihad when the group decided to go to war in Ambon, even 
though President Abdurrahman Wahid had openly prohibited this (Prasetyo 
2002:180-1; Schulze 2002). This is understandable, as it was widely under-
stood that Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman, Army Strategic Command 
(Kostrad) commander at the time, had created Muslim militias such as Laskar 
Jihad, and diplomats in Jakarta said that the disappearance of Rp 160 billion 
of Kostrad funds – of which Djaja’s replacement, Lieutenant General Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, later made an issue – occurred because the money was 
used to finance militia operations in Maluku (O’Rourke 2002:371).
The same happened with Laskar Jihad’s arrival in Poso. Despite the open 
announcement of their presence, the security forces did nothing whatsoever 
to prevent, and even allowed, the arrival of these laskar. Even with over 2,000 
TNI and Polri personnel concentrated in Poso at the time, Laskar Jihad was 
unrestrained when it carried out its attacks. The authorities should have 
taken stern action to prevent the arrival of Laskar Jihad, in order to prevent 
an escalation of the violence. On the other hand, the security forces’ failure 
to protect the Muslim community in Poso was also a problem, as this was the 
excuse for Laskar Jihad’s coming to Poso.
The complexity of the relationship between the security forces and militias 
can also be seen in the case of Brigade Manguni, which is well known for its 
role in the regional violence in Poso. The connection with Brigade Manguni 
was revealed by an army deserter named Sonny Mantiri. A secret written 
intelligence report from the security authorities about armed groups in Poso 
stated that Sonny led Brigade Manguni, with personnel strength in Poso of 
around 600 persons, armed with organic weapons. One influential Christian 
figure in Poso confirmed that Sonny had trained youths from Silanca Village 
(Lage sub-district) in warfare.10 He was constantly travelling to and from 
Tentena to obtain ammunition from a source he knew there. Oddly, dur-
ing the attacks on the Christian community in Sepe and Silanca Villages in 
August 2002, he ‘happened’ to be in Tentena. While in Silanca, he had close 
relations with TNI personnel, but not with the police. When he married 
a young woman from Silanca in 2001, many TNI personnel attended the 
wedding party. In mid 2004, he died at Tentena Hospital, with foam coming 
from his mouth, though the doctors there said he was suffering from hepa-
titis. Previously, his family had refused to have him treated in Palu, due to 
rumours that he would be the target of an operation by the security forces.
Brigade Manguni was reported to be close to the security forces. It is 
10  Interview, 15-9-2004.
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reported that hundreds of Kopassus personnel who had deserted from their 
units were ready to train Brigade Manguni. Lieutenant General (retired) 
Johny Lumintang, former Army Chief of Staff, even supported the estab-
lishment of Brigade Manguni. The relationship between Brigade Manguni 
and the generals is also evident from the Minahasa Adat Congress held on 
9 December 2003. It is reported that a number of active and retired officers 
originally from North Sulawesi supported the conduct of the congress. They 
included TNI Lieutenant General (retired) E.E. Mangindaan, TNI Lieutenant 
General (retired) Prabowo Subianto, TNI Lieutenant General (retired) Johny 
Lumintang, TNI Major General (retired) W.E. Kanter, TNI Major General 
Glenny Kairupan, and police Brigadier General Wenny Warouw (Radar 
Sulteng 4-12-2003). 
Institutional and personal advantage
Organic troops and territorial commands
The violence in Poso has upgraded the presence of organic combat troops in 
Central Sulawesi, and especially in Poso. This is indicated by the establish-
ment of Infantry Battalion (Yonif) 714/Sintuwu Maroso, with its headquar-
ters on the border between Ronononcu Village (Poso Kota sub-district) and 
Maliwuko Village (Lage sub-district). Two companies of its troops have been 
posted: Company B in Malino Village (Petasia sub-district, Morowali dis-
trict) and Company C in Pendolo (Pamona Selatan sub-district). It is planned 
that another company will be posted in Tabalu (Poso Pesisir sub-district). 
Previously, the province of Central Sulawesi had only one battalion of army 
combat troops, Infantry Battalion 711/Raksatama, one company of which, 
Kompi B Yonif 711/Raksatama, is posted in Kawua (Poso Kota sub-district). 
The commander of Korem 132/Tadulako, Colonel Suwahyuhadji said that the 
troops were posted for strategic reasons. Because these areas contain natural 
resource assets, which are vulnerable to disturbances from outside such as 
looting, and also because of the Poso conflict, these troop postings were more 
cost effective than bringing in troops from outside (Kompas 5-12-2002).
As if it did not want to be outdone by the army, the police also permanent-
ly stationed a company of the Brimob (Mobile Brigade) in Poso. A Brimob 
company headquarters and barracks now sit proudly on the hilltop opposite 
Pertamina Marketing Unit VII’s Poso Depot in Moengko Baru (Poso Kota 
sub-district). Another Brimob company is to be posted in Korompeeli Village 
(Lembo sub-district, Morowali district). The headquarters for this Company 
IV is currently being built. 
Following the partitioning of Morowali district and Tojo Una-Una district 
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from Poso district, Polri also partitioned its police sub-regions (Kepolisian 
resort, Polres). In Morowali, the establishment of the Polres followed the 
bloody attack on Beteleme Village, on 10 October 2003. At that time, nation-
al police chief General Da’i Bachtiar declared that a preliminary Polres 
would be immediately established in the district (Tempo Interaktif 10-10-2003; 
Sinar Harapan 11-10-2003). This plan was promptly realized, when Central 
Sulawesi regional police chief Brigadier General Drs H. Taufik Ridha inau-
gurated the Morowali Polres Office and swore in police Commissioner Drs 
Hanny Sulistyo Arianto as its first Kapolres (sub-region police chief) on 6 
December 2003 in Morowali. In Tojo Una-Una, Polri established a separate 
Polres on 3 March 2005.
On the TNI-AD side, also following the partitioning of Morowali district 
from Poso district, the establishment of a new Military district Command 
(Kodim) there was just a matter of time. As a preliminary step, the deputy 
commander of Kodim 1307 Poso is no longer stationed in Poso, but rather 
in Kolonodale, Morowali district. The Morowali district government, in its 
2003 Regional Budget, spent Rp 57 million to acquire land for the Morowali 
Kodim and Polres headquarters.
Thus, the violence that has occurred in Poso has provided multiple bene-
fits for the military. Like killing two (or three) birds with one stone, the mobi-
lization of troops to ‘restore’ security in Poso has in fact served as the entry 
for posting of organic combat forces, upgrading the quality and quantity of 
the military presence, and eventually expanding the number of TNI territo-
rial commands, or at least maintaining the existing territorial commands. For 
example, new Military District Commands are to be established in the two 
new regencies recently split off from Poso, Morowali and Tojo Una-Una dis-
tricts. And if the plan is realized to establish a new province of East Sulawesi, 
partitioned from Central Sulawesi, the possibility will be open to establish a 
new Military Sub-Area Command (Korem) in this region, and the police will 
also establish a new regional police (Polda). 
This snowball effect will then lead to the establishment of a new Military 
Area Command (Kodam), separate from Kodam Wirabuana, which has 
its headquarters in Makassar. The new Kodam would have four provinces 
under it: North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, and East Sulawesi, 
and probably have its headquarters in Manado. Kodam Wirabuana, mean-
while, would cover the provinces of South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, 
and the new province of West Sulawesi. This would not be new, because 
from 1969 to 1985, Sulawesi had two Kodam: Kodam XIII Merdeka, with 
headquarters in Manado, and Kodam XIV Hasanuddin, with headquarters 
in Ujung Pandang (Makassar). Since 1985, following the liquidation of the 
territorial commands, Kodam XIII and Kodam XIV were merged into Kodam 
VII Wirabuana, with its headquarters in Makassar (Lowry 1996:52, 56). A 
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similar scenario of partitioning of Kodam has occurred in Maluku with the 
continuing violence there. Before the 1985 liquidation, there was a Kodam 
XV Pattimura with headquarters in Ambon; now, Kodam Pattimura has been 
revived, separate from Kodam Cenderawasih, which has its headquarters in 
Jayapura (see also George Junus Aditjondro 2001:114-5).
Appointments and promotions
There is a sort of general pattern that appointments and promotions are 
enjoyed by those security officials who had authority for security while 
violence was taking place. This can be seen from the appointments and pro-
motions of numerous high and middle-ranking officers, both within Kodam 
VII Wirabuana (Military Area Command) and within the Central Sulawesi 
regional police. This creates the impression that Poso is considered a ‘Spartan 
training’ arena to prepare officers for appointments and promotions.
Several commanders of the Wirabuana Kodam later occupied prestigious 
positions. Among them are Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marasabesi, promoted to TNI 
Chief of General Staff; Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro and Maj. Gen. Ahmad 
Yahya, who both later became commander of the Greater Jakarta Military 
Area Command. A former commander of the Operasi Cinta Damai Task 
Force later became Military Sub-Area Commander (Danrem) 132/Tadulako. 
And two former Military District Commanders (Dandim) enjoyed promo-
tions to Chief of Staff of Military Sub-Area Command (Korem) 132/Tadulako. 
Within Polri, appointments and promotions were also enjoyed by several 
officers. Police Brigadier General Zainal Abidin Ishak and police Brigadier 
General Taufik Ridha both enjoyed promotions to regional police chief after 
serving as deputy chief of the Central Sulawesi regional police. Police com-
missioner Ricky Wakano, Head of the Criminal Investigation Section of the 
Central Sulawesi regional police was promoted to deputy chief of the Central 
Jakarta police sub-region, after he succeeded in arresting Pastor Damanik as a 
suspect in a firearms possession case. After serving as chief of the Poso police 
sub-region during a time full of violence, Deputy Chief Police Commissioner 
Djasman Baso Opu was appointed as sub-region police chief in Palu. Finally, 
Deputy Chief Police Commissioner Abdi Dharma Sitepu was promoted to 
sub-region chief of police of Poso after serving as acting commander of the 
Central Sulawesi Brimob unit.  
These appointments and promotions indicate that the violence in Poso 
is not seen as a failure on the part of the security officers; they are absolved 
of any responsibility for the violence that takes place. In reality, violence 
certainly is an indicator of failure to maintain security and order in a region. 
Thus, the violence in Poso has directly benefited, rather than harming, these 
security officers in their appointments and promotions.
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The businesses of the security forces
The presence of combat troops and the expansion of the territorial commands 
cannot be seen simply as a response to the existence of horizontal violence. 
It is also very important to note the security forces’ business interests – insti-
tutional, non-institutional, and criminal. In the case of TNI, one prominent 
institutional business since the violence first broke out in Poso is the fuel dis-
tribution business. The depot of Pertamina’s Marketing Unit VII in Poso uses 
tank trunks owned by the Primkopad (Primer Koperasi Angkatan Darat, 
Army Primary Cooperative) of Korem 132 Tadulako. But the Primkopad is 
actually only a ‘nameplate’ to protect the fuel distribution operations from 
the Pertamina Depot done by two private companies: PT Kaliwangi and CV 
Arba Putra (Aditjondro 2004b:146). But the most significant form of busi-
ness since the start of the Poso violence has been economic crimes, or what 
Aditjondro refers to as ‘grey businesses’. These take the form of extortion by 
‘certain individuals’ in uniform, protection for veiled prostitution operations, 
cockfighting, security guard businesses, hunting and smuggling of rare plant 
and animal species, trade in forest products, transportation of goods and 
passengers using official vehicles, security escort businesses, levies at guard 
posts, protection for property of certain businessmen or high officials, protec-
tion for the operations of businesses with large capital investment, and the 
illegal trade in firearms and ammunition (Aditjondro 2004b:149-50). 
One form of economic crime correlated directly with the violence is, of 
course, the sale of bullets of various calibres. Members of the security forces 
on duty in the field regularly sell bullets to citizens. Several sources have 
stated that 5.56 mm calibre bullets are the ones most often sold. This type of 
bullet, which is typically used in long-bore weapons of the SS-1, AK-47, and 
M-16 types, is sold by military personnel in the field for between Rp 2,500 
and Rp 5,000 apiece. However, the quantities sold are usually quite small, 
only one to five bullets at a time.
Another significant form of economic crime is security services: providing 
security escorts for residents who need to travel around or across Poso when 
the violence is intense. The fees for this vary, depending on the distance of the 
journey and the current level of tension. The greater the distance or the more 
severe the violence, the higher the costs. PT Fajar Bahari, a company oper-
ating a road construction project in Bungku Selatan, Morowali district had 
to spend Rp 10 million for escort services for a single journey in 2001. The 
money was paid to an officer in Korem 132/Tadulako. In return, around 20 
TNI personnel and a military truck escorted the convoy of company vehicles 
carrying material and an excavator from Palu to Tompira village, Morowali 
district. A former employee of the company who led the convoy said that the 
soldiers involved told him they only received pocket money of Rp 150,000 
11  Interview in Poso, 16-10-2004.
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each. Fees for security escort services are not the monopoly of officers; lower 
ranking soldiers do it as well. If long distances are controlled by the com-
manders, shorter distances are controlled by regular soldiers. Residents in 
the villages in Lage, Pamona Utara, and Poso Kota sub-districts regularly pay 
fees to soldiers from Company B, Battalion 711/Raksatama, Kawua to escort 
them by motorcycle into the City of Poso when the tension level is high. For 
example, a number of candidate civil servants had to do this when they were 
in their pre-appointment period in the City of Poso in early July 2004. They 
paid soldiers between Rp 15,000 and Rp 20,000 for security services, follow-
ing the shooting of a motorcycle taxi driver.
Another dominant pattern is the timber business. As the region is rich in 
forest products, soldiers on duty in Poso always see the timber business as 
a way to earn easy money. From the first Poso conflict (December 1998) to 
the third (May-June 2000), TNI personnel from Kostrad battalions 721, 722, 
723, 724, 725 and 726 from South Sulawesi, together with personnel from 
Company C, Infantry Battalion 711/Raksatama, Poso, were heavily involved 
in collection of and trade in ebony. In March 2003, the Poso district Forestry 
and Plantations Service foiled a shipment of 70 cubic meters of undocument-
ed plywood in Pendolo, Pamona Selatan. According to the Head of the Poso 
Forestry and Plantations Service, the wood belonged to certain TNI person-
nel in South Sulawesi (George Junus Aditjondro 2004b:153). Around a month 
later, the Poso Forestry and Plantations Service foiled another shipment of 
6 cubic meters of illegal wood owned by a member of  Kodim 1307 Poso. It 
was reported that the logs were being transported using military trucks. TNI 
personnel even own illegal sawmills (Poso Post 27-4-2003, 10-5-2003).
Polri personnel also see the wood business as a source of illicit funds. 
An informant in the wood business in Poso said that their businesses are 
often the object of extortion from the security forces, including the police. A 
number of sawmill operators say they have been extorted by local police per-
sonnel. They state that the extortion took place at the Poso police sub-region 
headquarters and involved the top officers in the local police sub-region. The 
method used was that, under the guise of Operasi Sintuwu Maroso, officials 
would stop trucks carrying wood to the sawmills. Even though the vehicles 
and the logs all had proper documents issued by the Poso Forestry Service, 
they were still taken to the police headquarters. There they were forced to 
part with a certain amount of money if they wanted the trucks and logs to be 
released. Businessman Hengky Tungkanan experienced this; he had to hand 
over Rp 70 million as a down payment on a total of Rp 100 million to the 
head of the Poso police sub-region’s Criminal Investigations Unit which was 
witnessed by the deputy police chief. The deputy chief then took the money 
to the sub-region police chief. Other victims included Toni Hantowo, who 
paid Rp 25 million, Chi Dewi (Rp 125 million), Hermawan (Rp 25 million), 
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and La’ba (Rp 25 million) (Nuansa Pos 26-7-2004, 2-8-2004).
In July 2004, a policeman from Palu who was posted to Poso was involved 
in transporting undocumented logs owned by a sawmill operator in Mapane 
village, Poso Pesisir. The five truckloads of logs were transported toward 
Palu under the policeman’s escort. A primary source who was on the journey 
said that the sawmill owner paid the policeman Rp 5,000,000 for this work. 
The policeman was also provided with additional money to pay off Polri and 
TNI personnel at each guard post along the Trans Sulawesi Highway in Poso 
Pesisir sub-district. He said that the policeman made payments ranging from 
Rp 50,000 to Rp 300,000 at each post.11 
In Morowali district, the involvement of the security forces in the wood 
business is also quite blatant. In December 2003, the local police seized 60 
cubic meters of wood that was being transported to Makassar on four trucks, 
escorted by two soldiers from Company B, Infantry Battalion 714/Sintuwu 
Maroso. The wood, from Bungku, allegedly belonged to Made Kuswandi, 
and there were rumours that he had the backing of an army officer in 
Makassar.12
Economic crimes involving the security forces in the violence in Poso have 
also occurred in the form of robberies and loss of property. During July 2000, 
many such cases befell residents in Poso. For example, on 11 July 2000, TNI-
AD personnel who were searching for sharp weapons in Uelene village took 
Rp 4,500,000 from Anwar Mbalowo. Earlier, on 8 July 2000, for no apparent 
reason, TNI-AD personnel took Rp 2,000,000 from Santo Lagi in Beteleme 
village, Morowali district. And a computer, a voltage stabilizer, an SSB radio, 
and an alarm disappeared without a trace from the Pendolo Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia Unit in Pamona Selatan sub-district when TNI-AD personnel were 
guarding the BRI building on 9 July 2000.13 
Other serious economic crimes have emerged in cases of diversion of 
humanitarian aid funds for Poso. The cabals to carry out this misappropria-
tion of humanitarian aid funds have blatantly included the security forces. 
Anwar M. Ali, Head of the Poso District Social Welfare Service, who was 
caught up in the aid misappropriation case, alleged that he had given some 
of the Poso humanitarian aid funds to local security officials. He confirmed 
that he had given Rp 112 million to Colonel Joko Purwoko, coordinator of 
the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Central Sulawesi Region, and Rp 50 
million to Deputy Police Chief  Abdi Dharma Sitepu, chief of the Poso sub-
region police (Seputar Rakyat, Edition 03/Year II/2004). 
12  Interview with two activists from Yayasan Sahabat Morowali, an NGO involved in natural 
resource advocacy in Morowali district, in Kolonodale, 14-10-2004 and 15-10-2004.
13  www.gkst.org (accessed 28-6-2002).
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In the long term, the presence of combat troops and the expansion of the 
territorial commands is actually an investment to guard the natural wealth in 
the eastern part of Central Sulawesi. This presence is needed to provide pro-
tection for the penetration of large-scale capital into the area. It is intended to 
overcome public opposition when their agricultural land is expropriated or 
disturbed by the presence of extractive industries in the mining, forestry, or 
large-scale plantation sectors. It is known that many giant companies, both 
national and trans-national, are either getting ready to or are already extract-
ing natural wealth from the area. Among these is the world’s second largest 
nickel mining company, Canada-based PT Inco, which is preparing to exploit 
nickel matte in the Bungku area of Morowali district (Arianto Sangaji 2002). 
There is also a plan to exploit natural gas in Toili and Batui, Banggai district 
and in Tiaka, Teluk Tomori, Morowali district.
Elections for president and heads of regions
The protracted violence in Poso has provided political advantages to former 
and active members of the military elite in their competition for political 
positions. This is clearly seen in the presidential election results in Poso, 
Morowali, and Tojo Una-una. In the first round of the presidential election 
in July 2004, two presidential candidates with military backgrounds – Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Wiranto – took first and second places in Poso, 
Morowali, and Tojo Una-una. The same thing happened again in the second 
round in September 2004, when the ticket of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and Jusuf Kalla won. There was a sort of nostalgia among voters to vote 
for these two candidates, based on a feeling that a president with a military 
background would better guarantee a sense of security.
This tendency to elect government leaders with security force back-
grounds was also evident in the election for district head of Poso in mid 2005. 
The field of candidates for district head of Poso to succeed Muin Pusadan 
was full of candidates with ‘green’ and ‘brown’ backgrounds. One name 
often mentioned was police Lt. Col. (retired) Luther Manganti, former chief 
of the Toli-Toli police from 1993 to 1997 and former member of the Central 
Sulawesi DRPD (provincial assembly) for the 1999-2004 period. Another 
name was Lt. Col. Dede K Atmawijaya, formerly commander of Kodim 1307 
Poso and Chief of Staff of Korem 132 Tadulako. Others included police Lt. 
Col. (retired) Piet Inkiriwang, and Lt. Col. (retired) Rudolf Rukka, former 




Reformasi, as an entry point to place the security forces under the control 
of the civilian government, has not gone smoothly. The rapid transition has 
been coloured by a tense relationship between the civilian government and 
the security forces, both because the institutions are not properly prepared 
and because of the tug-of-war between the interests of the political elite and 
those of the security force elite. One disappointing result of Reformasi is 
the government’s failure to create a sense of security among the populace. 
Indonesia’s security forces, which during the New Order era were so solid 
and strong, seem to have lost the power to create social order in line with 
their legitimate duties and functions. Regional violence, such as that in Poso, 
is one indication of this. 
Violence under the pretext of ethnic and religious conflict has actually 
created an opportunity for the security forces to restore their image and 
privileges, which had declined sharply since the start of Reformasi in 1998. 
First, the violence in Poso has given rise to a significant security force pres-
ence in the area. The deployment and addition of organic troops, and the 
expansion of territorial commands or of other security institutions on the 
same level, all prove that the security forces have succeeded in forcing the 
civilian government to bow to their institutional interests. This means that 
the violence in Poso has had a beneficial political impact for the security 
forces. Second, members of the security forces have benefited not only insti-
tutionally but also personally from the protracted violence in Poso – in terms 
of career advancement, access to economic activity, and political positions in 
government. 
john m. macdougall
criminality and the political economy  
of security in lombok
Over the past years, Lombok’s primary instruments for re-defining commu-
nity can be found in its anti-criminal militias. Starting in 1998, pamswakarsa or 
local security groups absorbed roughly 25% of Lombok’s adult men for the 
sole purpose of hunting down the island’s thieves. Led by the island’s most 
powerful noble houses and Muslim clerics, pamswakarsa waged war against 
long-standing criminal networks. As these groups grew in force, regional 
and national actors attempted to recruit militia leaders and their masses to 
support their political or economic agenda. By early 2000, pamswakarsa lead-
ers could claim as many as 400,000 trained members and many more voters 
to support the political causes of their choosing. By 2003, there were already 
reports of district head candidates recruiting both organized thief-networks 
and anti-crime militias to demonstrate side-by-side in support of the same 
candidate’s election. In order to understand how, why and under what con-
ditions such contradictory events have come to pass, we need to understand 
what happened when Soeharto’s control over criminality and security was 
subverted by an economic crisis. How could criminality assume such an 
important position in defining power and authority in Lombok? 
Lombok had always been famous for its long-standing and traditional 
thief networks. These networks grew more powerful during the economic 
crisis when remittances sent from Sasak labourers were suddenly worth sev-
eral times their previous value. Lombok’s thieves preyed upon families with 
remittance-bought commodities creating a crime wave of unprecedented 
intensity. While traditionally thieves only held stolen goods and returned 
them to their owners upon receipt of a tebusan or ransom payment, the anti-
crime militias formed by Lombok’s Islamic clerics or Tuan Guru did not 
attend to the ransom of stolen goods. Instead, cleric backed militias shifted 
their moral attention away from the traditional return of the stolen article to 
focus instead the arrest and execution of the unrepentant thief. 
Lombok’s anti-crime militias have helped to at once redefine political par-
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defined community-level vigilantism. In order to comprehend how these 
emergent groups were able to grow so quickly we must focus at once on the 
events of the past five years in Lombok as well as the long-standing cultural 
and political tensions between rival religious groups, ambitious nobles and 
the political designs of the regimes that ruled over them. Within these shifting 
frames of national politics and intra-Lombok competition, various new and 
old forms of cultural legitimacy have coalesced to redefine self-presentation 
through theft and vigilantism in post-Soeharto Lombok. 
Criminality in a colonial framework
Lombok lies east of Bali and is home to 2.4 million inhabitants. Ethnic Sasak 
Muslims make up 92% of the population with minorities of some 60,000 
Balinese Hindus and 20,000 Sasak Buddhists, mostly in North Lombok. 
Historically, western Lombok developed closer ties with Bali while eastern 
Lombok was economically and ideologically (through Islamic affinities) 
linked to Buginese Muslim kingdoms in Sulawesi to the north and Sumbawa 
to the east. Since the mid-eighteenth century, two East Balinese royal houses 
ruled over Lombok until Islamic brotherhoods based in East Lombok revolt-
ed against the Balinese colonizers in 1891. Although the Balinese subdued the 
rebellion, the Muslim brotherhoods asked the Dutch to assist them in their 
rebellion. After defeating the Balinese in 1894 the Dutch took over control of 
Lombok, but continuous revolts against the Dutch tax laws plagued colonial 
administrators until the Japanese invaded Indonesia in 1942. 
The Dutch introduced forms of indirect rule that discriminated against 
Muslim commoners and exalted golden age nobles over counter-colonial 
leaders. As a result, colonial authorities imprisoned Muslim teachers and 
disbanded their followings while they rehabilitated Sasak nobility to the posi-
tion of sub-altern district heads. As district heads and colonial bureaucrats, 
Sasak nobles re-calibrated their daughters’ bride-prices (aji krama) according 
to their contrived claims to golden age descent. Meanwhile, the children of 
famous Muslim clerics were denied access to colonial schools or patronage.
 The Dutch support of golden age legitimacy facilitated the administra-
tion of colonial taxation through Sasak nobles but, in so empowering the 
past against the present, also contributed to the messianic nature of peasant 
rebellions waged against Sasak nobles. In contrast to the Islamist rebellions 
against Balinese rule, the messianic revolts of the early twentieth century laid 
claim to the same golden kingdom of Selaparang that colonial forces used 
to legitimize the sub-altern nobles of their bureaucracy. Ironically, the Dutch 
colonial forces were later forced to issue a decree outlawing the use of golden 
age themes to counter Dutch rule over the island. 
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Whereas Islamic leaders were penalized and monitored under the Dutch, 
during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945) Japanese authori-
ties made use of Lombok’s Islamic leadership to train Islamic guerrilla units 
throughout the country to fight the allied forces. Many of Lombok’s future 
political and religious leaders underwent this training. Arab-Indonesian 
intellectual, Saleh Sungkar was one such figure. Head of Lombok’s most 
important Muslim organization, the Persatuan Ummat Islam Lombok 
(PUIL, Lombok Association for Muslims), during the Japanese occupation, 
he became an important reformer.1 He turned the local branch of Indonesia’s 
largest Islamic party, Masyumi, which he chaired, into an organization that 
welcomed commoners and nobles alike. After years of political favouritism 
under the Dutch, Sasak nobles worried that Sungkar’s reform would threaten 
their privileged position. Because of Sungkar’s populist policies, many of 
Lombok’s nobles (mamiek) left Masyumi to join the Partai Nasional Indonesia 
(PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party), where they enjoyed close ties to the mili-
tary and wealthy Balinese aristocrats.2
Saleh Sungkar represented Masyumi in Lombok’s district parliament 
when he was mysteriously murdered in 1952. At the time, he was head of 
Lombok’s district parliament. After his death, several fellow reformers joined 
Lombok’s branch of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, the Indonesian 
Communist Party). Muhammed Ba’asyir, a leading Arab member of the 
Masyumi party under Sungkar, became Lombok’s most outspoken advocate 
of the communist party (PKI).3 Counter to conventional stereotypes that the 
PKI was atheistic, modernist Islamic leaders in Lombok joined the PKI as a 
counter-gesture to Sasak nobles who opposed Masyumi’s plans to reform the 
rice distribution on the island. In November 1965, Lombok’s Muslim youth 
groups, backed by the military, started to kill at least 11,000 Sasak ‘com-
munists’ for their involvement in land reform and social welfare programs 
conducted by the PKI in the 1960s. 
1  Satu abad kota Selong 1998. Lombok’s most important religious leaders also founded impor-
tant pesantren during this period. Lombok’s largest is Nahdlatul Wathan in Pancor, Selong East 
Lombok. Others are Nurul Yakin in Praya founded by Tuan Guru Makmun in 1931, Darul 
Qur’an in Bengkel founded in 1940 by Tuan Guru Haji Hambali, and Assyidiyah in Gunung Sari 
founded by TGH Jafar. 
2  For a more comparative view of post-colonial elites in Lombok and Kalimantan see 
Magenda 1991.
3  Muhammed Baisir was upset about the political assassination of Saleh Sungkar, who was 
head of the local parliament for Masyumi at the time. In protest of Sungkar’s death Baisir left 
Masyumi and formed the PKI (Sairul S. Lubis 1962). 
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The New Order
When the killings were over, Soeharto’s political vehicle, Golkar, worked 
hard to co-opt Lombok’s clerics and community leaders. Historically, they 
had strong alliances to the large Muslim political parties, Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Masyumi. But in the elections of 1971, one of Lombok’s most important 
Tuan Guru sided with Golkar, reportedly as a sign of gratitude to Soeharto for 
his role in destroying the PKI. In return, the military and other government 
officials assisted Tuan Guru in their efforts to proselytize (dakwah) in North 
Lombok’s traditionalist hinterland. The primary target of these dakwah cam-
paigns were the Wetu Telu communities of northern Lombok. The Wetu Telu 
posed a hazard to Islamist campaigns because of their unique combination 
of Sasak ritualism and counter-reformist Islamic priesthoods. Together with 
sympathetic members of the local military command, Tuan Guru forced many 
hamlets to replace Wetu Telu tradition with more orthodox forms of Islamic 
ritual.4 
Two of the most powerful proselytizers were Tuan Guru Haji (TGH) 
Mutawalli from Jeroaru, East Lombok, and Tuan Guru Haji Zainuddin 
Abdul Madjid from Pancor, East Lombok, the founder of the largest Lombok-
based religious institution, Nahdlatul Wathan (NW). TGH Abdul Madjid cre-
ated an impressive network of educational institutions such as Islamic day 
schools (madrasah) and boarding schools (pesantren) while TGH Mutawalli 
was responsible for the conversion programs in northwest Lombok. In addi-
tion to his role in the development of educational institutions, TGH Abdul 
Madjid also undertook attacks against East Lombok’s Chinese minority in 
1965-1966 (Fathurahman Zakaria 2001). TGH Abdul Madjid’s role in the 
eradication of communist and Chinese merchants in East Lombok attracted 
the interest of Soeharto’s military who later requested him to mobilize sup-
port for Golkar among Lombok’s religious clerics in the 1971 elections. TGH 
Abdul Madjid agreed and he continued to serve as Golkar’s campaign man-
ager in East Lombok for the 1971 and 1977 national parliamentary elections. 
Golkar won majorities in Lombok at both elections, and TGH Abdul Madjid 
represented the province of West Nusa Tenggara in the National Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). 
In 1982, however, at a time when many Muslim leaders were unhappy 
with Soeharto government policies, TGH Abdul Madjid announced he was 
4  For instance, in Tanjung, a sub-district of West Lombok historically allied to Balinese forces, 
local military officers worked hand in hand with East Lombok’s Tuan Guru to destroy sacred 
sites and ancestral altars as part of a broader effort to dissuade Muslims from performing non-
Islamic rituals. As late as 1974, soldiers from Tanjung’s military command forced villagers to 
stand in rows on the community soccer field to profess their adherence to the prophet and holy 
book of their religion or be considered kafirs (infidels) – in effect criminal communists.
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leaving it to Nahdlatul Wathan followers to determine their own choice of 
party.5 Consequently, his supporters were arrested or intimidated, and gov-
ernment aid to NW schools was cut (Muhammad Nasihuddin Badri 2001:23-
25). Largely due to pressure from the military, Abdul Madjid was forced to 
return to Golkar before the elections of 1987 and remained a supporter until 
his death in October 1997. 
Nahdlatul Wathan grew more powerful than ever under TGH Abdul 
Madjid’s stewardship during the 1990s, but when he died in October 1997, 
a conflict erupted between his two daughters over who was to replace him, 
both as head of NW and as a central player in the political dynamics of East 
Lombok. Less than a year later, Soeharto resigned from office. The end of 
the New Order and the death of TGH Abdul Madjid left Eastern Lombok 
without the leadership that had guided their institutions for more than 40 
years. In the wake of their father’s death, TGH Abdul Madjid’s daughters 
organized militias to fight a battle over legitimate rule of Nahdlatul Wathan. 
Other leaders took advantage of Lombok’s situation to fill the gap in clerical 
leadership. Guru Ukit and TGH Sibaway, the sons of the aforementioned 
Islamic proselytizer, TGH Mutawalli, rose to the occasion to form Amphibi, 
an anti-crime militia that would later become Lombok’s largest and most 
important collective of vigilantes. 
The emergence of community-based vigilantism
With Soeharto’s regime in shambles, local claims to authority and security 
stimulated an inward-looking return to the community, while fears of ‘phan-
tom’ provocateurs operating at the national level imbued local vigilantism 
in Lombok. 
Indonesia’s civilian militias are not an entirely new phenomenon. In 1997, 
the armed forces added to their already extensive arsenal of civilian auxilia-
ries a voluntary civilian community policing body called pamswakarsa.6 
After Soeharto had stepped down, many provincial governments saw the 
formation of local pamswakarsa as a ‘grassroots’ security system capable of 
5  He called the choice ban-bin-bun meaning respectively banteng (bull, the symbol of the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), Indonesian Democratic Party); bintang (star, symbol of the Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Muslim United Development Party) and bunut (from the Sasak 
word for banyan tree, the symbol of Golkar).
6  Awaloedin Djamin 2002:2. Although this term only became popular after the 1997 legis-
lation it was first mentioned by then Wapang Kopkamtib, Jendral Widjoyo Suyono, when he 
suggested that a self-funded (swadana) and voluntary (swadaya) civilian security force be encour-
aged to provide security for residential areas (lingkungan pemukiman) and work environments 
(lingkungan kerja). Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Polri), Jakarta, Amanat Kapolri, 1-7-1979.
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replacing Soeharto’s top-down military style of authoritarian rule.7 Lombok’s 
reformist and conservative leaders welcomed pamswakarsa as a new form of 
‘people’s power’ capable of taking care of security concerns. Pamswakarsa 
were interpreted as a by-product of regional autonomy initiatives and a 
quasi-Islamic form of moral vigilantism where citizens were free to impose 
their own moral sanctions upon their crime-ridden communities.8 
The economy of theft in contemporary Lombok
Most people in Lombok appealed to local security groups because of the 
crisis-related crime wave hitting both Lombok’s rural and urban communi-
ties in 1998 and 1999. The monetary crisis had pushed Lombok’s peasantry 
into destitution. Lombok’s poorest peasantry relied on wage labor, and not 
regular harvests, to support their families. In the village of Pemenang Timur, 
where I was conducting research, over 60% of the farm land was owned by 
loan sharks who held ownership over harvests until the often small loan was 
repaid. During the economic crisis not only did the labourers’ wages not go 
up but the everyday costs of sustaining their households made it impossible 
to recover their pawned property. Conversely, the crisis weakened rupiah 
inflated remittance payments sent by Lombok’s migrant workers in Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia to several times their previous value.9 For instance, the 
numbers of formal migrant workers sent by the West Nusa Tenggara (Nusa 
Tenggara Barat; NTB) Department of Labour abroad doubled from 10,264 
workers in 1997-1998 to 20,893 in the crisis years of 1998-1999 most of whom 
went to Malaysia, the cheapest destination for Indonesian workers to reach. 
The majority of NTB’s workers sent abroad during those years were undere-
ducated, under skilled workers from rural Lombok and Sumbawa. The total 
remittance payments sent home by these labourers increased even more dra-
matically. In 1997-1998, migrant workers sent home Rp 37,122,960,000. Twice 
that number of workers sent home Rp 243,586,395,107 in 1998-1999. 
 Largely because of remittance-related purchases, criminals were not 
7  Regional autonomy Law no. 22/1999 made vague references to the increased autonomy of 
village authorities in the management of community security.
8  There also developed militias that defended the interests of particular ethnic groups. 
Lombok’s Sasaks had their own version of such an organization called Desak Datu Sasak. 
Although they were primarily known as an organization prepared to defend any cause that 
paid, they were regularly involved in pro-Sasak and anti-outsider demonstrations. This was 
most obvious when they set up roadblocks to check cars for Australian tourists in protest of the 
Australia’s military involvement in the UN peacekeeping forces operating in East Timor. 
9  Figures released by the West Nusa Tenggara Provincial Department of Labour Office in 
Mataram, Lombok.
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only making off with cattle but were also stealing valuable goods such as 
televisions and motorcycles purchased by migrant labourers upon return to 
their villages.10 According to one Amphibi militia member, Lombok’s thieves 
were becoming so ‘picky’ that, after scouring a house for precious goods, the 
thief left a note for the owner of a black and white television reading, ‘get a 
colour TV and then I’ll come and steal it!’ Although Lombok’s pamswakarsa 
later developed ties to the military, their organizations began with a primary 
focus on communal security (and not the moral erasure of theft) as the sub-
ject of their vigilance. 
The rise of anti-crime militias in Lombok was particularly unusual because 
Lombok was famous for sustaining such a large group of well known and, 
in many instances, popularly admired criminals. Each of Lombok’s districts 
possesses a village where thieves are not only treated with respect but 
acquire rank according to their accomplishments. In northern Lombok, for 
instance, the thieves of Bon Jeruk were famous for elaborate raids on rival 
communities. A Sasak leader in the West Lombok village of Pemenang, 
Amaq Nursih, described to me how, after a group of men in a neighbouring 
village succeeded in killing the criminal attempting to rob them, the thief’s 
family came from Bon Jeruk to retrieve the body. 
They treated the corpse of the man, a criminal, like the body of a hero just returned 
from war. If we succeed in capturing and killing one of Bon Jeruk’s thieves, we 
have to be prepared to face the consequences. If a Bon Jeruk man is killed in your 
village, his family will hunt you down until you or one of your kin is dead.
In January 1998, during the height of the crime wave, some of Mataram’s 
young gang members continued to speak admiringly of their thief heroes 
who were so wanen (brave, invulnerable) that they could stop a car full of 
wealthy tourists with their bare hands. 
Despite long and vigorous police campaigns against crime and criminal 
networks during the New Order, theft in Lombok has always been very 
persistent. This was especially evident during the post-Soeharto years when 
unemployment and remittance payments from international migrant labour-
ers dispersed wealth and poverty in uneven and sudden spurts throughout 
the poorer regions of Central and eastern Lombok. For Lombok’s unem-
ployed men few options were available. Those with family assets sufficient 
to serve as collateral against a loan paid the hefty ‘departure’ fee required 
to become a migrant labourer in Malaysia.11 For them (about 100,000 of 
10  The prices of new motorbikes and televisions inflated much later than staple goods or 
sembako (sembilan bahan pokok; nine staple goods that included rice, sugar and cooking oil). This 
is one of the reasons why remittance recipients purchased TVs and motorbikes. 
11  Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (TKI, Indonesian migrant labourer) or Tenaga Kerja Wanita (TKW, 
female migrant labourer).
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Lombok’s 2.4 million residents) their future was relatively bright. Most of 
Lombok’s men had no such assets, however, and they were forced to choose 
between part-time jobs as labourers or to become criminals. 
Many of Lombok’s non-criminal men chose to join pamswakarsa, which 
offered forms of masculine and symbolic capital similar to the bravado 
enjoyed by the island’s ‘noble’ thieves. This similarity presented pamswakarsa 
as more than mere village thugs. Instead, they were brave defenders led by 
Lombok’s Tuan Guru Muslim clerics who equipped them with a mystical 
invulnerability and an Islamist air of moral righteousness. They could also 
claim to be among the men responsible for dispelling Lombok of its most 
cunning criminals. For the other men who chose crime as their means of self-
actualization, they had the opportunity to apprentice themselves to Lombok’s 
great thieves and to study the irresistible arts of illusion and deceit. 
Reciprocities of theft
Whether respected or not, many of Lombok’s criminals are not merely thieves 
but also ritual practitioners capable of preserving a man’s dignity during the 
ritual theft of his bride (merariq or merangkat). Many great criminals are also 
skilled magicians who pass on the arts of invulnerability to their disciples. 
Great thieves are referred to as the ‘Lord of Thieves’ (Datu Maling) and are 
often consulted by politicians and the military. To speak of more practical 
matters, to this day the best way for a groom to show respect for his future in-
laws is to steal his bride, their daughter, from beneath their protective roof.12 
This is not to say that theft in Lombok is culturally sanctioned. Instead, it is 
important to recognize that Sasak forms of ritual theft evidenced in marital 
rites and spirit loss (ketemuq) are referred to and dealt with in the same way 
as those who suffer from criminal theft. Spirit loss (ketemuq), marriage by 
theft (kawin maling) and criminal theft (memaling) are all perceived as forms 
of partial loss and not ‘total’ theft. Just as a family loses its daughter to mari-
tal theft, or a farmer is deprived of his spiritual vitality (Sk. semangat) by an 
envious spirit, victims of theft in Lombok are rarely fully disowned of their 
stolen goods. Instead, victims of such thievery are given the opportunity to 
recover the stolen object. In the case of bride-theft, the thieving son-in-law is 
12  I would distinguish Sasak forms of kawin maling (marriage by theft) from Balinese or other 
‘mock theft’ marriages (kawin lari) practiced throughout the archipelago. In Lombok, the actual 
theft of a bride is carefully regulated by formal and traditional decrees. In fact hefty fines are 
levied against the groom if he communicates his intentions to anyone within the girls village, 
hamlet or even mosque association (langgar mesjid). The groom is fined for lack of ‘prowess’ in 
his theft. If he damages windows, fences or any other piece of property owned by his bride’s kin 
group, he is fined. 
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made to repay the family for their loss (of a daughter) in the form of ‘prices 
of tradition’ (aji krama) or, if the bride’s conversion is required, ‘the purchase 
of her religion’ (aji gama). The victim of soul theft (ketemuq) identifies the 
spirit through hair divination and then pays a ritual ransom (tebusan), to the 
thieving spirit. In a similar fashion, the victim of theft is allowed to commu-
nicate with the thief, settle on a ransom price (tebusan), and recover the stolen 
property unharmed. 
Criminal networks and tebusan 
If a thief in Lombok makes off with someone’s motorbike, it does not necessar-
ily mean that the original owner has been fully dispossessed of the bike. For 
instance, a Sasak friend of mine in Mataram, Gus Par, lost his bike to a band of 
thieves in 1998 and, within twenty-four hours, he received a phone call stating 
that the thieves had his bike and they were ready to make a deal:
In order to get my bike back I had to meet at a pre-arranged location and hand 
over a tebusan payment amounting to roughly 20% of the bike’s original value. In 
less than an hour my bike was back in the same position as when it was stolen. 
The tebusan method has changed somewhat in recent years. It used to be hard for 
thieves to move motorbikes without the official police papers (Surat Tanda Nomor 
Kendaraan, STNK) or proof of purchase. After the economic crisis of 1997, bike 
theft was rampant in Lombok and, regardless of how much the victim offered to 
retrieve her property, the bikes were being sent somewhere else.
While in the past thieves stole from people’s fields and barns, after the 
economic crisis they preyed on luxury items and motorbikes stored in the 
domicile. The new dynamics of theft in post-Soeharto Lombok became 
increasingly clear when I spoke with Asep, an experienced thief who lived on 
the outskirts of the village of Perampauan, in West Lombok; an area famous 
for its criminal networks. He explained how in 1998 the ritualized tebusan 
method described by Gus Par had been replaced by another form of non-
retributive and export oriented theft. Motorbikes were no longer ransomed 
by their original owners but acquired new identities and new owners. Asep 
explained this shift after the economic crisis when local police assisted them 
in the export of the bikes complete with new engine numbers and legal 
titles: 
I used to be involved in every aspect of the theft. We would steal a bike, hide it 
in a safe house and wait for the owner to contact us. If the owner neglected to 
contact us we would use our contacts to find the owner. We would turn over 
the bike after we agreed on what we thought was a fair tebusan (retributive pay-
ment). Now things are different. Most of the experienced thieves don’t even steal 
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anymore. They are middlemen (penadah). We don’t even have to use the tebusan 
method anymore. Instead, a three-phase procedure allows us to move more bikes 
more quickly and for more money:
In the first phase, the pemetik (literally: picker) or thief will come to us with a sto-
len bike. We look at the bike and see if it is worth the effort. If it is a high value 
bike we will accept it and turn over 25 to 30% of the bike’s second hand value to 
the ‘picker’. The thieves these days are usually inexperienced high school kids or 
chumps who, for some reason or another, are forced to steal a bike to make quick 
money. 
The second phase is the penadah or ‘middleman’ phase. The bike arrives in 
Perampauan after which the mechanics remove the bike’s engine number and 
alter the bike’s body and paint job. At this point, the bike is clean and can no 
longer be traced to any owner, factory or vehicle registration number. 
The third, or penadah II, or ‘second middleman’ phase begins after the bike has 
been fully worked over. At this phase, the police get involved. The military used to 
be involved in this syndicate but it was taken over by the police when they became 
more powerful in 1999.13 At this phase, they make a new engine number so that it 
is impossible to tell it from an original factory issued number. They then distribute 
the bike to other areas and issue new motorcycle letters. Nobody even knows that 
the bike came from Lombok. We have no connection to the bike after this point. It 
is entirely in the hands of the next phase of bike sellers. 
In 1998, a new form of hustle arose to address the needs of bike owners eager 
to recover their bikes through the tebusan method. Asep called the hustle dang-
dut after the Indonesian pop music genre popular in Lombok at the time. 
Dangdut is simple. You see, even though we have already erased the bike’s engine 
number and sometimes even impressed a new one to replace it, we still receive 
requests from the original owner to return the bike for a tebusan. When we real-
ized that we could make money off such hopes we cooked up a scheme where, 
even though the original bike had already been sent off the island, we would keep 
the bikes original engine number and make a metal facsimile out of old 100-rupiah 
coins. When requests for a particular bike came in all we had to do was produce 
an engine number rubbing and force them to turn over the money. Sometimes 
they wanted the license plate as proof before they turned over the money so we 
kept those handy too. We usually ask for tebusan as large as Rp 4 million (approxi-
mately US$ 450.00) for nice bikes. People pay the tebusan but their bike can not 
even be traced to their registration papers anymore.
The use of such ‘mock’ tebusan schemes like dangdut forced people in Lombok 
to take immediate retributive action. Unable to retrieve their bikes, Sasak 
victims of theft appealed to the police. Even though the victims paid ‘opera-
13  In April 1999 the police was officially separated from the military making the police an 
independent but grossly understaffed and under-funded national security institution (ICG 
2001a).
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tional fees’ or bribes, the police was unable to return the stolen goods to their 
 owners. Villagers grew suspicious. As early as July 1997, villagers wary of 
police involvement in local theft burned down the police station in Janapria, 
East Lombok. When the economic crisis struck in 1998, charges of police 
complicity in crime piqued and local efforts to stave off the crime wave 
intensified. 
Bujak: ex-criminals tracking criminals
At the height of the crime wave in late 1998 and early 1999, reports of 
a new community-based civilian security militia, pamswakarsa, circulated 
throughout Lombok. In Jakarta General Wiranto had mobilized pamswakarsa 
to protect the Special Session of the People’s Congress (MPR) in November 
1998. Prior to the MPR meeting in Jakarta, nearly all of Lombok’s famous 
Tuan Guru had gathered in front of the governor’s office with the military 
commander for eastern Indonesia, General Adam Damiri, and Lombok’s 
new governor, Harun Al’Rasyid to show their support for the event and the 
Habibie presidency (Lombok Post 5-11-1998). Two months later, Lombok’s 
anti-crime groups were called pamswakarsa.
The first of Lombok’s pamswakarsa to initiate the war on crime was 
Pemburu Jejak or Bujak which literally means ‘tracker’ in Indonesian.14 
Because Bujak consisted of a mixture of ex-criminals and streetwise thugs, 
they were able to work through contacts in criminal networks to intervene 
in the tebusan arrangements. Bujak mediated in the thief-victim relationship 
and often brought the tebusan cost down considerably. At the time, Bujak was 
lauded for its ability to protect its client communities from ‘total theft’ (in 
other words without tebusan). 
It is important to note that Bujak’s operations focused on the return of sto-
len goods and retributive money offering (tebusan) and not upon the criminal 
himself. Nevertheless, if Bujak caught a criminal in the act of theft he was 
often killed immediately. Not to kill or, at least, capture the criminal would 
be to confess complicit involvement with the crime at hand, which Bujak’s 
former thieves could not afford to risk.
According to many young Sasak men the term pamswakarsa sounded too 
‘Jakarta’ to take root in Lombok. Instead, they saw Bujak’s emergence as 
the result of neglected ritual obligations and pointed at the role of Central 
Lombok’s nobility in Bujak’s activities as part of the reason for the recent 
14  As early as 1994, Lombok’s police force employed Central Lombok’s most notorious ex-
convicts to form Bujak. At that time Bujak was not a community-based security body but an 
unofficial group of bounty hunters to help track stolen goods. 
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death of Lombok’s ‘noble’ thieves (Datuk Maling). As a young nobleman and 
Mataram ‘tough’ explained:
The elders of my household support Bujak with their old weaponry. Each year 
our ancestors’ ritual weaponry (pusaka) must be bathed in the blood of a sacrificed 
cow. The nobles neglected to continue this tradition and, as a result, our weaponry 
began to call out for human blood. Many of Bujak’s noble members carry our 
ancestral weapons on their nightly rounds for this very reason. When a criminal is 
discovered in the act of theft the magical weapons fly out of their sheaths on their 
own accord. They find their victim and kill him without any human involvement. 
The weapons forced Bujak back into action, not crime. 
Bujak’s war on crime inspired young men and social groups throughout the 
island to take the law into their own hands. Nevertheless, for youths who 
admired many of the thieves being killed by Bujak patrols, it was difficult 
to accept Bujak’s murder of Central Lombok’s old and respected thieves. 
Despite their success in returning stolen goods, Bujak’s thuggish reputation 
contributed to a steady decline in public support for the organization. By 
August 1998, Bujak was forced to accept the moral supremacy of another 
militia, Amphibi, based in the Islamic heartland of eastern Lombok.
Bujak and Amphibi
In early 1999 Bujak came under fire. Not only did the organization con-
sist of former criminals but it was also rumoured to be involved in crime 
against communities that did not join their ranks or pay their dues. Bujak 
distributed stickers among its clients and, according to residents in Central 
Lombok in 1999, a stickerless house meant ‘fair game’ to Lombok’s Bujak-
friendly thieves. While Bujak owed its resurgence to the criminal complicity 
of Lombok’s police force in the ongoing crime-wave, Bujak’s lack of a strong 
moral leadership inspired the formation of what was to become one of 
Indonesia’s largest militias, Amphibi. 
Amphibi was formed in the small town of Jeroaru, East Lombok. Its lead-
ers were none other than the sons of the famous dakwah pioneer of the 1970s, 
TGH Mutawalli. Like their father, both brothers were attributed certain 
magical abilities. Amphibi was, by August 1999, the new banner of moral 
vigilance for tens and thousands of East Lombok’s Islamic youth. The sud-
den appeal of Amphibi was only partly due to the re-emergence of Islamic 
politics and Islamist militias at the national level. Like other militant Islamic 
groups around the country, it attributed its formation to the moral weakness 
and criminal complicity of the police in immoral businesses and conflicts. But 
also, the death of senior religious leader and Nahdlatul Wathan’s founder, 
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TGH Abdul Madjid, only contributed to the mergence of Amphibi and the 
demand for a new kind of charismatic leadership. For instance, TGH Abdul 
Madjid’s own daughters divided Nahdlatul Wathan into two separate camps 
as they vied for sole leadership of the organization and formed two separate 
militias to defend their interests. The combined effects of the separation of 
the police from the military, the death of TGH Maulana Sheik and the fall 
of the New Order made room for new forms of religious legitimacy in post-
New Order Lombok. 
In early 1999, TGH Abdul Madjid’s feuding daughters embraced forms of 
both messianic and modernist legitimacy reminiscent of the early twentieth-
century when reformist Islam and messianic rebellions developed side by 
side. Rauhun, the older sister and committed modernist, evicted her younger 
sibling, Raihanun, from Nahdlatul Wathan’s headquarters. In response to 
her eviction, Raihanun moved to the mountain village of Anjani, the former 
home of early twentieth century messianic movements. Meanwhile, Rauhun 
remained in Pancor, the orthodox center of her father, and watched her fol-
lowers slowly shift to follow her charismatic sister in Anjani, where, it was 
told, the visage (kharomah) of Raihanun’s deceased father displayed post-
mortem favour for the messianic daughter and often appeared during Friday 
prayers at the mosque. Less than six months after Raihanun’s eviction, both 
sisters had amassed large militias.
Amphibi, Lombok’s largest pamswakarsa, possessed a similar form of 
religious charisma. Amphibi’s leaders, the brothers TGH Sibaway and Guru 
Ukit, combined archaic Sasak-mysticism and moralistic modernism. TGH 
Sibaway headed his own pesantren in Jeroaru, East Lombok, and was respect-
ed for his abilities to draw young ‘toughs’ into the fold of Islam. His tendency 
towards more idiomatic Islamic mysticism was reminiscent of his father 
who employed local idioms and mythology to persuade Wetu Telu to adopt 
orthodox Islam during the military-backed dakwah missions of the late 1960s 
and 1970s.15 TGH Mutawalli’s other son, Guru Ukit, was less orthodox in 
his practices. While his bother was known for his devotion, Guru Ukit was 
believed to have inherited the magical powers of his father. Renowned for 
his drinking and unconventional behaviour, Guru Ukit’s street-wise ways 
wooed Jeroaru’s less than pious toughs to join Amphibi.16 The brothers, each 
15  TGH Mutawalli was famous for his use of magical displays of power to persuade Wetu 
Telu to adopt more orthodox Islamic ritual. A contemporary of Nahdlatul Wathan’s founder TGH 
Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, TGH Mutawalli, was famous for his use of cultural idioms to persuade 
traditionalist Muslims to adopt orthodox doctrine (Cederroth 1981).
16  Guru Ukit appears and disappears in mysterious ways. According to one close relation of 
Guru Ukit’s, he has been known to relieve himself almost ritualistically after saying his prayers 
in the mosque proper. To many of his followers such unusual behaviour suggests that his mysti-
cal gifts were even greater than those of his late father. Unlike his brother, Guru Ukit was friend 
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bearing traces of their father’s religious charisma, recruited over a 100,000 
members to their ranks only five months after Amphibi became formally 
active in April 1999. 
Localizing national vigilantilism
Amphibi’s leaders were by no means estranged by contemporary politi-
cal and security trends of the post-Soeharto 1999 elections by constructing 
‘Amphibi security posts’ (pos keamanan Amphibi) in communities under its 
care. Painted in bright orange and emblazoned with an Arabic script seal 
and motto, Amphibi’s security posts resembled New Order style ‘community 
guard’ platforms (pos siskamling) as well as more recent political party stands 
(pos partai). Vigilance was in the air and, whether politically reformist or 
security-oriented, Amphibi’s efforts were not wasted on Lombok’s residents. 
Amphibi’s leaders also combined political fashion with their own noto-
riety as simbik, magically endowed men, when they designed the Amphibi 
uniforms. During the 1999 election period, Lombok’s youth coveted the 
rompi, a multi-pocketed sleeveless vest worn by party paramilitary mem-
bers (satgas partai) and campaign leaders (jurkam). Only party-paramilitaries 
were allowed to use these vests. When Amphibi began recruitment for their 
night brigade several months after the election, it announced that each of 
its guards would receive a rompi and that every group of 30 men would be 
given a walkie-talkie for quick coordination ‘in the field’ (di lapangan). TGH 
Sibaway himself read mystical mantras into the vests to render the Amphibi 
guard invulnerable. Amphibi became a young man’s dream. Not only did its 
members gain access to moral religious authority derived from a prominent 
Tuan Guru and his powerful brother (Guru Ukit), but they too would be 
able to wear the rompi and speak through walkie-talkies like the party para-
militaries they saw in action during the 1999 campaign. Sitting astride their 
motorcycles or lounging at the Amphibi security post the Amphibi guard 
was the very picture of masculine authority. 
In July 1999, Amphibi began to recruit men to become active patrol guards 
to protect East Lombok’s communities. Whereas Bujak relied on bounty 
payments from the owners of stolen property, Amphibi actually charged 
its active guard 120,000 rupiah per man for the honour to wear the orange 
Amphibi vest and hunt criminals in their communities. Bujak relied on ties 
with criminals to recover lost goods whereas Amphibi used walkie-talkies 
to coordinate anti-criminal chases in the area. Bujak had the use of sacred 
weapons from certain noble houses while Amphibi members had mystically 
to Balinese, Chinese, Christians and Buddhists. Guru Ukit also built a house in the magical for-
est, Gawah Sukaroh, and gave his sons non-Islamic spirit names (aran pemalik) such as Tambing 
Muter and Sigar Penyalin.
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inscribed rompi rendering them invulnerable. It was not long before Bujak 
and Amphibi had a showdown. 
Amphibi expansion
On 2 August 1999, Amphibi and Bujak engaged in a full-scale battle on the 
border between East and Central Lombok. ‘The beach, the forest, the fields 
of the village of Pene, Central Lombok were orange with our colours as we 
went to battle with Bujak’ an Amphibi member said.17 Although neither 
group claimed injury nor fatalities, men present at the battle admitted that 
many people had been killed in the showdown.18 Amphibi’s victory was 
apparent when it started to open guard posts throughout central, northern 
and western Lombok. By December 1999, Amphibi had registered 220,000 
active members, nearly 10% of Lombok’s population and 25% of all adult 
males in East Lombok.19 Amphibi’s operations targeted middlemen for stolen 
goods and, unless they confessed to their crimes, killed them publicly. The 
police could do nothing to prevent Amphibi and Lombok’s pamswakarsa from 
taking over their functions.20 
Unlike Bujak or the other pamswakarsa in Lombok, Amphibi developed a 
modern form of policing criminal networks on the island. Through a combi-
nation of religious authority and police methods of surveillance and ‘crime 
prevention’, Amphibi drew up lists of ‘TO’ (target operasi) or operational tar-
gets which were little more than names of men collected from other thieves 
interrogated while under Amphibi detention. Amphibi replaced Bujak’s ritual 
tebusan scheme, which tended to focus on the stolen property, with a security 
apparatus bent on the identification and eradication of immoral criminals. 
Because of this shift in focus and procedure, Amphibi ranks diversified in 
late 1999. They were no longer loosely affiliated militias but sub-divided into 
special intelligence divisions broken down into groups of ‘trackers’ (pelacak) 
and ‘hunters’ (pemburu). ‘Trackers’ collected information concerning particu-
lar criminals, their activities and hideouts, while ‘hunters’ traced and caught 
criminals on the run. Amphibi gave captured thieves a choice. If thieves 
attempted to run, they were killed. If a thief chose not to run he was asked to 
‘repent’ or mentobat in the mosque at Jeroaru witnessed either by Guru Ukit 
17  Interviews with Amphibi leaders in Jeroaru, East Lombok, October, 2002.
18  One of the difficulties of writing about this conflict is that very few people will admit the 
number of people who died. According to the Lombok Post (3-8-1999) 11 men with injuries and 
one corpse were sent to the Selong Hospital but Amphibi members claimed that truckloads of 
victims had been evacuated to be treated locally.
19  National Census Survey 1998.
20  Interview with Amphibi members in Jeroaru, East Lombok, October 2002.
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or TGH Sibaway. After their first mentobat, criminals were forced to confess 
the names of their partners in crime, hence the TO list of operational targets. 
After their second mentobat they would be held at Amphibi’s jail in Jeroaru. 
Depending on the crime, TGH Sibaway, the judge (hakim) in Amphibi’s court, 
would decide the duration of their sentence. After the thief’s third offence, 
however, the criminal would be considered ‘on the run’ (buron) after which 
Amphibi’s ‘hunters’ would take over and he would be traced and killed.
The Sengkongo incident
One of the most sensitive cases occurred when Amphibi attacked a Balinese 
nobleman’s family in a Balinese village near Lombok’s provincial capital of 
Mataram. As a nephew of one of Amphibi’s victims explained: 
At approximately 1:00 a.m., 18 December 1999, 45 trucks full of Amphibi militia 
drove from East Lombok to Mataram in search of two Balinese men suspected 
of fencing goods for thief networks in the hamlet of Sengkongo, Mataram. They 
were, to use Amphibi’s words, TO or operational targets. Upon reaching the vil-
lage Amphibi demanded the men to surrender themselves. Seeing the presence 
of over a 1000 armed men in the village, a landless old flute player, I Gusti Made 
Banjar, struck his kentongan wooden slit gong to sound the communal alarm. 
Upon hearing this, Amphibi guards killed him instantly with scores of deep 
machete wounds. 
After dragging I Gusti Made Banjar’s broken body down the road in Sengkongo, 
Amphibi cried out demands for Si Kentung, the alias of I Gusti Made Padma of 
the same community. Amphibi suspected I Gusti Made Padma of thievery and 
cut off one of his upraised hands and severely wounded the other. Amphibi left 
the community of Sengkongo on the morning of 18 December. Passing by the 
Mataram market of Beretais, Amphibi made victory rounds waving the severed 
hand of I Gusti Made Padma who was, after further police investigation, found 
innocent of the crimes Amphibi claimed he had committed. (ICG 2003c.)
The evening after the Sengkongo killing Amphibi trucks paraded the Lingsar 
area, the location for the ritual battle-of-rice-cakes between Sasaks and 
Balinese to be held the following morning.21 Read as a direct challenge to 
the Balinese minority on the island tensions rose as Lombok prepared to 
celebrate Christmas, Balinese New Year (Nyepi) and the end of the Muslim 
fasting month of Lebaran in the same three-week period. The Sengkongo 
21  The Lingsar rice-cake battle is often explained as a cathartic opportunity for Balinese and 
Sasak young men to beat up on one another without causing a conflict. In 1999, the Lingsar ritual 
was run by the police and military and, because it was held during the fasting month, there were 
very few participants. Interview with Balinese men at Lingsar temple, October 2002.
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incident was barely mentioned in the regional press for fear that Balinese 
would seek retribution against Sasak Muslims in Bali.22 Over the following 
month, several meetings between Balinese Hindu leaders and Mataram’s 
mayor did not result in justice for the killing of I Gusti Made Banjar. Instead, 
Lombok’s Balinese were allowed to form their own militia called, Dharma 
Wicesa (Balinese: Dharma Power). And so militias beget militias.
The Mataram riots 
On 17 January 2000, only a month after the Amphibi attack on Sengkongo, 
over 20,000 Sasak Muslim men crowded into Mataram to hold a religious 
gathering (Tabligh Akbar) in protest of the violence against Muslims in 
Maluku. Within three hours, small, organized groups ran through the streets 
of Mataram targeting and burning Christian homes and Churches and emp-
tying boxes of hymnbooks to be torched in the streets. During the course 
of the riots, most of the Chinese owned stores and Christian housing com-
plexes located outside of the Balinese protected enclave of Cakranegara were 
burned to the ground or looted. 
Many theories about the riots circulated. A simple economic analysis 
would reveal that Lombok’s peasantry had more than enough reason to 
target West Lombok’s market centres. Since the outset of the economic crisis, 
Sasak sellers accused Chinese and Arab merchants of taking advantage of the 
irregular inflation of sembako goods for profit.23 In fact, as early as January 
1998, Mataram’s Chinese merchants regularly closed their stores in response 
to rumours that poor Sasaks from East and Central Lombok were preparing 
to attack markets in the provincial capital of Mataram. Not only were shop 
owners stockholding goods, but Mataram merchants were buying up gold 
in Lombok’s hinterland at pre-crisis prices. Once peasants became aware that 
urban merchants were wily destructing their meagre savings, it was feared 
that they would seek retribution by looting the town’s Chinese-controlled 
market centres.
There were other reasons that contributed to the riots in January 2000. 
To members of intelligence units the riots came not as a surprise. They had 
warned the villagers in my research area to avoid Mataram on the 17th of 
January. By the 15th, scores of trucks were pouring into Mataram in prepara-
tion for the event. Riding on the heels of the recent violence in East Timor, 
22  Interview with Lombok Post and Bali Post reporters March 2003.
23  Sembako referred to ‘nine staple goods’ required by most Indonesians to stock their kitchens. 
The prices of these products, especially rice, sugar and cooking oil, fluctuated wildly according 
to varying degrees of inflation, stockpiling, and racketeering in Lombok’s markets. 
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it was hard not to assume that a conspiracy was afoot. At the national level, 
tensions between the recently elected President Abdurrahman Wahid and 
General Wiranto had piqued since the military backed violence in East 
Timor had made international and domestic observers wary of Wiranto’s 
counter-reformist intentions. Meanwhile, Wahid’s ambivalent stance towards 
the Christian-Muslim conflicts in Maluku had created an outcry of protest 
by Indonesia’s conservative Islamic groups. A CD-rom tape of the violence 
in Ambon showing a pregnant Muslim woman and her child being killed 
was distributed throughout the Muslim communities of Lombok. Also, a 
fake Christian missionary book was distributed ending with the phrase, 
‘all Muslims must be exterminated’. It was made to look as if Christians 
had made the book.24 Some conspiracy theorists blamed Jakarta-based 
actors for the Mataram riots and pointed in this respect at the role of Eggy 
Sudjana, the chairman of the Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (PPMI, 
Indonesian Muslim Merchants Association) and associated with General 
Prabowo Subianto, whose right hand man, Hairul Muslim, was among the 
men involved in the Tabliqh Akbar meetings of 13 January 2000, before the 
riots.25 Eggy Sudjana and friends worked with the Tablig Akhbar commit-
tee and agreed that the head of Amphibi would be responsible for security 
at the demonstration scheduled for 17 January 2000. Strangely, however, on 
the day of the violence, Amphibi’s walkie talkies were not operational, while 
another group began distributing flyers to all the mosques crying for war 
against Christians. 
After the riots, many of Lombok’s academicians, politicians and activ-
ists were arrested for their involvement in the Tabligh Akbar held prior to 
the riots. National actors, most notably Eggy Sudjana, were exonerated for 
lack of sufficient evidence. By lack of any real explanation of how and why 
the riots were organized, conspiracy theories gave meaning to violence and 
reinforced the credence of half-truths regarding the role of Wiranto and his 
partnership with military-friendly radicals. Conspiracies aside, in a very real 
way, Amphibi exerted its power over post-riot Lombok without challenge 
24  A police intelligence officer in Lombok concurred that, in fact, during the month prior to 
the riots both the ‘anti-Islamic’ handbook and the CD-rom coverage of the murder of Moluccan 
women and children were being circulated throughout Lombok.
25  According to the head of Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia for West Nusa Tenggara, Baharuddin 
Anwar, Lombok’s Muslim leaders held meetings on 13 January 2000 to prepare for the Tabliqh 
Akbar protest of violence against Muslims in Maluku scheduled for the 17th of January 2000. A 
letter was apparently signed on that day and sent to Lombok’s Christian community demand-
ing that they write a letter condemning Christian violence on Muslims in Maluku. ‘The letter 
was signed by TGH Sibaway, head of Amphibi and listed as the head of PPMI (Eggy Sudjana’s 
organization) in West Nusa Tenggara. When we contacted him to confirm whether he had signed 
the letter or not TGH Sibaway denied it’ said Catholic leader Remmy Giusnaga. 
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lending further credence to the theory that Amphibi had anticipated and 
profited from the insecurity Mataram’s riots had produced. 
Amphibi’s decline 
Within two months after the riots, it was not police or the military that were 
empowered, but instead Amphibi had established branches throughout 
western Lombok with memberships, they claimed, swelling to more than 
600,000. What initially appeared to be a somewhat overzealous approach to 
neighbourhood crime control had become an island-wide moral movement. 
Even the governor, Harun Al’Rasyid attended Amphibi ceremonies and the 
island’s businessmen made large ‘donations’ to Amphibi’s headquarters. 
Villages not included in the Amphibi network formed their own small vil-
lage-based militias to prevent an Amphibi incursion into their communities.26 
The emergence of counter-Amphibi militias was most popular in villages, 
such as Perampauan, known to harbour large criminal networks. In fact, the 
Perampauan-Amphibi conflict of January 2001 showed most clearly how vil-
lage-based militias were capable of undermining Amphibi’s dominance. 
As indicated above, Perampauan is famous for its criminals and its ‘service’ 
for victims of stolen goods. The Perampauan conflict began with the death 
in December 1999 of I Gusti Made Banjar of Sengkongo, the Balinese hamlet 
located in the larger village of Perampauan. The loss of I Gusti Made Padma’s 
hand was due to a larger effort of Amphibi to track down 51 Perampauan 
thieves. Amphibi insisted that Perampauan village authorities surrender the 
men or suffer the consequences. TGH Sibaway himself came to Perampauan 
and swore in about 17 Perampauan residents during the months of March 
and April 2000. Their TO status remained, however, and over the upcoming 
months, tensions rose between the neighbouring ‘Amphibi village’ of Bongor 
and the ‘thief village’ of Perampauan.27 In part to forestall the development 
of an Amphibi branch in their community, Perampauan leaders developed 
their own village-based pamswakarsa called Perkasa Pengsor. Perkasa Pengsor 
was limited to simple night security activities and, unlike Amphibi, did not 
operate outside the village boundaries of Perampauan.
On 10 January 2001, Perampauan villager Saida and two friends were on their 
way to the beach when they were ambushed by a group of masked Amphibi 
26  Elang Merah (Sakra), Sapu Jagad and Ababil (TGH Bodak) in East Lombok, Perkasa 
Pengsor in Perampauan (West Lombok), Pemenang Bersatu in Tanjung (northwest Lombok), 
and Dharma Wicesa for the embattled Balinese minority and Langlang Jagat among northern 
Lombok’s Wetu Telu were all formed as counter-Amphibi militias. 
27  Interviews in Perampauan and Bongor, April 2003. 
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members. This attack was, according to Perampauan residents, a trap to draw out 
Perampauan aggression. Perampauan residents and Bongor Amphibi members 
engaged in full-scale battle in front of the Bongor Mosque using handmade fire-
arms and large fishing bombs. A man from Bongor was killed by a handmade fire-
arm and both sides suffered serious injuries from arrows, machetes and spears. 
The morning after the Bongor battle, Perampauan residents stood watch 
as Amphibi prepared to launch a dawn attack on the village. According to 
Perampauan residents present during the attack, at 5:30 in the morning 6,000 
Amphibi members from East Lombok arrived in Perampauan in open air trucks. 
The Perampauan religious leader, TGH Mansyur told the villagers to ‘protect our 
village from the PKI (communist party)’.28 To everyone’s surprise, Perampauan’s 
villagers resisted Amphibi’s offensive and killed at least 20 of Amphibi’s front line 
militants. 
Amphibi’s failure to defeat Perampauan was the beginning of the steady 
fragmentation of the organization in 2001. Amphibi’s pan-Lombok appeal 
and its reputation for kebal (invulnerability) were dampened by the news 
of Amphibi’s thousand-man flight from only a few hundred home-village 
defenders. Wisely, West Lombok district head, Iskandar, had made use of 
regional autonomy discourse to allow the formation of village-based pam-
swakarsa in Perampauan. With their own pamswakarsa, Perampauan residents 
were portrayed not as criminals and infidels but as villagers upholding 
the principles of solidarity and autonomy, one of the reformist principles 
of regional autonomy legislation. After their defeat, Amphibi continued to 
maintain large branch offices in western Lombok but they no longer obeyed 
the East Lombok leadership. Instead, Mataram’s Amphibi branches began 
to run petty-extortion schemes to supplement their increasingly localized 
incomes. Very little of this money was sent to Amphibi headquarters in East 
Lombok and, according to Amphibi officials, they could do little to control 
their men in West Lombok.
 Regional elections: politicians, clerics and criminals
In mid-2003, heated discussions arose about the election of district heads in 
Lombok. Especially East Lombok witnessed intense rivalries between com-
peting Tuan Guru and noble camps. Since 1999, each of Lombok’s Tuan Guru 
and militia heads controlled a certain number of seats in the local parliament 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). While during the New Order 
28  When seen from the perspective of village autonomy, Amphibi’s efforts to track and 
dismember the Perampauan crime-network through forced confessions (mentobat) had turned 
Amphibi into the very embodiment of the ‘subversive’, a title reserved for PKI and armed sepa-
ratists under the New Order. 
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East Lombok’s district heads were recruited from the military, the election 
of civilian Golkar candidate, Haji Syadan, in 1999 depended very much on 
the support of Lombok’s Tuan Guru, the most powerful of which controlled 
whole blocks of seats within East Lombok’s district parliament. In June 2003, 
however, a couple of ‘wild card’ candidates decided to buck the trend of fol-
lowing only Tuan Guru and, instead, used Lombok’s criminal networks to 
gain authority among the members of legislature. 
For instance, on 1 June 2003 a group of thieves, organized under the name 
‘The Night Bats Group’ (Grup Kelelawar Maling), held a demonstration in 
front of the district parliament in Selong, East Lombok. Amak Kalep, the 
head of ‘The Night Bats Group’ voiced his support for H. Lutfi Mali, one of 
the candidates for district head of East Lombok. Playing traditional drum 
sets (kendang beliq) and dressed in Sasak ritual clothing the thieves marched 
beside the members of East Lombok’s pamswakarsa, Elang Merah, the very 
militia tasked with hunting down and apprehending the men with whom 
they now marched. When asked whether he feared arrest or attack after con-
fessing to be the head of East Lombok’s largest thief network Amaq Kalep 
stated: ‘All of the members here today have already nyikep (carry sacred weap-
onry with mantras read over them), we are fully prepared’.29 Commenting 
on such open cooperation between politicians, thieves, and pamswakarsa, a 
friend from a Mataram-based Islamic lobbying group explained it best: 
It is crucial for a district head candidate to have control over the thief networks in 
his area. Despite the presence of pamswakarsa, each year shows a marked increase 
in reported crimes. If a district candidate cuts a deal with the thief network he can 
promise the people that they will be free of crime if he is elected. When people see 
that the crime has stopped they know that the district head candidate is a man of 
his word and that he has cut a deal with the criminals. Several of the political Tuan 
Guru have students in villages known to harbour thief networks. In fact, many 
of the thieves rely on the Tuan Guru for kebal magic and other meditative arts to 
protect themselves during their stealing raids.
The fact that Haji Lutfi had the authority to recruit both thieves and anti-
thief militias to demonstrate at the same event displayed that he knew how 
closely pamswakarsa and thieves actually work in practice. If Lutfi was able to 
control both groups, he would be able to divert criminal attacks away from 
communities that supported his candidacy. Of course, Lutfi was not the first 
candidate to employ such tactics but he was the only one willing to make 
such an open display of normally behind the scenes moves and political 
strategy. Despite his efforts Lutfi was never elected. 
29  Bali Post 2-6-2003. Amaq Kalep added that the members of his group number 1,791 strong: 
‘Those are only the heads of the thief groupings. Each head controls anywhere from 10 to 15 
subordinate thieves’. 
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Conclusion
The fall of Soeharto had ushered in profound changes for Lombok. The 
combined effects of the 1997-1998 monetary crisis, mass-based politics and 
regional autonomy presented Lombok’s leaders and communities with new 
problems and opportunities. 
The demise of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime meant that violence, oppres-
sion and the right to define ‘criminality’ would no longer be controlled by 
the centralized institutions of the state but would be distributed to Lombok’s 
own leaders. Initially, the responsibility to protect one’s community was 
assumed as a reformist duty against the ‘provocateurs’ and rogue agents of 
Soeharto’s state. This changed when new leaders emerged who established 
locally defined forms of ‘law and order’. In response to Lombok’s crime 
wave, the traditional tebusan schemes long employed by criminal networks 
to hold stolen goods as collateral against bounty payments were replaced 
by a new style of Islamist vigilance against immoral thieves. It was not long 
before Bujak’s approach to negotiated justice was replaced by Amphibi’s 
much more righteous and unilateral effort to exorcise the immoral criminal 
from Lombok’s communities. Amphibi’s reputation for moralist purity over 
backstreet dealings succeeded to a certain degree and their militia established 
chapters in virtually every corner of Lombok. The Mataram riots only inten-
sified public desire for community-security and locally defined dominion. 
Militias beget militias and by 2001, ‘thief villages’ (desa-desa maling) devel-
oped their own counter-Amphibi security posts capable of undermining 
Amphibi’s increasingly bureaucratic and murderous attacks. 
As important as it is to look for a Jakarta-based interest behind the 
Mataram riots, it is even more important to try to understand what local 
needs Amphibi satisfied in the communities where it thrived. What we dis-
cover is not Islamic reformism intent on the implementation of syariat law 
nor a military-backed group of mercenaries, but a heterodox movement full 
of paradoxes. Lombok’s militias are led by charismatic siblings each of whom 
embody a mutually antagonistic part of Lombok’s cultural and political past. 
Amphibi’s Guru Ukit is a drunkard and Sasak mystic while his brother, 
TGH Sibaway, is an orthodox preacher. Nahdlatul Wathan’s feuding sisters 
are divided in similarly contrasting, but decidedly religious, ways. Rauhun, 
the elder and more orthodox sister, stands firm in her father’s headquarters 
in Pancor and remains loyal to Islamic rationalism and scriptural purity. 
Meanwhile, Raihanun the younger sister of the two, fled Pancor to espouse 
more messianic Islamic themes and relocated her substantial base of follow-
ers in the former centre of Lombok’s messianic movements, Desa Anjani. 
H. Lutfi’s campaign for district head of East Lombok in 2003 illustrates the 
nature of the politics of security in Lombok. The Islamic organizations and 
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the various island-wide and local militia groupings embody the particular 
way in which on Lombok political action has been decentralized. They illus-
trate the extent to which (anti) criminal action lie at the heart of Lombok’s 
regional autonomy. 
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How civil is civil society?

david henley, maria j.c. schouten and alex j. ulaen
Preserving the peace in  
post-new order minahasa
Indonesia has now muddled through six years since the fall of Soeharto, and 
its economy has grown every year for the last five.1 East Timor has been lib-
erated, free elections held, repressive laws abolished, and greater autonomy 
granted to the regions. Yet in the literature concerning the consequences of 
this Reformasi, pessimism prevails. Decentralization and the end of authori-
tarian rule from Jakarta, it is pointed out, have led to decentralized corrup-
tion, to the emergence of local kleptocracies, to environmental despoliation, 
and in the worst cases to ethnic strife and the breakdown of social order. 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken represent a widespread view 
when they write, in their introduction to this volume, of ‘the agony of decen-
tralization’ and of Indonesia-watchers torn between ‘professional optimism’ 
and ‘realistic pessimism’.
But if you happen to go to North Sulawesi, all the pessimism seems rather 
far-fetched. At the provincial airport the terminal is brand new and the dive 
tourists keep coming for the nearby Bunaken reefs. The city of Manado makes 
a more prosperous impression than in the past and boasts a complete new 
seafront on reclaimed land, with lavish shopping centres and entertainment 
venues. Loudspeakers on the steeples of numerous churches broadcast sug-
ary evangelical music to match the amplified calls to prayer from the city’s 
many mosques. Well-maintained roads lead up to the mountains and across 
the tranquil plateau of Minahasa. And this in a mixed but predominantly 
Christian area not so far from three other Christian enclaves where things 
have gone badly wrong in recent years: Poso, the North Moluccas, and 
Ambon. North Sulawesi, since Muslim Gorontalo divorced amicably from it 
in 2001 and became a separate province, is roughly 70% Christian, as is the 
1  This chapter is based on research carried out in North Sulawesi by David Henley in October 
and November 2003, by Maria Schouten in August, September and December 2004, and by Alex 
Ulaen intermittently throughout the period since the end of the New Order in 1998. Key inter-














Map 12. North Sulawesi
Preserving the peace in post-New Order Minahasa 309
provincial capital, Manado. In Minahasa, the area which forms the immedi-
ate hinterland of Manado and is home to the province’s largest ethnic group, 
the figure is a little over 80% if the city and its port of Bitung are included, or 
90% if they are not.
In North Sulawesi the impact of the Asian economic crisis which pre-
cipitated the fall of Soeharto was muted, and the subsequent recovery rapid. 
The provincial economy contracted by a mere 2.4% in 1998 (against 14% for 
Indonesia as a whole), then grew by almost 6% in 1999 – faster than in 1997 
– and has continued to expand at similar rates since. This good performance 
results partly from the peace and order which has allowed North Sulawesi to 
benefit from the troubles elsewhere as Christian and Sino-Indonesian refugees 
(and potential refugees) from the Moluccas and Java have invested money in 
Manado. Government services still work tolerably well and if administrative 
corruption has worsened as a result of decentralization and democratization, 
it evidently has not done so sufficiently to deter inward investment. Neither 
is there much sign of political conflict or repression. Non-government organi-
zations and political parties flourish, and state propaganda is limited to a 
softer version of the old Pancasila injunction to toleration of cultural and reli-
gious diversity. In an initiative supported by all of the province’s significant 
religious organizations, 2002 was officially designated a Tahun Kasih or ‘Year 
of Love’ in North Sulawesi, and the years 2003 and 2004 obtained the same 
designation. ‘Peace, in Manado’, as one visiting journalist has noted, ‘is some-
thing that many people are actively working at all the time’ (Lynch 2003:29).
This chapter examines the anatomy of peace in post-Soeharto North 
Sulawesi, particularly Minahasa. Attention is paid to two spheres, civil 
society and the state, in which a combination of favourable institutions and 
prudent decisions has helped to prevent the kind of conflict that has occurred 
in some other parts of Indonesia, particularly in areas where there is a large 
Christian population, since the end of the New Order in 1998. Of primary 
importance here, we argue, is the existence in Minahasa of a rather robust 
civil society based largely on religious organizations. Potential conflicts, on 
the whole, have been avoided or suppressed thanks both to the internal dis-
cipline of these organizations and to the close mutual cooperation between 
them, especially at leadership level. A second crucial factor has been the role 
of a local state which maintains a more or less legitimate near-monopoly over 
the means of violence, and is able and willing to use this to prevent rather 
than foment conflict. Besides these political advantages and achievements, 
economic and demographic factors have also tended to favour the preserva-
tion of peace. The local economy has been a stabilizing influence in that it 
features a relatively egalitarian distribution of wealth, and proved resilient 
in the face of the international business crisis which struck in 1997. The clear 
demographic predominance of Christians within the province, and especially 
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within Minahasa, has helped to moderate both Christian fears and Muslim 
ambitions in regional politics.
The fact that peace and order have so far been maintained by this com-
bination of a strong civil society, a relatively civilized state and a favourable 
set of economic and demographic conditions, we stress, does not mean 
that the long-standing tensions between the different religious groupings 
in Minahasa have been resolved. On the contrary, those tensions have been 
heightened since 1998 both by outbursts of religious conflict elsewhere in 
Indonesia, and by policy initiatives from Jakarta which are seen as hostile to 
Indonesian Christians. The ideological and political effort currently devoted 
to preserving the peace is in fact a measure of its fragility. At the end of the 
chapter we very briefly attempt to put the Minahasan experience in wider 
Indonesian context, and ask whether it offers lessons for other regions and 
for the future.
Civil society and religion: affinity or antithesis? 
In a world increasingly divided by religious conflict, faith often seems the 
enemy of civility and it can be hard to remember that historically speaking 
religion has been an important force for integration and cooperation within 
societies, nations, and civilizations. Under the right circumstances the world 
religions, by providing institutions and norms of conduct which transcend 
kinship and local community, can support the development of social capital 
(networks and trust) and civil society (association and cooperation) among 
co-believers. This observation, often thought to originate with Max Weber, 
actually goes back much further. For early modern Europeans, in fact, the 
truth of it was self-evident: even John Locke, making a famous plea for reli-
gious tolerance in his Letter concerning toleration of 1689, warned that ‘those 
are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God’, since ‘promises, 
covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no 
hold upon an atheist’ (Locke 1961:93). Besides this link between religious eth-
ics and social integration, the function of religious institutions themselves as 
buttresses of social order was equally obvious well before Weber and Marx 
made it a classic doctrine in sociology. Alexis de Tocqueville (1961:154-60), 
visiting the United States in the 1830s at a time when the federal government 
was weak and the disintegration of the country seemed imminent, concluded 
that mass membership of churches and church associations was the main 
thing still holding American society together.
In the context of modern Indonesia, some have argued that Islam and 
Islamic institutions play the same kind of role in promoting cooperation and 
generating a common identity among the members of their huge constitu-
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ency (Van Bruinessen 2004; Hefner 2000). Jim Schiller, in his contribution to 
this volume, portrays Islamic teachers, Islamic pesantren schools and the 
Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama as guardians of stability and civility 
at the local level in Jepara (Central Java). In Minahasa, where Christianity 
rather than Islam is the majority faith, the Christian churches certainly play 
that role. The churches of Minahasa are among the most impressive exam-
ples of non-governmental institutions in Indonesia. The largest of them, 
the Protestant Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (GMIM), has some 650,000 
members, more than three quarters of the population of Minahasa if this is 
taken to exclude the multi-ethnic towns of Manado and Bitung. The GMIM 
runs more than 800 schools and a major hospital, and supports diverse chari-
table and conservation activities. It offers opportunities for social mobility 
to women – more than half of its ministers are female – and, through its 
educational scholarships, to the underprivileged. It also owns businesses 
and plantations, and is very influential in provincial politics: no governor of 
North Sulawesi, it is sometimes claimed, could attain that position without 
first cultivating good relations with the head of the GMIM synod.
The organizational discipline of the GMIM is generally held to surpass 
that of the state itself. Instructions issued by its synod are followed faithfully 
and quickly by its clergy. Its lay membership is tightly organized into units 
of 15 to 25 households called kolom, meetings of which, held at least once a 
week, serve both religious and social purposes and are important occasions 
for the exchange of information. The leaders of the kolom, and of each local 
Protestant congregation as a whole, are lay people elected every five years in 
a lengthy process which requires the active participation of the local church 
members. During the New Order, these elections of lay church officials prob-
ably came closer to genuinely democratic procedures than did anything in 
the sphere of formal politics. Another way in which allegiance to church and 
congregation is expressed is through the sharing of material resources. The 
GMIM raises at least 40 billion rupiah every year in voluntary funding from 
local sources. Fund-raising is in fact a major reason for the existence of many 
church-affiliated associations, although this is never stated openly. The offer-
tories during church services and other gatherings owe part of their success to 
the opportunities they provide for display. Minahasans consider gift-giving a 
major virtue, especially when the gift is for the church with its aura of sacred-
ness. A well-publicized religious donation is therefore an effective tool for the 
enhancement of status, and in contrast with the usual practice in European 
churches, offertory giving in Minahasa is typically a public procedure. Much 
of the money collected goes to fund the construction of church buildings: the 
countless churches of Minahasa, often of a most peculiar architecture, are 
symbols of prosperity as well as piety, and are there to boost the prestige of 
their congregations and communities. Another part of the funds, however, is 
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earmarked for social institutions such as schools and health services, which are 
accessible to members of all faiths.
Similar forms of internal organization extending down to and below the vil-
lage level, and similar combinations of religious, social, economic and political 
activities, are to be found among Minahasa’s other Christian denominations 
– most importantly the Roman Catholic church, but also minority Protestant 
groups such as Seventh-day Adventists and Pentecostals. The GMIM, how-
ever, is special not only because of its size, but also for historical reasons. It is 
regarded as the main heir to the Protestant missions of the nineteenth century 
which originally converted Minahasa to Christianity. Although the GMIM as 
such was not founded until 1934, this still makes it one of the oldest institu-
tions in Minahasa. It is also perhaps the most truly Minahasan. Whereas the 
GMIM has its headquarters in Tomohon, in the heartland of Minahasa, almost 
all of the other churches are branches of larger organizations based elsewhere 
in the world. Particularly since Minahasa ceased to exist as an administrative 
unit in 2003 after falling victim to the nationwide pemekaran trend discussed in 
the introduction to this volume, the GMIM can also be said to form the central 
institutional focus of Minahasan ethnic identity. Over the last two years the old 
administrative district (afdeling, kabupaten) of Minahasa, dating from colonial 
times, has been progressively dismembered into three new districts and an 
autonomous township (kota).
Tension between religion and civil society arises when what civility calls 
for is not solidarity among co-believers, or what Robert Putnam (2000) calls 
the ‘bonding’ form of social capital, but rather the ‘bridging’ form which 
makes possible tolerance and cooperation between followers of different 
faiths. A system of cooperation which depends on encapsulating individuals 
within a more or less uniform institutional, ethical and cultural environ-
ment may prove worse than useless when it runs up against another such 
system with equally universal ambitions. The violent ‘clash of civilizations’ 
(Huntington 1996) which, according to some observers, has developed across 
the world since 2001 exacerbates tensions between Muslims and Christians 
in Indonesia, encouraging them to see themselves as members of global 
diasporas in conflict rather than as Indonesian citizens of different religious 
persuasion. In Minahasa things are not helped by a surprisingly direct iden-
tification with Israel: advertisements above Manado streets offer tours of the 
Holy Land on the same format as those advertising Haj packages to Saudia 
Arabia for Muslim pilgrims. In response to the threat (real and perceived) 
from laskar jihad organizations based in Java, Minahasan Christians have 
provided equal proof that social capital has its dark side by using it to cre-
ate their own paramilitary groups. The most important of these, the Brigade 
Manguni or ‘Owl Brigade’ (the owl was an oracular bird in local pagan belief 
and has also become the symbol of Christian Minahasa), is led by a former 
Preserving the peace in post-New Order Minahasa 313
Jakarta gangster and reportedly sponsored by a retired Kopassus general.
Such militias enjoy considerable cultural appeal in Minahasa, where 
there is a general admiration for forceful people who dare to speak up for 
themselves. Brigade Manguni, nevertheless, has shown restraint by pre-
senting itself as a critical complement to, rather than an opponent of, the 
government apparatus. The churches themselves have kept their distance 
from this and other paramilitary groups, and an attempt in 2002 to set up a 
militia directly affiliated to the GMIM was quickly disowned by the synod 
of that church. Moreover, since 1998 the leaders of all the major religious 
organizations in Minahasa – including, crucially, the Islamic groups, most 
importantly the local arm of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of 
Indonesian Islamic Scholars) – have cooperated intensively with each other 
to help prevent any outburst of the kind of religious violence afflicting other 
parts of Indonesia. When 15 truckloads of Brigade Manguni youths set off for 
Manado from Tomohon at Idul Fitri in December 2002 to ‘help the govern-
ment’ impose order on ‘chaotic’ (semrawut) Muslim street traders, they were 
prevented from entering the city by local police warned of their approach by 
the head of the MUI, who had in turn been tipped off by a prominent mem-
ber of the ‘Catholic’ militia Legium Christum.
The internal discipline of the individual religious groups and organi-
zations, meanwhile, is used to good effect in preventing inflammatory 
reactions to events inside or outside Minahasa. The GMIM, for example, 
has been able to ensure that its preachers, sometimes despite themselves, 
keep stressing Christ’s injunction to turn the other cheek in the face of any 
provocation. Sermons and meditations at religious assemblies of all denomi-
nations frequently include positive references to people of other creeds, 
who are described as saudara (brothers and sisters) worthy of kasih (love). 
An important part of the cooperation to prevent violence has taken place 
in the framework of the provincial government’s Badan Kerjasama Antar 
Umat Beragama (BKSAUA, Organization for Inter-Faith Cooperation), an 
institution which was established early in the New Order period but became 
much more active and important after the fall of Soeharto. The BKSAUA has 
numerous local branches, even in villages where the only religious divides 
are between different Christian churches. The leader of a BKSAUA branch 
committee is typically an elderly, generally respected person. This is not a 
demanding job, but the prestige attached to the function is evident from the 
treatment the incumbents receive on formal occasions in the village.
To what extent the contribution of religious leaders and organizations to 
the preservation of the peace in Minahasa actually rests on religious princi-
ples, and to what extent on prudent self-interest, is a moot question to which 
we will return below. But whatever the motivations behind it, up to now it 
appears to have worked. A civil society of sorts exists in Minahasa, and there 
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is a good chance that it will continue to exist in the future. But this is not the 
kind of civil society in which individual citizens interact freely within the 
bounds of the law, political and associational life is based on secular, rational 
principles, and religion is a private affair. It is more like Dutch society in the 
time of verzuiling or ‘pillarization’, when religious orientations (Protestant, 
Catholic, or secular) determined which schools people went to, which asso-
ciations they joined, and to a large extent also which political views they 
held. This is not to argue, as do Deborah James and Albert Schrauwers 
(2003:59), that the close association which exists between religious and politi-
cal behaviour and institutions in many parts of Indonesia reflects ‘the effects 
of a Dutch colonial culture’. Nevertheless the situation in the Netherlands 
half a century ago was similar to that of contemporary Minahasa in the sense 
that the different religious ‘pillars’, partly because of their very separation, 
were able to coexist in peace despite deep disagreements and prejudices, the 
political balance between them maintained by a constant process of accom-
modation and compromise between their respective elites (Lijphart 1968). In 
Holland, it was out of this framework that a more secular form of civil society 
ultimately evolved. But to expect a rapid secularization of political life in 
any part of Indonesia today would be unrealistic at best. And in Minahasa, 
where religious institutions are deeply intertwined with the maintenance of 
social stability, the provision of public goods, and indeed the redistribution 
of wealth, such a development would also be undesirable from any realistic 
point of view.
Conflict management and the social contract: bringing the state back in
Although religious leaders in Minahasa are directly involved in maintain-
ing the peace, when it comes to dealing with potential flashpoints such as 
the Idul Fitri incident mentioned above they are careful to rely on the police 
rather than their own followers to nip the trouble in the bud. That coercion 
and indeed violence will sometimes be necessary for this purpose is frankly 
acknowledged, even emphasized, by Christian and Islamic leaders alike. 
Their position, according to a statement issued by BKSAUA members in July 
2001, is that any disturbance of public order should be ditindak tegas (firmly 
dealt with), by which they mean little less than that the police should shoot 
to kill before the trouble can escalate. The special bimbingan rohani or ‘spir-
itual guidance’ which the GMIM provides to members of the police force is 
designed not to increase their awareness of human rights, but to give them 
the courage and resolution to use force if necessary to maintain the peace. 
It is likely that religious organizations also supply more concrete (financial) 
forms of support to police personnel. They also work in close cooperation 
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with other organs of the state. Besides the official meetings of the BKSAUA, 
from 1999 to 2002 a small rapat kordinasi, described by some as ‘the real 
DPRD´ (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, provincial assembly) and com-
prising permanent representatives of the Protestant, Catholic and Muslim 
communities as well as the provincial government, the police, the judiciary 
and the military, was held at least once every month in Manado to coordinate 
security policy.
Many informants not themselves directly associated with the state have 
assured us that in Minahasa there is still considerable public respect for the 
institutions of government. This respect improves the prospects for peace 
by making people reluctant to take the law into their own hands. The atti-
tude that only the state has the right to punish disturbers of the peace is 
found even in the ranks of the Minahasan paramilitary groups. Journalist 
Jake Lynch, reporting on a ‘show of strength’ staged by Brigade Manguni 
in response to the Bali bombing (and the simultaneous explosion outside 
the Philippine consulate in Manado) in October 2002, was surprised to find 
that the demonstrators were not bent on retaliating against Islamic terror 
themselves.
Their rampage through the streets, hundreds clinging to open-topped vehicles, 
wearing black t-shirts and shouting at the top of their voices, looked both spec-
tacular and slightly sinister [...]. Listen carefully to these people, though, and they 
project a sort of muscular communitarianism, which may not be as threatening 
as their appearance suggests. What would they do, if, for instance, any of their 
members discovered ‘outsiders’ in Manado? Why, hand them over to the police, 
of course. If they keep their word [...] then that would at least represent a step 
forward from the situation in other, more troubled parts. In Poso, for instance, the 
trigger incident for the first round of rioting came when a Muslim man, injured 
in a street brawl with Christian youths, ran instead into a local Mosque to rouse 
fellow believers to take revenge. (Lynch 2003:30.)
Whether Manado’s Muslim youths would take quite the same view is less 
clear: the composition of the local state in Minahasa, although far from 
homogeneous, reflects that of the population at large, in which Christians 
form a clear majority. Certainly it would be naive to assume that public sup-
port for the police as guardians of public order in Minahasa results entirely 
from trust in the impartiality of official justice. Soon after the fall of Soeharto, 
however, Muslims in the port town of Bitung on the east coast of Minahasa 
did hand over to the police a number of Islamic agitators who they said had 
recently arrived from outside the province to sow discord between local 
Muslims and Christians. And Muslims throughout North Sulawesi know 
that the police force in the province has since shown itself capable of act-
ing – with the support of church leaders – against threats to the peace from 
Christian as well as Muslim quarters.
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Both the trust which Minahasans still place in the (local) state as guard-
ian of the peace, and the responsible attitude of the local authorities when it 
comes to fulfilling that expectation, can arguably be traced back to the (by 
colonial standards) unusually harmonious quasi-contractual relationship 
which developed between state and society in Minahasa during the period 
of Dutch rule. By the early twentieth century the special regard in which the 
Dutch held Minahasans as loyal soldiers and servants of the crown, com-
bined with the lucidity and assertiveness with which Minahasans, thanks 
to colonial education, were able to raise their grievances, had already cre-
ated a stable political system which involved reciprocity and representation, 
and which was widely regarded as legitimate despite its colonial character 
(Henley 1996:94-107). A widespread familiarity with bureaucratic structures 
and procedures also developed. In the mid-twentieth century came a long 
interlude of violence and repression, beginning in 1942 with the Japanese 
invasion and continuing through the suppression of the Permesta regional 
rebellion (1957-1961) up to the establishment of the New Order in 1965. The 
ideal of a benevolent social contract which included the state, nevertheless, 
survived: Permesta was directed only against the policies of the central 
government under Soekarno, and did not question the legitimacy of the 
Indonesian state as such. During the New Order a relatively favourable 
experience of economic development without severe political repression 
served to revive that ideal and continues, alongside an idealized collective 
memory of the region’s unique colonial past, to colour Minahasan attitudes 
to the state today.
It is striking that the trust placed in the civil and police authorities does 
not extend to the army, which is regarded as a liability when dealing with 
conflicts because of its continuing involvement in power politics at the 
national level. While the preference for the police over the army seems to be 
present in Minahasa among Christians and Muslims alike, it is significant 
that Christians explain their attitude partly in terms of the support which the 
army is seen as having provided to Muslim protagonists in the recent Ambon 
conflicts. While it would be an exaggeration to say that people in this part of 
Indonesia have any very strong belief in the ‘rule of law’, all groups involved 
in preserving the peace in Minahasa have certainly been concerned to ensure 
that policemen, not soldiers, represent the coercive power of the state in situ-
ations where conflict suppression is called for.
The state has many faces and its predatory aspects, so prominent in the 
recent history of Indonesia, have rightly been the focus of much attention 
among Indonesianists. But its more or less contractual role in the provision 
of public goods, the most fundamental of which is peace and order, should 
not be ignored either. In Minahasa, peace and order have been preserved 
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thanks partly to the local state’s prudent and responsible use of the means 
of violence at its disposal. Among social scientists the contract approach to 
the state reached a low point of popularity under the influence of Marxism 
in the 1960s, when Robert Carneiro (1970:733) went so far as to declare that 
‘no such contract was ever subscribed to by human groups, and the Social 
Contract theory is today nothing more than a historical curiosity’. Today, 
however, some are arguing once again that the origins of state power must be 
sought in the demand for conflict resolution (Stone Sweet 2002; Henley 2004). 
The evidence of contemporary Minahasa confirms that civil society cannot 
replace the state, only complement it, and that the kind of state it needs to 
complement is one which is bound to society by a social contract, yet retains 
sufficient autonomy to intervene in society with force and impartiality when 
that is what fulfilment of its contract demands.
In Indonesia, the culture of civility remains vulnerable and incomplete if it is not 
accompanied by a transformation of state. This is to say, [...] civil society is not 
opposed to the state but deeply dependent on its civilization. The state must open 
itself to public participation. At the same time, independent courts and watchdog 
agencies must be ready to intervene when, as inevitably happens, some citizen or 
official tries to replace democratic proceduralism with nether-world violence. As 
vigilantes and hate groups regularly remind us, not all organizations in society 
are civil, and the state must act as a guardian of public civility as well as a vehicle 
of the popular will. (Hefner 2000:215.)
Discussion of decentralization and democratization in Indonesia, it seems 
to us, should focus in the first place on their implications, both positive and 
negative, for the endeavour to create a healthy relationship between state 
and society. On the positive side, these processes should in principle make it 
easier to check the predatory impulses to which states, given their control of 
means of coercion, are inevitably prone. On the negative side, closer engage-
ment with society may weaken the state to the point where it no longer has 
the power to serve the public interest, or subvert its impartiality to the point 
where it no longer has the inclination to do so. This is not to suggest that the 
authoritarian states of the colonial or New Order periods acted with impar-
tiality where the interests of their ruling elites were involved. But the cen-
tralization of power under those regimes at least meant that many regional 
issues – the protection of national parks, for instance – involved elite interests 
less directly than they do today, now that power is more widely dispersed. A 
related point is that the centralized corruption of the New Order state was at 
least more transparent and predictable, and hence less disadvantageous for 
business and investment, than today’s decentralized corruption. 
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Economy and demography: the politics of prosperity and proportionality
Besides possessing a strong civil society and a relatively civilized local state, 
North Sulawesi benefits from an economic structure which discourages con-
flict. One of the more prosperous provinces of Indonesia, it also displays a 
comparatively even distribution of wealth. In 2001, with 11% of its popula-
tion officially living under the poverty line, North Sulawesi had the fourth 
lowest poverty rate in the country after Jakarta, Bali and Riau. In the urban 
areas where its Muslim immigrants are concentrated, the figure was under 
9% (Statistik Indonesia 2002:593-5). Many households still do endure hardship, 
and of the Muslims in Manado and the rest of Minahasa, many are labourers 
and petty traders belonging to the poorer sections of the population. Even 
so, by Indonesian standards their deprivation, whether measured in absolute 
terms or relative to other groups, is in most cases mild.
Income inequality in North Sulawesi is clearly low [...]. The greater part of the 
population falls within the medium income bracket [...]. One reason for this per-
sistent pattern of even income distribution is that a characteristic feature of North 
Sulawesi is the small scale of its economic activities in almost every sector. Many 
actors contribute to economic output, and North Sulawesi effectively has what is 
referred to as a people’s economy (ekonomi rakyat) without this having to be pro-
moted by all kinds of plans and slogans. (Vekie A. Rumate 1999:10.)
This unplanned ‘people’s economy’ reduces the scope for jealousy and resent-
ment among the province’s religious groups, and provides strong structural 
disincentives to civil conflict. Even during crises there are relatively few peo-
ple in North Sulawesi who do not have something to lose, and when times 
are bad the enhanced fear of losing it tends to make people more rather than 
less inclined to defend the status quo. It is telling that in this province the 
financial crisis which began in 1997, and the political uncertainty created by 
the fall of Soeharto in 1998, fostered conservatism rather than radicalism in 
political life. After the 1999 general elections the former New Order state 
party Golkar, with 20 out of 45 seats, was still easily the largest faction in the 
provincial assembly. In the 2004 parliamentary election Golkar was again the 
most voted for party in North Sulawesi, and in the first round of the presi-
dential election of the same year Golkar candidate Wiranto obtained more 
votes in the province than did any of his rivals.
The economic consequences of the Asian financial crisis which precipi-
tated the fall of Soeharto, it is worth repeating, were in any case less seri-
ous in North Sulawesi than in some other parts of Indonesia. One reason 
for this was political stability itself, which made the province an attractive 
haven for capital belonging to Christians and Sino-Indonesians displaced 
or threatened by conflicts elsewhere. Other factors, however, had to do with 
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the diverse and partly export-oriented character of the provincial economy. 
Because the 1997 crisis was East Asian rather than global in scope, it had 
the effect of making many exports more, rather than less, profitable due to 
the falling value of the Indonesian rupiah relative to the US dollar. Nutmeg 
and cocoa growers in North Sulawesi, for instance, experienced boom times, 
and exports of coffee, fish, wood, furniture, and gold from the province also 
increased. For a time at the height of the crisis the weak rupiah brought trad-
ers from the Philippines, where the peso had lost less of its value, flocking 
to Manado and Bitung to buy a wide range of suddenly cheap Indonesian 
products. At the same time employment in the large and growing service and 
construction sectors enabled many others to share in the good fortune of the 
exporters, while savings and credit were available on a considerable scale 
to tide the least fortunate over. Among those worst affected by the crisis, 
it should be noted, were North Sulawesi’s (mostly Christian) civil servants, 
whose privileged economic position was eroded as their salaries were over-
taken by inflation.
If a relatively even distribution of wealth has helped to keep religious 
tensions under control, when it comes to the crude politics of demography 
it is precisely the imbalance between the province’s Christian and Muslim 
populations which has been an advantage in terms of preserving the peace. 
Although a small and sometimes vulnerable minority in the Indonesian 
nation as a whole, Christians still form a large and fairly confident majority 
within the confines of North Sulawesi. Their lack of fear of the local Islamic 
minority inclines them to tolerate that minority and to accept its participation 
in the public and political life of the province – on a level, that is, propor-
tional to its numbers. If elsewhere the call for ‘proportionality’ in government 
is usually a call for the political marginalization of Christians, in Minahasa it 
is a reassuring recourse for the Christians themselves. At the same time, the 
awareness of being a minority themselves at the national level is an addition-
al reason for Minahasan Christians to avoid even the semblance of threaten-
ing Muslims. Their concern is not only that this would lead to hostile external 
intervention in Minahasa, but also that it might provoke acts of vengeance 
against fellow Christians elsewhere in Indonesia. Within Minahasa, the 
potential vulnerability of the Muslim group inclines its members in a par-
allel way to prudence and moderation. This situation is intrinsically more 
stable than one like that of Ambon in which the two groups are more equally 
matched, so that every economic rivalry from street vendors to construc-
tion contractors, and every public appointment from governor downwards, 
threatens to become an explosive winner-takes-all contest between Christian 
and Islamic blocs.
Demographic situations, of course, are liable to change. Due to a combina-
tion of faster natural increase and slow but steady immigration of Muslims 
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from elsewhere, the Islamic part of North Sulawesi’s population has long been 
growing more quickly than the Christian part. One reason why Minahasans 
were able to accept the separation of Gorontalo from North Sulawesi in 2001 
with equanimity was that within what was left of the province, it restored a 
Christian majority which by that point had become vanishingly thin. 
Preparations for the split began under the presidency of Habibie, whose 
father was from Gorontalo. Except for some mixed feelings among higher ech-
elon civil servants about the reduced influence of ‘Manado’, most Minahasans 
have been almost as content to let Gorontalo go its own way as most Gorontalese 
have been to see Gorontalo emerge from Minahasa’s shadow. North Sulawesi 
in its new truncated form is solidly dominated by Minahasan and Sangirese 
Christians, and only its southern division of Bolaang Mongondow is pre-
dominantly Muslim. The fact that Gorontalo is a poor area with few natural 
resources was another reason for Minahasans not to regret its loss, but appar-
ently did not temper Gorontalese enthusiasm for separation. It should be 
added that in Gorontalo, where 98% of the population is Muslim, the religious 
factor as such is less often mentioned as a motive for the separation than it is 
in Minahasa – although some Islamic groups at national level rejoiced that ‘the 
number of provinces with a Muslim basis has grown again’ (Yogi W. Utomo 
2000:76). Many Christian Minahasans still fear that in the long run, continued 
demographic change will still reduce them to a minority in their own land. 
A demagogue of any ability who advocated some form of ethnic cleansing 
as the only way to avert this fate would no doubt strike sensitive chords in 
public opinion. So far, however, no Minahasan leader of any description has 
chosen to blaze this one-way trail to conflict.
Percentage of population adhering to Islam in North Sulawesi, Minahasa and Manado, 
1970-2002
 1970 1990 2000 2002
North Sulawesi 43.3 46.2 49.8 28.6
Minahasa including Manado 9.3 13.7 18.6 18.6
Minahasa excluding Manado 5.0 5.1 9.6 10.0
Manado city 25.0 28.1 31.4 31.2
Sources: Jones 1977; Sulawesi Utara 1991, 2001, 2003.
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Underlying tensions
In some academic commentary on post-New Order conflicts in Indonesia, 
the religious tensions and ethnic identities involved in these conflicts are 
interpreted as rather recent by-products of economic competition, or as 
the results of deliberate attempts by either outsiders or local elites to create 
political cleavages (George Junus Aditjondro 2001; Van Klinken 2005). In 
the Minahasan context, however, such ideas are not very useful. Religious 
divisions in North Sulawesi are too intrinsic to the society to require any 
conscious construction in political contexts. At the first Indonesian general 
election almost 50 years ago in 1955, religion in North Sulawesi (at that time 
also including what is now Central Sulawesi) was already thoroughly politi-
cized. Explicitly Islamic, Protestant and Catholic parties all appealed with 
success to their respective constituencies and the most successful secular 
party, the nationalist Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist 
Party) secured only 13% of the provincial vote (Pemilu Indonesia 2000:40).
At least in terms of church attendance and participation in Christian 
organizations, Minahasa is a Christian country to a degree which is some-
times difficult for Europeans to understand. Accordingly the area’s Muslims, 
who with some exceptions are not regarded as ethnic Minahasans, are 
constantly aware of their minority status. Within the category of Christians 
there also exists an important Catholic minority, which forms a distinct socio-
religious ‘pillar’ with its own institutions closely paralleling those of the 
GMIM. Catholicism, however, has very little to do with ethnicity, and under 
present conditions there is no potential for serious conflict between Catholics 
and Protestants in Minahasa. The potential for Christian-Muslim violence, 
by contrast, is real, and has been increased by alarm among Minahasan 
Christians at what they see as threats to their safety and way of life.
Most of these threats have originated from outside the region. Perhaps the 
most concrete of them was successfully averted in 1999 when six busloads 
(the first 300 of what was said to be an 800-man contingent) of laskar jihad 
militants, sent from Java via South Sulawesi to defend Muslim interests in 
Minahasa, were intercepted on their way to Manado and turned back by the 
provincial authorities. But the fact that elsewhere in Indonesia the militants 
were not sent home, and violence did erupt, continued to exert an unsettling 
influence. This was partly because of fears that the conflicts in the Moluccas 
and Central Sulawesi might be contagious, or reflect a nationwide anti-
Christian conspiracy. It was also because many of the 80,000 refugees whom 
these conflicts brought to Minahasa came with such vengeful feelings toward 
Islam, and so little left to lose, that they were perceived as a real danger to 
the delicate peace between Muslims and Christians which people in North 
Sulawesi were working hard to maintain.
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When renewed violence broke out in Ambon during April 2004, the police 
and military in North Sulawesi were kept on standby. The governor, via the 
medium of other prominent figures, urged the citizens of his province not 
to succumb to provocation (jangan terprovokasi). The disturbances in Ambon, 
he declared, were related not to religious differences but to the activities of 
a political group, the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan, Republic of the South 
Moluccas). During this episode a Protestant leader in Manado wrote an 
open letter expressing his feelings, undoubtedly shared by the majority of 
Minahasans, on the limits to Christian solidarity where non-Minahasan refu-
gees are concerned. Should things come to a Christian exodus from Ambon, 
he warned, the refugees must not be welcomed too hastily in Minahasa. Those 
who had arrived a few years earlier from Maluku Utara, he reminded his 
readers, had become a burden for the regional government and an unwelcome 
source of economic competition for the poorer part of the Minahasan popula-
tion. A further large influx of refugees would inevitably lead to public distur-
bances and the return of Brigade Manguni thugs (preman) to the streets. Later 
in 2004 acts of violence against Christians in Palu (Central Sulawesi) once 
again raised the tension in Minahasa, provoking angry protests and Brigade 
Manguni motorcades.
North Sulawesi is a small part of a very big country, and the comfortable 
predominance which Minahasan Christians appear to enjoy within their 
own province contrasts with their status as a small and potentially vulner-
able minority in the Indonesian nation as a whole. Just as the achievement of 
Minahasan civil society in preventing clashes between religious groups might 
be undone by failures of civility elsewhere in Indonesia, so the working rela-
tionship between local state and society in Minahasa periodically threatens 
to be eclipsed by policy initiatives from the centre of the state, Jakarta, which 
are perceived as hostile to Christians. The parliamentary debate in 2000 over 
the ‘Jakarta Charter’, a proposal to make Islamic law the law of the state for 
Indonesian Muslims, prompted talk of outright secession in Minahasa at the 
time, and its repercussions are still felt today even though the outcome of the 
debate was that parliament rejected the idea. Draft bills potentially affecting 
religious education in schools, and the position of Christian personnel in the 
health service, have generated similar anxieties and helped to ensure that 
theories of Muslim conspiracies against Christians remain favourite topics of 
conversation in small gatherings.
If Christian Minahasans are not particularly afraid of North Sulawesi’s 
Muslim minority, then, they certainly fear the potential implications of 
Indonesia’s Muslim majority both for national politics and for local Christian-
Muslim relations, and few have much real respect for Islam in general. 
Antipathy toward Islam, in fact, is probably stronger in Minahasa today 
than it has ever been. In Sonder, a rural area in central Minahasa where the 
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Muslim population is particularly small, people are proud to tell visitors 
that there is not a single mosque in the subdistrict. Some local academics 
argue that genuine tolerance toward Islam cannot be expected in the fore-
seeable future, and that sights should be lowered to a target of what they 
call akseptansi – a contraction of toleransi (tolerance) and akseptasi (accept-
ance) which signifies passive resignation in the face of an unavoidable real-
ity. Nevertheless it is against this background of private antipathy that the 
intensive public campaign for religious tolerance in North Sulawesi must be 
understood and appreciated. The apparently idealistic character of the pro-
vincial elites’ joint peace propaganda effort – as part of which, to give just one 
illustration, Manado’s most respected Islamic leader is regularly to be heard 
on the local Catholic radio station discussing the theme of ‘living together in 
a plural society’ – reflects not naivety, but urgent necessity.
Under the New Order the government of North Sulawesi, a province of 
unusual ethnic diversity even by Indonesian standards, had already begun 
to develop its own local variant of the national Pancasila ideology of ‘unity 
in diversity’. This featured the slogans torang samua basudara, meaning ‘we 
are all family’ in the Manado dialect of Malay, and Bohusami, an acronym 
indicating the unity of the province’s (then) four divisions and major ethnic 
groups, Bolaang Mongondow, Gorontalo (Hulondalo), Sangir-Talaud, and 
Minahasa. But it is only since the fall of Soeharto and the grim lessons of 
Ambon, Halmahera and Poso that the ideological campaign for religious 
harmony in North Sulawesi has really taken off. The new provincial slogan 
is baku-baku baik, baku-baku sayang, ‘be good to each another and love one 
another’, and the repeated references to love (kasih, sayang) in the campaign 
reflect a partly Christian inspiration. There are also references, however, to 
the culture and identity of pre-Christian Minahasa, which are portrayed as 
inherently tolerant and pluralistic in the same way as Indonesian national 
identity is tolerant and pluralistic according to Pancasila. In February 2003, 
an elaborate monument to religious tolerance was inaugurated by gov-
ernor A.J. Sondakh – himself, needless to say, a Golkar politician – near 
Kawangkoan in central Minahasa. Called Bukit Kasih or ‘Hill of Love’, this is 
a kind of religious theme park, smaller in scale but even more ambitious in its 
symbolism than Jakarta’s Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia 
in Miniature), containing juxtaposed replicas of a mosque, Protestant and 
Catholic churches, and Hindu and Buddhist temples. It also includes statues 
of Minahasan ancestor figures, and was deliberately built near the Watu 
Pinawetengan or ‘Stone of Division’ which marks the origin and ritual centre 
of Minahasa according to the modern interpretation of Minahasan paganism. 
In his inaugural speech, Sondakh described Bukit Kasih as dedicated to ‘the 
spirit of the Minahasan people’ (Ponsen 2003:63).
Just as Pancasila itself has always embodied a large measure of wishful 
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thinking, so this Minahasan neo-Pancasilaism, with its emphasis on har-
mony and inclusion, is partly an oblique confirmation that the potential for 
discord is strong. In 2002, JAJAK (Jaringan Kerja Kasih, the ‘Labour of Love 
Network’), an elite NGO backed by the provincial government and involving 
diverse North Sulawesi religious and intellectual figures, published a booklet 
entitled Kasih mengubah dunia (‘Love changes the world’) in connection with 
the province’s official Year of Love. In his introduction to this anthology 
Suhendro Boroma, editor of the influential Manado Post newspaper and him-
self a Muslim from Bolaang Mongondow, frankly acknowledges the extent to 
which it is the threat of violence, graphically illustrated by events in nearby 
regions, which keeps the eyes of people in North Sulawesi focused on the 
prize of peace.
The growing challenge we face in 2002 has to do with a weakening in the values 
of brotherhood and familial solidarity (persaudaraan dan kekeluargaan) which have 
served the Indonesian nation since its struggle for independence. Some areas in 
our immediate vicinity, including Ambon, Maluku and most recently Poso, have 
seen discord, conflict, enmity, and killing among fellow Indonesians. This is a 
concern and a challenge for the government and people of North Sulawesi, who 
must protect and maintain their own secure, peaceful and harmonious way of life 
[…]. We have all known the beauty and happiness of an existence built on love, 
togetherness and solidarity. That existence has enabled us not only to live our own 
lives and practice our own faiths in peace, but also to pursue all kinds of social 
and economic activities without hindrance. Government and society have been 
able to concentrate uninterruptedly on the task of developing North Sulawesi and 
improving its standards of living. Our foremost aim now must be to […] main-
tain and enhance the environment of peace and prosperity […] in the province. 
(Suhendro Boroma 2002:7.)
Despite its apparently hyperbolic idealism, then, the ideological campaign to 
preserve the peace in Minahasa is ultimately founded on a very pragmatic 
understanding that the price of failure to preserve that peace would be intol-
erably high for all parties.
Concluding remarks
Before Soeharto it was conventional to assume that the acknowledgement 
and politicization of ethnic and religious identities in Indonesia was a neces-
sary and inevitable stage in the ‘integrative revolution’ (Geertz 1963) which 
would eventually bring about ‘national integration’ (Liddle 1970) on a demo-
cratic basis. The New Order’s success in controlling regional and sectarian 
politics led many commentators to change their minds on this point. Now, 
however, there is an increasing consensus that New Order policies, par-
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ticularly with regard to transmigration and the control of natural resources, 
generated more ethnic and religious tensions than they defused, and in the 
long run exacerbated those tensions by denying them any legitimate politi-
cal expression. Whatever their precise triggers, the episodes of violence in 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Moluccas since 1998 show that ethnic and 
religious differences remain potential lines of battle in future civil conflicts. 
By whatever means, the tensions surrounding those differences will clearly 
have to be dealt with after all. Against this background, the good news from 
post-Soeharto Minahasa is that even old, deep religious and ethnic divides 
need not lead to violent conflict provided the society so divided is also a civil 
society, provided economic and demographic conditions are favourable, and 
provided the state is able to play its proper role as ultimate guardian of the 
peace. Religious institutions, moreover, can themselves be supportive, up to 
a point, of civil society and a civilized state.
Most parts of Indonesia, sceptics will immediately point out, are not much 
like this. Minahasa’s long tradition of contractual reciprocity between (local) 
state and society, in particular, is all too anomalous in the Indonesian context. 
It is hard to see how such a relationship, based as it is on trust, precedent, and 
a specific cultural environment, could be created at short notice anywhere 
else. Consultation between the leaders of different religious groups might 
be intensified in other provinces, but unless the leaders in question were 
inspired by the same level of commitment to peace which has animated their 
counterparts in Manado, and enjoyed similar degrees of authority over their 
respective followers, such consultation might still not accomplish much. And 
that economic equality moderates social conflict is little more than an abstract 
truism for regions which lack Minahasa’s background of smallholder export 
agriculture developed in the absence of big business. The problem with try-
ing to learn lessons from history is that history, being partly an accumulation 
of accidents, is seldom very replicable.
A different kind of cause for optimism, on the other hand, may be dis-
cerned in the fact that violent social conflict in post-Soeharto Indonesia, 
despite all journalistic and also academic alarmism, has actually been restrict-
ed to rather few and localized episodes, many of them deliberately fanned 
for political reasons by military interference (George Junus Aditjondro 2001; 
Liem Soei Liong 2002). This is not to deny that in some of the affected areas 
violence, as many chapters in the present volume attest, has been both acute 
and recurrent. The sustained rise of mob justice since 1998 is also a worry-
ing trend (Colombijn 2005:250-1; Van Dijk 2002). Yet given the New Order’s 
legacy of accumulated political tensions and resentments, the additional 
pressures brought to bear by economic problems and institutional changes, 
and the weakened and splintered condition of the state in many regions, 
the level of public order in Indonesia today can actually be described as 
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surprisingly high. While the threat of lynching parties and the presence of 
mafia-style protection rackets undoubtedly have something to do with this, 
Indonesia is far from the condition of anomie found in many African coun-
tries where the state is weak and at the mercy of interest groups (Van der 
Veen 2004). If peaceful public behaviour even in the absence of effective state 
conflict management or law enforcement is anything to go by, then society in 
many other parts of Indonesia besides Minahasa is more civil than it is usu-
ally given credit for. The origins of this pervasive Indonesian civility deserve 
further investigation.
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civil society in jepara
Fractious but inclusive
Introduction
From the early 1980s to the mid 1990s a thriving Jepara civil society emerged 
alongside a relatively responsive, development-oriented, ‘Powerhouse’ State. 
This chapter explores the character of New Order Jepara civil society and 
then looks at how that civil society has responded to the opportunities and 
constraints that accompanied the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the rise of 
the Reformasi movement, and the democratization that followed.1 
Jepara is a district (kabupaten) on the north coast of Central Java with a 
population of 1 million. Its capital, also called Jepara, is 90 km from the pro-
vincial capital, Semarang, and 30 km from any major trunk road. Between its 
glory days in the sixteenth century and the emergence of a major furniture 
industry in the 1980s, it was a relatively isolated and under-developed region. 
Since the growth of that industry it has become one of the most prosperous 
non-resource rich districts in Indonesia. The prosperity is not equally shared, 
but many ordinary Jeparans have done well. In 2002, it had the second lowest 
percentage of families living below the poverty line in Central Java. Jepara 
is 93% Muslim. Even under Soeharto the ‘traditional’ Islamic organization, 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), was and is the hegemonic social institution, with 
considerable capacity to influence society and to confer or deny legitimacy to 
the state and its actions. While it frequently has accepted state patronage it has 
also maintained a degree of autonomy from the state. Muhammadiyah – NU’s 
modernist Islamic rival – has a more recent and much smaller presence.2
1  Flinders University and the Australia Research Council funded fieldwork in Jepara. 
My thanks to Achmed Uzair who has been a diligent and capable research assistance. Earlier 
versions of some parts of this essay appeared in Schiller 2001.
2  Its political party (Masjumi) won 5% of the vote in 1955 and PAN – a post-Soeharto political 














Map 13. Jepara in Central Java
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Jepara in the New Order
During the New Order, the strong NU presence, the blossoming of a self-con-
fident, non-crony, indigenous commercial elite around the furniture indus-
try, and the electoral success of the overwhelmingly NU-based party Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Unity and Development Party) resulted in a 
community, and a district assembly, more capable of making demands on 
local government and uncovering corruption or mismanagement than any 
other I have encountered. (I have observed and visited with state officials, 
politicians, civic leaders, and journalists in more than thirty districts and 
towns.) The commitment of many state officials to development ideology 
and the reality of a ‘people not afraid to shout’ (their complaints) led to a 
relatively more responsive and effective state.
I first studied state-society relations in Jepara in 1980-1982. I found a 
rather active local assembly (dewan), receiving numerous letters and delega-
tions from aggrieved Jeparans, using assembly sessions to embarrass corrupt 
officials and sometimes modifying legislation to better suit their constituents. 
Assembly activism was led by PPP representatives who made up 40% or 
more of the elected members. The PPP representatives were more interested 
in assembly business than the Golkar majority who mainly had other jobs 
as state officials. The PPP minority was more willing to attend sessions and 
committee meetings and more willing to engage in protracted debate to make 
their point. Ideologically opposed to voting and unwilling to ‘waste time’, 
the Golkar forces often compromised with PPP proposals or acted on PPP 
complaints. As a result Jeparans got a somewhat more diligent, cautious and 
responsive local government. In today’s terminology we would say the Jepara 
came closer than most districts to achieving ‘good governance’.
My explanation for Jepara’s activist civil society and developmentalist state 
was three-fold. First of all, NU had very wide and deep roots in society. NU’s 
hegemony and its web of connections across Jepara and beyond provided those 
critical of the state with some shelter from official sanctions. NU demonstrated 
its community standing by winning more than 55% of the vote in the free 
elections of 1955 and then gathering 40% or more of the Jepara vote campaign-
ing as NU in 1971, while using PPP as its political party in the next four New 
Order-controlled elections. NU had village elite support in most of Jepara’s vil-
lages. Its religious teacher, landed elite, and small business leadership, in turn, 
provided the ongoing organization, patronage and activities, including penga-
jian (Islamic group religious studies) that sustained PPP between elections. It 
also mobilized financial and popular support for PPP in campaigns. 
of the vote in 1955 and its constituent parties PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Party of the 
Awakening of the Nation) and PPP won 56% in 1999.
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Secondly, Jepara’s economy began to grow as Indonesia’s oil boom econo-
my led to mushrooming domestic purchases of Jepara’s ornately carved teak 
furniture. Most of the businessmen involved were Muslim Jeparans with NU 
connections. After the oil boom ended, national policy promoted non-oil and 
gas exports and a thriving export furniture industry emerged alongside the 
domestic industry. Local state officials began to see that support for a busi-
ness agenda and cooperation with business leaders was essential for success 
in their careers and could prove lucrative.3 They also perceived that develop-
ment projects could be successful if they cooperated with NU landed- and 
religious teacher-elites. At the same time the materialism of the New Order 
improved the status of NU landed elites and businessmen who could afford 
the consumer goods (cars, televisions, motorbikes and so on) that marked 
higher status. This increased their self-confidence, their influence in society 
and their sense that they could make demands upon the state and its offi-
cials. Like small business entrepreneurs everywhere, most saw themselves 
as the engine of development and saw the state more as an obstacle than a 
partner. 
The third explanation is reputational and relates to the perceptions and 
actions of individual government officials. In the entire Soeharto period 
Jepara never had a military district head (bupati). Some retired officials 
thought that the position of Jepara district head was not lucrative and that 
moreover Jepara was a hazardous (rawan) posting requiring more sensitivity 
and less coercion. Jepara earned a reputation as a difficult place to be a state 
official, a place where the people were not afraid to speak out about official 
misbehaviour. As Jepara’s military commander put it: ‘The unrest that occurs 
here is a sign that the people of Jepara are certainly critical […] Jepara peo-
ple dare to react to every decision of the regional leadership’.4 On the other 
hand its people (or at least its community leadership) were seen as capable of 
cooperating with state officials for their mutual benefit, if they were treated 
properly. For example, cooperation with NU community leaders could help 
keep order and assist in achieving development targets and winning devel-
opment awards. These awards often led to promotion. The outsider bureau-
cratic elite that managed Jepara’s government – mainly from culturally less 
Islamic southern Central Java – could have chosen to ride rough-shod over 
the local, more Islamic commercial and religious elite. Instead district heads 
3  The best example of this is New Order elections in Jepara, in which local government 
officials tried to reduce conflict with local Islamic elites officials by resisting pressure from their 
provincial and central government superiors to deliver massive Golkar victories. The Golkar vote 
ranged from 15% to 30% below the provincial average.
4  Suara Merdeka 14-7-1999. This idea of Jeparans’ critical and vocal character is also described 
in a series on Jepara identity published in the Jepara local government monthly magazine, Gelora 
Bumi Kartini in 2001.
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and other senior state officials often chose to compromise and cooperate with 
local community leaders.
In short, I saw New Order Jepara as a place with a relatively strong civil 
society as well as a strong but relatively responsive local state apparatus. 
However my research up to Soeharto’s fall in 1998 left several unan-
swered questions about the nature of relations within Jepara civil society and 
between that civil society and the local state. Did Jepara have a battle-tough-
ened, fractious, and antagonistic civil society? Was it dominated by a strong 
social organization (NU or the PPP part of it) to which neither the local state 
nor the society could easily say no? Or was it a civil society that had built up 
social capital, in the form of civility between social organizations and indi-
viduals and civic trust between civil society and the state? Was Jepara’s civic 
culture based more on respect for what cooperation could achieve or fear of 
what other community leaders or state officials could do to you? The answers 
to these questions would determine how Jepara’s civil society would respond 
to uncertainty and a changing political, social and economic environment.
Civil society
Robert Putnam (1993) defines civil society as the entire voluntary – not for 
profit – sector. He excludes the family, businesses and organizations whose 
main purpose is to win votes and elect politicians. That is a common practice 
but it seems fruitless to set artificial boundaries between political parties and 
other social organizations. This seems especially so in a place like Jepara 
where the hegemonic social organization, NU – surely the core of civil soci-
ety in Jepara – had its own political party until 1973, and Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB, Party of the Awakening of the Nation) and PPP competed in 
1999 over which party was the legitimate offspring of NU. For the purpose of 
this essay political parties are seen as a part of civil society. Only families and 
businesses are excluded. All other non-government organizations – big and 
small, altruistic or self-interest oriented – are a part of civil society. The focus 
here will be on how civil society influences politics and how Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) interact with the state.
Civil society is often seen as the key to achieving democracy and to mak-
ing democracy (and economic development) successful. Unfortunately, civil 
society is an ambiguous concept. It refers to at least two different circum-
stances. In the first case strong social institutions deeply rooted in society are 
able to resist control by authoritarian regimes. This is sometimes called the 
counterweight concept of civil society. In the second case there is a dense web 
of social organizations that model or impart civility, cooperation and toler-
ance and create linkages between sections of society that encourage partici-
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pation, civic trust, and cooperation. This is sometimes called social capital.5
Both of these manifestations of civil society are problematic. If civil soci-
ety consists of strong institutions able to resist the will of the authoritarian 
state, what is to stop those same institutions from overpowering democratic 
processes and capturing democratic systems? Organizations that are power-
ful enough to resist authoritarian rule may be powerful enough to dominate 
weak states and to exclude the rest of the population from participating in or 
benefiting from democratic rule. On the other hand, if civil society is a dense 
web of social organizations encouraging civic trust and cooperation, how 
does that dense web come into being and how does the social capital it cre-
ates translate into the political cooperation and constraint necessary to make 
democracy or development work? 
The civil society I have seen in Jepara most closely resembles this second, 
social capital type. Jepara has seldom fiercely resisted the state, rather choos-
ing to bargain with the authorities for its cooperation. Whatever its short-
comings in Jepara, I will argue (as Putnam does for civil society in northern 
Italy) that it embodies real social virtues.
NU and Jepara civil society
In 1999 I wondered whether or not NU might be able to function as a core 
institution around which a tolerant but participatory democratic civil society 
could coalesce. Would it be able to provide a tent large enough to hold its 
PPP conservatives and its PKB reformers? Would its hold on the state con-
tinue to grow and would that diminish its willingness to act as a check on 
state excesses?
My picture of New Order Jepara depicts local civil society as interacting 
with national political and economic forces, including globalization, and 
influencing the actions of Jepara’s community leaders, bureaucrats and poli-
ticians to create a relatively benign – and yet lively – climate for development 
and political participation. Here I would like to consider the ways that a CSO 
like NU can shape civil society and state-civil society relations. 
Putnam sees two ways that CSOs may function to create civic trust and 
encourage civic engagement. Internally, they can instil habits of cooperation, 
solidarity and public spiritedness in their members. Externally, they can 
create a model of the pursuit of enlightened – or at least self-limited – self-
interest. Under some conditions this can create a dense network of activist 
groups that have civic competence (that is, the style and skills necessary for 
public social and political activity ), and some empathy for other community 
5  This discussion of civil society types and argument about the ambiguity of ‘civil society’ 
takes off from ideas advanced by Foley and Edwards 1996.
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groups. In other words it can create a culture in which demands are commu-
nicated and moderated. In such a climate political participants can afford to 
be ‘good losers’ or generous winners. This is much easier when many people 
belong to diverse organizations, have multiple divided loyalties, or have a 
world view shaped by a reference group with a diverse range of interests.
Alexis de Tocqueville famously described civic associations as ‘free 
schools’ of democracy,6 in which people learn to cooperate while also com-
peting. This is the opposite of ‘amoral familism’, which has been described 
as a way of thinking that emphasizes efforts to ‘maximize the material, 
short-run advantage of the nuclear family and assumes that all others will 
do the same’ (Putnam 1993:18). ‘Amoral familism’, which Putnam quoted 
from a study on Italy by Banfield, certainly has a place in Indonesian politi-
cal culture too. The Javanese concept of aji mumpung – taking advantage of 
one’s office – suggests that it is well known. The widespread application to 
Indonesia of the concept of patrimonialism – a system in which there are no 
fixed rules and everything depends on the relations between the ruler and 
the supplicant – also suggests that civic trust is not widespread. Neither the 
pursuit of short-term material gain, nor unbridled demands on the state 
when civil society that is too dominated by one world view or one interest 
group (the inadequate ‘counterweight’ concept) permits the promotion of 
healthy social cohesion and common goals. 
Jepara NU
What I want to do now is to briefly describe how I think NU as a hegemonic, 
civil society organization plays a role in shaping civic culture in Jepara. After 
that I will look at the 1999 democratic election in Jepara and how the election 
reflected and in turn influenced Jepara’s civil society. Finally, I will briefly 
consider how Jepara’s civil society and state are interacting in post-1999 
election Jepara. Six years into the ‘Reformasi Era’ does Jepara more closely 
resemble an inclusivist, trust-building civil society or an exclusivist, aggres-
sive, civil society? 
Jepara NU is a large and complex organization. It is reminiscent of what 
Alfred McCoy (1993), writing about the Philippines, evocatively called ‘an 
anarchy of families’. Its leadership structure includes a chairman and execu-
tive board (Tanfidziyah) and a council of religious scholars (Syuriyah). It 
has district, sub-district and village branches across Jepara. It has numerous 
affiliated male and female, adult, youth and student organizations. It has 
educational foundations – Lembaga Ma’arif and Rabithah Ma’ahid Islamiyah 
6  ‘[G]reat free schools to which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of associa-
tion’ (De Tocqueville 1969:193). 
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(RMI). Its members manage more than a hundred madrasah (non-residential 
Islamic schools at all levels), dozens of pesantren (residential Islamic schools), 
some Islamic secondary schools, a Timber Technology Academy (Akademi 
Teknologi Industri Kayu, ATIKA), an Economics Academy (Sekolah Tinggi 
Ilmu Ekonomi, STIE), and a university, Universitas Islam Nahdlatul Ulama 
(UNISNU). Its Institute for Mobilizing Human Resources (Lembaga Kajian 
dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia, Lakpesdam) runs community 
development programs and has initiated reconciliation programs between 
NU and Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) 
families who had been victims of the 1965 massacres and mass detentions. 
The same organization runs forums for poor and marginalized groups. NU 
members also control numerous small credit cooperatives and a hospital.
Above all, NU provides its members – and many other Jeparans – with 
a shared religious experience and discourse, including prayer and religious 
study. Many future Jepara leaders meet through NU schools or youth 
organization activities. This shared life experience makes communication 
easier and, under the right conditions, encourages trust. Secondly, NU pro-
vides opportunities to develop organizational and leadership skills. Thirdly, 
success in raising money and completing projects teaches self-confidence 
and empowers local leaders by demonstrating that there are considerable 
resources and altruism in the local community. Fourthly, NU provides its 
members with the opportunity to learn how elections work. This includes 
the discovery that candidates may need to compromise to win elections and 
that winners need to consider the desires of those who have lost. (Of course, 
they may also learn that elections can be rigged!) For the entire New Order 
period, NU provided a counter-hegemonic model by successfully holding 
competitive internal national and local leadership elections.
NU also models a decentralized notion of power, with limits on what one 
faction or individual can control. Its division of power between its council 
of religious scholars (Syuriah) and its executive board (Tanfidzyah) and 
between leaders of NU and affiliated organizations means that it speaks with 
multiple voices and seems to tolerate a wide range of views. It also some-
times acts as a reservoir of trust able to negotiate within society and between 
society and state.
This sounds very promising for democracy. But Jepara NU also has some 
weaknesses as a ‘free school of democracy’. Banfield’s description of ‘amoral 
familism’ in Italy describes a world view that also has a place in the NU 
community. There are frequently problems with lack of transparency, nepo-
tism, collusion and corruption in NU and its affiliated organizations. There 
is a fairly constant flow of rumours about school budgets being misspent, 
money for mosque building disappearing, and candidate lists being altered 
without authority. NU Jepara has never had a woman on its executive board 
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and many of its younger members consider it to be patriarchal. However, 
there are also a substantial number of reformers in NU that criticize and try 
to overcome NU’s ‘weaknesses’. 
So how did NU, Jepara’s civil society, and state-society relations change 
amidst the economic and political crises that accompanied the Soeharto 
regime’s collapse?
The economic ‘crisis’ in Jepara
Rather, Jepara people felt good fortune because the dollar rose. Because they got 
a lot of money they prayed for the crisis to continue.7
Many Jeparans did well in the economic crisis. At least 80,000 Jeparans 
are directly employed in the furniture industry, in 1999 worth 400 to 500 
million US dollars. The falling rupiah in 1998 actually spurred furniture 
exports and increased local employment and incomes. At the peak of the 
Asian economic crisis, the district was full of new furniture showrooms, 
fully occupied hotels, restaurants, and new shops. In 1998 Jepara sent more 
than 900 people on the haj, three times the number sent by the neighbouring 
district of Kudus and more than any other locality in Central Java. In 1999 it 
sent more than 2300, more than any other district in Indonesia. It has more 
motor vehicles (55,000 in total) than any district or town in Central Java 
except the capital, Semarang. Commercial and residential land prices are 
said to be the highest in Central Java and the cost of living comparable to 
Java’s largest cities. 
The furniture boom of the 1980s and 1990s continued with some ups and 
downs until 2000. My point is that economic decline was not the immediate 
cause of unrest and conflict in the 1998-2000 period. While Jeparans who did 
not work in the furniture or other export sectors were badly affected by the 
economic depression and inflation, jobs and wages in the furniture and other 
export industries increased and Jepara became a place where people moved 
to look for work.
7  Interview Pak Ali Irfan, NU educator, PKB leader and Deputy Chairman of the Jepara 
District Assembly, 14-12-1999.
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Reformasi and the weakening of a ‘powerhouse’ state
I have elsewhere described the New Order local state in Jepara as a ‘pow-
erhouse’ state.8 A powerhouse state is one that is constantly growing in 
resources, in the scope of its power (the range of human activity it influences), 
and the weight of its power (the force and consistency it can bring to bear to 
influence its people’s behaviour). A powerhouse state rests upon its citizens’ 
belief that it will have ever more power and resources and that tomorrow it 
will have even more patronage to reward or deny you than today. For nearly 
25 years the New Order government in Jepara had seen regular growth in its 
budget, its number of personnel, their salaries, their management skills, and 
its infrastructure (phones, computers, cars, offices). 
How could such a strong state weaken? The answer is that the hopes, 
expectations and fears that accompany the national collapse of a long-stand-
ing authoritarian regime are likely to make for testing times even for its more 
responsive and competent local state apparatus. Reformasi in Jepara was no 
exception. It was clear by the end of 1997 that the Soeharto regime was in des-
perate economic difficulty. By May 1998 Soeharto was gone and the notion 
that state-society relations would change was widespread. Even before 
Reformasi, Jepara had a reputation (like much of the north coast of Java) as 
having a fractious, belligerent society with a history of anti-Chinese rioting, 
campaign violence, demonstrations, suspicious furniture warehouse fires, 
and angry deputations to the district government offices. While the local 
government had been more responsive to its populace than most districts, it 
had made a number of enemies. Its most divisive actions had probably been 
its efforts to manufacture election victories by Golkar (the New Order state 
party) or victories by pro-Golkar village heads.
The euphoria that followed the fall of President Soeharto saw the rise 
– across Indonesia – of a host of protests and ad hoc organizations, large and 
small, with reform goals. Jepara’s local and village government leadership 
were targets of demonstrations and riots. Government records indicate that 
there were 1060 demonstrations (unjuk rasa) in Jepara in 1998-1999, peaking 
in mid-1998.9 Protests occurred in 95 of Jepara’s 192 villages and 120 of 136 
village officials targeted were dismissed, placed on the non-active list, or 
 
8  Schiller 1996  I borrowed the term from Geertz 1972, who in turn borrowed it from De 
Jouvenel 1962. 
9  There were only three in 1997-1998 – just before the political crisis – and three just after it in 
1999-2000. PEMDA Kabupaten Jepara, Jepara, ‘Laporan pertanggungjawaban akhir masa jabatan 
Bupati Jepara kepada DPR-D Kabupaten Jepara 1997-2002’, 2002:90.
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reprimanded.10 I am told that village head elections were held in more than 
three-quarters of Jepara’s villages, many of them to replace unpopular New 
Order era heads, and to prevent demonstrations in still other villages. 
The most important protests were the 5 July 1998 riots in which district 
government buildings including the library were burnt to the ground. This 
attack followed the government’s decision to ban KH Afifuddin – a fiery, 
Islamic religious teacher – from leading a public religious lecture (pengajian) 
in Jepara. His preaching had previously been followed by anti-Chinese riots 
in Pekalongan and Demak. NU and PKB activists had appealed to the local 
government and local assembly to ban his visit, but PPP supporters were 
aggrieved by that decision and rioted.
Violence, or the prospect of it, was consistently read by government 
officials as a warning to lift their own act or face the consequences. Even before 
the July riots the district head tried to demonstrate his reform credentials by 
issuing a document entitled ‘Report on the implementation of reform in 
every field’.11 The report named a committee responsible for Reform and 
spelled out processes and legal charges for common government services. 
It warned officials that they would be held responsible for complying with 
these regulations. The district head also noted elsewhere that a legal system 
seen as corrupt, unfair and unresponsive was a major cause of discontent.12 
As in many parts of Indonesia during the most turbulent months of 
Reformasi, Jepara civil servants feared wearing their uniforms in public or 
travelling in cars with government license plates. The police disappeared 
from the streets and the army withdrew from controlling mass demonstra-
tions or riots. Civil service salaries fell in real terms and prospects for local 
state officials and state budgets did not look good. Civil service morale was 
at its lowest. For a time the local state almost shut down. 
The Jepara government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent the loot-
ing of its state teak forests, to put an end to violence between villages and 
against sub-district offices, as well as its failure to prosecute rioters, signalled 
a government that was no longer dictating to society, and perhaps, no longer 
in charge of society. In this vacuum, whatever fragile order was to be main-
tained depended upon the interaction of strong social organizations. It was a 
time in which mobilization of youth groups, militias and gangs connected to 
village and local patrons seemed to be increasingly important and the local 
state authorities, police, forestry police and military increasingly impotent. It 
was a time in which the civility and tolerance of civil society was tested.
10  Nota Dinas from Kepala Bagian Hukum of Jepara local government to the Jepara district 
head, 4-9-1998.
11  PEMDA Kabupaten Jepara, Jepara, ‘Laporan hasil pelaksanaan Reformasi di segala bidang’, 
17-6-1998.
12  PEMDA Kabupaten Jepara, Jepara, ‘Laporan pertanggungjawaban akhir masa jabatan 
Bupati Jepara kepada DPR-D Kabupaten Jepara 1997-2002’, 2002:28-9.
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The 1999 election expectations
It was in this setting, with a weakened state and a strained civil society, that 
the 1999 election was held in Jepara. This first post-Soeharto election could 
be expected to be a formative one for the democratization of Jepara. I want 
to consider what the election tells us about the character and working of civil 
society in Jepara.
The consensus among journalists, activists, politicians and state officials 
was that PPP – the old NU-connected party – and PKB – the new, more liberal 
NU-connected party – would compete for local dominance. Golkar’s vote 
was expected to drop sharply and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
(PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) was expected to finish a 
distant third. The focus of the election watchers was on the contest between 
PPP and PKB. Would the new PKB party be able to attract votes away from 
PPP? In 1997 half of the vote had gone to Golkar. Which party would attract 
most of the 1999 Golkar voters?
Whether it would be possible to implement a fair election, free of violence, 
was also a matter of public concern. The danger that the election would be 
a disaster was made clear even before the official campaign began. On 30 
April 1999, PKB attempted to establish a branch in Dongos, a poor, over-
whelmingly PPP village in the sub-district of Kedung. The PKB supporters 
clashed with a much larger PPP crowd. It ended with four dead and more 
than a dozen people hospitalized. A number of houses and vehicles were 
also burned. The incident was widely reported in national and Central Java 
papers. The violence resulted in considerable fear that the election might 
spin out of control in Jepara. Newspaper stories worried that other districts 
with a potential for violence might be ‘Jepara-ized’ (diJeparakan). 
Election results
Twenty-eight parties competed in the Jepara election. PPP (the old party of 
NU) won easily with 46% of the vote.13 PDI-P (a successor party to PNI and 
the party of Megawati Sukarnoputri) came second with 20.2% of the vote. 
PKB (the new party of NU and Abdurrahman Wahid) was a close third with 
18.9%. Golkar was a distant fourth on 8.7% and Partai Amanat Nasional 
(PAN, Party of the National Message, the Muhamadiyah-connected, coalition 
of Amien Rais) was fifth with 3.9%. 
PPP was the clear winner, coming first in all but two of Jepara’s 12 sub-
districts and taking in more than double the votes of its nearest rival. PDI-P, 
despite its splintered organization, did a little better than expected, winning in 
13  Election data was supplied by the Kantor Pemilihan Umum Daerah in Jepara.
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Keling and Jepara sub-districts and coming second in five other sub-districts. 
PKB did less well than expected, coming second in Jepara sub-district and 
placing behind both PDI-P and its main rival PPP in eight sub-districts.
In reality PPP’s victory was not as dramatic as it looked at first sight. Its 
vote only increased about 2% from 1997. The Golkar vote fell 46% from 1997, 
but only 2% of that went to PPP. PKB and PDI-P each obtained about 20% of 
the votes lost by Golkar. PPP’s share of the vote in urban Jepara district and 
the furniture industry centre of Tahunan fell by 20% and 12% respectively. 
PPP actually finished fourth in Jepara town with about half the votes of PKB 
and PDI-P and slightly less than Golkar. Generally the data suggests that it 
was in the poorer rural villages near Demak that PPP did best and its vote 
declines closer to Jepara and to the agriculturally richer and less devoutly 
Muslim north.
PPP won 18 of the 40 elected seats in the 45-seat district assembly (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), PDI-P 8, PKB 7, Golkar 4, PAN 2, and 
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent and Star Party) 1. The army and police 
were awarded the other 5 appointed seats. PPP emerged as the largest party 
in the assembly. However, it fell short of a majority and had to gain the 
cooperation of one or more parties to pass legislation or elect the assembly 
leadership.
Jepara perceptions of the election
So how were the campaign and election results received, and what explana-
tions were proposed for the PPP victory and the PKB loss? These narratives 
on the election suggest a local state and civil society that was bruised by the 
campaign but still optimistic about the future.
Local state officials were generally enthusiastic about the election and the 
results. They felt that they had regained respect for their neutral, supporting 
role in a fair election and that the election result would take them off the 
hook as being responsible for all of Jepara’s problems. As one middle level 
official put it to me: ‘We can now appear in public in our uniforms’. They 
were also relieved that campaign violence was not as bad as had been feared. 
While some officials, who had been stung by PPP criticism in the past, would 
have preferred any other party (even PDI-P or PKB) to be the dominant 
party they also knew that 12 of the 18 successful PPP candidates – including 
the leader – had served in the previous assembly. Local bureaucrats may 
have had some difficulties with the criticisms they had received from the 
old assembly but there also had been some mutually beneficial cooperation. 
So, the bureaucracy, for the most part, seemed willing to accept a slightly 
diminished role and trust the new democracy with greater accountability to 
a PPP-lead legislature.
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Many young community activists, most of whom supported PKB, were 
despondent about the PPP victory. Unlike the officials, they thought PPP 
was not too radical but too conservative. One comment was that the ‘party 
which was fierce won’. Another comment in a village where there had been 
violence was: ‘It’s just the same, we only changed masters’. Several activists 
said: ‘PPP won, they used the old ways’. By the old ways they meant the 
coercion, intimidation and vote buying which they believed Golkar had used 
in previous elections. 
In fact, one of the surprises of the election was that there were so few seri-
ous incidents after Dongos. However, most people seemed to believe that the 
impact of Dongos was negative for the liberal NU party (PKB) even though 
most of the responsibility for the violence had lain with PPP. Dongos was said 
to have worked against PKB in three ways. Firstly, some NU leaders tried to 
distance themselves from PKB in order to restore peace in the NU commu-
nity. Secondly, PKB curtailed its campaign in areas where PPP support was 
overwhelming and the risk of violence high. Thirdly, in some respondents’ 
eyes, the impunity with which PPP followers were able to attack NU fright-
ened away many waverers who might have been considering supporting 
PKB. It seemed that only PPP could protect their followers.
PPP was reported to have used strident campaign slogans and stories. 
PPP banners proclaimed: Islam is my religion, the kabah is my orientation, 
PPP is my choice, jihad is my struggle. PKB countered with slogans proclaim-
ing that PKB was the ‘sole child’ or the ‘legitimate child’ of NU. PPP report-
edly responded by spreading stories that PKB was ‘the child of Golkar’, 
‘supported by Israel’ and ‘supported by America’.
Everyone pointed to the role of pengajian (public lectures) in the PPP 
campaign and many noted the animosity expressed in PPP-sponsored public 
lectures. The leader of PPP countered that their pengajian had started way 
back in 1997, and argued that PPP activities were simply more popular than 
NU. A PKB leader noted that as early as 1998 PPP was holding pengajian two 
to three times a night in every sub-district. 
Reports on the campaign by the Independent Election Observer Committee 
(Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu, KIPP) listed numerous cases of 
intimidation by PPP crowds or by uniformed militia. The latter were said 
to be connected to Jepara underworld gangs like Sadigo (an acronym mean-
ing ‘a little wrong and I’ll kill you’). Very few had been committed by other 
political parties. PKB leaders claim that religious teachers (kiai) associated 
with PPP banned their villagers from attending PKB rallies, and sent spies to 
see who went to PKB activities.
Stories about the PPP victory and PKB defeat emphasized the strength 
of PPP’s organization and its hold on Jeparans. In tone this was remarkably 
similar to a 1997 Golkar analysis of the strong PPP performance in that elec-
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tion which stated that the problem was ‘not enough NU kiai’, meaning too 
many religious teachers whose loyalty was to PPP rather than NU (even 
though in reality all PPP kiai are also NU members). 
Pak Ali Irfan, the deputy district head and a member of PKB, saw the 
election as a defeat for PKB but a victory for NU, whose elite chaired three 
of the four major parties: PPP, PKB and Golkar which shared about 70% of 
the vote.14 He suggested numerous causes for PPP’s strong showing. Firstly, 
he noted that some popular NU leaders either supported PPP or remained 
neutral. Secondly, he thought that Jepara’s traditional population remained 
suspicious of change, including the new party PKB. Thirdly, he noted the 
effectiveness of the PPP campaign techniques and its hold over the popu-
lation. He thought pengajian was more effective than media coverage and 
campaign rallies that preached to the converted. He said that the PPP hold on 
some villagers was so strong that, for example, the populace believed stories 
from their kiai that PKB leader (and later president) Abdurrahman Wahid 
was not really in Jepara or that they shouldn’t go to hear him because infidels 
or Jews would be there. While he mentioned the role of intimidation it was 
not a major focus of his explanation for PKB’s defeat.
PPP leaders saw the election result as due to their superior organization, 
their political experience and the gratitude of the Jepara people for their dec-
ades of standing up to the local government and its Golkar political machine. 
When interviewed, the PPP head and assembly chairman emphasized the 
cultural and religious activity of PPP. He said:
It should have been in Jepara, with an NU absolute majority, yes it should have 
been that PPP was finished lost badly […] We used dakwah (religious lectures) 
continuously so that our party activities became the culture of Jepara. [We used 
our] NU character so that compared to NU activity, there is more PPP activity in 
Jepara.
Three points are noteworthy about these views of the election results. Firstly, 
leaders of both PPP and PKB saw PPP’s hold over the population through 
pengajian and through the village kiai network as central to PPP’s victory. 
Reformist losers of this election, many of whom were involved in education 
and change-oriented CSOs, might be heartened by the thought that further 
education, better communications, and social change would weaken the 
village kiai’s hold on the population and ease the way for a more civil, less 
intimidating future election. In a climate of civility their chances of winning 
might improve. 
14  The Chairman of Golkar was a dean from one of the faculties at UNISNU, Universitas Islam 
Nahdlatul Ulama in Jepara.
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Secondly, the willingness of PKB leader, Pak Ali Irfan, to see an NU vic-
tory within a PKB defeat suggests that their NU loyalties might offer losers 
of future elections a notion that they still had a stake in whatever political 
coalition dominated local government.
Thirdly, the observations by CSO and community activists about the 
importance of intimidation and violence in the outcome reflect a liberal 
impatience with injustice. These reformers are a force for keeping violence 
– and the state’s inability or unwillingness to prevent or punish violence – on 
the public agenda. Campaign and election violence and intimidation do indi-
cate the presence of combative and exclusive groups in civil society, but the 
presence of groups and mass media willing to talk about violence might help 
to make that civil society more capable of compromise and cooperation.
Responses to the election
So far I have been arguing the case that, even though the campaign and elec-
tion showed signs of suspicion, combativeness and aggressiveness within 
society, elite perceptions of the elections provided some signs of trust in soci-
ety and some cause for optimism about future civility in politics. Discussion 
with PPP and PKB leaders about post-election politics generally supported 
the argument that there was sufficient trust so that politicians could compro-
mise and work together. 
A good example of this was the competition for chairmanship of the 
new local assembly (DPRD). PPP had won 18 seats but needed 23 votes to 
guarantee its candidate would win the chair. Pak Ali Irfan, the head of PKB 
explained that:
At the time of the selection of the assembly chairman, there was a kind of competi-
tion between me and them [PPP]. Some championed me […] it appears there was 
an effort to engineer things so I became chairman […] I didn’t like that because 
the result of the election should not deviate from the composition of the assembly 
[…]. If I became chairman of the council, while the one who received 18 [seats] 
became deputy chairman, that wouldn’t be fortunate for Jepara.15
In the end the PPP candidate for chairman and the PKB candidate for deputy 
chairman were elected unopposed. Both the PPP and PKB assembly leaders 
report that afterwards there developed a spirit of cooperation and a com-
bined effort to attend quickly to the many letters and deputations which the 
1999-2004 assembly received from its aggrieved or hopeful citizens. 
The network of NU friends and respected patrons continues to stretch 
across party divides. Among the PKB leader’s close friends was Pak Jubaedi 
15  Interview, Ali Irfan, 4-6-1999.
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Ali, an extraordinary NU leader who stuck with PPP in 1999.16 Pak Irfan said 
he meets Pak Jubaedi Ali frequently and also continues to meet a number of 
PPP-politicians on informal occasions. So it seems that the existence of an 
NU community has enabled Jepara’s politicians to trust each other enough 
to withstand or repair the election damage to civil society.
The 1999 election as a snapshot of civil society
The breakdown of a long-standing authoritarian regime, the uncertain poli-
tics of Reformasi and the first democratic election in over 40 years is not an 
ideal time to see the best face of civil society. Most Jeparans had no experi-
ence with democratic elections or resolution of disputes. Many expected 
that Reformasi and democracy would quickly bring justice, prosperity and 
opportunity. Many others feared that it would bring revenge and chaos. 
Given such trying times and given that the election campaign began with 
massive violence at Dongos, Jepara civil society held up reasonably well. 
During the campaign there was some small scale violence and some intimi-
dation, but the election was well received, especially by the leaders of the 
major loser, PKB. Furthermore, the post-election political responses by both 
the winner, PPP, and by PKB were conciliatory and cooperative.
It appears that at the district elite level there had been sufficient interac-
tion so that both NU-based political parties had enough trust and shared 
enough civic culture to work together. However, a tolerant, cooperative, 
trust-building civil society is more closely approximated at the district elite 
level. At the village level, elite competition seems more severe and civil 
society more divided along party lines. Usually, the divide is between PPP 
and PKB but sometimes between those two on one side and the less well-
organized followers of the secular PDI-P on the other.
A number of Jeparans described the village level struggle between PKB 
and PPP as a conflict between kiai pesantren and kiai langgar (charismatic 
Islamic teachers who run residential schools and Islamic religious teachers 
who are paid to give sermons or public lectures at privately owned small 
mosques). Their argument was that the kiai pesantren are less self-interested 
and more politically naïve, while the kiai langgar (called by one activist kiai 
bayaran, kiai for sale) are more worldly-wise and more connected to pri-
vate interests. Behind their generalization was an important issue, namely 
the connection between religious identity politics and individual interests. 
While nearly everyone agreed that the individual interests of competing vil-
16  Pak Jubaedi Ali led NU from the 1960s to the 1980s. He briefly became acting district head 
in 1966. Pak Jubaedi resigned as district head when forced to give up NU for Golkar. He led PPP 
in 1982 when they narrowly defeated Golkar in the local election, and stuck with PPP in the 1999 
election.
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lage-level patrons were a substantial reason for the conflicts that did occur, 
it was religious and organizational symbols and loyalties that were used to 
mobilize supporters. PPP used every opportunity to paint its PKB rivals as 
the instrument of Golkar, or Israel or America, and as weakly committed to 
Islam. PPP tried to paint itself as on a jihad to defend and advance Islam. 
PKB, meanwhile, tried to portray itself as the official party of NU. One refer-
ence in a speech by Abdurrahman Wahid, PKB’s leader and affectionately 
known as Gus Dur went: ‘If NU is the chicken, it has two products. PKB is 
the egg and PPP is the shit’.
Gus Dur’s rhetoric aside, what the PKB wing of NU was pushing was a 
nuanced view of Islam. As Pak Ali Irfan put it, PKB ‘looks at people’s conduct 
not their hats’. Its image – as a party that was ‘liberal’, willing to cooperate 
with Chinese and Christians, and willing to ally itself with Megawati’s PDI-P 
– didn’t work as well in the villages of Jepara as PPP’s simpler message that 
it was the party of Islam.
The 1999 election’s impact on civil society
So what effect did the first post-Soeharto election have on Jepara civil soci-
ety? Did it lay a solid foundation for deepening Jepara democracy? Three 
aspects stand out.
Firstly, the PPP victory was not as bad for democracy as many have 
claimed. In victory they could afford to be magnanimous. If they had lost they 
would continue to be aggrieved. Faced with a share of power over local gov-
ernment they were compelled to do what governments do, to figure out how 
to make things work. That would make it possible for them either to win or 
to alienate supporters based on their policies and performance. Either result 
would encourage voters to offer support to parties based upon perceptions of 
their interests rather than loyalty to religion or organizational identity. This 
could be expected to take away some of the heat of identity politics. 
Secondly, the role of various members of the NU elite as the main back-
ers of PKB, in the leadership of PPP and Golkar, and as neutral public intel-
lectuals, helped to break down identity politics, and this is likely to increase 
voters’ sense that they do have freedom of choice. In 1955, if you were part 
of the 55% or so of Jeparans in the NU community, you voted for NU. In 
1999 if you were an NU member you could vote for PPP, PKB or Golkar and 
still believe that you were demonstrating your support for an NU-led party. 
Divisions within the NU leadership may be worrisome, but one of the things 
they can do is to teach voters that authority figures can disagree or change 
their mind and that nothing terrible happens to a voter who makes their own 
choice, even if their local patron disagrees. As voters come to have multiple 
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and cross-cutting loyalties, civil society will be enriched and campaigns and 
election outcomes will be less threatening.
Thirdly, while the Dongos incident was appalling, the response by the NU 
community was generally constructive. The NU and party elites from PPP 
and PKB seemed genuinely upset by the breakdown of order. The meetings 
called in response to Dongos by the civil and military authorities and by NU 
leaders from Jepara and from the province impressed on NU leaders as well 
as PPP and PKB politicians that violence could easily get out of hand. This 
led to a winding down of campaign intensity and rhetoric and taught some 
lessons about civic responsibility. Perhaps PKB retreated further than PPP, 
but both pulled back from the abyss.
I have argued that in 1999 Jepara’s civil society was more inclusive at the 
district level and combative and exclusive at the village level. To some extent 
NU has been able to build and sustain a sense of trust and respect between 
political actors. Reformasi and the 1999 election challenged that inclusive-
ness. The conflict between PPP and PKB led to violence and considerable 
tension. However, the response to that violence – and to the election results 
– by NU and PKB have helped to restore a civic culture in which there is a 
degree of trust between political party and community leaders. 
The 1999 election was the first democratic election in more than 40 
years. In the uncertainty and euphoria of Reformasi that followed the fall 
of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime it is not surprising that there was politi-
cal violence in Jepara. The state party Golkar was clearly going to collapse, 
but it was not clear whether NU’s old guard in PPP or its new, more liberal 
wing in PKB was going to fill that vacuum. The PPP-leadership felt that they 
had struggled for decades to represent Jepara’s NU community against the 
Golkar juggernaut. They saw the PKB-leadership as upstarts plotting to har-
vest the fruits of years of PPP effort.
After the violence in Dongos, despite the invective and intimidation of 
the campaign, the election occurred without further major incidents. Perhaps 
civil society having learned from the 1999 election that the winner did not 
take all would be able to build a growing support base for democracy in 
Jepara. There were many challenges, for NU, and for the civil society it domi-
nates. NU, its leadership, and its affiliated and spin-off organizations needed 
to be a source of community activism and remain critical of the state and 
political parties, while maintaining its capacity to be a conciliatory force. It 
needed to provide space for liberal critics and conservative religious teachers 
and party officials alike while maintaining its mass legitimacy.




Six years, four elections,17 and a lot of political conflict and collaboration have 
gone by since the end of the Soeharto era. Gone too is the furniture industry 
boom and the teak forests that made Jepara prosperous. Employment, pro-
duction and exports fell, largely due to the shortage of quality timber, the 
shipment of poor quality furniture, and the fear of foreign buyers to travel 
to Jepara because of Indonesian’s terrorist problems. Weakened as well is the 
Jepara state, no longer such a ‘powerhouse’, and no longer able to count on 
rising budgets or selective patronage and repression to attract popular sup-
port or ensure community compliance. These have been far more demanding 
times for Jepara’s civil society and state. However, I want to argue that on bal-
ance, a more tolerant, inclusive and participatory civil society has emerged. 
I also want to argue that under some circumstances a civil society that is 
tolerant, inclusive, and trust-building can contain within it elements that are 
fractious, critical, and argumentative.
The Jepara state continued to show signs of reaching out to civil society 
and trying to be more participatory. One sign of this was the Forum Lintas 
Pelaku (FLP, the Inter-Actor Forum) which brought together many of the 
district’s development-oriented CSOs to implement or evaluate government 
programs and services. More than 30 organizations and most of the senior 
state officials attended regular meetings, which were often quite boisterous 
and critical of the state.
The state’s acceptance of the growing role of civil society was perhaps 
most visible in the 2004 election. Nearly one year before the election the 
Jepara government appointed a five-member team to choose the Local 
Election Committee (Komite Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD-kabupaten) 
nominees. The local government’s choice for the selection committee includ-
ed a lecturer at the NU university, a respected NU leader who was also the 
head of the Jepara branch of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesia 
Muslim Scholars Council), a medical doctor, and a Muhammadiyah patron 
who is a major furniture entrepreneur. The selection committee chose ten 
nominees from the more than one hundred applicants in a transparent selec-
tion process. The provincial election committee (KPUD-propinsi) named the 
five appointees. Four were from an NU background and three of these were 
former activists in the NU student organization Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam 
Indonesia (PMII, the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement). One KPUD 
member was a Muhammadiyah leader. Two were businessmen, two were 
academics and one was a religious teacher. Two had monitored the 1997 elec-
tions for the independent election monitor, KIPP and two others had been 
involved in the implementation of the 1999 election.
The Jepara electoral commission KPUD and its election oversight com-
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mittee (Panwaslu, Panitia Pengawasan Pemilu) were respected community 
figures and they managed the campaign and election strictly, even-handedly, 
and without incident. Parties were provided with clear instructions about 
where, when and how they could campaign. Parties that violated cam-
paign rules were warned and fined. For example the PKB leader, Gus Dur, 
arrived late for his scheduled campaign rally and was only allowed to lead 
a prayer.
The local 2004 legislative and presidential elections showed no signs of 
the violence and intimidation of the 1999 elections. Competition was keen 
and the dominant party PPP’s share of the vote fell from 44% to 31%. My 
own analysis of voting patterns in village Jepara shows a large number of 
competitive villages where no party got more than 50% of the vote and many 
villages in which the party winning the legislative election did not win the 
presidential election. This indicates that voters felt a high degree of freedom 
to make their own choice.
It is interesting that there could be a 13% decline in the PPP vote without 
a strident campaign and without cries of foul-play from PPP. No one seems 
to have thought that the elections were won by intimidation or money. No 
one suggests that religious symbols and identity were important campaign 
tools. Civil society had guided Jepara through what could have been a stress-
ful election year.
An inclusive civil society
Civil society has been enriched by a growth of reform movements and CSOs 
concerned with development, social justice, corruption and empowering 
people. Most of these organizations are led by people with NU backgrounds 
and degrees from universities in Yogyakarta or Semarang. Some of them 
focus on advocating the rights of fishermen, forest villagers and salt farm-
ers. Others deal with property development, land rights, and environmental 
concerns. Several see their task as uncovering mismanagement and cor-
ruption in government or law enforcement. Some work together with local 
government in implementing and evaluating development projects. Others 
work as part of programs supported by national or provincial CSOs. They 
raise money from foreign donors, CSO networks, private individuals and the 
local government.
There is a running debate between ‘soft’ CSOs that accept state fund-
ing, accompany assembly representatives on ‘junkets’ or privately report 
corruption or mismanagement to local state officials, and ‘hard’ CSOs that 
organize public protest and report corruption to the media or to the prosecu-
tor’s office. However, despite the harsh words between them, there seems 
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to be room for both radical and ‘co-opted’ CSOs in Jepara. Their leaders 
overwhelmingly share the same lifestyle, the same education, and the same 
religious, cultural and organizational experience. They also can choose levels 
of protest in their efforts to influence the state. For example, they fought for 
a local people’s participation law (actually a freedom of information act) by 
sending letters from their CSO to state officials or the media. For further 
pressure they can mobilize supporters from several CSOs for public rallies. 
For example, when pressing for corruption charges against local assembly 
members they brought in national and provincial CSO dignitaries to their 
rallies to urge prosecution. Finally, they can gain public support from NU 
mass organizations and their leaders.
I am arguing that, so far, Jepara’s civil society has managed to continue a 
‘big tent’ format. It continues to be an inclusive arena for condemning, criti-
cizing and sometimes cooperating with local politicians and the local state. It 
seems to have reduced the stridency and alienation of PPP, allowed the PKB 
supporters to find a role for themselves after defeat (for example as reformers 
in NU and in other CSOs), and spawned – or at least allowed room for – a 
new generation of boisterous reformers and radicals.
Those fractious radicals and reformers will pose new challenges for 
Jepara’s NU-led civil society, as will the efforts by the state to coopt would-
be critics or whistle-blowers. However, it seems likely that NU’s ability to 
appear to rise above the fray of everyday politics, NU’s habit of speaking 
with many voices, and its place in the community leadership all will sustain 
a fractious, lively and inclusive civil society.
taufiq tanasaldy
Ethnic identity politics in West Kalimantan
Local politics in West Kalimantan have assumed a strong ethnic colouring 
since the end of the New Order.1 Some of this has been conflictual, such as the 
violence in 1997 and 1999. Since the mid-1990s rifts have developed between 
the two biggest ethnic groups, Dayaks and Malays, over strategic appoint-
ments. Tension over political appointments aggravated after the end of the 
New Order, involving mass mobilization and sometimes violence. However, 
ethnicity also functions in quite peaceful ways in West Kalimantan, particular-
ly after 2000. Indeed it can be argued that the politics of ethnic ‘power-sharing’ 
now widely adopted at the district level has successfully pulled the sting of the 
violence and prevented a recurrence of the episodes of 1997 and 1999. 
 This chapter describes the rise of ethnic identity politics in West Kalimantan 
and asks to what extent they also offer possibilities of civility (as well as the 
much better known possibilities of violence). It begins by introducing the 
ethnic politics of Dayaks and Malays prior to the 1998 reform (Reformasi). 
Ethnic politics here refers mainly to the politics played or led by ethnic elites 
to secure greater representation in the executive and legislative branches. The 
first two sections show that the Dayak political resurgence after 1998 was not 
an instantaneous movement, but a reaction to a history of repression dating 
back to the colonial period. The third section discusses how the authoritarian 
New Order regime retarded local politics and hampered discussion of ethnic-
ity, and the unintended effects of this policy. The last sections discuss how the 
1998 reform led to a resurgence of ethnic politics. 
1  This chapter has benefited from critical comments made by Myrna Eindhoven, the late Isa 
Sulaiman, Gerry van Klinken, Henk Schulte Northolt, Harold Crouch, Jamie Davidson, Melly G. 
Tan, Vedi Hadiz, and Claire Conway. I am grateful for informants in West Kalimantan who gave 
























Map 14. West Kalimantan
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Dayak versus Malay: ethnic politics prior to the New Order
Identity formation
West Kalimantan, like many other provinces in Indonesia, has a diverse eth-
nic population. Based on the 2000 population census, the two largest ethnic 
groups are Dayaks and Malays, followed by Javanese, Chinese, Madurese, 
and Buginese (see Table). This chapter discusses only Dayaks and Malays. 
The Chinese and Buginese, the other important ‘native’ ethnic groups with 
long and significant associations with the province, will not be covered in this 
chapter, because neither of them have an ethnically consolidated movement in 
contemporary West Kalimantan.2 Javanese and Madurese have only recently 
begun to arrive in significant numbers, and they also have not engaged in eth-
nic politics. Madurese come from Madura, an island off the northeast coast of 
Java, the most densely populated and politically central island in Indonesia. 
The term ‘Dayak’ was first employed by Bornean Malays to designate native 
tribes in Kalimantan. It did not include the nomadic Punan. It was then popu-
larized by European explorers through their writings (Lumholtz 1920:23). 
The encompassing term Dayak was deficient because it described hundreds 
of heterogeneous tribal groups. These tribal groups were ‘united’ only by 
external forces, such as discriminative policies from Malay sultans and Dutch 
2  West Kalimantan Chinese played an important role in the region prior to Indonesian 
independence (Heidhues 2003; Bingling Yuan 2000). The role of the Buginese was also signifi-
cant during the Dutch colonial era. Mempawah, one of the more influential sultanates in West 
Kalimantan, was Buginese. Other important sultanates such as Pontianak and Sambas also had 
ties with the Mempawah Buginese royals. 
Ethnic populations in West Kalimantan 
Ethnicity 1930 1971 2000
Dayaks 48.9%* 41% 33.1%
Malays 28.5 39 32.4
Javanese 1.2 2 10.4
Chinese 13.5 12 9.5
Madurese 0.8 0.6 5.5
Buginese 6.6 5 3.3
(Residual ‘others’ account for totals just under 100%.)
Source: Volkstelling 1936; Tjilik Riwut 1979:49; Badan Pusat Statistik Kalimantan Barat 
2001:34.
*  Combines the categories ‘Dayak’ and ‘unknown’ (onbekend), who were mostly 
Dayaks. 
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colonialists, as well as through religion. 
Unlike the externally imposed term Dayak, the term ‘Malay’ was already 
widely in use before the arrival of Europeans in the archipelago. It described 
the inhabitants of many parts of coastal Sumatra, Kalimantan and the 
Malayan peninsula. In West Kalimantan, it initially designated people from 
Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula who came to West Kalimantan for trade 
and to spread their religion. Later, the term was expanded to include those 
Dayaks who had converted to Islam.3 
Dayaks routinely experienced discrimination under the Malay sultanates 
and Dutch colonialism. In most sultanates, Dayaks did not enjoy the same 
rights as the majority Malays, and were not considered citizens (anak negeri). 
Dayaks were not allowed to work under the sultanates. They also suffered 
social vilification by Malays, which prevented them from participating in 
social activities beyond their own group, including education. As a result of 
these obstacles, Dayaks in West Kalimantan were entirely absent from politi-
cal movements prior to independence.4
The rise and fall of Dayak politics
This situation started to change after the end of World War II. The Allied 
government led by NICA (the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) 
established a Dayak Affairs Office in early 1946. It carried out a series of 
unprecedented reform initiatives for Dayak emancipation, and secured 
unconditional agreement from the revived sultanates to abandon discrimi-
natory practices against Dayaks.5 NICA pushed for higher education for 
Dayaks, facilitated their entry into the bureaucracy, and later the local par-
liaments.4 These pioneering policies were of psychological importance to 
Dayaks. For the first time they were sitting in equal positions with Malay and 
Sultanate representatives in the government.
Another important actor in Dayak political emancipation was the 
Persatuan Dayak (PD, Dayak Unity Party), which was established in 1945. 
PD performed well in the elections in 1955 and 1958 when it won a significant 
number of seats in both provincial and district parliaments. A Dayak was 
appointed governor, and four became district heads (bupati). Some assumed 
positions as members of governing councils (Dewan Pemerintah Daerah, 
3  Dayaks treated Dayaks who converted to Islam, also known as Senganan, as Malays. This 
was a consequence of the Senganan’s renouncing their ‘inferior’ Dayak identities. Senganan 
would usually resettle in Malay villages, assume new names, adopt a Malay way of life, and 
claim to be Malay (V. King 1985:57-9; Tjilik Riwut 1993:191; Fridolin Ukur 1971:183).
4  This was not the case in Central Kalimantan. See Van Klinken 2004 and Miles 1976.
5  Kantoor voor Dajaksche Zaken, Pontianak, Notulen Vergadering di Sanggau pada  antara 
Dayak dan Landschap, signed by Oevaang Oeray and assistant resident, 10-10-1946, pp. 4.
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DPD, and later Badan Pemerintah Harian, BPH), and others took on leader-
ship positions in local parliaments.6 
As a result of national policy aimed at curbing regional political parties as 
well as internal rivalries within the party, by the early 1960s the PD had split 
into two factions. The biggest, led by the Dayak governor Oevaang Oeray and 
supported by most Dayak civil servants, joined the left-leaning national party 
Partindo. The other, led by Palaunsoeka and supported mainly by Catholic 
teachers and church personnel, joined the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik). This 
party was generally excluded from parliamentary politics in West Kalimantan 
from the 1960s until the collapse of the Soekarno government. 
Dayak politics under a leftist Partindo suffered a significant setback after 
the ‘communist’ coup attempt on 1 October 1965. In mid-1965, under the ini-
tiative of the local military commander, West Kalimantan’s Partindo branch 
merged into Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI, League of 
Supporters of Indonesian Independence), here a small nationalist party 
dominated by Malays. After the merger, a clash of ethnic interests occurred 
within the party. The original Malay members felt threatened and were dis-
appointed with the new leadership structure which included many Dayak 
figures. This culminated in 1968 when Tan Husni, a Malay and chairman of 
IPKI, expelled all ex-Partindo members from IPKI.7 Although later annulled 
by party headquarters, the expulsion left a scar on relations between the two 
ethnic groups. It was one reason why many Dayak leaders were persuaded 
to join Golkar in the emerging New Order. Golkar had closely followed 
the internal friction within IPKI and wished to cultivate Dayak support. 
Its efforts however, were initially unsuccessful.8 The patience of the regime 
ran out in 1971 as the general election approached. In January those Dayak 
leaders who had refused to join Golkar and who had links with the Chinese 
association Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki, 
Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) were arrested.9 Oevaang 
Oeray, the former governor, was transferred to Jakarta at the end of March 
1971. Without Oeray’s presence, some ex-Partindo Dayak leaders yielded to 
the pressure to join Golkar a month later.10 In the 1971 election, Golkar won 
6  IPKI, Jakarta, Partai IP-KI Kalbar, IPKI document signed by Achmad Sukarmadidjaja, H. 
Djilis Tahir, 10-2-1971, pp. 6.
7  Davidson 2002:93-101; L.H. Kadir 1993:304-8; H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus n.d.
8  IPKI, Jakarta, Partai IP-KI Kalbar, IPKI document signed by Achmad Sukarmadidjaja, H. 
Djilis Tahir, 10-2-1971, pp. 6.
9  Dokumen Pemerintah Indonesia, Singkawang, Surat Perintah untuk menangkap/menahan 
sementara, issued by Laksus Pangkopkamtibda KB, Team Pemeriksa Kodim 1202 Sambas, 14-1-
1971.
10  Golkar, Pontianak, Pernyataan bergabung dengan Sekber Golkar, signed by A. Djelani, P. 
Anjiem, I. Kaping, A. Sawa, J.M. Linggie, 17-4-1971, pp. 1. 
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21 seats in the provincial parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, 
DPRD) or more than 66% of the total, whereas IPKI and Partai Katolik, the 
two supposed Dayak strongholds, won only two seats each. 
Malay politics: a response 
Malay politics differed from Dayak politics in many ways. The Malay out-
look was integrated with national politics much earlier than that of Dayaks. 
Consequently, after independence, Malay politics were more nationalist, pro 
unitary state, and therefore Jakarta oriented; while the less exposed Dayaks 
formed their own local party and supported Dutch federalist policies. Most 
Malay bureaucrats did not at first consider the rise of Dayaks after 1945 a 
threat. However, ethnic tensions grew when angry Dayaks victimized some 
Malay elites in the Landak region, and created chaos in the provincial capital. 
More tension was prevented after Malay leaders in Pontianak backed down 
from their earlier demand to arrest the Dayak war leaders, fearing it could 
incite revenge from their followers (Hassan H. Basry 1961:69-70). From 1945 
until the dissolution of a pro-Dutch administration in West Kalimantan in 
1950, Malay and Dayak elites were at odds because of their different political 
outlook. Malays and Dayaks were at the brink of open conflict at the end of 
1950 in the interior district of Kapuas Hulu. The Dayak rise in the bureauc-
racy after their successes in the 1955 and 1958 elections also did not go with-
out reaction. In 1962 for example, non-Dayaks accused Oevaang Oeray of 
practising ethnic preference in recruitment and promotion of civil servants.11 
Allegations that he was creating ethnic fissures led in early 1965 to demands 
that he step down.12 
New Order authoritarianism 
The marginalization of local politics
 
The New Order never wanted to have strong local leadership, fearing it would 
lead to challenges to national leadership and in the worst case to separatism. 
One way to prevent this was to appoint ‘national’ civil servants, often from 
Jakarta, at the local level. Frequent rotation of key officials such as military 
11  Dokumen Pemerintah Indonesia, Pontianak, Pokok: Permohonan pindah Sdr. Mochtar-
roeddin, pedjabat Wedana Putussibau ke Kantor Gubernur Kepala Daerah Kalimantan Barat, 
letter signed by Oevaang Oeray, 12-1-1962.
12   Surat Resolusi untuk meretul Gubernur Oevaang Oeray, signed by Abi Hurairah Fattah 
(PNI), Chris F. Hetharia (Parkindo), PF Soedjimin (PK), Ismail Hamzah (Angkatan 45), Pontianak, 
8-3-1965, pp. 2.
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commanders was intended to prevent them from cementing close ties with 
local political forces. In 1999, the majority of local department and bureau 
heads in West Kalimantan were non-locals, although Malays held some posi-
tions and Dayaks even fewer.13 Another way was to centralize the recruitment 
of future local elites. Together with similar institutes elsewhere in Indonesia, 
the prestigious local civil servant training institute (Akademi Pemerintahan 
Dalam Negeri, APDN) in Pontianak was closed and replaced by a single insti-
tute (Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, STPDN) in Bandung, near 
Jakarta, in 1992. Since then, the national institute has accepted only around 
ten students from West Kalimantan annually, which is much less compared to 
the 50 students annually, mostly locals, who entered the APDN Pontianak.14 
At the end of  the 1960s and during the early 1970s, graduates from the APDN 
Pontianak had been fast-tracked to become sub-district heads (camat). Fewer 
STPDN local graduates meant fewer locals to assume these strategic posts. 
In an effort to ensure that national interests were paramount over regional 
ones, strategic decisions were made in Jakarta, in a top-down fashion. District 
head elections illustrate this. Usually, the central government pre-selected 
the district head prior to the selection process. It then closely monitored the 
whole process from the nomination until the election. The government had 
the power to intervene at any stage to ensure that its own candidate won. 
The regime’s policy was accentuated by a strong military presence. This 
was not unprecedented in West Kalimantan. The province’s long border with 
Malaysia invited military attention. They were the dominant force during 
‘Confrontation’ with Malaysia in the early 1960s, and even more so during 
the early New Order while they combated what they called a communist 
insurgency (Davidson and Kammen 2002). At this time the military took over 
strategic positions formerly assigned to civilians such as governor, district 
head, and parliamentary chairperson. Before the New Order there was only 
one military district head (Hercan Yamani of Ketapang). But by 1968, five of 
the seven district heads and mayors were military officers. Four district DPRD 
chairs were also given to military officers.15 The power of the military was so 
great that their regional commander undermined the power of the governor. 
One high-ranking official revealed to me that Soemadi, the governor from 
1966-1971 who was also a military officer, was agitated when the military 
commander bypassed him on several important decisions. Supported by an 
extensive command and intelligence network from the provincial down to the 
13  ‘ Kemerdekaan, penindasan dan tuntutan merdeka’, Kalimantan Review 48(1999):5-7.
14  APDN, Pontianak, Meletakkan landasan yang kokoh dalam mengembangkan kiprah 
organisasi beserta himpunan keputusan hasil Musyawarah I Ikatan Alumni APDN/STPDN se 
Kalimantan Barat, 1997.
15  Dokumen Pemerintah Indonesia, Pontianak, Laporan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi 
Kalimantan Barat dalam sidang terbuka DPRD-GR, Propinsi Kalimantan Barat, 11-3-1968.
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village level, military bureaucrats effectively controlled local politics.
The New Order severely weakened once influential local bureaucrats and 
political parties. During the period between 1965 and 1971, political parties 
other than Golkar were demonized, repressed, and separated from their 
constituents, thus losing their influence. All civil servants, traditionally a 
source of support for political parties, were required to sever ties with these 
parties in 1970, prior to the general election. Under these conditions, the 
other parties fared poorly in the 1971 election, and never recovered. The 1973 
national party restructuring caused serious internal friction within the par-
ties, particularly during the general elections in 1977 and 1982. Continuous 
government interventions further crippled the political parties. For example 
in 1996-1997, the government effectively orchestrated PDI’s West Kalimantan 
branch to oppose the leadership of the oppositionist Megawati, despite her 
popularity among party supporters. 
Nation building and local culture
Particularly once the New Order was over, a cultural discourse emerged that 
blamed the New Order’s promotion of a national culture for the degeneration 
of local culture. Dayaks in the NGO Pancur Kasih, for example, accused the 
New Order of dismantling their longhouses. Malays held similar convictions 
over their culture, saying that only Islamic symbols had survived the New 
Order.165 Both cultures had already been in decline long before the New Order. 
Dayak culture has undergone rapid erosion since the introduction of Islam 
and Christianity. Indeed, earlier Dayak politicians had in fact asked Dayaks to 
abandon some ‘antiquated’ or ‘extravagant’ traditions in the name of moderni-
ty (Davidson 2002:97). Malay culture waned with the declining fortunes of the 
sultanates, the centre of Malay civilization in the past. The last remnants of the 
sultanates’ administration (swapraja) were abolished prior to the New Order. 
However, the New Order should also share some of the blame, because it did 
not try to support those declining cultures, or at least did not prevent them 
from disappearing altogether. Some New Order cultural policies accelerated 
the dissolution of local cultures by absorbing them into a national culture. 
Local icons that might threaten the country’s unity and Jakarta’s author-
ity were removed. Sultan’s palaces were converted into museums or left to 
decay. Longhouses, powerful symbols of Dayak communal life and unity, 
were largely annihilated during the New Order era. The regime claimed they 
were places of free sex and unhealthy living, fire hazards, reminders of head-
hunting, and, most importantly, media for communism (Djuweng 1996:7; 
Roekaarts 1985:15). Many functions attached to the longhouse ceased to exist. 
16  ‘Pembangunan hancurkan kebudayaan Melayu’, Kalimantan Review 48(1999):28.
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Communalism and congeniality among Dayaks decreased, oral traditions 
were forgotten, and arts and performance related to life in the longhouse 
declined (Djuweng 1996:17, 124; Drake 1982:49-52). Many Dayak youngsters 
in the city do not speak their own language because they consider Indonesian 
or Malay to be more prestigious than their own languages.17 Dayak cultural 
performances were portrayed as exotic and primitive. Shifting agriculture 
was held responsible for forest fires from the 1980s. The regime sponsored 
Christian missions to convert ‘animists’. 
Traditional authority was also affected by administrative changes. After 
1979, traditional village heads were rapidly replaced by a younger but less 
respected generation of public servants. Robbed of their traditional authori-
ties, villagers were drawn to modern apparatuses such as the police who 
were backed by state power, and thus they discarded many of their tradi-
tions. Reorganization of village boundaries after 1979 further jeopardized 
traditional leadership. 
Transmigration, the expansion of plantations and logging activities added 
to the pressures on local cultures. Dayaks, who usually lived in small groups, 
became a minority in transmigration sites such as Seluas, in Sambas district.18 
Many inland villages now have Javanese or even Batak names.19 Dayak NGO 
activists said that plantations and logging introduced prostitution and mar-
riages of convenience (kawin kontrak). Locals were pushed to cut down trees 
in sacred forests for logging companies.
SARA and ethnic politics
The New Order opposed all discussion on ethnic or other ‘sectarian’ issues.20 
The regime feared such issues could lead to social instability or separa-
tism. After 1971 no New Order census referred to ethnic groups. The West 
Kalimantan government followed instructions closely by not including eth-
nic information on their employee records.21 
The regime also exercised strong censorship. The use of the terms ‘Dayak’ 
17  Julipin and Pius 1987. Assimilation toward a more powerful and prestigious culture is often 
observed. In Norway, for example, the ‘inferior’ Sami were incorporated into the mainstream 
Norwegian culture (Eriksen 1993:29). 
18  ‘Masalah kependudukan di Kalimantan’, Kalimantan Review 19(1996):12.
19  Some Iban villages were given new names such as Toba, Pulau Manak, and Rantau Prapat 
by a Batak sub-district head in the early 1980s (Lumenta 2001:113). Javanese names were given 
to many new villages, and to some villages which previously had Chinese names. 
20  Issues to be avoided were summarized in the acronym SARA, ‘Suku, Agama, Ras dan 
Antar-Golongan’, meaning Indonesian ethnicity, religion, race (that is, the Chinese) and ‘class 
conflict’ (that is, Marxism).
21  However, its provincial human resources department blundered by leaving religious infor-
mation easily available. In West Kalimantan ethnicity can be easily identified through religion. 
The 2000 census once more included ethnicity as a category.
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and ‘Malay’ in local newspapers was rare.22 Much reporting on ‘Dayaks’ 
was camouflaged with terms such as isolated (terasing) or inland (pedalaman) 
groups. In reporting ethnic conflict, the media never disclosed the ethnic 
background of perpetrators. Its causes were always described as ‘not ethnic’ 
but ‘common criminal’ (for example Akcaya 16-11-1979). Ethnic-oriented 
NGOs were kept under tight control. They themselves often exercised 
self-censorship so they could continue their activities. Ethnic organizations 
established before the 1997 conflict, such as Pancur Kasih, refrained from 
mentioning the ethnic groups with which they were working. 
However, the SARA-sensitivity of the regime did not prevent the erup-
tion of several ethnic conflicts, notably between Dayaks and Madurese.23 All 
these violent conflicts started with small altercations in which a Dayak was 
victimized, which triggered a strong Dayak reprisal. Government officials 
as well as social experts who analysed these events, particularly after 1997, 
often agreed with Dayaks that Madurese had been culturally insensitive and 
callous toward their surroundings.
Most ethnic violence involving Dayaks and Madurese in West Kalimantan 
does not appear to have been politically motivated. However, political elites 
did try afterwards to take advantage of them, particularly those that evolved 
into widespread violence such as in 1997 and 1999. Their role only appeared 
in the middle to later stages, after significant casualties had fallen. One of 
their motivations to become ‘involved’ was to secure ethnic concessions. In 
the conflict in 1996-1997 for example, Dayaks through their customary coun-
cils (to be discussed below) were merely intensifying long-standing demands 
for political positions for themselves. 
Open ethnic politics were certainly not entertained during the New 
Order. However, they continued at a more subtle level after 1966 within West 
Kalimantan’s bureaucracy. These were usually between Dayaks and Malays 
but also, for example, between coastal (Sambas) and inland Malays. In the 
early 1980s, Dayak politicians in Sanggau district (unsuccessfully) demanded 
several top positions.  In 1982 they threatened to sabotage a Golkar victory in 
the district election.24 In June 1993, several months after a successful national 
Dayak seminar, three Dayak politicians wrote a letter to the governor and all 
other related departments including the president, among others demand-
22  Between 1980-1990, the local newspaper Akcaya published only six articles on the Dayak 
(Davidson 2002:261). 
23  ‘Sejarah perang suku di Kalbar’, Kalimantan Review 50(1999):10; Davidson 2002. The only 
one of numerous events that did not involve the Madurese as the ‘victim’ was the conflict in 1967, 
when Dayaks expelled the Chinese population from the interior of the Bengkayang and Landak 
regions. Davidson and Kammen (2002) claim that this episode was driven by the military.
24  Golkar, Sanggau, Laporan khusus; Kelompok 11 di Sanggau, signed by Oteng Sukarna, 
28-4-1981, pp. 6. [Introductory letter signed by Djalaluddin Latarissa.]
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ing at least three Dayak district heads.25 This demand was probably the 
entrée for the two most important cases of New Order ethnic politics in West 
Kalimantan: the district head elections in Sintang (1994) and in Kapuas Hulu 
(1995). 
Sintang district head elections 1994 
L.H. Kadir, a Catholic Dayak bureaucrat, was the government-favoured 
candidate in the Sintang district head election in 1994 (Tammar Abdulsalam 
1997:157). The other ‘accompanying’ candidates (calon pendamping) were 
Abdillah Kamarullah and Abdul Hadi Karsoem, both Malay bureaucrats in 
Sintang district. Kadir’s appointment seemed guaranteed because Golkar 
and the military faction occupied almost 80% of the seats. On top of that, 
Kadir also received support from other parties, particularly PDI which had 
four Dayak members. But the election in February 1994 turned out to be dif-
ferent from the usual scenario. Kamarullah won the election with 21 votes, 
while Kadir only got 16 votes, and Karsoem got one vote.26 Malays wel-
comed Kamarullah’s victory because two previous district heads had been 
Christians. For the Dayaks, Kadir’s failure heightened their conviction that 
there had been concerted efforts to marginalize Dayaks in the bureaucracy. A 
Dayak head of the Golkar faction calculated that the defeat had been caused 
by the defection of almost half the Golkar members. I was told he was also 
convinced that the defectors were Muslim and non-Dayak (see also Davidson 
2002:268). The fact that the regime immediately applauded the election result 
angered Dayaks (Kompas 12-2-1994, 2-3-1994; Akcaya 1-3-1994, 3-3-1994). It 
was highly unusual for the regime to celebrate the defeat of its own can-
didate. Dayak elites and commoners tried to reverse the result by sending 
delegations to Jakarta (Kompas 1-3-1994). Demonstrations were staged in 
Sintang and Pontianak (Tammar Abdulsalam 1997:161-2), and some Dayak 
politicians even threatened to quit Golkar if Kadir was not installed (Akcaya 
1-3-1994; Kompas 2-3-1994). Golkar responded by sending a delegation to 
investigate matters (Akcaya 2-3-1994), but the government signalled it would 
not reverse the decision. 
25  The letter dated 21 June 1993 was signed by G.P. Djaoeng, Rachmad Sahuddin, and A.R. 
Mecer, influential Dayaks. Djaoeng was the first Dayak district head elected in 1958. Sahuddin 
was involved in the establishment of district and provincial customary councils. Mecer was the 
‘brain’ and one of the founding members of Pancur Kasih Foundation, a respected Dayak NGO. 
All were members of Golkar. 
26  Kadir himself was not present during the election. One source mentioned to me that Kadir 
was not interested in the position because of family considerations. His lack of interest might 
have given incentives for the manoeuvres not to elect him.
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After a delay to allow tensions to ease, Kamarullah was sworn in as Sintang 
district head on 5 April 1994 (Davidson 2002:268). The inauguration did not 
pass without incident. Two Dayak members of parliament, representing 
Golkar and PDI, interrupted the inauguration. In Sengah Temila, hundreds 
of kilometres from Sintang, hundreds of Dayaks vented their anger by block-
ing the main road between Ngabang and Sanggau and smashing windows of 
passing cars (Tammar Abdulsalam 1997:163; Davidson 2002:268). This event 
was the first open political opposition from the Dayaks. It showed that even 
an authoritarian regime could be ‘challenged’, and it set a precedent of overt 
ethnic politics for the next district head elections. All this helped to set the 
stage for a more severe conflict in 1996-1997.
The Kapuas Hulu district head election in 1995
The election of the district head in Kapuas Hulu in 1995 can be seen as a con-
tinuation of the unfinished Kadir saga. In order to assuage the upset Dayaks, 
the governor reserved this post for the middle-ranked bureaucrat Jacobus 
Layang. He was not the most senior Dayak bureaucrat, but he was certainly 
one of just a few to have climbed to the middle ranks.27 His appointment ben-
efited from his close relations with the military, as well as from his appoint-
ment as chairman of the newly established Majelis Adat Dayak (MAD, Dayak 
Customary Council).28 Taking a lesson from Sintang, the governor had taken 
serious steps to prevent an unexpected result. Tammar Abdulsalam, Deputy 
Governor II who was responsible for elections in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu, 
was temporarily relieved from his duties. The main reason was his failure to 
deliver Kadir as Sintang district head the previous year. He was replaced by 
a confidant of the governor, the incumbent district head of Kapuas Hulu. To 
eliminate ethnic complications in the election, the Minister of Internal Affairs 
dropped two Malay candidates from the final list. The remaining three can-
didates were all Dayaks.29 Finally, a senior Dayak politician, Iman Kalis, was 
dispatched as the governor’s ‘envoy’ to Kapuas Hulu prior to the election to 
ensure the election of Layang.30 The governor’s precautions against a Malay 
27  The only two Dayaks with higher provincial positions at that time were L.H. Kadir and 
J. Sotorman. The governor was not comfortable with ‘weak’ Sotorman, but at the same time he 
could not offer the position to Kadir, who had earlier been rejected in Sintang. 
28  His relations with the military appeared to be more important than his role in the MAD, 
which had no political significance and little influence within the Dayak community. 
29  The names of five candidates were sent to the Minister of Interior for final approval, two 
Malays and three Dayaks. Knowing that the government would give the position to a Dayak, 
these two Malay candidates claimed they were ‘Dayak Islam’ during the election process 
(Tammar Abdulsalam 1997:165).
30  This information comes from various interviews.
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‘scheme’ proved to be wise. After the failure to get any of their candidates on 
the final list, the Malay politicians were manoeuvring to elect the ‘best’ Dayak 
district head who could serve their interests. They chose the terminally ill St 
Kupon. They believed his poor health would not permit him to serve for 
long, and his Malay deputy would soon take over.31 They planned a narrow 
win for Layang one day before the election. With this strategy Kupon could 
win the election with only a small swing in the voting, and the schemers 
could avoid being blamed for insubordination because in an election small 
vote swings are always possible. Further, they encouraged sub-ethnic divi-
sions between the Dayak members of parliament. Sensing the manoeuvres, 
Iman Kalis, the envoy, objected to the marginal winning strategy advanced 
by the DPRD. He insisted that Layang should have a decisive vote of 18, 
while Kupon would have only one vote. He also worked behind the scenes 
to ‘unify’ the Dayak vote behind Layang. Even after all these efforts Layang 
won by only a narrow margin, eleven votes to eight votes for Kupon. Thus 
increasingly confident ethnic challengers were beginning to threaten the cen-
tral government’s ability to appease this or that ethnic faction by manipulat-
ing parliamentary ‘votes’. The next phase would be to go public. 
Reform and the reinvention of ethnic identity
The politicization of ethnicity in West Kalimantan has a long history. It has 
been practised by the underdog Dayaks rather than the more powerful 
Malays. Like the Dayak elites, ordinary Dayaks also felt the deprivation and 
marginalization. The government had converted ancestral forests and lands 
into transmigration, plantation, and logging sites with the promise that 
they would benefit local Dayaks. However, many of these projects in fact 
worsened their living standards. As the problems increased, silent discon-
tent was slowly transformed into more active protests. In the 1990s groups 
of villagers went to the local legislative assembly to demand justice in the 
form of compensation. As the government ignored these demands, peace-
ful engagements transformed into more violent protests manifested in the 
burning of plantations, confiscation, and blockades of access to plantations 
(Davidson 2002:264-6). Thus, Dayak elites, enlightened NGO activists, and 
ordinary Dayaks began to converge from the mid-1990s into an important 
political force and accelerated their political momentum. The district head 
elections of 1994 and 1995 indirectly strengthened the Dayak bonds vis-à-vis 
other groups. As the movements gathered momentum, Dayaks grew more 
prepared to act. The events of 1996-1997 became the turning point. It became 
31  One high ranking official of Malay origin described the scheme to me as a wicked plot or 
rencana busuk. 
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the most violent conflict between Dayaks and Madurese in the history of 
West Kalimantan (Davidson 2003:71-6; Human Rights Watch 1997). After a 
long period of distress and marginalization, this conflict could be seen as a 
radical self-assertion by the Dayaks, in this case directed against Madurese 
immigrants (Davidson 2003:320-1). 
The Reformasi of 1998 released a flood of contestation that had previously 
been taboo, also in the area of centre-region relations and ethnicity. Demands 
for greater autonomy, or even independence, were growing.32 Other issues 
were the subdivision of existing districts (pemekaran) and the rights of native 
sons (putra daerah), both of which became vehicles for competition between 
the two main ethnic groups in West Kalimantan (Bamba 2002:6-7). 
Peaceful ethnic politics after the New Order
Contrary to the exclusively violent images created by the widely publicized 
conflicts of 1997 and 1999, ethnic politics have become widespread and ‘nor-
mal’ in West Kalimantan, but also by and large peaceful. Indeed, the ethnic 
compromises reached in these politics are designed to short-circuit the recur-
rence of violent conflicts. The following sections describe the dynamics of 
these peaceful ethnic politics.
The creation of new ‘ethnic’ districts
The idea of subdividing districts in West Kalimantan was first discussed at 
the end of the 1950s, but not implemented as national politics took a central-
izing, authoritarian turn under Guided Democracy. The issue resurfaced in 
the early 1990s. In 1996 the governor proposed some divisions (Akcaya 28-
3-1996), but district heads and district legislatures cautiously preferred to 
await a firm decision from the top. However, within a year after the end of 
the New Order two new districts, Bengkayang and Landak, were carved out 
from the districts of Sambas and Pontianak. Despite government denials, eth-
nicity became a major consideration in this pemekaran process. Landak and 
Bengkayang were Dayak districts. In Landak, the Dayak population was 79% 
while Malays made up only 9.7%. The Dayak population in Bengkayang was 
52.4%, while the Malay formed a minority of 18.7% (based on the Indonesian 
Census 2000). After the division, their respective parent districts, Sambas 
and Pontianak, became overwhelmingly Malay. The government drew the 
boundaries of the new districts according to ethnic lines. Thus the major-
ity Dayak sub-districts of Mandor, Menjalin and Mempawah Hulu, which 
were originally to have remained with Pontianak district, were reassigned 
32  Akcaya 27-11-1999; ‘Baiknya kita merdeka sajalah...’, Kalimantan Review 48(1998):8-9.
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to Landak.33 The government also fast-tracked the subdivisions in conflict-
prone areas. Bengkayang, for example, was established earlier than the bet-
ter-prepared but tranquil Singkawang. The formation of Kubu district (out of 
Pontianak district), which was proposed together with the formation Landak 
district but which has experienced no conflict, were delayed. The district sub-
division in these cases are mainly about power sharing and gaining access to 
the bureaucracy. It was a conscious decision by the government to subdivide 
districts as a result of which Dayaks could have their own areas to govern. 
The aim was to prevent the recurrence of violent ethnic conflict that had hap-
pened in 1997 and 1999. This has so far been proven to be successful as the 
former hot-spots Landak and Bengkayang have been peaceful.
The election of the Sanggau district head 
Under the New Order, district head elections were tightly controlled, and 
their results were usually predetermined before the elections. After 1998 the 
central government ceded most of its control to the local parliament (DPRD) 
(Malley 2003:109). This new arrangement was first tested during district head 
elections in Sanggau and then in the districts in Pontianak.
Sanggau’s election process started in early 1998, still under the New 
Order. As usual, it proceeded under the strong influence of the governor, 
who favoured the head of his social political bureau (Sospol), Soemitro, for 
the job. But previous experience had taught the locals that ethnic pressure 
could swing the odds in favour of their preferred candidates. Malays had 
at least two main candidates, Tahir Herita and Setiman H. Sudin. Until the 
end of the New Order, Sanggau (like Sambas and Pontianak Municipality) 
had always been reserved for a military officer. This led some Malays at first 
to rally behind Tahir Herita, who had a military background. When Herita 
failed to make the shortlist, many switched their support to Sudin. The Dayak 
candidates were Donatus Djaman, Benedictus Ayub and Mickael Andjioe. 
For the same reason, most Dayaks rallied behind the military Andjioe. Their 
strong performance in the ethnic conflict of early 1997 had given Dayaks an 
enviable bargaining position. Dayaks had also started bargaining through 
the customary association MAD. Malays showed no signs of ethnic ‘awaken-
ing’ until the end of 1999. Thus the government thought it would be better to 
make some concessions to soothe the Dayaks. 
Unable to diffuse the Dayaks’ support for Andjioe, the government even-
tually gave in. He made it onto the list of five candidates to be sent to the 
Interior Minister only at the last minute. Still, Andjioe was pressed to with-
33  Akcaya 27-6-1997, 3-6-1998. Based on 2000 population census, those three sub-districts have 
between 70-90% Dayak population, and less than 7% of Malays. 
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draw from the competition some days before the May 1998 riots broke out in 
Jakarta. But President Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998 had an immediate 
effect on the election process. The Dayak customary council which had been 
working hard for Andjioe’s nomination stepped up the pressure. On 4 June 
1998, the Sanggau DPRD wrote a letter to the governor and the interior min-
ister suggesting that the ‘old system’ in the election was no longer proper in 
the era of reform. The ‘people’ of Sanggau had rejected Soemitro’s nomina-
tion, the letter went on, and wanted Andjioe to retract his withdrawal. 
Realizing the opportunities presented by the reform, Malay leaders who 
had been disappointed with the earlier developments were once more drawn 
into the process. Two days after the DPRD issued the letter, Malay leaders 
asked the DPRD to remain ‘neutral’ and not be influenced either by (Dayak) 
‘masses’ or by Jakarta’s demands. They wanted the DPRD to consider only 
three candidates in the package who in their view had demonstrated no 
‘complications’ during the process: Donatus Djaman, Benedictus Ayub, and 
Setiman H. Sudin. They also expressed their respect for Andjioe’s decision 
to withdraw from the competition (Akcaya 8-6-1998). Their requests were 
astutely devised to block the possibility of Andjioe’s return to nomination, as 
well as to downplay the Dayak demonstrations.
However, the new government in Jakarta was responsive to the more 
forceful lobby and finally conceded to the Dayak demand. The Tanjungpura 
regional military commander retracted support for Soemitro, and gave his 
approval for Andjioe in June 1998. Four candidates were resubmitted to 
the Interior Minister in September 1998: Mickael Andjioe, Benedictus Ayub, 
Donatus Djaman, and Setiman H. Sudin. Djaman, an influential Dayak 
bureaucrat who was also the head of local Dayak Customary Council, was 
eventually dropped from the final list of three. The government probably 
feared that with influential Djaman in the race, the Dayak votes would be 
split, endangering Andjioe’s chances. Andjioe won the election in early 
November 1998 with 29 votes, against Sudin’s 12, and Ayub’s 4 votes. At the 
end of the month, Andjioe was sworn in as the second Dayak district head of 
Sanggau, after more than 30 years.
District head elections after 1999 have been largely peaceful, mostly 
because of conscious power-sharing between Malays and Dayaks.34 Both eth-
nic groups had reached an understanding of their respective ethnic domains. 
In the district with one dominant ethnic group, the district head and the 
deputy head are both to be from that ethnic group. This has been the case in 
the Dayak Bengkayang and Landak districts, and in the Malay Sambas and 
34  There were some protests after the district head election in Kapuas Hulu (2000) and in 
Sanggau (2003). These were mostly related to intra-ethnic conflict, and therefore not amenable to 
inter-ethnic power sharing.
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Pontianak districts. In districts with a mixed ethnicity, such as in Ketapang 
and Kapuas Hulu, mixed leadership is to be expected. 
Regional representation 
Another arena for ethnic competition has been the selection of Regional 
Representatives to the National Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
MPR). This is the country’s supreme legislative body, and thus very prestig-
ious. West Kalimantan was allocated five Regional Representative (Utusan 
Daerah) seats in 1999.35 Understanding the possible ethnic tensions in the 
selection process, provincial DPRD members agreed to informally have the 
seats divided among the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese according to a 2-2-1 
formula: two for Dayaks and Malays, and one for the Chinese. However, when 
voting took place on 4 October 1999 the results did not match the formula. 
DPRD members needed to select five persons from more than 40 candidates. 
The Dayak vote was divided among four serious candidates. The results of the 
voting were Oesman Sapta Odang (34), Zainuddin Isman (32), Budiono Tan 
(29), Ikot Rinding (29), Chairil Effendi (26). This left Dayaks with only one rep-
resentative, Ikot Rinding.36 Feeling cheated, Dayak crowds waiting outside the 
building became enraged. Under this pressure, the DPRD members decided 
to annul the letter they had just signed, and promised to reconsider the elec-
tion (Kompas 5-10-1999). The DPRD was committed to have two Dayaks, Ikot 
Rinding and Barnabas Simin. The Dayaks kept up the pressure until some 
time in November 1999, yet the DPRD failed to reconvene because of the lack 
of a quorum. 
Safety considerations may have kept members from attending, but more 
likely the members, particularly Malays, were less than interested in giving 
in to the hardball game Dayaks had been playing since 1997. Most of those 
who prevented a decision by absenting themselves from the relevant DPRD 
meetings were from Islamic parties. Their confidence in going against the 
Dayak may have been the result of growing support from Malays. The latter 
had gained a tremendous boost of confidence and symbolic strength after 
their own conflicts with the Madurese early in 1999 (Davidson 2003:320). 
This had proven that Malays matched the physical prowess of the ‘war-like’ 
Dayaks.37 The conflict had so markedly improved the Malay bargaining posi-
tion in the new circumstances that it had reached parity with Dayaks. A new 
35  Dayaks of Kalimantan were given one seat for Minority Representative. 
36  ‘Politik reaktif di negeri dongeng’, Kalimantan Review 51(1999):34.
37  The conflict itself was no less cruel than previous conflicts involving the Dayaks. Mutilation 
and cannibalism, although not part of Malay culture, were widespread during the conflict. In 
terms of ethnic cleansing, the Malay-led conflict achieved more than previous conflicts led by the 
Dayaks. Most of Sambas remained free of Madurese. 
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ethnic equilibrium had been reached. One Malay group, Aliansi Masyarakat 
Melayu Kalbar (the Alliance of Malay Community of West Kalimantan), 
issued a strong statement on 8 June 1999 warning Dayaks (though without 
naming them) not to turn West Kalimantan into another Ambon. Some days 
before, some Malays had clashed with Dayaks in front of the provincial 
DPRD, a scene not seen since independence. To back their stance on the 
MPR regional representative issue, Malay leaders argued that the original 
composition had satisfied the ethnic formula, since another member-elect, 
Zainuddin Isman, was also a Dayak, although Muslim.38 In the end, Dayaks 
did not get the extra representative in Jakarta until the next round in 2004.
Ethnic identities were also being consolidated in less overtly competitive 
ways. Sanggau Dayaks, for example, inserted Dayak customary law into a 
‘village regulation’ (Perda Kampung) that was passed by the district DPRD. 
A similar move is currently underway in Landak district. Malays rejuvenated 
cultural festivals and revived defunct sultanates. Many of these activities 
were organized or supported by ethnic organizations such as MAD, YKSPK, 
MABM, to be discussed below. 
The role of ethnic institutions 
The history of the Dayak Customary Council (MAD) can be traced to 1985, 
when a district level council was formed in Pontianak district. A provincial 
customary council (majelis adat) was established almost ten years later in 
August 1994.39 Jacobus Layang, one of its founders, became its head.40 Like 
other semi-state agencies, MAD’s existence was closely linked to the regime. 
Its founding charter declared that it aimed to help the government relate to 
customary society (masyarakat adat). 
MAD’s officials were mostly civil servants. As a state-led organization 
involved in ethnic affairs, it adopted a cautious public profile. The district 
councils, established earlier than MAD, mostly ‘socialized’ government poli-
cies to the locals. MAD recorded no activities from the time of its inception 
until 1997, when the Dayak-Madurese conflict erupted.41 
38  Zainuddin Isman was a second-generation Muslim born in Kapuas Hulu. Many Dayaks 
did not see Isman as a Dayak since he never admitted himself as a Dayak nor acted as one (‘Kita 
menuntut keadilan’, Kalimantan Review 51(1999):33). 
39  The initiative, I was told, came from two well-known Golkar politicians: Rachmad Sahuddin 
and Ikot Rinding (see also Kalimantan Review 26(1997):22-3). 
40  He was regarded as an expert on Dayak customary law. Layang was a visiting lecturer at 
Tanjungpura State University from 1979-1995. He had written several articles on Dayak cus-
tomary law, and a book on the Dayak war against the Japanese during the Second World War. 
Davidson writes that Layang was pushed to form MAD in order to boost his profile as candidate 
district head of Kapuas Hulu (Davidson 2003:269).
41  MAD, Pontianak, Laporan pertanggungjawaban Majelis Adat Dayak Propinsi Tingkat I 
Kalimantan Barat Periode 1994-1997, 19-9-1997.
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However, the ethnic conflict of 1996-1997 catapulted MAD into promi-
nence. Caught unprepared and shocked by the extent of the conflict, the 
government turned to MAD for help. MAD mediated between Dayaks, the 
government, and the Madurese, and participated in government-sponsored 
peace meetings (see the details in MAD 1997). Understanding that the gov-
ernment could not dispense with its help, MAD seized the opportunity to 
bargain for political positions. In February 1997, when the conflict was still 
flaring, MAD organized a meeting to demand political concessions from 
the government. In the same month it produced a document claiming that 
Dayak marginalization was one of the main causes of the conflict, and urg-
ing serious efforts to remedy the situation. On other occasions MAD asked 
openly for several vacant bureaucratic positions to be given to Dayaks. 
Under such persistent pressures, the governor made some concessions. One 
of the first was the promotion of Ignatius Lyong to head of the provincial 
human resources in June 1997. After a few successes under this rather recep-
tive governor, MAD became more aggressive. At its first plenary meeting 
in September 1997, MAD redefined its objectives by explicitly referring to 
Dayak interests. It changed its name from a generic Majelis Adat (Customary 
Council) to today’s Majelis Adat Dayak. The name change had been suggest-
ed by the governor himself. MAD, together with other organizations such 
as Persatuan Intelektual Kristen Indonesia (PIKI, Indonesian Association of 
Christian Intellectuals) successfully lobbied the government for two Dayak 
district heads, in Sanggau and Pontianak District.42 MAD continued to 
pursue Dayak interests, although it yielded little result after 1999. The once 
accommodative governor had become more resistant. He had discovered 
the Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu (MABM, Malay Cultural and Customary 
Council) as a counterforce to MAD. Also, internal friction began to weaken 
MAD and tarnished its image among Dayaks. 
The Pancur Kasih foundation 
 
Ethnic politics in the post-New Order period were not confined to elite 
manoeuvring for district leadership but also involved increased ethnic aware-
ness among ordinary people concerned about their livelihoods.43 Much of 
this awareness raising work was done by the Pancur Kasih foundation in 
Pontianak, a private NGO initially associated with the Catholic Church. 
42  Under its chairman Mian L. Simanjuntak, PIKI was very aggressive in demanding politi-
cal positions for Dayaks and Christians. He was mysteriously murdered in January 2000. Many 
Dayaks saw the murder as politically motivated. 
43  Many arguments in this section follow closely Davidson’s arguments (Davidson 
2003:256-67).
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NGOs under the umbrella Pancur Kasih Foundation always opposed MAD’s 
approach. They believed that although MAD’s jockeying had opened some 
opportunities for elite Dayaks, it did not benefit Dayaks in general. Nor 
had they forgotten that some district level customary councils (Dewan Adat 
Dayak, DAD) had acted as agents of the New Order to persuade Dayaks to 
let go their lands and forests (Bamba 2000:41).
Pancur Kasih was formed in April 1981 by several Dayak intellectuals and 
a pastor.44 It was part of a network of Catholic institutions and related NGOs 
in Jakarta, which provided substantial financial support and also introduced 
its activists to new ideas and to some concerned foreigners. 
Some of the most important NGOs under the Pancur Kasih umbrella are 
the Credit Union which works in the economic area, the Institut Dayakologi 
(ID) in the social and cultural area, the Lembaga Bela Benua Talino (LBBT, 
Institute for Community Legal Resources Empowerment) in indigenous 
rights, and Pembinaan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam Kemasyarakatan 
(PPSDAK, Strengthening Community Natural Resource Management) in 
customary land mapping. These NGOs provide financial guidance and assist-
ance, schools and scholarships, as well as more effective and acceptable agri-
cultural practices. They also give legal advice and have equipped Dayaks with 
critical thinking to face encroaching forces under the name of ‘development’. 
Whereas MAD has tended to be elitist and aimed only at political positions, 
these NGOs work at the ground level to assist Dayaks to improve their liveli-
hood. This has earned them Dayak respect and support. In January 1997, a 
group of Madurese attacked one of the Pancur Kasih buildings and wounded 
two Dayak women. The attack sparked a deadly Dayak retaliation (Human 
Rights Watch 1997). The chairman of Pancur Kasih, A.R. Mecer, was appointed 
as the only Dayak representative for the whole of Kalimantan in the National 
Assembly MPR in September 1999 (Akcaya 15-9-1999). The organization’s 
influence among the Dayak grassroots was recently proven again when a 
member of the Insitut Dayakologi was elected to the Regional Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) in Jakarta in 2004.45 
The credibility of these NGOs on issues related to Dayaks, environment 
and conflicts, extends beyond the Dayak community. The government has 
consulted with the Institut Dayakologi for teaching materials on local cul-
ture. When the Provincial Statistical Bureau was fined by the MAD because 
of ‘mistakes’ in ethnic classification, the bureau consulted the institute for a 
44  Pancur Kasih’s formal name was Yayasan Kesejahteraan Sosial Pancur Kasih (YKSPK). In 
2001, the foundation was renamed as Union (Perkumpulan) Pancur Kasih.
45  Four DPD members were elected from West Kalimantan, two Malays and two Dayaks. 
Maria Goreti was a staff member at ID of Pancur Kasih. Though her profile was lower than other 
Dayak politicians, academics, and priests who also ran as candidates, she won an impressive 
support, second only to Piet Herman Abik. 
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solution. Branches of national NGOs such as the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat 
Nusantara (AMAN, Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) 
and Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Walhi, Indonesian Forum for 
Environment) were mainly staffed by individuals linked to Pancur Kasih. 
Pancur Kasih has consistently focused its work at the grassroots level for 
almost 20 years. It has refused to get involved in parliamentary and party 
politics. However, some senior members, including A.R. Mecer, the founding 
member, were convinced they needed to work within the system to create 
genuine change. Mecer joined the Christian party Partai Pembela Demokrasi 
Kasih Bangsa (PPDKB, Defenders of Love the Nation Democratic Party) 
to compete in the 2004 election in West Kalimantan. The PPDKB quickly 
established itself in West Kalimantan owing to an extensive Pancur Kasih 
network. The party failed however to pass the national legal hurdles to par-
ticipate in the election.
The Malay Cultural and Customary Council (MABM)
Malays were initially slow to take up the challenge offered by the growing 
Dayak assertiveness. West Kalimantan history reveals that Malays lacked the 
incentive to build formal ethnic organizations, since they already enjoyed 
their status as a ‘ruling’ ethnic group. Even during the heyday of the Dayak 
PD and Partindo in the 1950s, Malays remained the majority in the bureauc-
racy and parliament. 
This all changed in April 1997, when Malays established the equivalent of 
MAD and named it Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu (MABM,  Malay Cultural 
and Customary Council). It grew out of earlier similar associations in Sambas 
and Ketapang districts. It aimed to represent Malays at the provincial level. 
Already since the 1990s, the provincial government had had difficulty in 
directing a request for Malay participation for regional Malay conferences 
or meetings. MABM also aimed to restore the standard of living and revive 
the culture of Malays, which had been in decline after the dissolution of the 
sultanates and had been subsumed under a national New Order culture.46 
Despite denials from its founders, its birth was closely related to the height-
ened tension as a result of the ethnic conflict in 1996-1997. Malays needed a 
‘counter’ for the Dayak political movements at that time (Davidson 2003:346). 
MABM’s first few years were spent on consolidation. It set up branches at the 
district level, and focused on getting acknowledgement from the Malays. It 
kept a low profile during the period of transition in 1997-1998.47 None of its 
46  Kalimantan Review 48(1999):28.
47  From information obtained in various interviews it appeared that this restrained attitude 
irked the governor, who on several occasions, as if to balance the Dayaks’ demand, urged MABM 
to take a more aggressive attitude.
Taufiq Tanasaldy370
overt policies posed a direct challenge to the Dayaks. Instead it has tried since 
its inception to be friendly towards its counterpart. For example, it continued 
to attend provincial Gawai Dayak festivals and participate in ‘reconciliation’ 
forums organized by Dayaks. During the 1998 crisis in West Kalimantan, 
together with other ethnic associations, MABM appeared repeatedly in the 
newspapers urging solidarity and unity among the ethnic groups.
Nevertheless, MABM could not prevent tensions between Malays and 
Dayaks from increasing. MABM started to build Malay Traditional Houses 
(Rumah Melayu) at the provincial and district levels, and encouraged Malays 
to wear telok belanga dress at festivals and religious events. MABM personnel 
lobbied the government to incorporate more Malay symbols such as yellow 
colour and lancang kuning (a traditional boat) in the government premises, 
such as at the entrance gate. Later, the very existence of MABM indirectly 
encouraged resistance to the Dayaks, such as occurred during the clash over 
the MPR representatives in October 1999 described above. The MABM pro-
file was also raised when fighting broke out between Malays and Madurese 
in 1999-2000. The main actor in the conflict was the Forum Komunikasi 
Pemuda Melayu (FKPM, Union of Malay Youth Communication), a youth 
organization which had consultative relations with MABM.48 Although rela-
tively quiet in district elections in 1998 and 1999, MABM has been actively 
promoting Malay concerns in more recent elections. The MABM in Sanggau 
issued a ‘warning’ in the 2003 district head election not to have both a Dayak 
district head and a Dayak deputy. It suggested a list of Malay candidates 
for the deputy position, to pair with the Dayak district head candidate. In 
Landak and Sanggau, MBAM led the challenge to the implementation of 
Dayak customary law. For MABM, national law should always prevail over 
customary law, and the latter should apply only to the related ethnic group. 
To widen its influence, MABM maintained relations with the newly revived 
Malay sultanates, as well as Islamic organizations such as political parties, 
forums and universities. The objective was to build a stronger coalition vis-
à-vis the Dayaks. 
Concluding remarks
Throughout the post-independence history of West Kalimantan, except dur-
ing the New Order, ethnic politics have been identical to Dayak elite politics. 
Dayaks were the only segment of West Kalimantan who constantly and 
overtly played on ethnic sentiments. They mostly wanted greater representa-
tion in the bureaucracy, citing a long history of marginalization. Malay elites 
48  For the role of FPKM in the 1999 conflict see Davidson (2002:297). 
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were more inclined to avoid mobilization and engage in internal office poli-
tics, where they had a better bargaining position. The end of the New Order 
saw a resurgence of ethnic politics. Dayak elites, who had begun to challenge 
the regime in the mid-1990s, were the first to seize the opportunity offered 
by the changes occurring in 1998. By mobilizing the Dayak masses, these 
elites and some ethnic organizations were able to pressure the government 
to appoint two Dayak district heads. Malays, threatened by the rise of Dayak 
politics, belatedly formed an ethnic organization in 1997. After the conflict 
between Malays and Madurese in 1999, which gave them a tremendous 
boost, the Malays started to answer the challenges posed by the Dayaks.
After 1999, political dynamics among the Dayaks have changed. The 
customary councils that had played such an important role in 1997-1999 
started to lose their influence. They lost ground because the key positions, 
especially the district head offices, were now institutionally shared between 
Malays and Dayaks. They also received less support from the grassroots 
Dayaks because of their elitist approach. Many Dayaks felt that supporting 
and cooperating with Dayak NGOs such as those under Pancur Kasih would 
bring more results to the people rather than supporting the MAD and DAD. 
Meanwhile, Malays created an effective counter movement. Malay-related 
organizations started to germinate after 1999. The nature of ethnic politics 
has also shifted from elitist ‘power sharing’ to more popular issues which 
affect a wider audience and address fairer civil service recruitment. The 
issues of district head elections, which used to be the paramount issues, 
ceased to dominate the agenda. 
Ethnic identity will continue to play an important role in West Kalimantan 
politics, but in increasingly peaceful ways. The trend since 1999 shows that 
high ethnic politicization between Dayaks and Malays has not resulted in 
open ethnic violence. Instead, the ethnic politics now played consciously by 
both Dayaks and Malays has not only prevented further ethnic violence but 
is part of a new democratic and civil process in West Kalimantan. 

andi faisal bakti
family rule in Wajo, south sulawesi
Introduction
In this chapter I examine the position of aristocratic power holders in the 
district of Wajo, South Sulawesi, from the late New Order until the elections 
in 2004. In particular I address the following questions: 1. To what extent was 
administrative power embedded in aristocratic family rule in the late New 
Order? Which families were involved, and how did they exercise their rule? 
2. What was the impact of Reformasi and regional autonomy in Wajo? What 
changes can be observed? 3. What was the effect of the elections in 2004 on the 
position of the aristocracy? 4. Finally, what kind of changes took place in the 
local power structure between the late New Order period and 2004? 
Christian Pelras (1976:314) analysed traditional authority in Wajo in the 
1960s. He concluded that members of the aristocracy would remain in power, 
although in forms which differ from those of the past. Similarly Burhan 
Magenda (1989:891-2) emphasized with regard to South Sulawesi the surviv-
al of the local aristocracy within the administrative apparatus (pamong praja). 
The fact that the pamong praja had become the bastion of local aristocrats is 
not surprising given the fact that the local bureaucracy had grown out of the 
dynastic bureaucracy of the ‘self-governing territories’ dating from the colo-
nial period. The decentralization reforms of 1938 brought about the enlarge-
ment of the dynastic bureaucracy, accommodating the fruits of expanded 
educational opportunities and a growing number of aristocrats (Burhan 
Magenda 1989:896). With respect to the Philippines, Benedict Anderson 
(1988) described a so-called ‘cacique democracy’, in which a well-entrenched 
oligarchy cooperates with a strong central state machine. Anderson showed 
how Filipino notables learnt to manipulate electoral politics during the 
Marcos era. In the following pages I will describe how the aristocratic elite 
in Wajo tried to survive with ‘coerseductive’ strategies,1 when the political 
system to which they were accustomed began to change. 
1  Syllogism between coercion and seduction, a communication concept introduced by Rene 
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The role of the Wajo aristocracy in the late New Order
In the late 1980s one member of the aristocracy took measures to restore a solid 
administrative dynasty in Wajo.2 This action was initiated by a senior Wajorese 
politician with a military background. I will call him ‘the Puang’, a term of 
reference used for Buginese of aristocratic descent. He was born in 1942 in 
Sengkang to an aristocratic family. After he finished high school he entered the 
army in 1965, whence he built an administrative career within South Sulawesi. 
He married the daughter of an aristocratic landowner and cattle breeder 
from Gilirang, and has four children. In 1995 he was promoted to the rank of 
Colonel. The Puang started his political career by joining Golkar in 1987 as a 
member of the Golkar Security and Defence Section, or Wanhat (Perlawanan 
dan Pertahan Golkar). In the same year he became a member of the Wajo dis-
trict parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). In 1993 he was 
elected district branch leader of Golkar as well as of the Wajo DPRD, positions 
he kept till 2004, when we was eventually elected district head. 
Although he gained power basically through the military and the Golkar 
party, he also used and strengthened his network of family connections. He 
appointed relatives to various strategic and ‘wet’, or lucrative, positions in the 
Wajo bureaucracy. Through the so-called ‘Jalur Jati’ (jalur, direction or way, 
which refers to Jalan Jati,3 the street where the official residence of the chair-
man of the DPRD was located), people obtained a position or a promotion, 
and family members emerged as powerful bureaucrats. 
The Puang has paved his way to family rule since 1983, when he was 
(until 1988) in charge of security at the Wajo district office. He succeeded in 
appointing his brothers and other relatives to different positions within the 
district office. In 1989 he showed an interest in becoming district head, but 
decided to concentrate on his military career instead. 
In 1993 the Puang reinforced his power when his brother was appointed 
Second Assistant to the district head, in the Economy and Development 
Section, where he was in charge of the budget for development projects. This 
position is considered very lucrative, as its holder determines prices and 
expenditures and approves the allocation of projects to various contractors. 
Two other assistants (assistant one and three) are also related to the Puang. 
Although these do not directly manage funds, their signatures are required 
in order to approve projects. As all three assistants are relatives of the Puang, 
deals are concluded smoothly.
2  In 2002 Wajo had 359,326 inhabitants spread among 176 villages and small towns (BPS Wajo 
2002). 
3  It also mirrors Jalan Cendana, the street in Jakarta where the Soeharto family lives, which 
is similarly named after a tree. 
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In 1998, by which time he was chairman of the district parliament, he tried 
his luck again for district head, but lost the elections to a financially stronger 
non-aristocratic Buginese Golkar man who was supported by the central 
government.
The new district head was, however, to play a marginal role in Wajo 
politics, as he was soon overshadowed by the Puang. For despite his defeat, 
the Puang managed to strengthen his position in the years 1998-2004 as the 
number of bureaucrats related to him increased. A number of departmental 
heads, sub-district heads, and bureau chiefs were put in place through the 
Jalur Jati. The position of the Puang seemed beyond challenge, and as his 
power increased, many prominent leaders in Wajo claimed a family relation 
with him.4 Important positions are basically shared amongst his aristocrat 
relatives and loyal allies. In the mean time, aristocrats not able to use the 
Jalur Jati are unlikely to be promoted. As one respondent said: ‘We know that 
Jalur Jati is the way to obtain a job, but we do not know who to contact; and 
if we commit an error while doing so, we will not get a job and lose our bribe 
money as well. That is the risk.’
Another brother of the Puang is in charge of the Provisions Section 
(Kepala Bagian Perlengkapan), another lucrative position, in charge of the 
purchase of all sorts of equipment (television sets, computers, overhead 
projectors, radios, fax machines, typewriters), tools, vehicles, stationary, 
furniture (tables, desks, benches), clothes, gifts, and so on. As in many dis-
tricts in Indonesia, the marking up or duplication of receipts is a widespread 
practice, and when an inspection is made, the inspector is bribed with plane 
tickets, hotel vouchers or money deposited in the account of a family mem-
ber. Another practice is to provide inspectors with letters falsely attesting 
they have inspected a location (Surat Perjalanan Dinas, SPD), which allow 
them to claim travel bonuses from their supervisors without having to leave 
their office. The head of the Provisions Section cooperates with the heads 
of the Economy Section and the Sub-division of Financial Management and 
Regional Expenses (Badan Pengelola Keuangan dan Barang Daerah, BPKBD), 
both of whom are also close relatives of the Puang. Offices (kantor dinas) 
which are considered wealthy, such as Agriculture (the richest), Revenue (the 
second richest), Transportation, Land, and Information/Communication, as 
4  Buginese kinship terminology starts with biological brothers and sisters, then first, second, 
and third cousins. Fourth and fifth cousins are seen as relatives. The children of these cousins 
are called nephews and nieces, and their grand-children are called grand-children, and so on. 
The fathers of these cousins are called uncles, and mothers are aunts, and their grand-parents are 
called grand-parents too. Thus the system of family ties facilitates a wide circle of relatives. For 
further reference on the Buginese family, see Millar 1989, Pelras 1976, 1996, 2000, Mattulada 1974, 
and Andi Faisal Bakti 2004. For an example of the familial way Buginese expand their power in 
Johore-Riau, see L. Andaya 1995. 
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well as Forest and Soil Conservation (Perhutanan dan Konservasi Tanah) are 
led by cousins of the Puang.5 Furthermore, 10 out of 14 sub-district heads are 
aristocrats, and they all claim a place in the family tree of the Puang. Four are 
non-aristocrats, but are connected to the Puang through his relatives.6 
Since 1988, the Puang had secured the support of members of the aris-
tocracy and wealthy educated non-aristocrats within Golkar. His relatives 
included the second deputy-chairperson, second deputy-secretary, and third 
treasurer of Wajo’s branch of Golkar. Three out of five section heads are rela-
tives of his, while one of his sisters-in-law was chief of the Women’s Affairs 
section. Apart from relatives, wealthy cronies included the first deputy sec-
retary and the first and second treasurers. Other sections were headed by 
friends of his. 
Although members of the aristocracy formed a minority within Golkar, 
they still held strategic positions.7 Non-aristocrats form a majority in the Wajo 
district parliament, many of whom managed to graduate from Hasanuddin 
University in Makassar. As students, many had been active in organiza-
tions like Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic University Students’ 
Association), Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Students’ 
Union), or Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII, Indonesian Islamic 
University Students’ Movement). Usually, having joined one of these organi-
zations, students also joined the Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI, 
5  In the non-departmental sphere a cousin of the Puang heads the Water Supply Agency 
(Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, PDAM), where funds are also literally pouring in. Strangely 
though, the Logistics Depot (DOLOG, formerly BULOG), a lucrative section which manages 
agricultural products, in particular rice, is led by an individual not related to the Puang family. 
One respondent explained: ‘The head of DOLOG is a Javanese, and is probably placed there by 
the central government’.
6  Out of 176 lurah/kepala desa (mayors/village heads), 59 are aristocrats and relatives of the 
Puang. While both govern the same village-sized unit, a lurah is in charge of a more developed 
village. Kepala desa are required merely to have a high school diploma. However, lurah are 
required to have an academic degree, preferably from a government academy like the Domestic 
Government Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, APDN). One of these was for-
merly located in Makassar, before being moved to Bandung and given the status of College of 
Internal Government Science (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, STIPDN). Most 
lurah belong to the aristocracy. Many Wajo bureaucrats, in particular in the district office, sub-
district heads and their deputies, graduated from these government institutions. The networks 
of these state schools were further strengthened in South Sulawesi when Ryaas Rasyid, a 1976 
alumni of APDN, became rector of the Institute of Ilmu Pemerintahan (IIP) in Jakarta, which also 
trains bureaucrats. In mid-1998, during the presidency of Habibie, he was appointed Director 
General of Regional Autonomy. He was then appointed Minister of Regional Autonomy and 
drafted the regional autonomy policy in Indonesia. Jamaluddin Santo is a close friend of Ryaas 
Rasyid, and also, through his wife, a relative of the Puang. Jamaluddin Santo’s wife is a daughter 
of Datu Mungkace, a highly respected noble in Wajo, himself related to the Puang. Santo’s wife 
also graduated from APDN and now works in Bappeda, under the leadership of the Puang.
7  See H. Schulte Nordholt in this volume for a comparable decline of aristocrats in Bali.
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Indonesian National Youth Committee), an association affiliated with Golkar. 
It was considered to be a ‘highway’ (jalur tol) to Golkar membership. These 
organizations were quite successful in training emerging non-aristocrats 
in leadership, organization, and management, as well as administration in 
South Sulawesi, as elsewhere.8 Some aristocrats were also active in these 
organizations, but they remained marginal.
The Puang was also deputy leader of ICMI’s advisory board in the 
region through which he played a central role.9 As the Puang advised on 
the names of new board members, he had a strong control over the organi-
zation. Interestingly, ICMI’s treasurer was the same businessman who was 
also treasurer of Golkar. Another treasurer of ICMI Wajo also headed the 
Financial Bureau of the district (Badan Keuangan Daerah, BKD). While non-
aristocrats are more numerous within the ICMI leadership than aristocrats, 
interviews show that they greatly respect the Puang.
The Puang also maintained close contacts with businesspeople. All 
wealthy individuals in Sengkang’s central market, such as retailers and store 
owners, maintain a relationship with Golkar and make regular donations. 
Apparently, Golkar has a monitoring system to ensure that they remain faith-
8  In order to gain political power in South Sulawesi, one needs to gain access, via HMI and 
KNPI, to Golkar. This was also seen as an avenue for strengthening the position of modernist 
Islam. Some of these new emerging Muslims, like Marwah Daud, eventually dominated Golkar 
in South Sulawesi, and established direct links with party leader Akbar Tanjung in Jakarta, who 
had been a HMI and KNPI leader in the 1970s. However, during Habibie’s presidency, this group 
was disappointed by Akbar Tanjung who competed with Habibie for the Golkar leadership 
presidency. Habibie comes from Sulawesi and was the preferred leader to South Sulawesians. 
After Habibie’s defeat, disappointed Muslim Golkar leaders established a regional caucus within 
Golkar named Iramasuka (Irian Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan). In the late New Order 
period, the role of other parties (PDI and PPP) was limited. Only those who strongly believed 
in political Islam supported PPP, while PDI was basically supported by the Toraja minority of 
Christians in Sengkang, Bottodongga, Siwa, and Lauwa.
9  ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals) was established in the early 1990s and provided then-Minister of Technology 
Habibie with a strong constituency. In many cases, governors and district heads became ICMI 
leaders. ICMI soon branched out throughout the world, in particular in cities with Indonesian 
embassies and consulates. As a result of ICMI’s popularity, ambassadors and consuls almost auto-
matically became ICMI leaders abroad. In South Sulawesi, the retired governor was the advisory 
board leader of the provincial ICMI branch. A number of former rectors and university professors 
became deputies or secretaries. In addition, Muslim entrepreneurs, including the spouse of the 
2004-2009 elected vice president Jusuf Kalla and her associates were named treasurers. 
As ICMI is closer to so-called modernists than to traditionalist Muslims, many among ICMI’s 
board members belong to the Muhammadiyah or HMI. A university professor at the Alauddin 
Institute (IAIN Alauddin), who graduated from the University of Michigan, became an advi-
sor for ICMI in Wajo and South Sulawesi. He is also the top leader of the As’adiyah Pesantren 
in Wajo. The Puang supported this pesantren financially. While ICMI’s board of South Sulawesi 
mostly includes hajis and non-aristocrats, Wajo board members are mostly hajis and aristocrats 
with family connections to the Puang. 
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ful to the party and to consider whether these entrepreneurs should be pro-
moted within Golkar. In fact, one of the biggest businessmen was made treas-
urer of Golkar.10 The Puang granted contracts to wealthy entrepreneurs, all 
Golkar district parliamentarians and who included the treasurer of Golkar, 
for the construction of district offices and the public transportation terminal 
in Sengkang. These government projects thus benefited both the Puang and 
his cronies. As Golkar treasurer, the wealthy Wajo entrepreneur was granted 
a large number of contracts by the government, including the construction 
of a road between Ana’banua and Tarungpakkae, a ring road in Sengkang, 
and a road between Sidrap and Siwa. Apparently, government projects are 
routinely offered first to state-owned companies (Badan Usaha Milik Negara, 
BUMN) and then sub-contracted to his company.11
Reformasi and regional autonomy (1998-2003)
After Reformasi the Puang further strengthened his position and took advan-
tage of regional autonomy by keeping relatives and cronies in key posts. 
Even appointments in companies and NGOs which are not under his direct 
authority ultimately end up on his desk for approval.
As a result of regional autonomy, the district head is no longer controlled 
by the provincial governor and the central government. The district head 
is no longer accountable to the provincial governor but to the members of 
the district parliament. This explains why the Puang is struggling to ensure 
that these members – and not only his own Golkar people – are loyal to him. 
Since 1999, the struggle to obtain parliamentary seats is quite open and new 
parties have mushroomed. Although Golkar and the military (Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) fractions continued to dominate, the 
1999 elections brought change as PAN, PKB, PPP, PDR, PBB and PDI-P each 
obtained one seat.12 
10  His business includes ten motorbike dealerships, construction companies, textile pro-
duction, bookstores, contracting offices, etcetera. He also has branch offices in Makassar and 
Jakarta.
11  Working closely with the Puang is a Chinese businessman. He owns PT Nei Dua Karya 
Persada, which deals in real estate, construction/development, car rental, gold and electronic 
equipment retailing. He has been a Golkar treasurer II (Deputy Treasurer) since 1988, when the 
Puang recruited him. This businessman has financed Golkar and contributes to Golkar’s electoral 
campaigns. In return he gained access to various government projects. 
12  Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, Party of the National Message); Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
(PKB, Party of the Awakening of the Nation); Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Unity and 
Development Party); Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR, Islamic People’s Sovereignty Party); Partai 
Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent and Star Party);  and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-
P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle).
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The power of the Puang was strengthened through his relatives and cro-
nies in the administration from the district to the village levels, as well as 
in parliament, so that it reached a state of near hegemony. The case of Wajo 
does, however, not represent South Sulawesi as a whole, where aristocratic 
hegemony is less evident as only 12 out of 28 district heads belong to the 
aristocracy. 
In 1999, the Puang was elected by the DPRD as chairman for another 
term. Golkar still dominated the 1999 elections as it won 26 seats. Although 
the aristocracy formed a minority in the DPRD (with only 10 out of 36 mem-
bers) the Puang controlled the non-aristocratic members as well. Wealth, 
education, or marriage into the nobility made it possible for non-aristocrats 
to become members of the DPRD.13 They were approached by the Puang to 
join Golkar and they even constitute the majority in Golkar (19 out of 26).
In contrast to the composition of the DPRD, the top layer of the Wajo 
bureaucracy is heavily dominated by the aristocracy, as they occupy 90% of 
the higher positions. They are all believed to have entered the bureaucratic 
elite through the Jalur Jati.
The general government assistant, simultaneously head of information 
and communication, and the tax revenue head are uncles of the Puang. The 
Puang’s cousin, formerly a sub-district head, now heads the Environmental 
Protection Programme, with a significant budget for ecology. While his broth-
er-in-law heads the General Government Administration Section (Kabag Tata 
Pemerintahan Umum), his cousin, son of a former district head in the 1960s-
1970s, was named district secretary. His two brothers remain in their positions, 
as respectively district government assistant for economy and development, 
and provisions section head. The Head of the Incomes Section remained 
under the leadership of his nephew. Two relatives from Gilirang, the town of 
origin of the Puang, are head of Information and Communication, and Third 
Assistant (Administrative and Finance). The head of transportation is a close 
relative of the Puang. Two relatives of the Puang also remained at their posts 
as head of Agriculture and Forest, and of Soil Conservation. The chief of the 
Security Bureau is the Puang’s cousin. Ten out of fourteen sub-district heads 
are said to have been promoted through Jalur Jati. The sub-district head of 
Tempe (Sengkang) is the Puang’s cousin. The General Election Committee 
(Komite Pemilihan Umum, KPU) was also headed by a close relative of the 
district chief. A son of a former district head (in the 1960s) was appointed 
head of Guidance and Counselling (penyuluhan), while the district secretary 
is a son of another former district head, and an aristocrat.
The Puang also maintained his grip on the Wajo business community and 
in particular the small group of Chinese entrepreneurs. Regional autonomy 
13  Thirteen members of the DPRD are hajis, which indicates their wealth.
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had changed the way in which these entrepreneurs operate. As one entrepre-
neur explained:
Regional autonomy facilitates our business and lobbying. During the previous 
period, the bureaucracy was very complicated and we had to lobby in Jakarta. 
Now, everything is done here. The DPRD is also independent now, so we can easily 
lobby each parliamentarian. Under the previous district head [1998-2003], the dis-
trict government was strong. But, imagine, since regional autonomy and a district 
head who is an aristocrat [referring to the Puang], government is even stronger 
now! In addition, under regional autonomy, there is less paperwork and lobbying 
is easier. I attended the same school as the current district secretary, which makes 
it easy to have access to the bureaucracy. I am also a close friend of the head of 
Facilities and Provisions, who is a brother of the Puang. These links helped me 
join Golkar, and become deputy-treasurer. This position gives me an opportunity 
to have access to Golkar’s leaders. I was even asked to become a Golkar legislative 
candidate in the last elections, but I declined, as I prefer to do business.
In Wajo, civil society organizations were not able to establish an independent 
counterweight to the dominance of the Puang. Instead, they were incorpo-
rated into his regime.
As’adiyah, the oldest religious school (pesantren) in Wajo is affiliated with 
the Nahdlatul Ulama, but supports Golkar. In return the Puang granted the 
pesantren various facilities, such as a school and a dormitory, mosques, and 
houses for teachers, and donated Rp 100 million to renovate the pesantren 
leader’s house. 
Similarly, Muhammadiyah in Wajo is also not very critical. But DPRD 
members of PAN, the political party most closely related to Muhammadiyah, 
voiced criticism about corruption and the dominant role of the aristocracy, as 
a result of which they were eventually isolated by the Puang group.
Among the 400 NGOs in Wajo, only four are perceived as critical. They 
include AISS (Aku Ingin Sehat Sejahtera,  ‘I would like to be healthy and 
prosperous’), and the Sabri Study Club. The leader of AISS complained that 
many NGOs stopped criticizing government wrongdoings once they were 
seduced by money or coerced by the Puang. She criticized in particular the 
Puang, his relatives and followers for monopolizing the leading positions 
in Wajo. She mobilized people in Sengkang in order to clean up the Muslim 
cemetery, the dilapidated state of which had been left unnoticed by the gov-
ernment. While some bureaucrats under the Puang have called her mad or 
strange, she has a growing number of sympathizers, as her actions demon-
strated that it is possible to criticize the government without being arrested.
The Sabri Study Club has cooperated with AISS, but its leader’s preoc-
cupations basically lie with education and language. He is worried about the 
fate of the Buginese language, and the reluctance of the government to pro-
mote local cultures and Islamic education. According to him, Islam should 
Andi Faisal Bakti382
allow anyone, irrespective of his or her origins, to rule the region. 
According to another NGO activist it seems that regional autonomy has 
made bureaucrats at the district level into warlords: 
District secretaries are very powerful. In addition, all staff members have to 
‘obey’ the district head, which for them represents the aristocracy. They have been 
coerced to vote Golkar. Individuals are also promised they will keep their posi-
tions or will be promoted following the election of a selected candidate. Usually, 
politicians promise a community or a village they will get a road or a mosque, 
if they are elected. The government has also given money to opinion makers. A 
motorbike was promised to each village head (kepala desa), while individuals were 
offered a trip to Mecca as a reward for their support.14
In South Sulawesi several cities have their own newspapers. The city of 
Makassar has Pedoman Rakyat and Fajar, the most widely read newspapers 
in South Sulawesi. The Parepare Pos is published in Parepare, while Palopo, 
a city in the north, has the Palopo Pos. Sengkang had the Merdeka Pos, which 
was closed in January 2004, after two years in business. Many believe that 
this latter newspaper was created by the Puang for the sole purpose of sup-
porting his election as district head. After the Puang was elected, the news-
paper lost its usefulness and was closed.
Some of the newspapers were quite critical of the misconduct of the South 
Sulawesi government including the Wajo administration. Pedoman Rakyat, 
Fajar, Parepare Pos and Palopo Pos often published articles and letters to the 
editor on malpractices by Wajo bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and members of 
parliament.15 However, it appears that journalists have also been approached 
and bribed by government representatives in order not to publish these sto-
ries. The practice occurs on both sides. According to an NGO leader: 
We sometimes meet journalists seemingly ‘without a press’, who have introduced 
themselves and interviewed us. As we were critical of the Puang administration, 
they asked us to pay them in order to print this interview, to make the news. 
However, although we paid, we have never seen that interview published, either 
because the newspaper for which this journalist supposedly worked does not 
exist, or because this journalist was bribed further in order for his article not to 
be published.16
14  Apparently, some members of the ‘Success Team’ of the Puang were brought to Mecca for 
umrah (short pilgrimage).
15  For example the inappropriate involvement of the Puang’s cronies in the various projects 
has been exposed. Quite often, local issues are covered, such as embezzlement of project funds (a 
Rp 20.3 billion port construction project in Bansalae, North Wajo, see for example Fajar 2-3-2005) 
and the controversy about a rice processing centre in Ana’banua, Wajo.
16  See also McCarthy in this volume.
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The elections of 2004: old networks in a new context
Four months before the general elections in April 2004, the Puang was elected 
by the members of the parliament as district head, and was officially inau-
gurated in February 2004. His ‘opponent’, who received only three votes, 
was an aristocrat from his own family whose candidacy had to demonstrate 
that democracy is operative in Wajo. The position of district head was the 
crowning of a long political career, but soon his solid powerbase in the DPRD 
would be challenged. 
During the elections of April 2004 for the district parliament, Golkar had 
to face a serious decline in popular support as it lost 9 seats (from 26 to 17).17 
As a result, Golkar also lost the majority in the DPRD of Wajo. The decline 
of Golkar would have been more dramatic without the efforts of the Puang 
to consolidate the position of Golkar. According to a member of the KPU 
(the General Election Committee), a letter of the Puang circulated among the 
members of the KPU and the bureaucracy in which he instructed the lower 
administrative officials to secure a Golkar victory. 
The main challenge to his regime came from two modernist Islamic par-
ties, PAN and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party). 
PAN managed to win five seats and based its emergence on a substantial 
Muhammadiyah following. PKS is a new party without a strong local con-
stituency, which nevertheless won four seats. Its rise can largely be attributed 
to the fact that the party used Habibie’s picture on its campaign leaflets 
throughout South Sulawesi, thus suggesting that Habibie was its presidential 
candidate (although Habibie was at the time not even in Indonesia).
These changes did not immediately imply that the Puang had lost his 
dominance in the DPRD. The number of DPRD members with an aristocratic 
background rose from 10 to 14, the majority of whom were in one way or 
another connected with the Puang.18 Also in terms of wealth, representatives 
of the upper middle class, many of whom are allied with the Puang, still 
dominate the DPRD of Wajo.19 
Conclusion
In general, tensions between aristocrats and non-aristocrats seem to have 
17  In 1999 the members of parliament numbered 36, but since the military seat was removed 
after the 2004 elections, this went down to 35. As Golkar won 17 out of 35, its share was reduced 
to less than 50%, a serious blow to Golkar’s popularity.
18  Only 10% of the population belongs to the aristocracy, but this group occupies 40% of the 
seats in the Wajo DPRD.
19  Fifteen members of the DPRD are haji, and 19 have an academic title.
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come to the surface, although they are rarely acknowledged explicitly. Within 
the aristocracy, competition has also increased as people prepare themselves 
for a power struggle once the rule of the Puang has come to an end.20 
The impact of the Puang on Wajo politics has been considerable. Although 
he was from aristocratic descent it was his career within the New Order state 
that brought him to power in Wajo. His rise within the army and his move 
into Golkar provided him with a powerful starting point, from whence he 
could expand his personal network, the core of which consisted of family 
relationships. So it was the strong New Order state that initially facilitated his 
political career in Wajo, but his rise to local power was based on the articula-
tion of institutional power with a wide patron-client network. Together these 
framed the patrimonial rule of the Puang. Regional autonomy accelerated his 
career, which eventually resulted in his election as district head in 2004 and 
gave him the opportunity to establish a hegemonic regime in Wajo. What this 
case study has shown is that decentralization and regional autonomy have 
reinforced autocratic rule instead of establishing good governance, transpar-
ency and democracy.
However, electoral democracy enabled opponents to gain ground as 
Golkar lost its majority. The rule of the Puang was primarily based on his 
ability to control and command the local state and its DPRD. It remains to be 
seen to what extent this ‘cacique democracy’ can survive when in the future 
the new district head will be directly elected by the population. 
20  At the time of writing (mid-2005), the Puang’s brother, who is now Assistant Two, was 








On 16 August 2003 the Bali Post celebrated its 55th anniversary with a spe-
cial edition.1 It contained an extensive report on a seminar held earlier that 
month under the title Menuju strategi ajeg Bali, towards a strategy for a strong 
and resilient Bali.2 The word ajeg refers to a discourse about the position of 
Balinese culture in present-day Indonesia, in particular since reformasi and 
desentralisasi had changed the political map of Indonesia. The general feeling 
at the seminar was that Bali was endangered by a variety of negative external 
influences and that Balinese culture had to be rescued. 
Representatives from various sectors in society voiced a shared concern 
that uncontrolled building activities and the rapidly expanding tourist sector 
cause large scale environmental damage, while they also feared that Western 
influences stimulate criminality, the use of narcotics, and a hedonistic materi-
alistic attitude, at the cost of traditional religious Balinese values. Moreover, 
the influx of thousands of Muslim migrant workers from neighbouring islands 
Java and Lombok gave the unpleasant feeling that Balinese are becoming a 
minority on their own island. In order to counter these negative develop-
ments, the need for a spiritual revitalization and the strengthening of cultural 
self-confidence was felt. Ajeg Bali became the key word in a quest for a new 
master plan that respected the delicate balance between Gods, men and envi-
ronment (Tri Hita Karena). 
1  The information for this article was gathered in 2003 and 2004. I was assisted by Nyoman 
Wijaya, Slamat Trisila, Ngurah Suryawan and I Wayan Supartha. I would like to express my grat-
itude to Margreet Bersma, I Nyoman Darma Putra, Gerry van Klinken, Graeme MacRae, Michel 
Picard, Carol Warren, Adrian Vickers, and the participants of the workshop ‘Renegotiating 
boundaries; Local politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia’ (20-22 December 2004 in Jakarta) for their 
helpful comments.






























The discourse on Ajeg Bali has a long history, which is closely connected 
with efforts by outside forces to define the unique (non-Islamic, Hindu) 
identity of the Balinese. Especially from the 1930s onwards measures were 
taken to preserve Bali in a steady state of supposed authenticity while at the 
same time a set of new categories was introduced by which Balinese were 
invited to think about themselves. In order to preserve the special custom-
ary arrangements an institutional distinction was made at the village level 
between custom (adat) and administration (dinas). Custom or tradition was 
framed by religion (agama), while later on the notions of culture (kebudayaan) 
and art (kesenian) were added. Balinese started to think about themselves in 
terms defined by outsiders and, according to Michel Picard, they discovered 
that they had a culture, which was turned into a separate entity that could be 
displayed, performed, and sold (Picard 1999:16. See also H. Schulte Nordholt 
1999; Picard 1996).
Since the 1970s tourism has become a part of Balinese culture. The notion 
of cultural tourism implied not only the commoditization of culture but also 
the touristification of society, blurring artificial boundaries between culture 
(inside) and tourism (outside). Tourism thus contributed to the making of a 
Balinese culture, which had become a marketable object (Picard 1996, 2003).
The island came increasingly under pressure as Jakarta-based investors 
and rising numbers of tourists and migrant workers invaded the island 
from the late 1980s. Were Balinese still in control of their own culture, which 
formed the backbone of their economy? Two other factors increased a sense of 
crisis and insecurity among Balinese: first the decentralization laws (Law no. 
22 and 25/1999), which promised more autonomy but also brought fragmen-
tation and confusion, and secondly the bomb attack in Legian on 12 October, 
2002, which ruined the image of Bali as a peaceful resort isolated from inter-
national terrorism. In this context ajeg became a catchword to indicate the 
need for a socio-cultural self-defence. However, apart from the good, but 
vaguely phrased intentions to strengthen Balinese culture, very few practi-
cal solutions were suggested by the participants of the Bali Post seminar in 
August 2003. In the end two dilemmas surfaced: First, how to achieve more 
regional autonomy vis-à-vis Jakarta, whereas decentralization had produced 
administrative fragmentation; second, how to get rid of dangerous external 
influences and unwanted immigrants, while at the same time the Balinese 
economy needs foreign visitors, investors and labour in order to survive. Bali, 
the open fortress. 
For many Balinese, recent developments have been a confusing experi-
ence. It looks as if various seemingly unrelated and diffuse processes are at 
work with highly insecure outcomes. In this essay I intend to trace some of 
these processes and investigate to what extent they are interrelated. I will 
look briefly at recent shifts in economic and political relationships between 
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Bali and Jakarta, the impact of political reform and administrative decentrali-
zation in Bali, and in particular at the effects these had on the politics of caste, 
the position of regional aristocracies, and the formation of new party-based 
politics. In Bali decentralization did not stop at the district level but affected 
the village level as well. What were the implications of these changes in terms 
of local autonomy and conflict management? In this context it is important to 
look at long-term trends, which were only accelerated by the recent agony of 
decentralization and reform. These changes increased a sense of insecurity, 
which formed the breeding ground of the Ajeg Bali movement.
It would be misleading to focus too exclusively on the special nature of 
Bali, as ‘Baliologists’ tend to do. Instead I want to point to some ‘Indonesian’ 
phenomena in present-day Bali: ethnic tensions, ‘sweeping’ of immigrants, 
the connections between gangs of preman (thugs) and politicians, recent elec-
tion politics, and the role of urban middle class intellectuals in articulating 
exclusive cultural identities. It is against the backdrop of these developments 
that the discussions about Ajeg Bali and its post-New Order nature should 
be understood. And this raises eventually the question of how Indonesian 
Bali actually is.
Figures of change
One of the key questions regarding the development of tourism in Bali was: 
how to profit from tourists while at the same time keeping them at a safe 
distance?3 Around 1970 it was decided to concentrate mass tourism in the 
southern tip of Bali. Soon, however, more areas were opened and when in the 
1980s the touristification of Bali gained momentum and the deregulation of 
the banking sector facilitated a sharp increase in domestic investment, tourist 
areas eventually covered a quarter of the island. In a relatively short period 
the Balinese economy became increasingly dependent on the tourist industry, 
which was primarily fuelled by an increase of direct foreign arrivals. In 2000, 
two million foreign tourists visited Bali compared to one million in 1990 and 
300,000 in 1980. Since the early 1990s the number of domestic tourists, who are 
not included in the official statistics, increased significantly and even outnum-
bered foreign visitors. It is estimated that in 2001 the total number of tourists 
was close to three million, which approaches the total population of Bali. 
The tourist boom had an immediate impact on the environment, the econ-
omy and social relationships. The rise in the number of hotel rooms, from 500 
in 1970 to 40,000 in 2002, was accompanied by a rapid increase in restaurants, 
3  Bali Membangun 2003; Bali Post 16-8-2003; Jakarta Post 25-5-2003; Kompas 12-3-2001, MacRae 
1997; Picard 1996, 2003, 2005; Pringle 2004; Putu Suasta 2001. 
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art shops and so-called ruko (rumah toko, a combination of a shop and a house, 
on top of which the house temple is built). As a result every year approxi-
mately 1000 hectares of irrigated rice-land disappear and in 2001 there was 
only 86,000 ha left. The traditional landscape has become a scarce commodity 
while ongoing erosion and the large quantities of water needed for hotels and 
golf courses cause serious water shortages for the population of Denpasar. 
Bali is no longer a predominantly agrarian society. In 2005 half of the pop-
ulation will live in urban areas. Between 1970 and 2002 the agrarian sector 
decreased from 56.6% to 21.4% and in 1998 51.6% of the Balinese income was 
earned from tourism. If related fields like handicraft, garment production 
and transport are included, 50 to 70% of the workforce depends on tourism.
With an average economic growth of about 8% Bali experienced a transi-
tion from an agrarian economy towards an urbanized tourist economy. Social 
changes included the massive inflow of Muslim immigrants from neighbour-
ing islands, and the rise of a new Balinese middle class for whom the village 
was a distant icon of ‘Balineseness’ and the rapid growth of the modern 
economy and its global dimensions a point of ongoing concern.
Protest 
Since the early 1990s external investors have become more and more inter-
ested to participate in the tourist economy in Bali, and governor Ida Bagus 
Oka (1988-1998) proved to be a cooperative go-between, which is why he was 
also called Ida Bagus ‘O.K.’ (George Junus Aditjondro 1995). Growing feel-
ings of discontent about the intrusion of Jakarta-based investors culminated 
in 1993 in the rise of a protest movement against the realization of the Bali 
Nirwana Resort in Tabanan, close to the holy sea temple of Tanah Lot (Far 
Eastern Economic Review 26-5-1994; C. Warren 1994; Putu Suasta and Connor 
1999). The protest was supported by a broad middle class coalition of aca-
demics, public intellectuals, students, NGO activists, the regional newspaper 
Bali Post and representatives of the oppositional party Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party). The rallying point of the 
movement focussed primarily on religious sentiments. It was the proximity 
of the resort to the temple that mobilized an island-wide protest that embar-
rassed both investors and government institutions. Resistance was silenced 
after direct intervention by President Soeharto, and in 1997 Le Meridien 
Nirwana Golf and Spa Resort advertised its soft opening.
Commenting on the issue, the military commander in Bali, Maj. Gen. R. 
Adang Ruchiatna stated that ‘demonstrators are not part of Indonesian cul-
ture’ (Far Eastern Economic Review 26-5-1994). Public protest was indeed not 
part of the ideology of Indonesia’s New Order, but it was now firmly framed 
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within a religiously informed Balinese discourse of discontent. This became 
evident when in 1997 another protest was launched against the building of 
a hotel at Padanggalak beach close to Denpasar. The issue was similar to the 
Bali Nirwana Resort but the outcome was very different (H. Schulte Nordholt 
2001:66-8). 
In October 1997 the Bali Post reported that at the Padanggalak coast, 
which belongs to the village of Kesiman, a large tourist resort was being 
planned and that building activities had already begun without a proper 
environmental impact assessment. The owners of the project were based in 
Jakarta but the actual building was done by a local firm in which governor 
Ida Bagus Oka was indirectly involved. The beach was an important religious 
site where ritual cleansings (melasti) and post-cremation purifications were 
held. A broad coalition, this time also supported by local villagers, protested 
against the project. In the village of Kesiman a powerful alliance was formed 
between villagers, customary (adat) leaders and the local nobility. Governor 
Ida Bagus Oka originated from the village of Kesiman, and the village coun-
cil decided to ostracize him (kasepekan), which implied that the village would 
boycott his cremation and prevent the proper continuation of the journey of 
his soul. When he heard about the village verdict, the governor immediately 
declared that nothing had actually been decided yet about the Padanggalak 
project, and that the village had, of course, a final say in this matter. With 
remarkable speed all the building activities at Padanggalak beach were can-
celled, and by the end of November 1997 the place had been restored to its 
former condition. The Padanggalak case showed that a combination of mid-
dle class protest and village-based resistance was strong enough to defeat a 
coalition of external investors and local administrators. 
Hubris, shock and recovery
Despite the protests against the boundless expansion of the tourist sector, 
the ambition of growth prevailed and it inspired sculptor I Nyoman Nuarta 
to design a 146 meter high bronze statue of the god Wisnu on the Garuda 
bird. The project reflected a belief in an almost unlimited growth, and sym-
bolized a Balinese sense of hubris. While the economic crisis (krismon) hit 
Java in 1997, Bali suffered less from the crisis. The number of foreign visitors 
even increased, and optimists speculated that by 2007 seven million tourists 
would visit Bali.4 
4  Whereas the national economy contracted by 14% in 1998, the Balinese economy went 
down by only 4%. Recovery in Bali started in 1999 with 0.5% growth and reached a level of 3.4% 
growth in 2001.
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The new governor of Bali, I Dewa Made Beratha, emphasized that Bali was 
a safe place amidst the turmoil of ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia. 
But he also knew that tranquillity on Bali was fragile: ‘If a bomb explodes in 
Bali [...] its image as well as Indonesia’s in general will be completely ruined’ 
(Jakarta Post 14-8-01). And he was right. The terrorist attack in Legian on 12 
October 2002 shattered the image of Bali as an isolated safe heaven. Tourists 
immediately abandoned Bali and in 2003 the recession in the tourist sector 
continued due to the SARS epidemic and the Iraq War. 
On 15 November a large ritual, attended by thousands of people, was 
staged on nearby Legian beach to release the souls of the victims and to 
cleanse the site of the attack from evil forces. It was generally believed that 
due to this ritual the perpetrators of the attack were soon arrested. Earlier 
bomb attacks elsewhere in Indonesia had never been solved, but the suc-
cessful uncovering of the Jema’ah Islamiah network proved, according to 
this view, that Bali was different from the rest of Indonesia.5 So, for many 
Balinese, the ritual gathering in November 2002 marked the successful end-
ing of the tragedy, but the extent to which recovery would succeed depended 
very much on the political configuration, which had experienced fundamen-
tal changes as well. 
New rulers
Reformasi came to Bali in the guise of numerous seminars and interactive 
radio talk shows, but did not bring much reform.6 There was a brief out-
burst of (anti-Islamic) ‘Bali Merdeka’ (Independence for Bali) sentiment in 
October 1998 when Minister A.M. Sjaefuddin remarked in an interview with 
Republika that Megawati was not a suitable presidential candidate because she 
worshipped Hindu gods. On 28 October 50,000 demonstrators in Denpasar 
demanded Sjaefuddin’s resignation, but this did not materialize either. 
In the early 1990s the oppositional PDI, forerunner of the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), had 
been relatively strong in Bali. In the elections of 1992 it won almost 20% of 
the votes, but the number of seats the PDI acquired in provincial and dis-
trict elected assemblies was modest compared to the comfortable majority 
of Golkar and the armed forces. PDI gained in popularity when Megawati 
5  The ritual was on strained terms with the desire among foreigners to commemorate the 
tragedy every year. For why should one invite the souls of the deceased to return after they had 
been released with care and splendour?
6  Former governor Ida Bagus Oka was accused of corruption and nepotism. In January 2001 
he was arrested and brought to court, but in April 2002 he was acquitted of all charges (Jakarta 
Post 13-1-2001, 8-4-2002).
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Soekarnoputri became party leader. In 1996, however, the PDI was weak-
ened due to an internal conflict manipulated by the government. Megawati 
lost her position and the PDI lost most of its popular support. During the 
elections of 1997 the PDI won only 3.5% while Golkar and the armed forces 
monopolized the district assemblies. 
How strong Megawati’s position in Bali still was became clear in October 
1998 at the first congress of the PDI-P (PDI’s reformasi-era successor) in 
Sanur when 50,000 supporters surrounded the Bali Beach hotel where the 
convention was held. There was ‘an outpouring of emotion and an explo-
sion of energy’, one witness wrote.7 This atmosphere surfaced again during 
the elections in June 1999, which celebrated both the demise of the New 
Order and the victory of the PDI-P. The fact that the elections coincided 
with Galungan – the day when ancestors and gods descend – added to the 
euphoria. 
The elections of 1999 caused a political earthquake in Bali. Golkar fell 
back from 93.5% to 10% of the votes whereas PDI-P rose from 3.5% to almost 
80%. The PDI-P victory was primarily a manifestation of Balinese ethnicity 
expressing anti-Javanese and anti-Muslim sentiments. These erupted in a 
violent manner in October 1999 when it turned out that instead of Megawati, 
Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president of Indonesia. On the evening of 
20 October and during the following day riots occurred in Negara (Jembrana), 
Singaraja, and Denpasar. Especially in Singaraja and Denpasar many govern-
ment buildings were set on fire while the residences of the (Golkar) district 
heads were also attacked.8 
Although the period between May 1998 and October 1999 did not result 
in fundamental reforms, there was a changing of the guard among the politi-
cal and administrative elite. In 1998 governor Ida Bagus Oka was replaced 
by the former provincial secretary I Dewa Made Beratha. He was not a very 
reform-minded politician but an experienced Golkar bureaucrat and skilful 
diplomat, who managed to accommodate an overwhelming PDI-P majority 
in the provincial parliament after the elections of 1999. The provincial and 
district assemblies were controlled by PDI-P, and in contrast to other regions 
in Indonesia, where experienced Golkar bureaucrats managed to survive, in 
most districts new PDI-P leaders came to power.
Apart from a shift from Golkar to PDI-P, the position of the nobility 
within the administration was also challenged. Until 2000 the majority of the 
7  E-mail Rucina Ballinger, 10-10-1998.
8  Bali Post  21-10-1999, 23-10-1999; Couteau 2002: 243-5. The attacks were not a spontaneous 
expression of popular anger. Unidentified trucks coming from Java left a trail of damage in north 
Bali, while in Denpasar ‘unknown people’ played a leading role in the riots, which were over as 
soon as Megawati was chosen vice-president on 21 October.
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district heads in Bali still belonged to the nobility, but by 2004 commoners 
prevailed.9 
The demise of aristocratic rule was accentuated by the defeat of Bali’s 
most famous royal lineage during the elections in Klungkung in 2003. The 
previous district heads had come from the royal house of Klungkung and 
maintained close connections with Golkar, but this time the old royal family 
was defeated by a commoner who represented a new type of politician. I 
Wayan Candra was a successful independent entrepreneur, who was sup-
ported not only by the PDI-P grassroots but also by various Pasek groups, 
large non-aristocratic kinship organizations. He had mobilized both anti-
Golkar and anti-aristocrat sentiments and terminated the administrative rule 
of Bali’s oldest dynasty (Bali Post August, September, November 2003; Jawa 
Pos 24-11-2003).
The fall of Golkar was accompanied by a general decline of aristocratic 
power. The extent to which Golkar had been intertwined with the aristocracy 
is reflected in the composition of the provincial assembly. Especially in the 
mid-1980s Golkar hegemony coincided with a strong aristocratic dominance. 
In the 1990s, however, a gradual shift in favour of commoner representatives 
occurred. It seems as if it was no longer necessary for Golkar to rely on the 
nobility. Instead, the party had nurtured its own bureaucratic cadres most 
of whom were of commoner descent.10 In 2004 the ruling elite of the New 
Order had been replaced by a new group of district heads: four of them 
were entrepreneurs, two were politicians, one was a dentist, one had a mixed 
background in education and martial arts, and only two had a bureaucratic 
background.11 
Changing caste relationships and religious reform 
Leo Howe (2001) has pointed out that in pre-colonial times Brahman priests 
and noble rulers maintained an ambiguous relationship. Under Dutch colo-
9  In 1970 six districts heads belonged to the nobility and two were commoners; in 1990 the 
relationship was 5:3 and in 2004 3:6. 
10  Composition DPRD Bali: Non Balinese Nobility Commoners  
 1982-87 10 22  8
 1987-92 9 21 15
 1997-99 8 12 25
 1999-04 4 16 35
This development was not unique for Bali. Michael Malley (1999) has shown that elsewhere in 
Indonesia Golkar started to rely more and more on its own regional cadres.  
11  In 1980 four district heads came from the military, two from the police and two from the 
bureaucracy.
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nial rule caste hierarchy was reinforced, but royal dynasties lost most of their 
power while the superior status of Brahmans was confirmed. Strong exter-
nally imposed states tended to reinforce caste hierarchy and especially the 
position of Brahmans, whereas periods of weak states (1945-1966 and 1998- ) 
coincided with the emergence of egalitarian tendencies in Bali. 
Since the mid-1920s an emerging group of commoner intellectuals, who 
advocated a status system based on achievement and merit, had challenged 
the aristocratic colonial elite who maintained that Balinese culture was based 
on caste hierarchy. While both groups sought to achieve modernity, repre-
sentatives of the aristocracy emphasized the Balinese nature of their religion, 
which was rooted in adat and caste hierarchy, whereas their opponents point-
ed to the universal nature of modernist Hinduism, which was more egalitar-
ian in nature (Picard 1999; Ramstedt 2002, 2004). It was along these lines that 
hierarchy was to be contested or defended during the next 80 years.
In 1958 Balinese Hinduism was recognized as one of the national religions 
in Indonesia. Balinese had to prove that, if their belief was a religion, it had a 
god, prophets, a holy book and a daily prayer. External criteria derived from 
Christianity and Islam started to determine the parameters of religion in Bali, 
and external sources of inspiration helped to institutionalize Hinduism in 
Bali as young Balinese intellectuals visited India where they were inspired by 
new modernist Hindu ideas (Bakker 1993). Modernist ideas caused a gradual 
shift from ritualism to scripturalism, from magic to ethics, and from a collec-
tive to an individual experience of religion (Howe 2001:148). The emphasis 
on personal merit and individual daily prayers facilitated more egalitarian 
ideas in which achievement instead of birth determined one’s position, while 
caste could be separated from religion. 
The gradual development of these new ideas was increasingly constrained 
by the rigid bureaucratic structures of the semi-government organization, 
Parisada Hindu Dharma. In 1986 Parisada was renamed Parisada Hindu 
Dharma Indonesia when it became a nationwide organization with the task 
of supporting the Indonesianization of Hinduism. The ongoing bureaucra-
tization of the organization as well as its orientation towards Hindu com-
munities outside Bali facilitated the rise of commoners within the ranks of 
Parisada. Just like Golkar, Parisada offered commoners the possibility of 
challenging aristocratic dominance. This was accentuated even more when 
the national headquarters of Parisada moved to Jakarta in 1996.
The rise of commoners within Parisada strengthened the influence of 
commoner groups which were organized in quasi clan-based organizations. 
High on the agenda of these commoner groups, or warga, was the recognition 
of their own priests at the same level as Brahman priests, or pedanda. 
In 1999 reformasi in Bali took the shape of caste conflict and was focussed 
on one of the largest island-wide cleansing rituals, the so-called Panca Wali 
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Krama which would have its climax at the all-Bali temple of Besakih (I Gde 
Pitana 1999, 2001). A massive alliance of commoner groups demanding that 
warga priests should act at the same level as Brahman pedanda caused heated 
public debates and complex bureaucratic intrigues. Facing each other were 
conservative aristocrats supported by Golkar and Parisada leaders, and 
reform-minded intellectuals plus commoner organizations that threatened to 
boycott the ritual at Besakih. Governor Dewa Made Beratha understood the 
signs of the times and helped the commoners to gain a victory, but conserva-
tive aristocrats were not yet defeated.
Soon caste conflict manifested itself within Parisada Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia. Since the early 1990s Parisada had lost a great deal of govern-
ment subsidy as President Soeharto started to support the newly estab-
lished organization of Muslim intellectuals, ICMI (Ramstedt 2002:160-1). 
Meanwhile growing numbers of Muslim immigrants accentuated the ‘rise 
of Islam’ in Bali. Alarmed by the invasion of both Muslim immigrants and 
Jakarta-based investors, and convinced of the need for a revitalization of 
Balinese culture, Balinese intellectuals criticized Parisada for its lack of inspi-
ration and inability to protect the Hindu community. Shaken by decreased 
government protection and external criticism, the aristocratic cum bureau-
cratic power holders in Parisada had become vulnerable. 
At the Parisada congress in 1996 in Surakarta, criticism was raised con-
cerning the intellectual poverty of the organization and its emphasis on 
bureaucratic procedures. But attempts to separate Parisada policy from 
Golkar interests and to increase the number of commoners in the board of the 
organization failed (I Gede Ngurah Bagus 2004). However, at the next con-
gress in Sanur in September 2001 the opposition succeeded in toppling the 
Brahman hegemony within Parisada. A newly elected board was dominated 
by commoners and warga priests formed the majority of the advisory board. 
Whereas modernist Hindu ideas had gained ground in the national 
Parisada, a powerful group of conservative aristocratic dissidents in Bali 
remained loyal to old concepts of hierarchy. When these dissidents refused 
to obey the decisions of the new national board, Parisada in Bali split 
into two opposing factions, the so-called Parisada Campuan and Parisada 
Besakih. Tensions ran high when in November 2001 the aristocratic oppo-
sition planned to hold its own convention and supporters of the national 
Parisada tried to prevent this and besieged the house of the governor of Bali 
to force him to side with them. The governor tried to remain neutral but 
many people suspected that he sympathized with the conservative Parisada 
Campuan. Whereas Parisada Besakih criticized the ‘feudal’ nature of caste 
differences, the Campuan group criticized the ‘Indianization’ policy of the 
modernists of the Parisada Besakih, which would in their eyes eliminate 
Balinese culture. 
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The dissident Parisada Campuan can still count on substantial popular 
support, as its chairman, Ida Pedanda Made Gunung, is a very popular pub-
lic figure who has an influential daily talk show on Bali TV. Moreover, many 
commoners are reluctant to give up their long-standing relationship with 
their Brahman priests, which could bring illness and other disasters. 
Hierarchical relationships have changed considerably over the last dec-
ades and changes have accelerated since 1998, when caste conflicts formed 
the core of reformasi in Bali. The different external concepts introduced in the 
course of the 20th century in Bali have led to fundamental changes in the way 
culture, religion and custom were represented as separate categories. In the 
use of language and in ritual practices there is a tendency towards egalitari-
anism. At the same time there is an increase of ritual activities.
Modernist religious ideas advocate modest rituals, which enable more peo-
ple to participate, especially since public transport has made it possible to visit 
virtually every temple all over Bali. As a result Bali has become more Hindu 
than before, while religion is no longer exclusively framed in caste hierarchy.
Administrative fragmentation
The relatively small province of Bali is – with its provincial administration, 
eight districts and one administrative town – rather over-administered. Since 
decentralization has transferred funds and administrative tasks to the district 
level, the districts are often called ‘little kingdoms’ whose leaders prefer to 
ignore the coordinating capacities of the provincial government. Officials 
at the provincial level complain that they have more expertise on a variety 
of matters but they are no longer consulted because inexperienced district 
administrations pursue their own policies. District heads often send low-
ranking staff members to meetings convened by the governor about matters 
of common interest where he intends to arrive at a coordinated approach. 
As a result pressing problems concerning irrigation, the supply of drinking 
water, and a balanced development of tourism remain unresolved.12 
A key issue in the relationship between the districts concerns a more equal 
distribution of administrative funds and locally raised taxes. The amount of 
money from the centre (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) forms in most districts 
the bulk of the incoming funds. In 2002 DAU covered about two-thirds of 
12  Although from time to time efforts were made to put the issue of special autonomy for the 
province on the agenda, discussions never materialized in concrete political decisions (Kompas 
8-2-2000, 22-11-2004, 13-1-2005). 
13  In 2002 Bali received Rp 1,539 billion DAU from Jakarta; the total income was Rp 2,362 bil-
lion, and Rp 1,145 billion was spent on salaries.
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Bali’s total government income and two-thirds of the DAU was spent on 
salaries.13 Overall income increased, but expenditure rose as well. While 2001 
still showed a surplus, this evaporated in the following years due to ‘9/11’, 
SARS, the Iraq war and the ‘Bali bomb’. 
At the district level the amount of local taxes makes the difference. Eighty 
percent of the so-called Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD) is derived from the 
hotel and restaurant tax, Pajak Hotel Restoran (PHR).14 Already during the 
New Order, rich districts like Badung, Denpasar and, to a lesser extent, 
Gianyar generated large sums of money, while poor districts like Jembrana 
and Karangasem produced next to nothing in this respect. Although some 
adjustments were made to redistribute the PHR from the affluent tourist 
centres to less prosperous regions, major differences in wealth continued to 
exist and no structural changes occurred after decentralization.15
Regional autonomy reinforced the tendency among districts to give prior-
ity to their own interests, as a result of which differences in wealth between 
regions did not decrease. At the same time there was an uneven distribution 
of funds between government sectors. As elsewhere in Indonesia, large sums 
of money went into new prestigious government offices, while, for instance, 
the educational sector was by and large neglected (Bali Post 13-8-2003, 4-9-
2003).  After decentralization the district budgets show not only that differ-
ences in wealth between districts are maintained but also that Bali remains 
to a large extent financially dependent on Jakarta.
Fragmented autonomy: from desa dinas to desa pakraman
Decentralization in Bali was not restricted to the district level but affected 
the village as well. Dutch colonial rule introduced a distinction in the 1930s 
between administrative (dinas) and customary (adat) rule at the village level. 
This construction was designed to keep Balinese religion and culture (adat) in 
a supposed authentic state, while modern administration would form ‘a thin 
layer of modernity’ touching village Bali only superficially. This adat-dinas 
divide was to survive well into the New Order, when the state penetrated 
deeper into village affairs and the desa adat was increasingly subordinated 
to the desa dinas. Various government regulations stipulated that adat was 
14  In 2001 PAD in Bali totalled Rp 563 billion, Rp 420 billion of which consisted of PHR.
15  Since the 1970s Badung was required to pay 30% of its PHR and Denpasar 10% to the other 
districts (Picard 2003; Kompas 12-3-2001). In 2002 the district assembly of Badung wanted to reduce 
its contribution to the other districts from 30 to 15% of the PHR. Governor Made Beratha needed 
all his diplomatic skills to reach a compromise. In July 2003 it was agreed that Badung would pay 
22% and Denpasar 10% of their PHR to the other districts but not to Gianyar and the province.
16  Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri no. 11/1984; Perda no. 6/1986 and no. 12/1988.
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but an instrument in the pursuit of development and needed state guidance 
and supervision.16 Adat remained, however, a contested field and on some 
occasions became a bastion of resistance against unwanted government 
intervention. 
Reformasi and Law no. 22/1999 on decentralization opened the way for a 
revision of the relationship between the dinas and adat spheres.17 It was in the 
adat domain where fundamental changes would take place.  
In 2001 the provincial government of Bali issued a regulation on the role 
of the desa adat (Perda no. 3/2001). It reflects in many respects the concerns of 
urban middle class Balinese who believe that Balinese culture should be pro-
tected against the evils of globalization. Since Balinese culture is in their eyes 
rooted in the desa, and the desa is based on adat, it follows that adat forms the 
cornerstone of Balinese culture. In order to emphasize the authenticity and 
the autonomy of the traditional village, the word adat, which was considered 
to be too colonial, was replaced by the term pakraman, taken from ancient 
inscriptions.18 
Perda no. 3/2001 gives the desa pakraman full authority to run its internal 
affairs and makes the village council the highest authority. The desa pakraman 
has authority over village land, which may not be sold and is not subject 
to government taxation. Illustrating their newly acquired autonomy, some 
desa pakraman requested from the provincial government a larger profit from 
the tourist ‘objects’ such as temples, which are located within their borders. 
Other villages even demanded money from nearby hotels for the view on the 
authentic village their guests enjoyed.19
Whereas under the New Order the desa dinas formed the main channel 
of government funding into the village, after decentralization the provincial 
and district governments in Bali prefer to subsidize the desa pakraman. In 
June 2001 the provincial government announced that it would donate every 
desa pakraman Rp 10 million and a tax-free Honda Supra motorbike for the 
village head. According to the announcement, local adat had to be rein-
forced because ’Bali was seriously ill’.20 District governments also decided 
17  Within village administration the advisory board (LKMD) was replaced by a representative 
assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Desa) with representatives from each hamlet or banjar that would 
control the village head. However, in Law no. 32/2004, which replaced Law no. 22/1999, provi-
sions regarding new democratic village assemblies have been deleted.
18  The word krama refers to customary practice as well as the village council (C. Warren 2004; 
Sarad 36, 2003). Unlike the situation in West Sumatra where the nagari has replaced the New 
Order village, in Bali the desa dinas has not disappeared. It still provides basic services such as 
the issuing of identity cards and so on.
19  Bali Post 20-3-2002; C. Warren 2004. The new regulation also reinforced the possibilities for 
the desa pakraman to provide credit, set up local businesses and attract investors. 
20  Radar Bali 7-6-2001. In 2003 and 2004 villages received Rp 20 and Rp 25 million (Bali Post 
25-3-2004).
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to support the desa pakraman. Depending on district wealth, villages in the 
eastern district of Karangasem received only Rp 5 million per year in 2002, 
whereas villages in the rich tourist area of Badung were given Rp 100 mil-
lion each.21  
Officially Perda no. 3/2001 has been effective since March 2002, but its 
practical implementation remains uneven (C. Warren 2004). Many Balinese 
appreciate the new flow of funds, which supports temple restoration and 
ritual activities and strengthens a sense of community. But the Perda was also 
criticized because it is based on Dutch colonial ideas about the autonomous 
and republican nature of the Balinese village while reflecting a romantic 
desire for cultural authenticity.22 
The invention of traditional police
The new village autonomy was accompanied by the establishment of a brand 
new traditional police force at the local level, the so-called pecalang. Already 
in 1996 and 1997 village policemen in Sanur and Kuta were active under this 
name. However, the place were this police force was truly launched was not 
the traditional village but the founding congress of PDI-P in Sanur in October 
1998 (Sarad 31, 2002; Suara Merdeka 10-7-1997; ICG 2003c). The armed forces 
were present with more than 3000 men, but there was widespread suspicion 
that they were pro-Golkar and might cause riots instead of maintaining 
order. PDI-P had organized its own security forces comprising of 1200 men. 
The story goes that when tension ran high one man dressed in adat clothes 
managed to stop a crowd that was almost in a trance and persuaded them 
to sit down. The PDI-P congress proceeded in an orderly manner and it was 
clear that invisible (or niskala) forces had been at work here. Since then mili-
tias dressed in traditional attire have served as security forces at other big 
gatherings, while all over Bali villages established their own groups of peca-
lang. In June 2000 the provincial department of culture organized a seminar 
about the phenomenon in an attempt to impose some uniformity, and in 2002 
a booklet was published in cooperation with Parisada in which tasks, func-
21  Law no. 34/1999 stipulates that 10% of the Hotel and Restaurant Tax has to be redistributed 
among the villages. In Bali the desa pakraman received these funds. Due to the effects of the ‘Bali 
bomb’, income from tourism declined and in 2003 villages in Badung only received Rp 50 mil-
lion. 
22  I Gde Parimartha 2003. Another criticism concerned the status of immigrants. Informed 
by the same modernist ideas, which separate caste from religion, Perda no. 3/2001 separates 
religious and social spheres of interaction in the village. Hence immigrants are only expected to 
perform social duties, which are relatively light in comparison with the ongoing flow of religious 
obligations (Sarad 39, 2003; Bali Post 27-5-2004).
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tions and dress of pecalang were explained (Nyoman Widnyani and I Ketut 
Widia 2002). Within less than four years a moment of charisma had been 
transformed into a new island-wide and village-based institution.23 
Perda no. 3/2001 recognizes pecalang as a traditional security force (sat-
gas keamanan tradisional), especially with regards to adat and religion. Their 
uniform consists of a destar or head cloth, a flower behind one ear, a t-shirt 
on which the word pecalang and the name of their village is printed, a safari 
jacket without sleeves, a black and white chequered kampuh over a sarong, 
and a kris which has been blessed in the temple, plus a hand phone, while 
tattoos are taboo. Thus attired they are supposed to represent traditional 
authority, which must be seen in contrast to the corrupt practices of an exter-
nal and often absent police force. 
Although some pecalang have acted as well-paid and well-equipped secu-
rity guards, while others have been involved in criminal activities, in most 
villages the new village policemen play a modest role. The most visible – and 
often also rather annoying – manifestation of their authority is when they 
block entire roads and redirect traffic during temple ceremonies and other 
rituals, for which commercially sponsored traffic signs are used.
Social volcanoes 
Far-reaching decentralization, village autonomy and the establishment of a 
village police increased violent conflicts within and between villages. Since 
regional autonomy was put into motion, the coordinating power at the pro-
vincial level and government authority as such have weakened. As a result, 
administrative institutions are no longer capable of managing many – some-
times long-lasting – local conflicts. Under the heading kasus adat – which is 
seen as a legitimate form of violence – land and border disputes as well as 
conflicts about caste and status claims within villages easily explode into 
large-scale violence, often conducted by groups of unemployed youths. The 
Balinese journal Sarad estimated that between 1997 and 2003 almost every 
month a kasus adat resulted in mass violence (Sarad 44, 2003). It seems as if 
villages show less tolerance toward deviant behaviour, while the implemen-
tation of social sanctions has become more violent.
Due to a combination of population growth and rising market prices 
for land, conflicting claims on land easily result in violent confrontation. 
According to Indonesian law the village is not a legal body, but according 
to local adat villages do own land. In many disputes, conflicting parties refer 
23  In the old days pecalang did not belong to the village sphere. In nineteenth century Mengwi 
they were agents/spies acting on behalf of the royal centre (H. Schulte Nordholt 1996:150). 
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either to national law or local adat to legitimize their claims (Sarad 49, 2004). 
Apart from land disputes within the village, there are also an increasing 
number of confrontations between villages involving claims on land and 
contested borderlines. 
Although many kasus adat have an economic background, others are 
rooted in caste conflicts or long histories of rivalries between villages, which 
tend to generate their own dynamics. Regularly caste conflicts within vil-
lages come to the surface when villagers boycott or even prevent cremations 
of aristocrats who ignored local adat rules. Increasingly, conflicts between vil-
lages, and between hamlets within the same village, are reinforced by politi-
cal antagonisms. In most cases government administrators and the police 
are rather powerless. Meanwhile the government itself has also become the 
target of popular anger. In several instances police offices were the prime 
targets of popular discontent at the local level. Taken together, the long list 
of conflicts also demonstrates that the newly created pecalang were not able 
to prevent the regular outbreaks of violence at the local level. 
Sweepings
Since adat was seen as the cornerstone of Balinese culture and the ultimate 
stronghold against the evils of globalization, it follows that pecalang were 
seen as the guardians of this culture. Degung Santikarma (2001a) has argued 
that, under the New Order, culture was conceptualized in material terms. 
As a commodity, culture could be reproduced and sold, but it could also be 
stolen, as was evidenced by a series of temple thefts in the mid 1990s, which 
were attributed to ‘Javanese’. It was therefore not only the task of pecalang to 
protect their village from narcotics and the like, but also to keep their terri-
tory free from suspicious strangers.
In the late 1990s a steady flow of immigrants looking for jobs suddenly 
began to increase, as conflicts and crises drove people from Eastern Indonesia 
and Java to Bali. Most immigrants concentrated in South Bali, where they 
tried their luck in the tourist sector. The 2000 census counted about 250,000 
Javanese and Madurese immigrants in Bali, out of a total population of 3.1 
million people.24 Apart from a small group of well-to-do entrepreneurs, the 
majority of immigrants provide cheap labour in the construction and agrar-
ian sectors, furniture and textile production, and in hotels and restaurants.25
Muslim immigrants came to embody social pollution, which threatened 
24  Penduduk Indonesia 2001, Seri L.2.2: 10.9, 11.1. 
25  ICG 2003c:8; Bali Post 3-1-03. Construction workers from Lombok earn Rp 25,000 per day, 
whereas Balinese are paid Rp 50,000. 
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Balinese culture. These feelings were eloquently summarized by the deputy 
mayor of Denpasar in April 2002: 
Most of these people are jobless, they create a problem. They are criminals. There 
are problems with housing and traffic jams are getting worse. These people pro-
duce a lot of waste; they make slums. (South China Morning Post 3-4-2002.) 
Although the terrorist assault on 12 October 2002 did not result in a violent 
cleansing of Muslims, the immigrant population of Bali experienced physi-
cal and administrative repression. Immigrants who returned from Java after 
the fasting month were screened and intimidated by a combined force of 
regular police, administrative police and local pecalang. These forces also 
conducted razzias on a regular basis in Denpasar and other places in South 
Bali in search of illegal immigrants. In the administrative sphere especially 
the municipal government of Denpasar took strong measures to reduce the 
number of immigrants by applying a ‘shock therapy’. In order to obtain 
an immigrant identity card (Kartu Identitas Penduduk Pendatang, KIPP 
or Migrant-ID) the immigrants had to show letters from their home village 
and their employer and landlord in Bali, while the official costs of the card 
increased to Rp 400,000 per year, to which a similar amount in bribes often 
had to be added (ICG 2003c; Sarad 34, 2003). In January 2003 the governor 
of Bali and the district heads reached an agreement to issue a uniform rule, 
according to which non-Balinese immigrants had to pay Rp 200,000 per year 
for their permit, and immigrants from other places within Bali only Rp 20,000 
(Bali Post 11-2-2003). 
During a meeting of adat village leaders in Gianyar early in 2004 emotions 
ran high about the supposed ‘take-over’ of Bali by immigrants. Public intel-
lectual Prof Luh Ketut Suryani did not hesitate to depict a gloomy future, in 
which Hindu Balinese might become a minority on their own island (Taksu 
May 2004). Many villages put up signs forbidding ‘scavengers’ from entering 
village territory, and pecalang were depicted as vanguard troops defending 
Balinese culture (Nyoman Widnyani and I Ketut Widia 2002).
The answer to the threat of Western decadence and Islamic intrusions 
was found in the intimacy of the desa pakraman. But the ‘revival’ of the desa 
pakraman and adat, with its conservative, male-biased and exclusive ethnic 
attitudes, are not in line with the requirements of national citizenship and 
democracy.26 It is, moreover, difficult to determine the borderline between 
legal authority and legitimized violence on the one hand and the criminal 
activities on the other of semi-official groups who act in the shadow of formal 
state institutions and political parties.  
26  See Connor and Vickers 2003:177-9.
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Preman and party politics
Apart from immigrants and ethnic conflict, other aspects of ‘Indonesia’ pen-
etrated into Bali as well. The rise of PDI-P in Denpasar and Karangasem was 
accompanied by the formation of gangs of allied preman who provided pub-
lic support in exchange for political protection and room to manoeuvre in the 
criminal sphere. The genealogy of the biggest gang in Denpasar can be traced 
back to the 1970s when Ngurah P., a former leader of a PNI militia who had 
been involved in the killings of 1965, established the Armada Racun. This 
group wanted to protect Denpasar against the so-called ‘Anak Sudirman’, 
or non-Balinese military from the Kodam Udayana, who tried to control the 
entertainment centres in Denpasar and Kuta. In order to gain protection from 
higher authorities the Armada allied itself in later years with the thuggish 
pro-Golkar youth group Pemuda Pancasila. 
According to well-informed people in Denpasar, there is a direct link 
between the Armada Racun and the Forum Peduli Denpasar (FPD), which 
was established in September 2002.27 Whereas the name of the Armada 
(army) Racun (poison) reflected aggression, the new Forum Peduli Denpasar 
(Forum Caring for Denpasar) presented itself in the guise of a NGO dressed 
up in a civil society discourse. Supported by intellectuals, politicians, artists 
and entrepreneurs, the FPD stated in its ‘vision and mission’  that it aimed to 
enhance the security and cultural unity of Denpasar and that it would fulfil 
this task in the spirit of the Puputan Badung – the heroic suicidal resistance 
of the king of Badung against the Dutch in September 1906. In his opening 
speech the chairman of the FPD, I Made Sutama Minggik, emphasized that 
FDP advocated a bottom-up approach to development, resulting in a clean 
city, with less traffic jams, where people would obey the rule of law. In order 
to reinforce regional culture he promised to fight drugs and secular mar-
riages.28 
From the start the FPD maintained a special alignment with the mayor of 
Denpasar, Anak Agung Puspayoga, who acted as the patron of the organiza-
tion. Through the person of Puspayoga the FPD was also allied with the PDI-
P and puri Satria, the old ruling dynasty of Denpasar. At first sight the FPD 
manifested itself as a decent organization. It offered assistance to the victims 
of the bomb assault in Legian in October 2002, for which they received a 
prestigeous award from the national chief of police Dai Bachtiar during a big 
event at the Hotel Borobudur in Jakarta. However, the FPD also harbours a 
variety of illegal activities, from which police, politicians and preman benefit. 
27  See also ICG 2003c:10.
28  Bali Post 30-7-2002, 12-8-2002, 22-8-2002, 20-9-2002, 23-9-2002; official documents of the 
establishment of Forum Peduli Denpasar 20-9-2002.
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It has its basis in the transport sector of Denpasar and controls entertain-
ment areas and gambling spots. It also showed its less friendly face when 
it became deeply involved in so-called anti-immigrant ‘sweepings’. In July 
2003 the FPD operated as strongmen protecting the interests of their patron, 
mayor Puspayoga, when the group attacked one of his political opponents.29 
Commenting on this incident a colleague from Universitas Udayana lament-
ed that in the early days of reformasi he was often invited to participate in 
discussions convened by the mayor, ‘but now Puspayoga seems to rely on 
preman to solve his problems’.
Unstable party rule 
The intertwining of administrative interests, party politics and criminal activ-
ities does not only occur in Denpasar, but also in the small town of Amlapura 
in the eastern district of Karangasem. Here the political influence of the local 
dynasty ceased to exist in the mid-1980s. After a period of military district 
heads, a new PDI-P politician became the new administrator in 1999. He had 
a degree in public administration but more important was his network in 
martial arts (pencak silat) circles that helped him to win the elections. Just like 
the mayor of Denpasar, the new district head of Karangasem was supported 
by a ‘civil society’ organization, the Dewan Perwakilan Massa (DPM, Council 
Representing the Masses). The DPM is headed by Kari Subali, a tough guy 
with a big beard and a moustache, every inch a strong man, who can easily 
mobilize 200 to 300 men to underline the point he wants to make.
As a new player in the political arena in Bali PDI-P had a weak basis in 
the administrative bureaucracy, which was still dominated by old Golkar net-
works, and the party had not much experience in controlling decision-making 
processes in the district assemblies. Auxiliary forces like FPD and DPM were 
therefore helpful to support the interests of newly elected administrators.
Apart from the marriage between party bosses and preman, the sudden 
rise to power of the PDI-P was accompanied by spectacular internal con-
flicts. In the districts of Jembrana and Buleleng reformasi and decentralization 
offered ample opportunities for clever political entrepreneurs to seize power, 
while tensions between party headquarters in Jakarta and regional branches 
played an important role as well. 
In August 2000 a new district head was elected in the region of Jembrana 
in West Bali. With 17 out of 30 seats PDI-P dominated the district assembly 
and it seemed as if the party was in full control of the electoral process. 
29  Bali Post 28-7-2003; Denpost 26-7-2003, 27-7-2003, 28-7-2003, 29-8-2003, 5-9-2003, 6-9-2003; 
Fajar Bali 26-7-2003.
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The party candidate had the blessing of the national headquarters and was 
expected to gain an easy victory. But due to a miscalculation he was unable 
to obtain the required 50% plus one of the votes and a second round was 
needed. To the astonishment of the PDI-P he was then defeated by an out-
sider, Dr Gede Winasa, who had managed to buy – as many believe – the 
votes of a majority of the assembly, including a number of PDI-P members. 
Anger and frustration among PDI-P cadres led to violent attacks on the party 
office of Jembrana (ruined) and the house of the PDI-P chairman of the dis-
trict assembly (burned).30 In July 2003 Gede Winasa also succeeded – against 
the wish of party headquarters – in gaining control over the regional branch 
of the PDI-P.31 Despite his contested rise to power Gede Winasa did achieve 
remarkable results as an administrator. Although Jembrana is known as a 
poor district, he managed to increase the local budget and provided both 
free education and free health services, so that the Indonesian weekly Tempo 
called him ‘a record breaking district head’.32 
Unstable party politics in Jembrana had facilitated the rise of a new strong 
man. A similar but more complex process occurred in the northern district 
of Buleleng.33 Here the position of the district head I Ketut W. Sindu came 
increasingly under pressure after the elections of 1999.34 After the elections of 
1999 PDI-P had gained a majority in the district assembly and Sindu’s room 
to manoeuvre was seriously restricted. He had to make deals with the leader 
of the PDI-P, I Nyoman S. Duniaji, whose star was rising rapidly in Buleleng. 
Duniaji had been headmaster of a high school and a travel agent. While 
his father had been secretary of the Soekarno-era party PNI in Buleleng, he 
himself had been a fierce supporter of Megawati when she was ousted from 
the PDI in 1996. Supported by party headquarters and representing a new 
generation of reform-minded politicians, Duniaji was in 1999 elected chair-
man of the district branch of PDI-P in Buleleng. In 2000 he became chairman 
of the district assembly (DPRD) of Buleleng, while a close friend of his, D.K. 
Astawa, succeeded him as chairman of the party branch. 
The career of Duniaji was resented by an older party cadre, Wayan 
Dangin, who had lost the elections for party leader and speaker of the district 
30  The official inauguration of the new district head had to be postponed when a mob of angry 
PDI-P supporters of the defeated candidate disturbed the ceremony and several people were 
wounded and one man was killed. (Kompas 15-8-2000; Apakabar 28-8-2000).
31  Denpost 21-7-2003, 26-7-2003, 14-8-2003, 8-9-2003, 20-9-2003, 23-9-2003. 
32  Tempo 28-12-2004. I was told that Gede Winasa maintained good relationships with a group 
of Japanese investors.
33  See Lay 2002:Chapter 3; Savirani 2004:Chapter 4.
34  Sindu was an old and loyal Golkar administrator who had been active in the so-called 
‘Golkarization’ campaign in Buleleng during the 1970s, which had to erase the grass roots sup-
port for the leftist wing of the nationalist PNI. In 1993 he had become district head and served 
now for a second term. 
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assembly. Dangin wanted revenge. Meanwhile Duniaji’s power increased. 
As chairman of the assembly he made deals with district head Sindu, who 
depended on him for support. He organized overseas trips and cars for 
his fellow PDI-P assembly members and influenced decisions regarding 
infrastructural projects and the appointment of high-level officials. Towards 
the end of 2001 he felt strong enough to start a campaign to replace district 
head Sindu. Ironically Sindu was now supported by Dangin, who opposed 
Duniaji’s ambitions. But to no avail. In January 2002 district head Sindu was 
forced to step down, immediately after which Duniaji started a campaign to 
be elected as the next district head of Buleleng. 
Because Dunaji was confident that he would win the elections, he started 
to ignore his local power basis. He rejected his political friend and ally 
Astawa (the local PDI-P chief) as running mate because he preferred a can-
didate with more education. Actually Duniaji looked down upon most of his 
fellow PDI-P men in Buleleng and considered them backward and ignorant. 
Although supported by party headquarters, Duniaji ran the risk of isolating 
himself.
Suddenly a new candidate appeared, Putu Bagiada, a businessman with 
a background in private banking in Jakarta. Bagiada was warmly supported 
by Duniaji’s enemies. And as a businessman Bagiada had ample funds to 
finance his campaign. When the district assembly convened to elect the new 
district head, Duniaji presided the meeting in his capacity as chairman of the 
assembly. When he realized that he was losing the elections he tried to post-
pone the meeting halfway the election procedure, but he failed. Bagiada was 
elected with 27 out of 45 votes. Shocked by this unexpected defeat Duniaji 
mobilized his supporters and staged demonstrations against the suppos-
edly fraudulous election. However, in early July 2002 Bagiada was officially 
inaugurated as district head, while Duniaji remained a relatively powerless 
chairman of the district assembly.
In the end an alliance between old local party cadres with external money 
had defeated an alliance between a high-handed leader and party headquar-
ters in Jakarta. Party headquarters was very unhappy with the fact that it had 
lost control over the party branches in Jembrana and Buleleng. The other dis-
trict heads in Bali were also worried. The consequence of electoral democracy 
– fuelled by money politics – was that the PDI-P faced uncontrolled processes 
of decentralization within its own organization. This offered outsiders an 
opportunity to penetrate into powerful positions. And this would also have 
serious repercussions for the election of the governor of Bali in July 2003.
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Rising tensions 
Meanwhile, campaigns for the national elections of 2004 started in Bali as 
early as July 2003 and caused violent confrontations between PDI-P and 
Golkar. Supported by its own militarized youth organization AMPG, Golkar 
made a modest but self-conscious come-back in the political arena after the 
devastating defeat of June 1999.35 
In many places throughout Bali, tensions between PDI-P and Golkar or 
between PDI-P and its dissident offshoots increased. Especially in Tabanan, 
Jembrana and Buleleng numerous small incidents were reported.36 Towards 
the end of October tensions increased even further when Golkar planned to 
hold its 40th anniversary in Bali, while PDI-P announced it would celebrate 
the national commemoration of the ‘Youth Oath’ with large parades and other 
manifestations. On Sunday 26 October 2003 a PDI-P parade near Singaraja 
in Buleleng was attacked by Golkar supporters. Not long afterwards a PDI-
P mob retaliated and lynched two members of the youth organization of 
Golkar. Violence continued during the next two days around Singaraja and 
consisted mainly of attacks on Golkar offices (Jakarta Post 27-10-2003; Bali Post 
27-10-2003, 29-10-2003).
These incidents caused a lot of concern among party leaders in Jakarta. If 
the pattern in Bali was to set the tone for the national elections, what would 
happen in other parts of Indonesia? Both government officials and party 
bosses put pressure on the local branches of their parties in Bali to refrain 
from further violence. They succeeded, but many people feared violence 
might flare up when the real campaign would start in April 2004. 
Ajeg revisited
Lack of administrative coordination, violent adat cases, internal party tur-
moil, confrontations between parties, immigrants, preman and other aspects 
of ‘Indonesia’ illustrate that the old dichotomy between an isolated Bali and 
its fragile culture on the one hand, and the evils of the outside world on the 
other, no longer held true. Bali has of course always been open to outside 
influences, and has long been an inseparable part of Indonesia. But since 
regional autonomy was set in motion the moral dichotomy between Bali 
(innocent) and the outside world (evil) was difficult to maintain. For it could 
35  Golkar hijacked the slogan ‘Bali aman, turis datang’ (When Bali is safe, tourists will come), 
and changed it into ‘Golkar menang, turis datang’ (If Golkar wins, tourists will come).
36  Sarad 44, 2003; Bali Post 28-5-2003, 4-8-2003, 27-8-2003, 5-9-2003; Denpost 28-8-2003, 8-9-
2003. 
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no longer be denied that ‘evil’ was now part and parcel of Bali itself (Connor 
and Vickers 2003). However, the main sources of the evil forces within Bali 
were still located in the outside world: globalization and, after the terrorist 
attack in Legian, international terrorism. The threat of globalization – in the 
guise of a free movement of trade, capital and labour as well as the demoral-
izing impact of drugs and decadence – motivated concerned urban intellec-
tuals to participate in countless seminars. A telling illustration of these gath-
erings was a prestigious symposium held in July 2000 on cultural heritage 
conservation, which was sponsored by the World Bank and Unesco. Here old 
discourses about the uniqueness of Bali (commonplace since the nineteenth 
century) and efforts to preserve Balinese culture (since the 1920s) resurfaced 
in empty ‘newspeak’. Since the uniqueness of Bali, its environment and cul-
tural traditions were under challenge, the recipe for sustained development 
should consist of the empowerment of governance of local communities, the 
revitalization of historic towns, the adaptation of tradition and the renewal 
of the cultural fabric by keeping living cultural practices alive.37 It was along 
these lines that ‘Balinese move into the future by returning to their past, and 
embrace modernity by re-acquainting themselves with old traditions’, as Leo 
Howe observed (Howe 2001:83). This approach was both inward-looking 
and conservative.
It was in this context that the new leader of the independent Bali Post 
Group, Satria Naradha, launched his Ajeg Bali campaign in 2002. The son 
and heir of Ketut Nadha, founder of the Bali Post in 1948 and its chief editor 
until his death in 2001, Satria Naradha became the self-appointed leader of a 
moral movement that claimed to protect and strengthen Balinese culture.38
During the late 1990s and especially under Satria Naradha the Bali Post 
became a powerful provincial media concern which now includes a local 
TV station, four radio stations, the well-respected newspaper Bali Post itself, 
the daily Denpost, which covers primarily criminality, and several other 
newspapers and magazines. Although the Bali Post Group has no monopoly 
– Jawa Pos with its imprint Radar Bali, NUSA and commercial TV stations are 
alternative sources of news – Satria Naradha is well-equipped to determine 
to a large extent the political agenda. If necessary, he is willing to impose 
censorship. 
In an interview Satria Naradha claimed that he received his inspiration 
to launch the concept of ‘Ajeg Bali’ already in the 1980s, as he was meditat-
ing as a high school pupil. ‘I received the idea, but I could not yet give it a 
37  Announcement of the symposium in H.SEASIA 6-6-2000. 
38  The Bali Post is one of the oldest independent newspapers in Indonesia. It started in 1948 
as Suara Indonesia (Putra Dwikora and Wayan Supartha 2000). Ideologically the newspaper has 
always been close to PNI and PDI(-P).
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name, but when in the 1990s I saw large billboards in Bali mobilizing people 
to safeguard Bali, I suddenly knew what it should be’. Others think that the 
modernist Muslim and Hindu movements of the 1990s, when he was study-
ing journalism in Surabaya, formed important sources of inspiration for his 
later activities as a cultural activist.39 
Ajeg Bali was launched at the opening of Bali TV in May 2002, when the 
governor of Bali, I Dewa Made Beratha urged his audience to mengajegkan 
Balinese adat and culture (I Nyoman Darma Putra 2003). Ajeg stands for 
strong, upright, and is in a way a stronger version of the notion of kebalian, 
or ‘Balineseness’ (Picard 1996). Related terms like ajeg-ajeg and ajegang refer 
to village regulations and locate the term in the centre of Balinese culture (I 
Nyoman Darma Putra 2003). The notion of ajeg consists of a loose category 
that offers different groups of people a comfortable way to talk about Bali. 
Although many of my middle class intellectual friends dislike the conserva-
tive tone of the Bali Post, the dull programmes of Bali TV, and the post-New 
Order nature of the Ajeg Bali discourse, many ordinary Balinese like the 
concept: 
‘Ajeg means that we should go back to the origins. Back to the pure and peaceful 
Bali, when things were orderly and true.’ 
‘Ajeg means that Bali is safe and can resist terrorists.’
‘Ajeg Bali offers us an answer to modernization without substance.’
They also like the way Ajeg Bali is communicated on local television. Local 
news and the prime time live horror show Sekala dan Niskala address familiar 
topics, and Balinese soap series offer a welcome alternative to the Jakarta-
based sinetron situated in an air-conditioned upper class world largely 
unfamiliar to many Balinese. Although the rather folkloristic formats of talk 
shows on Bali TV look rather clumsy and guests are expected to appear in 
full adat dress, the messages have an impact. Especially in the talk show Ajeg 
Bali Balinese culture is presented as a homogeneous and relatively static 
thing, which is essentially religious and rooted in village adat. 
Balinese culture is also increasingly presented as exclusively Hindu. This 
is achieved by emphasizing contrasts with Islam and, ironically, by imitat-
ing Islamic formats at the same time. In contrast to the Islamic salutation 
assalam’alaikum anchormen, reporters and talk show hosts start with a sol-
emn Om Swastiastu, and conclude with Om Shanti Shanti Shanti Om, while 
they bring their hands together in front of their face. When most national 
39  Couteau 2002. Whereas Satria Naradha claims the sole ‘authorship’ of Ajeg Bali, others 
(Agung Alit 2004) argue that the leader of puri Satria and mayor of Denpasar, A.A. Puspayoga 
played a major role in conceptualizing the idea. Helen Creese informed me that the term ajeg was 
already used in 1993 in the context of the conservation of Balinese culture (Nyoman Sukartha et 
al. 1993:4).
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networks broadcast the Islamic evening prayer (adzan magrib), Bali TV broad-
casts a Hindu prayer (puja trisandya) at six o’clock that follows the Islamic 
format and uses phrases derived from Protestant prayers. A televised series 
of 285 episodes imported from India reminds the Balinese that they are part 
of a huge civilization that is much older than Islam. 
One of the most popular programmes is the daily talk show Dharma 
Wacana (sponsored by Toyota) presented by Ida Pedanda Made Gunung 
– chairman of the conservative Parisada Campuan – who discusses religious 
topics and their practical moral implications. He is a witty man and his 
audience often laughs about the points he makes. Although he is not openly 
hostile to immigrants the following message is clear enough: 
‘Many Balinese sell their land in order to eat lots of sate, but don’t forget 
that many immigrants sell sate in order to buy a lot of land’. 
Although many public intellectuals supported the notion of Ajeg Bali, a 
minority criticized the top-down character of the campaign and compared 
it with the compulsory Pancasila courses from the New Order period. They 
feared that Ajeg Bali, because of its vagueness, could be used to silence criti-
cal voices, while the magazine Sarad warned against the return of ‘feudal’ 
attitudes (Sarad 43, 2003). 
Satria Naradha’s prime intention was to unify Bali through his Ajeg Bali 
campaign. His political agenda was focussed on various issues. He was anx-
ious to prevent the spread of political violence (Bali Post 12-9-2003). He was 
also concerned about the absence of administrative coordination and urged 
district heads to cooperate more closely with the governor. At the launch-
ing of Bali TV he invited these administrators to together hold one torch, 
symbolizing the unity of Bali. In order to gain support and legitimacy for his 
campaign Satria Naradha invited administrators and high-ranking guests 
to sign so-called prasasti, stone inscriptions through which they endorse the 
intentions of Ajeg Bali. In doing so he ‘revived’ an ancient royal tradition of 
issuing stone inscriptions and continued a New Order habit of commemorat-
ing official events with an inscribed signature of a state authority. All senior 
administrators of Bali, national politicians and the sultan of Yogya signed 
these prasasti, which were gathered in the Bali Post headquarters. In January 
2005 Satria Naradha proclaimed ten Ajeg Bali Heroes, while the Ajeg Bali 
campaign targetted schools and became part of the curriculum, including 
competitions for the best ajeg teacher, ajeg pupil, ajeg performance, ajeg prayer 
etcetera.40 Meanwhile the term ajeg appeared almost everywhere, in news-
paper articles, on banners during public meetings, and in casual ‘warung 
40  Bali Post 5-1-2005. The heroes included freedom fighters, nationalist and religious leaders, 
a dancer, a painter, an architect, an environmentalist and one foreigner, the American Catholic 
priest Shadeg who was honoured for his study of the Balinese language. 
Bali 413
talk’.41
The Ajeg Bali campaign is instrumental in emphasizing an exclusive eth-
nic profile of Balinese culture and religion. Ethnic unity was in turn based on 
religion.42 When I met Satria Naradha he talked about Ajeg Bali in terms of 
a ‘cultural renaissance’, but when my assistant asked him casually what this 
meant in practice he immediately put the sweeping of immigrants on top of 
the agenda. This reveals, despite the flexible vagueness of Ajeg Bali, its rigid 
ethnic agenda. Since the position of the aristocracy is weakened and caste 
hierarchy is contested, Ajeg Bali offers urban intellectuals and middle class 
officials an opportunity to represent Bali as a homogeneous culture able to 
face external threats. At the same time the Ajeg Bali discourse erases conflicts 
concerning class, caste, religion and ethnicity, while it legitimizes violence 
(by pecalang) in the name of culture.
Gubernatorial elections and Ajeg Bali 
The connections between the Bali Post, politics and the Ajeg Bali campaign 
became visible during the re-election of governor Dewa Made Beratha in 
august 2003. The election showed how party politics and media interests 
were closely intertwined and how the Ajeg Bali campaign was used to cover 
up corruption within the PDI-P. 
The election of the governor should be understood within a broader 
context of national politics. President Megawati and her PDI-P sought to 
strengthen support among governors and district administrators, who were 
expected to help her win the presidential elections of 2004. A series of contro-
versial elections – in Jakarta, Lampung, Central and East Java – occurred dur-
ing which local PDI-P candidates were ignored in favour of strong ‘non-cadre’ 
favourites of party headquarters in Jakarta. Alerted by the stubbornness of 
local party branches in Buleleng and Jembrana, PDI-P leaders in Jakarta 
approached the provincial leaders of the party in May 2003 to ‘synchronize’ 
the strategy for the upcoming election of the governor of Bali.43 It turned out 
that party headquarters preferred the re-election of governor Dewa Made 
41  During the commemoration of the Puputan Badung on 20 September 2003 a banner had 
the slogan: Dengan semangat puputan kita kokohkan persatuan dan kesatuan demi ajegnya Bali 
(With the spirit of the puputan we reinforce the totality and unity for the sake of the strength of 
Bali).
42  Bali’s police chief Mangku Pastika stated in this respect that ‘Ajeg Bali has to be Ajeg Hindu’ 
(personal communication Ngurah Suryawan).
43  It is interesting to see how terms like ‘synchronization’, ‘anticipation’, ‘coordination’ and 
‘operation’, which formed the military grammar of the New Order bureaucracy, are still prac-
ticed. 
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Beratha and rejected the local PDI-P candidate Cokorda Ratmadi. Ratmadi 
was district head of Badung while his brother, A.A. Puspayoga, was mayor of 
Denpasar. Both come from puri Satria Denpasar, an old and respected PNI/ 
PDI(-P) stronghold. Megawati preferred Made Beratha, who had a Golkar 
background, because he had facilitated the founding PDI-P congress in Bali 
in November 1998. Megawati’s counted on the loyalty of ‘her’ people in Bali 
and tried to gain extra support in Golkar circles by choosing Made Beratha. 
This was a serious miscalculation.
When rumours leaked out in May 2003 that PDI-P headquarters did not 
support the local candidate, panic spread in party circles in Bali. In late June 
all PDI-P members of the provincial assembly were invited to Jakarta where 
they were told to support Mega’s candidate. For the time being the provin-
cial PDI-P decided to support two candidates: Cokorda Ratmadi and Dewa 
Beratha.44 On 21 July party headquarters ordered the provincial PDI-P to 
drop the candidacy of Cokorda Ratmadi and to vote for Made Beratha. This 
letter caused a revolt among party cadres, who screamed that the ideals of 
the party were crushed and that it was now an all-out fight between them 
and Jakarta (Bali Post 22-7-2003, 24-7-2003; Denpost 23-7-2003). Three days 
later Megawati visited Bali and told Cokorda Ratmadi ‘If you want to dis-
grace me, go ahead’.
Emotions ran high, confusing conflicts erupted over procedures, and 
pressure on Ratmadi increased. Eventually on Monday 28 July Ratmadi 
announced in front of weeping supporters that he had withdrawn his can-
didacy. 
From then on the Bali Post played an active role as a reconciling media-
tor. Instead of presenting Cokorda Ratmadi’s withdrawal as a defeat, he was 
praised as ‘Sang Pahlawan Ajeg Bali’, the Hero of a Strong and Unified Bali, 
who had sacrificed his personal interests to serve a higher public cause. In 
order to emphasize harmony Satria Naradha staged a reconciliation ceremo-
ny in puri Satria, which was directly broadcasted on Bali TV and received 
front page covering in the Bali Post (29-7-2003, 3-8-2003). Reconciliation was 
underlined by signing yet another prasasti, which symbolized the peace 
between Made Beratha and puri Satria and the pledge of all parties to sup-
port Ajeg Bali. The demonstrations by PDI-P supporters against Dewa Made 
Beratha which took place outside the frames of the cameras were not men-
tioned, but large scale riots did not occur.
Although the leader of the Bali Post, Satria Naradha, had been close to 
puri Satria, he had his own reasons to support Made Beratha. His television 
44  Radar Bali 29-5-2003; Bali Post 24-6-2004. The running mate of Made Beratha was Alit 
Kelakan, a young PDI-P cadre who had actively supported Megawati when she was expelled 
from the PDI in 1996. 
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station was in jeopardy because it had started broadcasting before the new 
law on local television (Law no. 32/2002) was in operation. Therefore Bali TV 
was strictly speaking illegal, and Jakarta could close the station down. Satria 
Naradha needed Made Beratha’s mediation in Jakarta to stay on air, which 
eventually succeeded.
The role played by the Bali Post illustrates that the local press is not always 
the best agency to reveal background information about local conflicts and 
other sensitive issues because of their proximity to the issues. On the con-
trary, often these agencies become involved as interested parties, either by 
taking side, or by playing an active role of their own. 
It seemed as if most of the tension was over after the withdrawal of 
Ratmadi and the public reconciliation in puri Satria. On the 3rd of August 
the PDI-P members of the provincial assembly went on pilgrimage to the 
temple of Besakih and the next day they were locked up (dikarantina, quar-
antined) in Hotel Bali Cliff where they would stay till the election of the new 
governor on 6 August.45 The Bali Post then covered the re-election of Dewa 
Made Beratha as governor with 31 votes (out of 55 assembly members), as a 
‘victory of Ajeg Bali’.46 
Meanwhile other media revealed that bribery had occurred on a large 
scale shortly before the election (Tempo 18-8-2003; Radar Bali 19-8-2003; Jakarta 
Post 23-8-2003, 29-8-2003). Two PDI-P members had confessed they received 
Rp 50 million from a representative of PDI-P headquarters, who had visited 
them in Hotel Bali Cliff. Another amount of Rp 100 million would be trans-
ferred after the election. The Bali Post only reported that allegations about 
bribery were denied by provincial party leaders (Bali Post 13-8-2003). The 
fact that Bali Corruption Watch, the Legal Aid Foundation and the Pemuda 
Hindu Bali demanded an investigation and lodged a complaint with the 
Administrative Court in Denpasar was silenced by the Bali Post. The court 
rejected the allegation. 
When Dewa Made Beratha was inaugurated on 28 August, the building 
of the provincial assembly was heavily protected by police, army and PDI-P 
militia. No incidents occurred. The re-election of the governor was decided in 
favour of ‘Jakarta’ and marked the defeat of regional autonomy. But it had a 
price. According to a detailed reconstruction by the magazine Sarad, 38 PDI-P 
members of the provincial assembly had received Rp 5.5 billion from their 
party.47 Bali’s police chief Mangku Pastika stated however that no bribery 
45  Bali Post 4-8-2003, 6-8-2003. Mobile phones were collected to guarantee that the 38 PDI-P 
members were isolated from the outside world. 
46  Bali Post 7-8-2003, 11-8-2003. Apparently seven PDI-P members had defected. 
47  Sarad 41, 2003. Money from the office of the governor was first transferred to PDI-P head-
quarters in Jakarta and then distributed among PDI-P assembly members. Taken together the 
assembly members have probably received a total amount of more than Rp 13 billion from all 
the candidates involved.
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had occurred because the case had not caused a loss to the state. Moreover, 
he added: ‘There is no term for “money politics” in our laws’ (Jakarta Post 
29-9-2003).
Beyond Ajeg Bali: trans-national challenges
Decentralization has resulted in administrative fragmentation, which under-
mines regional autonomy. A paradoxical development is that Balinese mid-
dle class intellectuals tend to stress their regional authenticity and deny their 
Indonesian identity, but they do both in a very Indonesian way, because 
throughout the archipelago differences are increasingly expressed in similar 
terms.48 Therefore one may wonder how Indonesian the whole ajeg cam-
paign actually is.
The dilemma of Bali as an open fortress cannot be solved because an 
open economy and a closed cultural identity are not compatible. In contrast 
to the dominant view that defines Balinese culture as essentially Hindu and 
anchored in village adat, Degung Santikarma (2001b:22) wrote:
Living in the midst of the trans-national traffic jam that is Bali can be an exhaust-
ing experience. For gloBALIzation has not just shipped bamboo wind chimes and 
leering wooden cats out to the boutiques of Berkeley and Brisbane, or seen Bill 
Clinton and Bay Watch battling for television airtime in the banjar, but has opened 
new markets for that most precious commodity of the new cultural capitalism: 
authenticity.
The problem with concepts that express hegemonic ambitions like Ajeg Bali 
is that they are based on post-colonial models that refer to closed and homo-
geneous societies and cannot incorporate notions of change and agency. 
Perhaps the need to discuss these issues will fade away as soon as an increase 
of tourism brings renewed prosperity to Bali, but it seems that growth will 
slow down. Therefore one of the biggest challenges of Balinese administra-
tors and intellectuals will be to develop a more dynamic idea of their cul-
ture, which offers room for hybridity and trans-national dimensions. For 
how long and to what extent can a concerned urban middle class emphasis 
on authenticity and a rigid defence of an exclusive ethnic profile of Bali be 
compatible with the ongoing formation of a new trans-national urban cor-
ridor stretching from Bangkok, through Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, 
and Surabaya to Bali?49 It is challenging to imagine what an open-minded, 
self-confident and well-regulated Bali, as a cultural counterpart of business 
metropolis Singapore, would look like in the future. 
48  I borrow this phrase from Bayly 2004:2; See also Vickers 2002:94.
49  Dick 2005; Connor and Vickers 2003:168.
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political communities
Introduction
After the fall of the Soeharto regime, Indonesia has embarked on a large scale 
process of renegotiating its administrative, political and social boundaries. A 
body of legislation laid the foundation for this negotiating process, loosening 
the boundaries between the central state and the regions and shifting power 
to lower administrative levels, most notably districts.1 However, the process 
of redrawing boundaries that ensued extends far beyond the devolution of 
power to lower levels of administration. This chapter explores two separate 
but closely related consequences of the decentralization policies characteristic 
for West Sumatra that have important implications for the drawing of social 
boundaries.2
The first concerns the reorganization of village government. The Law on 
Village Administration of 1979 put into effect in 1983 in West Sumatra had 
introduced a nation-wide unified village structure based on the Javanese desa. 
The West Sumatran villages called nagari were much larger than the average 
desa in Indonesia. To avoid financial disadvantage for the region the nagari 
were split up in smaller administrative units now called desa. From its incipi-
1  See Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Sakai 2002; Holtzappel, Sanders and Titus 2002; Aspinall 
and Fealy 2003; Schulte-Nordholt and Asnan 2003; Avonius 2004; Fanany 2003; Turner et al. 2003; 
F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2001, 2005. 
2  The research on decentralization which we have conducted since 1999 was carried out with 
the assistance of Alfan Miko, Aidinil Zetra and Indraddin of the Studies Centre for Development 
and Socio-cultural Change (SCDev) and in cooperation with Andalas University in Padang. 
We gratefully acknowledge the help and stimulation of Abdul Aziz Saleh, Alfan Miko, Erwin, 
Syahmunir, Sjofjan Thalib, Narullah Dt. Parpatiah nan Tuo, Takdir Rahmadi and Tasman. We 
thank John McCarthy and the other authors of this volume for their thoughtful comments and 
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ence the desa system and the splitting up of nagari had been heavily criticized 
in West Sumatra and some reunification of desa took place during the 1990s. 
However, it was not until the decentralization policy was put in place that a 
more fundamental redesigning of the village administration became feasible. 
With Provincial Regulation no. 9/2000 on the village administration, village 
boundaries were redrawn and the neo-traditional village communities within 
the geographical boundaries of the former nagari re-emerged. This ‘going 
back to the nagari’ kindled interest in adat and adat institutions, and districts 
designed different ways of incorporating them into the new village govern-
mental structures. As we shall explain in more detail below, this renewed 
interest in adat and its institutions should not be understood as merely popu-
list, nostalgic and backward looking; it has some clear practical and future 
oriented reasons as well. 
The second consequence concerns the reconsideration of Minangkabau 
identity in the larger Indonesian polity. While other regions in Indonesia 
show a similar heightened interest in their regional identity, Minangkabau 
identity seems to be uncommonly ambivalent. Minangkabau used to pride 
themselves with a prominent political presence before and immediately fol-
lowing Independence, but this position declined during the Soeharto regime. 
Today, many Minangkabau regret having been reduced to a middle range 
position of relative insignificance. Coming to grips with their lost superior 
position and understanding why this happened and what it means for their 
position within Indonesia is for many as much part of the general discussions 
about decentralization and the restructuring of village communities as are the 
more concrete issues of control over resources. 
Renegotiations of social, political and administrative boundaries occur in 
many different but connected arenas and permeate political processes at all 
levels within the region, and included the urban and rural population in West 
Sumatra and migrants alike. They have to be understood against undercur-
rents of longue durée in the history of West Sumatra with its ambivalent and 
shifting relation between three main moral and normative structures of adat, 
the state and Islam.
In this chapter we will focus on the negotiations of the boundaries and 
political organization of villages. We suggest that control over natural resourc-
es is crucial for understanding the tensions and contradictions between adat 
and adat structures and the new village administration. Then we turn to the 
issue of Minangkabau identity and the tensions between adat, Islam and the 
state involved and discuss the various arenas in which debates about these 
issues are carried out and how the various arenas of negotiation are intercon-
nected. We shall finish drawing some conclusions about the extent to which 
Minangkabau villages are embedded in larger political structures. 
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From nagari to desa
When the Dutch incorporated West Sumatra in the beginning of the eight-
eenth century, during the Padri War between islamicist groups that tried to 
establish an Islamic theocracy and those in favour of retaining a political 
structure based on adat, the colonial government based their system of indi-
rect rule on the government structure of the nagari, the Minangkabau adat vil-
lage, while suppressing Islamic structures. Nagari were largely autonomous 
territorial political units. Leadership, group affiliation and property relations 
were based on a matrilineal kinship structure. The nagari were governed by 
the heads of matrilineages, called panghulu. Over a period of more than half 
a century the Dutch reshaped the village political order substantially. They 
introduced a head panghulu as mayor and fixed the number of recognized 
panghulu. The council of lineage heads reconstituted in 1915 as the nagari 
council laid the foundation for a dualistic village structure, that in various 
forms were to characterize village government till today.3 On the one hand 
there was the regulated nagari government, with the head panghulu or mayor 
and a Village Council or Kerapatan Nagari (KN), which included some but 
never all adat leaders. On the other hand, there remained a nagari government 
‘according to adat’, albeit not officially recognized by the Dutch. The council 
of lineage heads, Village Adat Council (Kerapatan Adat Nagari, KAN)4 or 
Council of Panghulu remained the highest village institution in terms of 
adat. Most nagari had a complex internal structure, consisting of several set-
tlements or wards under different names. These wards were to become the 
basis for the structure of village administration introduced during the last 
decades of the Soeharto regime.
In 1979, the Law on Local Government was passed introducing a nation 
wide uniform village structure. In West Sumatra the law was only imple-
mented in 1983.5 The law introduced a new type of administrative organi-
zation, called desa, a purely administrative model with no provision for 
adat matters or leadership as the earlier local government regulations in 
West Sumatra had done. The other major change regarded the geographi-
cal boundaries of the desa. In theory the province of West Sumatra could 
have opted for converting each nagari into one desa, but mainly for financial 
3  See for the history of village government, Westenenk 1918; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979; 
Manan 1984; Kahn 1993; Sjahmunir 1996; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2005. See further Kato 
1982; Oki 1977; Dobbin 1983.
4  We shall use the abbreviation KAN throughout this paper. As we shall see later, Provincial 
Regulation no. 9/2000 speaks of Lembaga Adat Nagari (LAN), Adat Law Institution, but in many 
nagari it is common practice to continue to use the term KAN. We shall only use the term LAN 
when specifically referring to Regulation no. 9/2000. 
5  See for more details Sjahmunir 1996.
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reasons, it preferred to divide the nagari up. The new law allocated a fixed 
yearly development grant (bantuan desa, bandes) to each village, irrespective 
of its size or population. As the nagari were substantially larger than villages 
elsewhere in Indonesia, West Sumatra would financially be severely disad-
vantaged had they simply converted each nagari into a desa. In the first phase, 
the government chose the simplest way and converted all wards into desa. 
This multiplied the amount of funds from the central government by nearly 
seven. However, many of the new desa proved to be too small. From 1988 
onwards a process of reunification set in directed by the provincial govern-
ment which reduced the number of desa by half.6
Information on the desa period is rather scarce.7 Mayors and village coun-
cils were rather strictly controlled by the district and sub-district administra-
tion. This was not new, but as long as the state did not provide many services 
to the nagari, the state’s actual control on social and economic and village 
political issues had been limited. By 1983, state support in the form of struc-
tural development grants (bandes) and especially development projects had 
vastly expanded and with that its control over the new village functionaries. 
During the last decades of the Soeharto regime bandes was more and more 
replaced by project funding. The kepala desa became the central figure in 
attracting project funding from the central and provincial government.
The nagari had ceased to be an official administrative unit. However, the 
provincial government realized that total abandonment of adat structures 
might cause problems. Provincial Regulation no. 13/1983 therefore allowed 
for the nagari as ‘adat law community’ and acknowledged the KAN as the 
institution representing this community. The various implementing regula-
tions that followed gave detailed instructions for the council’s constitution 
and how it was to exercise its main tasks: strengthening traditional values, 
maintaining the unity of the nagari population, and settling disputes on adat 
matters, and managing the nagari’s wealth. Thus, paradoxically, the nagari as 
adat law community and the KAN were formally regulated, but as ‘informal 
law and institutions’. These new KAN, however, were more Golkar control-
led and more bureaucratic than their predecessors of the 1970s, and repre-
sentation of clan and lineage heads declined. Although they did not function 
as intended in many villages, the KAN still had considerable influence in vil-
lage politics. It seems that adat leaders and KAN continued to exert authority 
over lineage land, people, and in dispute management. Conflicts between the 
KAN and adat leaders or desa heads seem to have been common. Their role 
in managing village land (ulayat) was contested by the desa administration, 
6  Thus, the 543 nagari in West Sumatra (including the islands of Mentawai) initially split up 
into 3516 desa. After some reshuffling approximately 1700 remained.
7  Sjahmunir 1996; Van Reenen 1996; Biezeveld 2002; Damciwar 1990.
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though hardly any ulayat was left. Many villages had distributed their ulayat 
land among the lineages long before, while ulayat of other villages had been 
put under the authority of the Departments of Land and of Forestry. Some 
lineage heads were said to have taken part in shady dealings of expropriation 
for logging or plantation concessions. The adat leaders’ authority in marriage 
and divorce affairs and their authority over the allocation of fees and village 
development funds were hotly disputed. The period was characterized by a 
gradual decline of adat and adat leadership in the villages and the transmis-
sion of adat knowledge from (adat) teacher to pupils virtually came to a halt. 
There were structural reasons within the villages that contributed to this 
decline, among them a misfit between desa administration and nagari. Desa 
authority was based on territorial residence in the desa. Adat authority was 
based on the political localization of a person’s matrilineage and property. 
According to the Minangkabau rules of post-marital uxorilocal residence, 
men resided on the land and in the houses of their wives’ matrilineage (F. and 
K. von Benda-Beckmann 1978). Here they were only urang sumando (in-laws) 
and had no right to speak in adat matters. Their own place of authority in adat 
terms was where their matrilineage was localized, quite often in a different 
desa. In addition, desa heads often had a weak adat position in the desa which 
they headed in their capacity as village head, because they had no status in 
adat there. However, for the majority of the population these tensions were 
unimportant, and they adjusted relatively smoothly to the desa. They had 
conducted their main daily life and business within their ward anyway. If 
anything, they enjoyed the fact that the village administration had come 
closer to their home.
Preparing the ground for a return to the nagari
During the 1990s, public debates among adat leaders and urban elites were 
dominated by negative accounts of the desa structure. It was generally held 
that the desa system was not functioning well, that it had destroyed adat and 
the unity of the nagari population and that it had eroded the authority of the 
elders over the young. At a seminar held in 1989, Hasbi (Hasbi et al. 1990) 
concluded that the predictions of many Minangkabau experts had become 
true, that the decision to divide nagari into desa had deleterious social, eco-
nomic and cultural effects. The desa administration had proven unable to 
mobilize villagers for the common good. Moreover, the state did not provide 
any significant financial compensation for desa heads. While the KAN had 
been acknowledged by the government, it had become an inefficient insti-
tution without real authority (Hasbi et al. 1990:30; Mochtar Naim 1990:60). 
And it was deplored that there was hardly any cooperation with or support 
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from migrants, because they identified with the nagari and not with a desa. 
Mochtar Naim (1990:48) – a well known Minangkabau academic and politi-
cian – noted that nagari and desa did not just differ in size and administrative 
structure, but that they also represented different world views and philoso-
phies. The nagari were the political micro-cosmos of the wider Minangkabau 
way of adat governance, in line with the basic fundaments of adat, matriclans, 
and language, while the desa was the lowest unit of the bureaucratic state. 
‘What we need’, Mochtar Naim (1990:60) concluded, ‘is a village government 
rooted in earth and with its head up in the air, and not, as the desa system, 
with the roots in the air and the head below’. Discussing the problems of 
the desa system, Abdul Aziz Saleh (1990:88) – professor of Social Science at 
Andalas University in Padang – concluded ‘that for the time being, the best 
alternative is to return to the nagari, even if we shall have to call this nagari 
desa’. There were also more critical voices. For example, Damciwar (1990:75) 
– a lecturer at Andalas University – pointed out that ‘it was not the fault of 
the Local Government Law no. 5/1979 that the wards instead of the nagari 
had been declared desa, but our own, because we put the financial considera-
tions higher than the social and cultural ones. So we should not be surprised 
if the desa did not develop well’. 
Once the possibility of revising the village government structure had 
become concrete and the laws of 1999 were to be implemented, attitudes in 
West Sumatra shifted remarkably from a predominant scepsis that had been 
dominant during the early 1990s, to widespread acceptance among both poli-
ticians and the wider population. In 1998, the governor had initiated research 
on the opinions and attitudes in rural areas. The researchers, under the guid-
ance of professor Syahmunir of the law faculty of Andalas University, con-
cluded that the majority of the rural population preferred a nagari over a desa 
structure. Thereupon the governor decided in 1998 that West Sumatra should 
return to a nagari structure and he set out to convince the political field in 
Jakarta and in West Sumatra. After intensive discussions within and outside 
the provincial parliament, consultations with non-governmental adat and 
Islamic organizations, influential Minangkabau migrants in Jakarta and dis-
cussions in the local newspapers, Provincial Regulation no. 9/2000 on Village 
Government was enacted. Within a very short period of time the governor 
had managed to create a broad consensus at the provincial level.
The prospect of going back to the nagari had generated quite passionate 
political discussions circling around two separate issues that often were con-
fused. The first issue concerned the appropriate territorial basis for the new 
village. The second was about the organizational model to which the village 
should ‘return’: a pre-colonial, a colonial, an Old Order (Orde Lama) or an 
New Order (Orde Baru) model. The images about the nagari government 
before the introduction of the desa and the role of the KAN that circulated in 
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the media and many public discussions were based on a shallow knowledge 
of Minangkabau history and had little to do with historical reality. Rather they 
reflected the hopes and expectations of the participants in the struggles.
Optimists, among them many adat leaders, argued that going back to the 
nagari would solve all problems the desa were facing. They hoped it would 
revive respect for adat and adat leaders as the legitimate village government 
and holder of village property, and as the guardians of family histories. These 
voices were supported by the Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau 
(LKAAM, Minangkabau wide Association of Village Adat Councils). The 
LKAAM had been established in 1966 after Soeharto had come to power, its 
main function being to contain political aspirations of adat leaders. Though 
it had always taken a critical stance to the governments’ attempts to further 
registration of lineage land, it developed into a rather complacent organiza-
tion and became increasingly involved in the Golkar party. Towards the end 
of the Soeharto regime, the LKAAM dissociated itself from Golkar and took 
more independent positions. In the Reformasi period, it withered an oppor-
tunity for adat leaders to recover some of the power they had lost during the 
desa period and became one of the most vocal critics of the government.
More sceptical voices, among them many university teachers and other 
urban intellectuals as well as most of the acting desa heads who feared loos-
ing their position, pointed out that a return to some nostalgic past would 
not remedy any evils of the desa. In their eyes, the main reason why the desa 
did not function well was lack of adequate financial resources and qualified 
personnel. In their view, adat leaders were not a remedy; they were part of 
the problem, because they often refused to cooperate with the desa admin-
istration. Moreover, it was claimed, they themselves had contributed to the 
destruction of adat and adat authority, because they no longer really knew 
adat, did not develop the KAN into a functioning institution and manipu-
lated whatever control they had over nagari assets to their own personal 
advantage. Among the youth that had grown up under the desa system 
very few saw the necessity or advantage of a nagari system of which they 
had no knowledge at all. During a discussion at the Law Faculty of  Bung 
Hatta University in 2001, students complained they would be subjected to a 
system that would strengthen the position of old men instead of relying on 
young, dynamic, well educated persons. Yet others predicted that the local 
government reform would simply change the name of the village unit and 
would not fundamentally change the political and economic relationship 
between farmers and the state administration, or between provincial and 
national politics. Most common villagers and urban people did not have a 
clear opinion one way or another, but remained ambivalent, at times almost 
schizophrenic, towards adat and adat leadership. On the one hand, a return to 
adat values and governance seemed to hold great promise for improving the 
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social, cultural and political conditions in the region. On the other hand, adat 
and lineage heads were seen as weak, autocratic and old-fashioned. 
The land issue
A central issue in the debate concerned the question of control over village 
land (ulayat). The question of who rightfully controlled such resources and 
could legitimate their exploitation had been a source of conflict between vil-
lage governments, lineage elders and the Land and Forestry Departments of 
the State ever since the Dutch had issued the Domain Declaration for West 
Sumatra in 1874. Villages claim – on the basis of adat – that they should control 
their ulayat land. The state claims its superior rights on the basis of national 
law. While West Sumatra never had a large plantation sector, during the last 
decades of the Soeharto regime much land and forest had been expropriated 
with inadequate compensation, yet sometimes in close cooperation with line-
age elders. Most of these lands had been given as concessions or licenses to 
persons or enterprises close to the regime for logging or plantations.8 
The new political freedom and the public emphasis on anti-corruption, 
transparency, and good governance had given many the hope that some of 
the worst injustices could be redressed. More generally, many saw a ‘window 
of opportunity’ to settle the still contested ulayat issue in their favour and 
to have it recognized.9 The central government in 1999 issued a Ministerial 
Regulation concerning the Recognition of Village Land in order to resolve the 
ulayat problem.10 However, this regulation only recognized ulayat land that 
‘continues to be held as in the past by the nagari, and where the relationships 
between the adat law community and ulayat have not been severed in the 
course of time’. The regulation thus validated all actions on ulayat land taken 
by the government, including the transfer of former Dutch plantations to the 
state. In the state interpretation, ulayat land, once it has been given or taken 
as license or concession under state law, remains state land after the license 
expires. A provincial draft regulation on tanah ulayat based on this interpre-
tation has been under discussion for the past four years. It has led to many 
protests and demonstrations, and an alliance was formed between farmers 
and fishermen, urban intellectuals and NGOs and the LKAAM, claiming that 
the status of village land cannot extinguish by these acts of government. The 
8  See Oki 1977:114; Kahn 1993:202; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2004.
9  Compare Sakai 2002 for examples elsewhere in Indonesia.
10  Between 1994 and 1999, a World Bank sponsored research looked into the possibilities of 
recognizing and registering communal land rights in Minangkabau and some other regions 
(Slaats 1999).
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LKAAM in particular has become an outspoken critic of the government’s 
draft regulation. It proposed its own draft regulation according to which 
land concessions after expiration resume their status of ulayat land. Some 
staff of the faculty of law at Andalas University, notably Syahmunir and 
Narullah, have relentlessly lobbied for recognition of villages’ ulayat rights, 
to the growing irritation of the provincial government. Given the contested 
nature of these land rights questions, the issue of tanah ulayat was left out of 
the Provincial Regulation on Village Government no. 9/2000. Early 2005 the 
issue was still pending.
The ulayat issue became a central factor in the discussions about the role 
of adat in the new village structure, because land claims directed against the 
state or investors had to be based on adat, and in the name of nagari, clan and 
lineage leaders. It became all the more prominent because it was expected 
that the state would gradually lower its funds for villages and require the 
nagari to generate their own funding. Despite disagreement about the spe-
cific form the return to the nagari should take, there was general agreement 
among the rural population that ulayat should be under village control. Some 
of the district heads with personal logging and plantation interests were said 
to resist a return to a nagari structure, because they feared that this would 
foster claims to ulayat. They were slower in responding to the new village 
structure than those without plantation and logging interests. Despite the 
fact that the issue has not been resolved, the very idea that ulayat in the future 
may form an important source of revenue for villages convinced many ini-
tially opposed of the importance of returning to the nagari. Nagari could what 
desa never could accomplish: lay a claim on ulayat legitimated in adat.
The administrative structure of the nagari
Provincial Regulation no. 9/2000 provides for an initial return to the nagari in 
their territorial boundaries of before 1979 and sets a general framework for 
local government, leaving the details to the districts.11 The village govern-
ment consists of an elected mayor, his staff, and an elected legislative body. 
The mayor represents the nagari internally and externally and is accountable 
to the village parliament which discusses and enacts village regulations 
and the village budget, and controls their implementation. According to the 
provincial regulation, the village parliament consists of members elected by 
the nagari population in general and free elections. The district regulations 
11  There is considerable variation in the district and village regulations, both in terms of 
institutional set up and in terms of election rules. For more details, see F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 2001; Alfan Miko et al. 2005.
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require that the village parliament represent the important categories of 
persons constituting the nagari, including the three classical categories, the 
adat elders (ninik mamak), religious leaders (alim ulama) and intellectuals (cer-
dik pandai) and ‘adat women’ (bundo kandung) and ‘the youth’. This not only 
resonates adat but perhaps even more the functional groups (golongan karya) 
of the Old Order and the New Order.
Mayor and parliament together form the official village government. In 
addition, two further institutions are provided for. An Adat and Religion 
Consultative Council advises the mayor and village parliament on adat and 
religious matters. Moreover, all villages are to have a Village Adat Institution 
(Lembaga Adat Nagari, LAN) which mediates in disputes relating to lineage 
property and protects adat in general, but which is not part of the official 
nagari government. By choosing the term Village Adat Institution (LAN) 
instead of Village Adat Council (KAN) provincial parliamentarians wanted 
to emphasize their intention of dissociating this body from the KAN of 
Soeharto’s New Order. But districts and nagari could opt for another name, 
and five out of eight district regulations have reverted to the term Village 
Adat Council, KAN. The KAN (and LAN) maintained their ambiguous posi-
tion in the new village governance structure. It is not a body of the official 
nagari administration, yet it is regulated and its functions are officially regu-
lated in quite some detail. 
The politics of changing boundaries
The provincial regulation prescribes that the villages return to the territorial 
units of the nagari before the introduction of the desa system. Fusions and 
divisions of nagari are not excluded, but referred to a later stage. A nagari may 
be split up only after consultation of the whole adat law community and com-
mon deliberation (musyawarah) between the KAN and other social leaders. If 
consensus is reached the decision is forwarded to the district administration 
and has to be confirmed by decision of the district head. The regulation also 
provides for the establishment of a new nagari with its own administration, 
while remaining under the KAN of the mother nagari. By early 2005, 32 nagari 
had split and it is generally expected that eventually there will be around 800 
nagari, considerably more than the pre-1983 543 nagari.
In most cases the desa agreed to reunite, but some of the old nagari sim-
ply had grown too large and agreed to split up. Some desa had once been a 
separate nagari and were fused by the state administration sometime in the 
past, as had happened with Padang Luar. These desa decided to establish a 
separate nagari again, such as Sungai Tenang did early 2005. Such splits have 
not been problematic.
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In two situations the redrawing of boundaries has caused serious prob-
lems. One is where desa have been caught up in the expansion of municipali-
ties trying to incorporate neighbouring desa as municipal districts (kelurahan). 
For example, the mayor of Bukittinggi has unilaterally incorporated some 
adjacent desa of nagari belonging to the district of Agam. This has created 
protracted political fights among the district head of Agam, the mayor of 
Bukittinggi, the respective parliaments, the media, former desa heads and 
current mayors and adat representatives of the nagari concerned supported 
by mass demonstrations of the village population, and included the governor 
and the central government. Other expanding municipalities such as Padang 
Panjang and Pariaman face similar problems. By early 2005, these conflicts 
were still unresolved.
The other problematic constellation concerns desa that had originally been 
settlements of newcomers (orang datang) or descendants of slaves (kemanakan 
dibawah lutuik). Most of these settler groups are Minangkabau themselves 
and have lived there for more than a century. But they may also be traders 
or Javanese transmigrants who have settled relatively recently. They enjoy 
only inferior political and economic rights under adat. The territory on which 
these communities live is usually part of the inherited property of original 
clans who had ‘given’ it to the newcomers according to adat. While this 
property has the status of inherited property (pusako) for the newcomers, it 
remains under some residual rights of control of the original pusako or ulayat 
holders. Some of these groups live in a more or less separate ward of the old 
nagari and were a desa of their own. Under the desa system such newcomer-
desa enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy, cherished by these settlements 
and resented by the old lineages. Newcomer-desa are afraid that under the 
new regime the heads of the old lineages, who mainly reside in the older 
parts of the nagari and who dominate the KAN, will reassert their rights, and 
for that reason insist on forming an independent nagari. 
These struggles are an indication of the resilience of adat principles and 
old adat status differences and their legal implications. In contrast to equally 
important social distinctions on the basis of education, the adat status differ-
ences between newcomers and original adat citizens are ascribed, implying a 
legal status with differences in rights and obligations. The fear among many 
urban intellectuals that former inequalities, which had been largely balanced 
out under the desa regime, would re-emerge under the new system is more 
realistic than the adat protagonists like to concede.
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Contesting nagari resources 
One of the major problems in the new nagari is the question of who controls 
the village resources: the mayor representing the village government and 
its citizens, or the KAN as the representative of the adat community? This 
issue has substantive grounds. Under the New Order an investor wanting 
to exploit gravel, sand, coal or forest had to negotiate with the provincial 
or even central administration. District and village authorities simply had 
to carry out the instructions from above and villages usually received little 
or no compensation. Today investors have to negotiate at many levels and 
can no longer neglect village and district administrations. Markets were an 
important source of income for districts, but today villages want their share 
and claim control over their markets. Though not many markets have in fact 
been handed over to villages, most villages expect this to happen in the not 
too distant future. Village control not only means potential income for the 
village to use for village development; it also means a source of potential 
corruption for persons in leading positions. It is in particular this potential 
illegitimate income that makes the internal struggles among village admin-
istration and adat institutions so intense. The experience of corruption is so 
ingrained that distrust among the villagers and their leaders is rampant.
Compared with the period before 2000, the KAN’s role in the manage-
ment of nagari resources has changed. The desa heads, having no basis in 
adat, could not lay claims to ulayat or other nagari property, but the mayor as 
the head of the new nagari government now competes with the KAN as the 
holder of traditional adat authority. Somewhat paradoxically then, the return 
to the nagari has formally strengthened the position of the mayor vis-à-vis the 
adat government. The governor’s Circular Letter (Surat Edaran) of 2003 pre-
scribes that the riches of the nagari are to be managed (dikelola) by the Village 
Government. In some villages, the authority has officially been handed over 
by the chairman of the KAN to the village government, but many mayors 
have difficulties to take over actual control over the resources from the adat 
elders or the KAN. In other nagari, compromises have been negotiated. There 
are also examples of fruitful cooperation between the mayor and the chair-
man of the KAN. 
Adat, Islam, the state and Minangkabau identity 
In the process of redrawing of villages’ geographical, social and administra-
tive boundaries, the relationships between the three major normative orders 
are also being renegotiated. Going back to the nagari not only preoccupies 
the minds of many Minangkabau because of the details of village govern-
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ment and land rights. Equally important is the feeling that it restores an 
essential element in Minangkabau identity, namely their geographical, social 
and political roots. These processes have also revitalized discussions about 
Minangkabau culture (kebudayaan) in general and in particular with respect 
to the other half of Minangkabau identity – of being Muslim.
Minangkabau identity has always been strong and ambivalent, multi-
layered, full of contradictions and tensions. The historically oldest layer 
is rooted in adat. But adat has been joined, partially superseded but never 
replaced, by other worldviews, symbolic universes and legal orders. While 
the extent to which Minangkabau embraced or rejected new knowledge 
and values varied considerably, they rarely relinquished the earlier ones. 
Over time, Minangkabau developed a pronounced self-understanding and 
cultural – and later ethnic – identity that implies an uneasy and shifting 
reconciliation of these normative orders. The titles of three recent books 
by Minangkabau writers indicate this growing concern of Minangkabau 
with their own ethnicity: Etnis dan adat Minangkabau (Ethnicity and adat 
Minangkabau, 2002), H.Ch.N.Dt. Bandaro Latief; Masih ada harapan; Posisi 
sebuah etnik minoritas dalam hidup berbangsa dan bernegara (There still is hope; 
The position as one ethnic minority living with people and state, 2004), S. 
Bahar and Mohammed Zulfan Tadjoeddin; Utopia nagari Minangkabau (The 
utopia of the Minangkabau nagari, 2003), Hasrifendi and Lindo Karsyah. In 
each of these publications discussions of the new nagari implies a discussion 
of Minangkabau identity.
Minangkabau adat is very elaborately expressed in oral histories, proverbs, 
stories, and songs. It has sparkled the imagination of foreign observers from 
the early nineteenth century on and in the Dutch writings on adat and adat 
law in Indonesia, sources on Minangkabau occupy a disproportionally large 
space. Yet as Joel Kahn (1993) has shown, ‘constituting the Minangkabau’ has 
never been an affair of colonial Dutch or Indonesian state officials of non-
Minangkabau origin only. Many Minangkabau writers have actively contrib-
uted to debates on the relations between adat and other world views.
The relationships between adat and Islam, and later between adat, Islam 
and the state, have varied historically.12 In pre-colonial times Islam was large-
ly adapted to matrilineal adat. This changed in the Padri War, when Islamists 
offered their own blueprint for social, economic and political organization. It 
changed again when the Dutch intervened and supported adat against Islam. 
The duality of adat and Islam has remained a central and constitutive point 
of identification for most Minangkabau. The inseparable unity of adat and 
Islam is expressed with the saying ‘Adat is founded on the syarak, the syarak 
is founded on the holy Koran’ (Adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah, 
12  Taufik Abdullah 1966; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1988.
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usually abbreviated as ABSSBK). While this saying has a long history,13 in 
recent years it is on everyone’s lips. Between 2002 and 2003 three conferences 
were held and several publications appeared on ABSSBK.14 The conviction 
that adat and Islam are inseparable, that values of both must govern the lives 
of Minangkabau, and, given their decline, must be revitalized, has also found 
its expression in another ‘return movement’, the ‘return to the surau’. Surau 
were the sleeping places for unmarried Minangkabau men who had no place 
to stay in their maternal homes under the system of matrilineal social organi-
zation and post-marital uxorilocal residence. They were also the place where 
instruction in adat and Islam was given.
The Dutch and later the Republican governments introduced new social 
and political worldviews of modernity and development. While many 
Minangkabau had no difficulty in adopting these new ideas, matrilineality 
and modernity were often seen as mutually exclusive. Yet Minangkabau 
persistently occupied a prominent position in the political landscape of the 
emerging Indonesian state. Minangkabau politicians were represented in the 
leadership of all political parties and they were disproportionally present in 
first governments of the Republic. ‘Modernity’ later gave way to the strug-
gle for independence and, once that goal had been reached, for a democratic 
Indonesian state. 
After the regional rebellion Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia 
(PRRI, the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) had been 
put down by the armed forces of the Republic, Minangkabau’s educational 
head-start dwindled away and most intellectuals became complacent under 
the increasingly authoritarian and centralist regime of Soeharto’s New Order. 
There is a deep and widespread sense of frustration in Minangkabau of hav-
ing lost its prominent position in Indonesia.15 Navis (1995:19) speaks in this 
respect of an ‘intellectual disaster’ (musiba intellektual).
Discussions of Minangkabau identity since the downfall of the Soeharto 
regime are mostly inward looking. While in former times the Minangkabau 
had operated jointly with others against a common enemy (the Dutch dur-
ing the colonial period, and the Javanese during the PRRI) and had been the 
centre of the strong and resource-rich Province Middle Sumatra, today they 
stand rather alone in negotiating their relationships within the national state, 
and their weak economic position gives them little leeway. Richer provinces 
within Sumatra such as Riau and Aceh redefine their position within the 
13  Until the late 1970s, the relationship was commonly expressed as adat basandi syarak, syarak 
basandi adat. See Taufik Abdullah 1966; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1988.
14  LKAAM 2002; PPIM 2003; Salmadanis and Samad 2003. See also Ade Chandra et al. 2000; 
Erizal 2000a, 2000b.
15  Taufik Abdullah 1995; S. Bahar and Mohammed Zulfan Tadjoeddin 2004.
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Indonesian state from a strong economic position and show no inclination to 
share their wealth with Minangkabau who have little to offer in return. The 
enthusiasm for the return of the nagari should therefore also be seen in the 
light of a general frustration of finding Minangkabau in a position among 
neighbours who are much stronger and richer than West Sumatra. Despite 
their critique and disillusion most Minangkabau still identify strongly with 
the Indonesian nation-state. There is no discussion about secession in the 
region. 
The diminished political and ideological pressure from the centre has 
stimulated an outburst of formerly suppressed Minangkabau-ness, which 
finds its expression in nagari, adat, and ABSSBK. Questions that emerge 
include: how to fill this space, what is adat, who knows adat, what do nagari 
government and ABSSBK according to adat mean? Globalization offers addi-
tional frameworks in which identities can be formulated (for example ethnic 
minority, indigenous people) while at the same time neo-liberal pressure 
poses challenges that are held to threaten Minangkabau values. With regard 
to Minangkabau a number of international organizations support the proc-
ess of decentralization and the return to the nagari. Minangkabau as well as 
outsiders from within Indonesia, foreign anthropologists and development 
agencies assisting the decentralization policy such as the Ford Foundation, 
the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), the GTZ (Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit), largely use a global rhetorical repertoire, 
and local agents increasingly adopt the same language. A striking illustration 
is the report on a seminar on the return to the surau, held in Padang in 2001. It 
warns of the dangers which the globalization of science, information technol-
ogy and lifestyles bring for Minangkabau identity and ABSSBK values, but 
then goes on to frame the issues in globalized language: partisipatif, dialogis, 
demokratis, transparansi and akuntabilitas, sinergi, efektivitas, efesiensi.16 Thus, 
the normative order represented by the state and transnational normative 
notions are as much part of the Minangkabau identity as adat and Islam, 
but in contrast to the relationship between adat and Islam, there is not much 
debate about the ensuing contradictions.
Arenas and actors 
Discussions and struggles about identity occur in different, interdependent 
arenas, in villages, among district and provincial political elites, in parlia-
16  ‘Pemda Sumbar dan ICMI, Padang, Pedoman gerakan kembali ke surau di Sumatera Barat, 
Kembali ke surau di Sumatera Barat’, outcome of seminar and workshop, in Hotel Buni Minang, 
on 27-28 June 2001. See for Bali, Henk Schulte Nordholt in this volume.
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ments, and in circles of development agencies, and among Minangkabau 
migrants in Medan, Jakarta, or Bandung. Workshops, seminars, books and 
local TV and newspapers are the main channels of information. Return to the 
nagari and ABSSBK also mean different things for different people in differ-
ent positions. The debate about the nagari has been focussed on the glittering 
past and has created much nostalgia.17 
Debates among intellectuals
After a period of relative neglect in the 1980s and early 1990s, adat and 
Minangkabau society are enjoying lively interest among intellectuals, uni-
versity lecturers, journalists, and migrants.18 Illustrative are the books 
published by the Foundation Genta Budaya which came out of workshops 
held in the 1990s, in which the predicaments of Minangkabau are critically 
discussed.19 A series of school books on adat and history have been pub-
lished for use in primary and secondary schools (Yulfian Azrial 1994). With 
the return to the nagari, the search for adat knowledge intensified further. 
Publications on adat have increased and older books and booklets on adat 
have been reprinted. The LKAAM publishes books and teaching materials 
and for some time a Buletin Seri Alam Minangkabau in Minangkabau lan-
guage. It also offers training courses in adat.20 Members regularly publish in 
local newspapers and appear on TV (Semangat Demokrasi 16-19 March 2002). 
Today the LKAAM is only one organization out of many claiming a greater 
role for adat and interpreting and extolling the significance of ABSSBK. It 
has been joined by new organizations such as the Pusat Pengkajian Islam 
dan Minangkabau (PPIM, Centre for Studies of Islam and Minangkabau). 
Feminist organizations organize meetings on the role of Minangkabau 
women; NGO alliances fight for adat rights and organize seminars and 
workshops. Migrants write books and pamphlets on Minangkabau adat and 
on problems of ethnicity and identity and organize meetings and seminars 
17  Taufik Abdullah (1995:8) characterized this attitude as narcissistic and warned against uto-
pian expectations. 
18  Until the 1970s the representation structure of adat was relatively simple, consisting of some 
recognized all-Minangkabau adat experts such as Rasjid Manggis Dt. Rajo Panghoeloe (1971) 
and Idrus Hakimy Dt. Rajo Panghulu, the LKAAM and some adat law teachers, social scientists 
and historians such as Taufik Abdullah, Mochtar Naim, Imran Manan, Amelioes Sa’danoer and 
Abdul Aziz Saleh. 
19  See M. Hasbi et al. 1990; Edy Utama 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Abdul Aziz Saleh and Van Giffen 
1990; Idrus Hakimy Dt. Rajo Panghulu 2001.
20  LKAAM, Padang, Lembaga pemberian bekal adat alam Minangkabau (Babekal Alam) 
LKAAM Sumatera Barat, 2001.
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in West Sumatra.21 The migrants’ organization Gebu Minang in Jakarta has 
founded a book club and in 2001 started to publish a series of short pocket 
booklets (buku saku) dealing with selected aspects of Minangkabau adat and 
history. 
There is subtle and not so subtle negotiating about who is entitled to 
speak about and for adat. The LKAAM always emphasizes that it covers both 
adat and religion, in the spirit of ABSSBK, and tries to capture the back to the 
surau discourse. According to them, the all-Indonesian Islamic organization 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars) is 
expert on religion only and is therefore not entitled to speak about adat or 
about the relationship of adat and Islam. NGOs have no say in adat matters 
either according to the LKAAM. The LKAAM itself is also under critique 
and its abolition has been repeatedly demanded in the local media. It is 
criticized for its Golkar past, and other organizations doubt its legitimacy to 
represent adat (Singgalang 28-4-2003). NGOs in particular see no reason for 
the existence of such an institution.22 Others argue that there is no need for 
an LKAAM because adat is rooted in the nagari; there are no adat institutions 
on the provincial level. Moreover, nagari leadership should not consist of adat 
elders only. The LKAAM defends its position and history in the media and 
in seminars. It explains that it was not founded in 1966 by the regional gov-
ernment but by the KAN of all Minangkabau nagari. It would accept critique 
only from those KAN. Moreover, the LKAAM had always claimed that land 
in Minangkabau was tanah ulayat and not government land.23 
Activist groups such as the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum  (LBH, Legal Aid 
Bureau) or the Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat (FPSB, Forum of Concerned 
West Sumatrans) take a similar position as the adat champions in the tanah 
ulayat issue. The NGO alliance Paga Alam for instance adopts an approach 
to adat and tanah ulayat that is even more radically adat minded than that of 
the LKAAM.24 But while the members of the LKAAM fully identify as adat-
21  M.S. Amir 1999, 2005; H.Ch.N.Dt. Bandaro Latief 2002; H.Ch.N.Dt. Bandaro Latief et al. 
2004; S. Bahar and Mohammed Zulfan Tadjoeddin 2004. S. Bahar organized a live discussion of 
his controversial book (S. Bahar and Mohammed Zulfan Tadjoeddin 2004) on Padang TV. The 
migrants’ organization of Solok district organized a large meeting on adat, the position of women 
and suku management in January 2005. The Minangkabau Women Congress planned for 2005 
and for a discussion of the agenda with Minangkabau migrants from Java, local NGO activities 
and the provincial branch of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission.
22  Semangat Demokrasi 16-19 March 2002. See A.R. Rizal in Singgalang 6-7-2002; Mochtar Naim 
in Singgalang 4-5-2003. 
23  Singgalang 29-4-2003. LKAAM, Padang, Hubungan dan eksistensinya Lembaga Kerapatan 
Adat Alam Minangkabau (LKAAM) dan Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) di Sumatera Barat, no 
date.
24  Paga Alam Minangkabau, Padang, Siaran Pers no. 01/S-Pers/PALAM/IX/2004 tentang 
Ranperda Pemanfaatan Tanah Ulayat, 2004.
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champions, other organizations fight for recognition of adat rights without 
implying an extensive role for adat leadership. According to them, govern-
ment according to adat is not democratic but has a feudalistic ring. They 
differentiate between the substantive rights embodied in adat (considered 
more just than land rights embodied in state legislation) and the organization 
entitled to claim these rights. Yet others claim that struggles for political and 
economic rights of the population could better be entrusted to uncompro-
mised civil society organizations. Adat rights are supposed to support the 
interests of the population and not to strenghten feudal positions of corrupt 
adat leaders.
 
The government and provincial politics
The provincial government is an important and active player in the regional 
arena. It successfully pre-empted and controlled the politics of decentraliza-
tion. When it became probable that the Soeharto regime would not last and an 
era of Reformasi appeared at the horizon, the emphasis on Minangkabau-ness 
and revaluating the characteristically Minangkabau nagari became a means 
to show distance towards Jakarta and the ‘Javanese’ village organization of 
the desa which ‘Jakarta’ had imposed in 1983. Emphasis on Minangkabau-
ness also served to reassert local economic interests against domination by 
central authorities in Jakarta. When the West Sumatran political elite fought 
against the centre to keep West Sumatra’s only large industrial enterprise, the 
Cement Factory in Padang, under local control, West Sumatran authorities 
strongly emphasized the specific status of Minangkabau tanah ulayat which 
according to adat cannot be sold (Sakai 2003b). As we have seen, this does not 
prevent the same authorities from insisting that once licenses or concessions 
have been given for such land, the land remains state land. 
The provincial government continues to subsidize most of the organiza-
tions engaged in discussions of adat and Minangkabau culture. There is hard-
ly any publication without a preface by the governor. The debates between 
organizations operating at the provincial level such as the LKAAM, the 
PPIM, and the MUI about the role of adat, the position of Islamic authorities, 
ABSSBK and the return to the surau are not only a discussion about values 
and morals, but should also be understood as a competition for government 
funding and for advisory services to the government.25 While this gives the 
25  Thus when the LKAAM criticizes the provincial government for not caring about adat, this 
probably is a veiled critique that the government has given too much subsidies to a newcomer 
in the adat-Islam-culture field, the PPIM. See the critical exchanges in the newspaper Semangat 
Demokrasi 23-26 March 2002, (LKAAM) and 20-22 March 2002 (Governor’s office). 
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government a means to sanction certain views, it cannot prevent organiza-
tions such as the LKAAM or university staff from criticizing provincial poli-
tics. Some other organizations operate more at a distance from the govern-
ment, as they are supported by migrants or foreign NGOs.
A major topic in the regional political discourses concerns the Minangkabau 
form of democracy. Most Minangkabau take great pride in Minangkabau 
democracy with its strong emphasis on common deliberation and consensus 
and consider it superior to the ‘western style 50 plus 1 voting democracy’. 
It is not just the traditionalist adat lobby that is in favour for introducing 
Minangkabau principles of democracy, many politicians and public figures 
such as the rector of Andalas University praise Minangkabau consensus 
democracy as well.26 Such statements, however, do not prevent the provin-
cial and district governments from overloading villages with regulations and 
bureaucracy.
Various international, national and regional donor agencies also partici-
pate in these debates, following their own agendas and trying to promote 
their political issues. Thus, the GTZ advises several villages and districts and 
organizes training courses on the organization of a nagari structure, empha-
sizing issues of transparency and administrative responsibility.27 Both propo-
nents of adat and ‘modern’ democracy play to the ears of donor agencies. The 
former emphasize that adat is indeed development from below, participatory, 
community based. The latter stress the value of free elections and democratic 
decision-making processes. The donor agencies themselves are ambivalent 
how to evaluate the competing principles of democracy. The Minangkabau 
consensus type appeals to their notion of participation and community based 
development (see Asia Research Centre 2001). With their interest in adat 
they want to emphasize that they are not introducing foreign or ‘Western’ 
ideas into Indonesia. A brochure of the UNDP Partnership for Governance 
presents the Minangkabau nagari as good governance avant la lettre, indicat-
ing that the present good government offensive is nothing new but intended 
to restore traditional values (UNDP 2001:6). The partnership organizes and 
finances workshops and small research projects on the progress of the local 
government reform, carried out by local NGOs or university research and 
development institutes.28 These workshops are important events not only 
because they bring villagers into contact with issues discussed in wider social 
and political contexts; they also are important meeting places for village offi-
26  See the rector of Andalas University in Haluan 8-6-2001.
27  The Friedrich Naumann Stiftung supports anti-corruption training; The USAID-sponsored 
Perform Project has been active in some districts and some projects are supported by the Ford 
Foundation. The UNDP partnership for governance has sponsored meetings with villager lead-
ers about democracy and open society in the nagari.
28  On the activities of donor agencies, see GTZ 2001b; Turner et al. 2003:129-35.
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cials, who learn about each others’ experiences. From the discussions we had 
over the past five years with representatives of foreign donor organizations 
it seems, however, that the initial enthusiasm for local level democracy has 
given way to more sober assessments.
These discussions also serve to renegotiate the relationship between adat 
and Islam. Under the rhetorical unity of adat and Islam, old struggles over 
the relative superiority of one over the other continue. The greater autonomy 
of districts have allowed district heads to make their imprint on the village 
structure, thus contributing to regional differences within the province. 
Some district heads clearly favour adat dominance in internal village affairs, 
while others have created a sharper division between adat and religion by 
introducing a separate Council of Religious Elders parallel to the KAN. The 
return to the nagari and especially the issue of land rights are clearly issues 
that upgrade adat. For most local politicians, village leaders and NGOs, 
the relevant ‘community’ under debate is the adat community of the nagari 
(masyarakat hukum adat), not the Islamic community of believers. Initially ‘the 
return to the surau’ discourse (later called movement) was an answer to the 
return to the nagari discourse. In contrast to the discourse on adat with its 
political and economic overtones, the discourse on Islam stresses the impor-
tance of Minangkabau moral values, and the need to defend them against 
cultural and economic globalization. Islamic pressure in the Provincial 
Parliament, for example, led to the adoption of a hotly discussed regulation 
(no. 11/2001) on ‘social illnesses’ (penyakit masyarakat, PEKAT), such as gam-
bling, prostitution and drug abuse. This regulation has great symbolic value 
but no-one expects any practical relevance. Thus, while adat has acquired 
greater prominence in political and economic terms, Islam is mobilized for 
specific moral issues.
Villagers
The depressed sense of identity is primarily a problem for the Minangkabau 
elite witin and outside of West Sumatra, where the discussion about the rela-
tion between adat and Islam is the most pronounced. However, it rubs off on 
the rural population as well, because these arenas are linked to rural areas. 
Many participants mainly engaged at the regional level occupy an adat posi-
tion or are otherwise actively involved in their village of origin. The LKAAM 
and MUI have their links with villages, as have political parties. Political 
parties are not allowed to play an open and active role in village elections, 
but through the organization of workshops for villagers they supported the 
process materially and made their views known. Moreover, with the new 
nagari many (often retired) migrants, who had lost interest in village affairs, 
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have taken a renewed and active interest in their village or origin. Some have 
taken on office as adat leader, as official advisor, or even as mayor. Wearing 
several hats at the same time, neither a real insider nor a real outsider, they 
contribute to the construction of Minangkabau identity and to the more 
mundane concerns of village administration and politics. 
While urban elites discuss adat in general terms, villagers tend to discuss 
it in connection with concrete issues of the structure and procedures of vil-
lage government, control over resources, and lineage and property histories. 
This requires knowledge about the actual functioning of the nagari govern-
ment in the past and of the embodiment of adat in the political and economic 
nagari constitution. That knowledge remains oral and is, if at all, transmitted 
within the lineages. However, many of the newly installed young panghulu 
have been elected because of their high education and good connections 
with the government. They lack authoritative knowledge about the history 
of their nagari, the composition of its suku and lineages, the history of suku 
and lineage land and lineage splits, which is necessary to be a successful vil-
lage leader (Agus Indiyanto 2005). But they are reluctant to ask the old men 
and women who may know more, because that does not accord with their 
status and might undermine their authority. More often than not essential 
knowledge has been lost for ever and the lineage history is being recre-
ated from scratch by young lineage heads without any training in adat. The 
many books and booklets on adat are of little help, because these reproduce 
Minangkabau adat and history, as expressed in adat proverbs and maxims, 
but are far removed from contemporary affairs. Knowledge of this type may 
help the youth to develop a stronger identification with adat, but such books 
do not provide clues as to how nagari in the sense of adat organizations might 
be developed or fruitfully accommodated within the state structure.
Likewise, the relationship between adat and Islam has different connota-
tions for urban elites and the rural population. While some Minangkabau 
migrants in Java find it difficult to reconcile the two systems of belief, villag-
ers generally have no problem identifying equally with adat and Islam. They 
are critical of the political elites in West Sumatra who took the issue as an 
opportunity to debate whether villages should or should not have Religious 
Councils, for these councils were said to be an entry point for political influ-
ence from which political parties were legally barred. Wealthy migrants 
financed prayer houses and mosques for their family or lineage back home as 
a public sign of religiosity and of family support. But many villagers regard-
ed these prayer houses as a threat to the nagari community, undermining 
the rule that a nagari community shares one mosque, and thus undermining 
the unity of adat and Islam. On the other hand, many villagers have readily 
embraced the new slogan of ‘going back to the surau’, as a counterpart to the 
movement of ‘going back to the nagari’. Few take it literally, but see it as a 
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necessary reconsideration of Islamic morals and values, that are threatened 
to be eclipsed by the adat hype. The rapid spread of Islamic dress require-
ments for women must be seen in this light. Though it certainly is part of an 
Indonesian wide development, it has only taken off in West Sumatra since 
the debates about adat had evoked an Islamic response.
Critical voices 
Adat and adat leadership are not unanimously supported in Minangkabau. 
Critique is partly directed at established adat leadership, and partly at the 
lifestyle adat seems to stand for. Many among the younger generation of 
urban intellectuals, hold at best ambivalent feelings towards adat leadership. 
Adat elders in the nagari are frequently perceived as indeed old, old fashioned 
and backward, not in line with modern life, and lacking good formal educa-
tion. They are therefore considered incapable of governing the nagari. They 
are also blamed for having given in too easily to the pressures and tempta-
tions of the administration and investors during the Soeharto government. 
They are reproached for having abandoned ulayat too easily and of having 
pocketed compensation without sharing it with their kemanakan (matrilineal 
relatives). Urban intellectuals, on the other hand, are held to be lacking solid 
knowledge of adat. Many leading civil servants of the provincial and district 
governments in West Sumatra now carry the datuk title of a panghulu. Since 
they do not live in the nagari, they are seen as useless for day to day village 
government. While mobile phones have considerably bridged temporal and 
spatial distance and are indeed frequently used for inter-local communica-
tion they cannot replace day to day physical presence and availability.
Finally many Minangkabau have self-critically commented on the flowery 
but virtually empty rhetoric of adat virtues, ABSSBK and the return to nagari 
and surau, and depicted Minangkabau as ‘champions in slogans’ (juara slo-
gan), spending hours ‘ber-Minang-Minang’, engaged in being Minangkabau. 
These critics do not trust the regular declarations that the values are good, 
and that only the people have forgotten them. And they do not believe that 
once the return to the nagari and the surau is ‘socialized’ (disosialisasikan), adat 
values and the authority of knowledgeable elders and their matrilineal kin 
will automatically be restored and the nagari will function as it should. 
The return to the nagari thus is a lively issue discussed in many arenas at 
different levels. Each of these arenas has its own political constellation and 
concomitant preoccupations. However, the arenas are not insulated from 
each other, but form permeable, overlapping fields. Urban Minangkabau, 
participating in regional or national debates and at the same time being an 
adat leader or participating in nagari matters in another capacity, play a crucial 
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bridging role. But perceptions of the nagari certainly are different for people 
living in the nagari and for outsiders. From the outside and from the perspec-
tive of migrants living far away, the nagari may be a small and intimate com-
munity, the incarnation of adat and adat leadership through adat elders in the 
Adat Village Council, inviting nostalgic feelings and supporting romanticized 
notions of nagari and adat. Seen from the inside nagari are not cosy communi-
ties but complex social organizations divided along many lines.
Conclusions
Decentralization has evoked a process of renegotiating social and political 
boundaries in West Sumatra in various interlinked arenas each with its own 
specific focus and concerns. While the province has receded somewhat to the 
background, districts self-confidently emphasize their autonomy vis-à-vis 
the province and the central state. The same autonomy allowed districts free-
dom to redesign their relationship with villages and to define the boundaries 
of authority. Despite widespread initial scepticism about the wisdom of 
returning to the nagari, it was soon accepted throughout West Sumatra. Much 
of the debate then addressed the particular form the nagari was to take. These 
debates were carried out in urban centres, in the regions, as well as in each 
village, while Minangkabau migrants outside West Sumatra took an active 
part as well. Important links between these arenas were formed by members 
of urban elites who had become actively involved in village politics as adat 
official or in other capacities. For some it provided a return to their own val-
ues which had been oppressed by the autocratic Jakarta regime. For others 
it provided a populist platform for local politics. A main factor, and not only 
for adat leaders, was the promise of more control over village resources, so 
vital for a future with decreasing funding from the central government. Such 
claims only had a chance to be recognized if based on adat by adat communi-
ties, which nagari were but desa were not. 
Decentralization and the return to the nagari was much more than just 
a geographical and administrative reconfiguration. They allowed for con-
siderable differentiation among the districts and villages. Territorial village 
boundaries were renegotiated under legislation that allowed desa to go back 
to the nagari territory and prevented desa from establishing their own nagari. 
And it forced the rural population to redefine internal village relationships. 
In that process, social and economic boundaries that had become more or 
less obsolete during the desa period, such as between original settler lineages 
and lineages of newcomers or descendants of former slaves were reinforced, 
causing much tension within villages with a major population classified as 
newcomers. On the other hand, old social and economic relationships based 
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on common clan-membership of persons living in different desa relations that 
had weakened during the desa period now become closer and stronger again. 
To some extent the new village structure also blurred their boundaries, as 
migrants living in the urban centres within West Sumatra or outside became 
more involved in village matters, taking adat offices or positions in the vil-
lage government. Thus the geographical boundaries are not so problematic 
as such, but because of what they imply for social differentiation and politi-
cal control over economic resources such as village land and markets. The 
nagari, then, are complex social and political communities, with diverse and 
ambivalent administrative structures, and with more internal social bounda-
ries and differentiation than during the last decades of the Soeharto regime. 
Externally they have become somewhat more independent from the central 
and provincial administration, yet as the lowest level of state organization, 
heavily regulated and predominantly funded by the districts, they remain 
deeply embedded in the wider Indonesian political, financial and social 
structures.
The decentralization policies have stimulated debate about the relation-
ship between adat, Islam and the state. This has not only had ramifications for 
the structure of village government, but also for Minangkabau identity and 
their position within the Indonesian state. While tensions between adat and 
Islam have marked Minangkabau history from the beginning of conversion, 
this relationship has gone through phases of great tension as well as rela-
tive relaxation. The last decade of the Soeharto period was characterized by 
general disinterest in adat and a rise of Islam. The new political freedom and 
the decentralization policies increased identification with adat even among 
the urban elites and pushed Islam temporarily more to the background. The 
return to the surau movement must be seen as an attempt to balance out the 
relationship between adat and Islam. Most Minangkabau identify as much 
with the Indonesian nation-state as with adat and Islam and leave no doubt 
that they see their future within Indonesia. Urban elites are used to combine a 
modern lifestyle and strong adherence to Islam and with a heightened inter-
est in adat, despite the numerous discussions about Minangkabau identity. 
For villagers state institutions have been part of their everyday life and they 
have been so accustomed to bureaucratic procedures that it has even rubbed 
off on adat institutions. Even the most adamant proponents of adat only strive 
for a larger role of adat, not for retreat from the Indonesian state. The rela-
tionship between adat, Islam and state has shifted, but the Minangkabau still 
derive their identity from the three normative orders in conjunction.
Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann442
Postscript: the revised decentralization laws of October 2004
The revised decentralization laws of October 2004 mark an end to the decen-
tralization policies as discussed in this chapter, paving the road for a partial 
reversal of decentralization. Given the dynamics of Indonesia’s political and 
economic development it is not easy to predict what this will mean for the 
internal dynamics within the region, but a few things can be said. During our 
last field visit in February 2005, officials of the district administration were 
fully aware of the changes to come. They showed great concern, because it 
would mean a shift in the power relationships back towards the province and 
central government, at their expense. The concern among the district officials 
contrasted starkly with the matter-of-fact attitude we found in villages. In this 
reshuffle the village structures are of little importance though they will not 
remain unaffected. The new laws bring considerable change in the degree of 
village autonomy. The mayor and the village secretary will come under more 
district control, while within the villages their power will increase in rela-
tion to other village institutions, notably the village parliament. However, to 
many nagari the autonomy has proven to be more of a burden than a blessing 
anyway, because autonomy means more tasks without proper funding. To 
lose some of this autonomy therefore may be less important than the ques-
tion how much funding can be expected from the state. There is thus far no 
indication that the nagari will be abolished and replaced by something like a 
desa structure. Politicians at higher levels are fully occupied with their fight 
for power with the political and administrative centre where villages do not 
play a role. 
carole faucher
contesting boundaries in the riau 
archipelago 
The fall of the New Order and the implementation of the regional autonomy 
laws have provided fresh opportunities for the local elite to promote and 
consolidate their own sphere of influence. As has already been the case in 
a number of provinces and districts, instances of conflict have spread, often 
in the context of power struggles and highly complex social and political 
restructurings (H. Schulte Nordholt 2002). In many cases, these conflicts are 
popularly articulated through the language of ethnic and religious identity 
politics. Similarly, ethnic and religious sensitivities which were consciously 
repressed during the period of the New Order, are now exposed. The Riau 
Archipelago (or Kepri from Kepulauan Riau) had been so far largely spared 
from acute tensions and mounting violence. However, among the urban 
middle class and between generations ideological polarization has taken 
place. The different attempts to conceptualize ‘Masyarakat Kepri’ – the 
society of Kepulauan Riau – by politicians and public intellectuals seems to 
demonstrate how an increasing emphasis on regional identity has gradually 
superseded a more general concern with the nation. The discussion about the 
character of the newly formed province of Kepri has oscillated over the past 
years between the aristocrats’ ideal of reverting to the era of the sultanate, and 
an image of an industrial oriented pluralistic society, advocated by business 
people, which is strong and autonomous enough to compete economically 
with Singapore and Malaysia. 
The proximity to Malaysia and Singapore has created an interesting para-
dox. On one hand, Singapore and Malaysia have been a source of identity 
for the Malays in the Riau Archipelago as important economic and cultural 
power bases. On the other hand, precisely because of the geographical prox-
imity to Malaysia and in particular to Singapore, the islands of Batam, Bintan 
and Karimun have attracted the highest number of Indonesian migrants of 
the whole archipelago, to the point now that Malays are there in minority. 
Tanjungpinang’s population has grown dramatically in the past years – from 





































Map 18. Riau Archipelago (above) and detail (below)
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and incorporation of large groups of immigrants.1 
This chapter investigates how the idea of ‘Masyarakat Kepri’ is imagined 
whith a specific focus on the role of the urban middle class. I first examine 
the recent political developments which have resulted in several cases of 
pemekaran (or administrative fragmentation) since the fall of the New Order, 
at both district and provincial levels. Then I explore the problems differ-
ent groups encountered in trying to formulate a model that would foster a 
sense of belonging to the Kepri province. Finally I look at the role of educa-
tion and the efforts put forward to revive ethnic pride within the context 
of a wider Malay identity. To what extent is the young generation ready to 
accept a historically rooted sense of Malayness? Or does it prefer a modern 
and globalized identity which is linked with nearby Singapore? I will focus 
on the city of Tanjungpinang on Bintan Island because it has been the most 
important administrative centre of the Riau Archipelago. It also comprises 
the greatest number of Malay-Bugis aristocrats in the archipelago and forms 
as such a centre of Malay identity politics. 
From Kepulauan Riau (Kepri) District to Kepulauan Riau Province
Until the formation of a separate province, Kepri was a district consisting of 
a cluster of islands located at proximity of Singapore, including the islands 
of Bintan and Karimun but excluding Batam. Tanjungpinang on the island of 
Bintan was until 2001 the district capital. Soon after the fall of Soeharto and 
the beginning of the decentralization process, the pemekaran-virus affected 
local leaders in Tanjungpinang as well, where the first thoughts of a split 
between mainland Riau, with its capital Pekanbaru, and the Riau Archipelago 
were articulated in public. 
Soon Tanjungpinang became an autonomous city (Kota Otonom) and the 
district of Karimun, which covered the western part of the Riau Archipelago 
was created. These stimulated stiff competition between the two districts of 
Kepri and Karimun and the two municipalities of Tanjungpinang and Batam 
in order to develop economic relations with Singapore and, to a lesser extent, 
Malaysia. During the same period, Huzrin Hood, then district head of Kepri 
district, launched his idea of forming a distinct Malay province in the Riau 
Archipelago. The governor of Riau, Saleh Djasit, opposed the project at a 
number of occasions. Interestingly it was his most vocal critic, Tabrani Rab 
– who was also known as the leading figure behind the Free Riau movement 
– who criticized the idea of a separate province of the Riau Archipelago 
because he saw it as a strategy by the government to weaken the independ-
1  www.kotabestari.net.
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ence movement of larger Riau (in other words mainland and archipelago) 
(Jakarta Post 21-5-2003).
His strong stand against the split of Riau was primarily directed at Huzrin 
Hood whom he publicly accused of nepotism and corruption. Despite protest 
from mainland Riau the bill that established the new province was passed 
in September 2002 by the Indonesian Parliament, but it took almost another 
two years to see its official implementation. After almost six years of heated 
debates and intensive lobbying, the new Kepri province became eventually 
finally operative on the first of July 2004 when H. Ismeth Abdullah, chair-
man of the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), was appointed 
caretaker governor. In 2004, just after the official nomination of the caretaker 
governor, it was the turn of Lingga to form a new district.2 
But by that time Huzrin Hood was officially no longer in function. In 
November 2003, he was sentenced to two years in jail following a Rp 4.3 billion 
corruption charge.3 Apart from being district head of Kepri, Huzrin Hood was 
at that time also the chairman of the Badan Perkerja Pembentukan Propinsi 
Kepulauan Riau (BP3KR, the Working Committee for the Development of 
Kepri Province) and the most likely candidate for the position of caretaker 
governor. Huzrin’s arrest was publicly displayed as part of a new policy to 
show that reforms were really taking place, even far away from Jakarta. 
Old dreams, new concerns
For many local Malays regional autonomy offers an opportunity to revert to 
the period when Tanjungpinang formed the heart of the Malay world and 
it was well entrenched in the regional economy. The act of breaking away 
from the provincial control of mainland Pekanbaru by forming a new prov-
ince that only consists of the Riau Archipelago seemed, at the first glance, 
to be the best response to a long-standing ideological divide about Malay 
identity (B. Andaya 1997; Adhuri and Rachmawati 2004). Although it looked 
at first sight as if Huzrin Hood and his allies wanted to create a province 
along ethnic lines which would benefit the Malay, in reality a large part 
of the population of the islands of Batam, Karimun and Bintan consists of 
migrants. It is therefore even more difficult to emphasize local Malayness as 
an identity marker for the new province. In order to overcome this problem 
2  For a couple of months following this last pemekaran, the district head of Lingga was hesi-
tating between remaining in the Riau (daratan) province and joining the new Kepri province. He 
finally opted for the second option. 
3  Huzrin Hood was first sentenced to six years. This sentence was reduced to two years after 
appeal and then to one year in jail and one year under city arrest.
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the Malay elite and local academics in Kepri try to revive a trans-national 
Malay solidarity, or serumpun. This elite consists to a large extent of high 
ranking bureaucrats of Bugis-Malay aristocratic descent who enjoyed many 
privileges during the Soeharto era. 
At the same time, however, mixed marriages are extremely common, 
especially in urban areas, making questions of ethnic identity even more 
complex. In public high schools of Tanjungpinang, for instance, the number 
of students of mix parentage outnumbers the ones who claim belonging to a 
particular ethnic group. Taken together the ethnic make-up of Kepri is very 
uneven. While the Malay form a majority in the rural areas – 85% in Lingga 
– in urban areas, such as Tanjung Balai and Tanjungpinang, they do not 
count for more than 40%. In Tanjungpinang Javanese form the second larg-
est group with 25%, while ethnic Chinese make up the third largest group 
with 13%.4 If we add to this picture the recent inflow of migrants one could 
argue that at least in Tanjungpinang a multi-ethnic pluralistic framework 
had been created at the eve of decentralization. The dominant image of Kepri 
being predominantly Malay was a New Order construction – meant to serve 
both the interests of the Malay elite and the state – which was mobilized 
and manipulated when regional autonomy required a reordering of regional 
relationships.5
Despite the fact that the Dutch and the British had already in 1824 
officially divided their respective territories in the Malay world, the Riau 
Archipelago remained until recently a relatively open border zone. 
During the Japanese Occupation, the Riau Archipelago was placed under 
the administration of Singapore and many Malays, including aristocrats, 
were taken to Singapore to join the Imperial Army (B. Andaya 1997). 
During the 1950s and until the konfrontasi in 1963, the Riau Archipelago 
was a duty-free zone where the Strait Dollar of British Malaya was the main 
currency (Wee 2002; Lufti et al. 1977; Faucher 2005). Tanjungpinang consti-
tuted for Indonesians the principal port of entry into Singapore. Migrating to 
Tanjungpinang was, in fact, the most difficult step; anyone who intended to 
do so needed a local sponsor. The proximity of Singapore and the use of the 
Strait Dollar were no doubt important incentives for Malays from mainland 
Riau to migrate to the Riau Archipelago. Once residing in Tanjungpinang, it 
4  Adhuri and Rachmawati 2004. This paper cannot account for the Lingga and Natuna 
perspectives because this research concentrates mostly on Bintan. However, informants born in 
Lingga pointed out to me that the islands of Lingga and Singkep have always suffered from lack 
of support and from disregard of the part of Malays in Bintan. 
5  An emphasis on ‘Malayness’ also helped to erase the role of the economically strong 
Chinese in Kepri. 
6  Jobs in the civil service and education were given to Malays or at least to individuals who 
would identify themselves as such (Faucher 2005).
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was possible to travel to Singapore without passport.6 Even up to 15 years 
ago, it was still relatively easy to travel to Singapore but the situation has 
significantly changed over the past years. 
Since the mid-1990s, there have been accounts of Malays from Kepri who 
were refused entry permits by Singapore immigration officers. Based on 
these experiences many people in Kepri assumed that any first attempts to 
enter Singapore were automatically bound to fail. According to respondents 
the sentiment of alienation from Singapore and Malaysia could be traced 
back to the early 1990s when the SIJORI Growth Triangle, was implemented, 
which links the economies of Singapore, Johore and the Riau Archipelago. 
The agreement between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia suggests an 
open zone which facilitates free interaction. Instead the Growth Triangle 
embodies a new trans-national hierarchy in which Singapore capital takes 
the lead and the Riau Archipelago forms, as a provider of cheap labour, the 
bottom (Perry 1998:87). 
The Riau Archipelago was incorporated into Singapore’s global project 
through the opening of two major industrial parks operating under Singapore 
management, Batamimdo in Batam and Bintan Industrial Park on Bintan 
Island. Compared to the 1950s, when the same currency was used in the 
whole region the Growth Triangle is an unequal configuration. Furthermore 
Christopher Tremewan (1994:43) argues that: 
the implication that the Singapore-Batam-Johor triangle is a relationship of mutu-
al growth is called into question by the absence of substantive mutual investment 
between Batam and Johor. Rather than triangular, the initiative is more likely to 
develop as two bilateral relationships with Singapore, leaving one side of the 
triangle missing.
Thus, the agreement gives Singaporean firms access to cheap supplies of 
land and labour in Indonesia. In 2002 the Singapore influence over Kepri’s 
economic relations was reinforced through the signing of a free trade agree-
ment with the USA that involves part of the Riau Archipelago as well.7 
Since the implementation of the Growth Triangle, social representations 
of Kepulauan Riau have become more and more disparaging in popular 
discourse in Singapore and Malaysia. The term ‘Indon’, which has been used 
as a derogative term for Indonesian migrants in Malaysia during the 1950s, 
is now used again to refer to any Indonesian in Malaysia and Singapore 
and appears relatively frequently in the print media of these two countries. 
7  This FTA should largely benefit Singaporean firms because under this pact, components 
– such as electronics, made offshore of Singapore – which means in Batam or Bintan, will be 
regarded as if they originate in Singapore, which means that the final products will also qualify 
as Singaporean (Far Eastern Economic Review 18-12-2002). 
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The increase of criminality in Singapore has been attributed to Indonesian 
crime syndicates whose members are believed to enter Singapore via the 
Riau Archipelago.8 For these reasons, and due to the more recent terrorist 
threats following 9/11 and the Bali bombings, immigration procedures in 
Singapore with regard to Indonesians have been tightened.9 Yet, the bulk 
of Indonesian visitors entering Singapore through the ferry terminal check-
points are Malays or ethnic Chinese from Riau who visit their relatives. The 
tightening of immigration procedures is perceived as offensive by the Malay, 
even more so since the Singapore immigration officers who are Malay them-
selves have the reputation of being harsher with them in comparison with 
immigration officers of other ethnic background. As a result, Malays from 
Kepri feel that they are cut off from their relatives and alienated from a world 
they were supposed to be part of. 
Relationships between Malaysia and Indonesia came under pressure 
when the Malaysian government initiated operation Tugas in order to evict 
some 100,000 illegal Indonesian workers, while the two countries had also a 
dispute over two rock islands in the oil rich Sulawesi Sea.10 The harsh por-
trayal of Indonesia that has been circulating in the Singapore media since the 
beginning of the Reformasi has further affected cross-border relations and 
foster a climate of mutual distrust. These tensions made many Kepri Malay 
ponder about their loyalty towards the wider Malay world. Part of the idea of 
the autonomous province Kepri was the desire to be treated as equal partners 
and full control over its own resources. As summarized by the secretary of a 
local NGO who is a fervent supporter of the serumpun ideology:
We are Malays and should continue to promote and foster cultural and economic 
relations with Malays in Malaysia and Singapore. However, it is also important 
to understand that we have our own identity. We need to be diplomatic, but if a 
konfrontasi would happen again, I would definitely side up with Indonesia. 
The impact of being portrayed as criminals and the experience of being 
subordinated to Singapore’s economic interests have incited new hopes and 
ideals which are not exclusively restricted to notions of regional autonomy. 
For, ‘Singapore’ and ‘Malaysia’ are currently the geo-political entities against 
which a sense of national pride is rapidly emerging in the urban settings 
of the Riau Archipelago. For people in Tanjungpinang, regional autonomy 
8  According to James Warren (2003), these crime syndicates often operate from Batam under 
the leadership of Chinese from Hong Kong or Singapore.  
9  The arrest in early 2003 of Mas Selamat Kastari, the head of the Singapore branch of Jama’ah 
Islamiyah in Tanjungpinang further aggravated the reputation of Kepulauan Riau as a source of 
criminals and terrorists (Jakarta Post 6-2-2003; Strait Times 6-2-2003).
10  Meanwhile Singapore and Indonesia had a conflict over the transfer of sand from Kepri 
meant for construction work in Singapore. 
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ideally implies better control over relations with their closest neighbors, 
especially Singapore, which would ideally prompt greater respect for them. 
The Reformasi, however, has also brought new hopes for fresh vitality and 
strength within the boundaries of the Indonesian nation-state. Paradoxically, 
as I will elaborate below, especially urban youth of Kepulauan Riau seems to 
turn itself towards the nation, when leaders in many provinces and districts 
are trying to redefine their identity on the basis of an exclusive regionalism. 
Often cultural politics are considered to be marginal compared to ‘hard 
core’ issues concerning purely political and economic interests. However, 
Joel Kahn (1998:1) correctly reminds us that ‘contrary to the impression 
generated by the majority of observers of contemporary Southeast Asia – of 
a region whose peoples are dedicated entirely to the single goal of economic 
development – matters cultural are never very far down anyone’s agenda’.
As part of the decentralization process, each region is expected to enhance 
its own exclusive traits. This is accelerated by the process pemekaran, which 
requires a further exclusive emphasis on difference in terms of bahasa (lan-
guage), adat (customary laws and customs), budaya (culture) and pahlawan 
daerah (local heroes). At the basis of these particularities is often a territorially 
defined notion of ethnicity. In Kepulauan Riau leaders promote a consensus 
that ‘Malayness’ is the basis of its territorial identity. As I have indicated 
above, in the urban context of Tanjungpinang this notion is being contested 
by migrants form other regions and local Chinese, but also by young middle 
class Malay who do not want to be portrayed as belonging to the bottom of 
the socio-economic hierarchy in the region. 
Speculating on the Riau leaders’ agenda following the beginning of the 
decentralization process, Vivienne Wee (2002:12) once asked ‘Who owns 
Riau?’ According to her, ‘the cultural revitalization movement sustained the 
idea of the Riau Sultanate as a cultural reality within a temporal past-in-the-
present. This further legitimated the everyday practice of customs and ritu-
als derived from the time of the Sultanate’ (Wee 2002:15). As I have argued 
elsewhere, the revitalization of the Riau sultanate in the Riau Archipelago 
has been frowned upon by commoner Malays all over the Riau Archipelago 
(Faucher 2005). The question of Riau’s ‘ownership’ is complex in the sense 
that political leaders cannot restrict themselves to an exclusive Malayness, 
if they do not want to alienate large sections of the non-Malay population. 
It is particularly the case in the Riau Archipelago. Therefore there have 
been lately some attempts to redefine the Kepri identity within a non-ethnic 
framework. This approach primarily defines Kepri as a ‘maritime province’ 
and tries to link economic activities with issues of identity. In this context, 
ideas to further develop industrial fishing and bio-marine research – with 
investments from Singapore and Hong Kong – are currently subject of dis-
cussion which was also stimulated by Huzrin Hood. 
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The territorial aspect of the common identity is underlined by recent 
attempts to knit the archipelago closer together by the building of expensive 
and prestigeous bridges. In 2004, a series of bridges linking the islands of 
Batam, Rempang and Galang was completed. The region is now known as 
‘Barelang’, reminding us of ‘SIJORI’, which also refers to an economic link-
age between these islands. A few months after the completion of the Barelang 
bridges, an even more ambitious project has been announced: The so-called 
‘Babin’ bridge – estimated costs Rp 3 trillion, offering employment to 5,000 
workers and planned to begin in January 2006 – will link the two politically 
and economically strong islands of Batam and Bintan.11 Regional autonomy 
has increased internal competition between Batam and Tanjungpinang over 
the question where the new provincial capital will be located. Batam holds 
a negative reputation in the popular imagery of Tanjungpinang middle class 
dwellers and the prospect of the Babin bridge raises fear that criminals and 
prostitutes of all sorts who are believed to plague Batam will now be given 
the opportunity to carry their activities to Bintan. 
Masyarakat Kepri, Malayness, putra daerah and the Chinese
The use of the Indonesian concept of masyarakat suggests that Kepri is popu-
lated by a social and cultural coherent group of people, and Masyarakat 
Kepri seems to refer to Malayness. In practice, however, this Malayness is 
only accepted when it is expressed in artistic terms, that is to say culture as 
performance. Ironically, however, one of the prominent Malay performing 
arts groups in Tanjungpinang, counts in fact only one local Malay among 
its 70 members. And when the mayor of Tanjungpinang supported the festi-
val for the Revitalization of Malay Culture (Revitalisasi Budaya Melayu) in 
July 2004 she was criticized by the Chinese in Senggarang for ignoring the 
pluralistic nature of Tanjungpinang, and in particular the Chinese presence. 
In response a special event took place in Senggarang, called ‘Revitalisasi 
Budaya Pluralistik’, which included performances by non-Malay groups like 
Balinese and Chinese opera performances (Kepri Pos 25-7-2004). 
Hence, a hybrid ‘Masyarakat Kepri’ and a mixed ‘Budaya Kepri’ are the 
blurred but sensitive issues local political leaders try to deal with.
The economic priority of the new province was from the very beginning 
focussed towards industrial development in Batam, Bintan and to a lesser 
degree Karimun, while the other districts of Natuna and Lingga, where the 
11  Media Kepri, April 2005. Both projects have been initiated by BIDA (Batam Industrial 
Development Authority) in a bid to facilitate the transport of natural gas, water, and electricity 
between the islands.
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majority of Malays actually live received less attention. In Lingga job oppor-
tunities remain rare and poverty is wide-spread. However, as a Malay high 
school teacher remarked, the district of Lingga is seen as a region where 
Malay traditions and adat are still strong and where the Malay heritage is 
truly preserved. However, it is also widely believed that Malay traditions do 
not co-exist along with development and urbanization. In other words, where 
Malayness is strong, economic developments remain stagnant. Consequently, 
defining Masyarakat Kepri in terms of Malayness is met with ambivalence in 
urban circles as it is associated with economic stagnation. 
There are a growing number of non-governmental organizations in 
Tanjungpinang which openly challenge the way ethnic classifications oper-
ate in Indonesia. These organizations advocate that a more inclusive notion 
of Malayness should provide the framework for a Masyarakat Kepri iden-
tity. One of the most outspoken organizations, Kekerabatan Keluarga Besar 
Melayu (KKBM, The Extended Family of Malay Kin), promotes a Malay 
identity which resembles the Malaysian idea of bumiputera. In order to be 
included as a ‘Malay’ in their own Masyarakat Kepri ideal framework, one 
has to speak Bahasa Melayu, be a Muslim and follow the adat Melayu. This 
interpretation offers room for many local politicians who advocate a revitali-
zation of Malay traditions but who are themselves not from a ‘pure’ Malay 
background.12 However, the chances that the Malay identity of Kepri will be 
officially recognized are small because Indonesian legislation prohibits the 
kind of ethnic categorization which is practised in Malaysia and Singapore. 
Meanwhile, aristocrats have been reluctant to give up ideas of Malay 
revivalism which is connected with the old sultanates. Regional autonomy 
has in many parts of Indonesia been acompanied by a revival of local aristoc-
racies and this was the case in Riau as well (Pratikno 2005). As I said before 
aristocrats occupied influential positions during the New Order and enjoyed 
considerable privileges. In an effort to restore their former glory members 
of the Malay-Buginese aristocracy were initially among the most prominent 
supporters of the establishment of a separate Kepri province. They were 
especially attracted by the idea of a regional autonomy defined by ethnic 
and territorial boundaries. In their view nobody can refer to Kepri as a Malay 
province without referring to the local rajas of Pulau Penyengat. Moreover, 
members of the aristocracy are well respected for their scholarship, espe-
cially in relation to history and to the Malay language (Faucher 2005).
Defining Masyarakat Kepri according to a strict Malay identity frame-
work will be opposed by the economically strong Chinese minority, which 
appears less inclined to remain politically passive in the new administra-
12  This interpretation of Malayness was also articulated by Tabrani Rab when he addressed 
the issue of an independent Riau (Colombijn 2003).
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tive setting. In October 2004, Bobby Jayanto (alias Bu Hui) of Partai Patriot 
Pancasila was elected as the chairman of the DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah, Regional Parliament) of Tanjungpinang for the term 2004-
2009. This election was vehemently opposed by various groups, among oth-
ers the Islamic Forum Komunikasi Masjid Mushola (FKMM, Masjid Mushola 
Communication Forum). This group organized a series of demonstrations 
and exposed Bobby’s business activities related to gambling and prostitu-
tion.13 The fact that Bobby Jayanto was elected came as a surprise for many 
and was shocking for Malays. Only a few months later he was put under 
house arrest pending his trial in a murder case. The election of Bobby J., 
however, illustrated the potential role of the Chinese on the political scene 
in ‘Malay’ Kepri. 
Allthough Huzrin Hood and the mayor of Tanjungpinang have always been 
keen to acknowledge the multi-ethnic aspect of Kepri and Tanjungpinang, 
the public role of the Chinese are still by and large ignored. But, Chinese-ness 
could also be incorporated in the ‘maritime’ identity of the region due to the 
longstanding role they have played in trade networks (see J. Warren 2003). 
Today, most of the hotels, golf courses and expensive restaurants in Bintan 
alone are owned by local Indonesian Chinese, or in partnership with Chinese 
Singaporeans. Interestingly however, in the narrative of their common dream 
of reverting to the prosperous 1950s, my aristocrat and commoner respond-
ents unanimously omit the presence of the taoke, the Chinese middlemen who 
played a crucial role in the circulation of trade goods between Kepulauan 
Riau and the Singapore port (Kepulauan Riau 1999).
 
Educating identities in the context of decentralization
The political rhetoric of a cross-border Malay identity framework would 
have the potential to survive and expand in Kepri only if it was truly able to 
replace – or at least to compete with – the state discourse in the local school 
system. It is therefore interesting to investigate to what extent administra-
tive decentralization offered more autonomy to educate particular regional 
identities, and what forms this took in Kepri. Decentralization of education 
was officially implemented in 2003 but this occurred only in 2004 in the Riau 
Archipelago. 
Decentralization caused major changes including the implementation 
13  Batam Pos 1-11-04. Bobby Jayanto has been one of the suspects in the murder of the local 
treasurer of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, Party of the National Message) in 2001. In 1999 he 
was suspected of harassing a Tempo journalist who was investigating the Singapore-based gam-
bling ring, Elephant.
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of the new school curriculum, Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi (KBK, 
Competency Based Curriculum), which involves completely new ways of 
teaching and learning, as well as the decentralization of funding. Provincial 
governments are expected to play an active role in terms of monitoring, 
among others, the providing of teaching materials and the organization of 
training courses, while educational management, local curriculum devel-
opment, planning, funding, maintenance, and appointments are under the 
responsibility of the district government (Asian Development Bank 2001).
Seen from the perspective of headmasters and teachers decentralization 
results in a complex situation. In general they still see themselves as part of 
a highly centralized bureaucracy, which involves a curriculum that empha-
sizes national unity. At the same time, however, headmasters are confronted 
with district committees and local leaders, whose agenda is determined 
by regional priorities. Hence contradictory claims are laid on teachers. 
Standards of competence are still evaluated in Jakarta. This means that an 
adequate syllabus must be designed according to national norms, detailed 
by Puskur (Pusat Kurikulum, Curriculum Development Centre), and that 
an emphasis on regional autonomy is necessarily limited in scope as the cur-
riculum must primarily promote national unity. According to the guidelines 
of the Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi ‘the nation has become even more 
important in the larger context of globalization, information, communication 
and technology and free market’ (Puskur 2002).
Within this centralized framework three subjects of ‘local content’ (mua-
tan lokal) are allowed to be included in the curriculum. These three ‘local 
subjects’ are decided on by the district and are compulsory for all students. 
At the SLTP and SLTA in Tanjungpinang these subjects are ‘Computer 
Science’,14 ‘Home Economics’ and ‘Arab Melayu’. The first two subjects are 
new but Arab Melayu had already been an elective at the SLTA level under 
the former curriculum. We see here that decentralization has not led to 
regional autonomy in education. 
Due to the limited scope of the ‘local curriculum’ very little attention is 
paid to local Malay history. Moreover, textbooks that deal explicitly with the 
local Malay heritage are scarce as well. Recently a few history textbooks deal-
ing with local history and written by Malay aristocrats are used on a modest 
scale at some SLTP and SLTA. It must be emphasized here that in this case 
alternative histories do not represent the voice of the powerless. As Gregory 
Forth (1994) remarks, alternative cultural representations and historical nar-
ratives often represent elite perceptions, be it in a regional context. This is 
illustrated by the textbook for the SLTP, Kedatangan Upu Tandru Daeng Rilaka 
14  SLTP: Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama, Junior Secondary School; SLTA: Sekolah Lanjutan 
Tingkat Atas, Junior High School.
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ke-Riau (The arrival of Upu Tandru Daeng Rilaka at Riau), which was first 
published in 2002. The book traces the journey of the Buginese ancestors of 
the Riau rulers, who left Sulawesi to join the Melayu royalty and form the 
Johore-Riau-Lingga realm. Throughout the textbook, the Indonesian charac-
ter of these ancesors is emphasized. During their journey they visited vari-
ous Indonesian ports, including Batavia, which is illustratred by the Syair, 
poems, written by Raja Haji Ali, one of the most prominent historical figures 
of Bugis ancestry.15 This text reinforces a more general idea that Malay lan-
guage and culture belong to the founding elements of Indonesia. Students 
have already learned in school that the Malay language is at the origin of the 
current Bahasa Indonesia, and that the local national hero (pahlawan nasional), 
Raja Haji Fisabilillah (1727-1784) was a fierce warrior who resisted Dutch 
colonialism (Barnard 1997).
Whereas the presence of the local is weak, the impact of the nation-state 
is strong. SLTA students in Tanjungpinang have all been thoroughly social-
ized through the centralized Indonesian education system. They are also 
the first generation which is fully exposed to Indonesian media, notably 
television and popular music. When I asked SLTA students why they prefer 
to watch Indonesian television programmes, they answered that Singapore 
and Malaysian channels were boring and moralistic, that they cannot iden-
tify with them and that, most of all, the language used (Malay) was foreign 
to them. This is not surprising as the Bahasa Melayu spoken by the older 
generation in Kepri is different from the Malay used in the Malaysian and 
Singaporean media. But, speaking local Malay is a symbol of backwardness, 
and only students from the surrounding small islands and fishing communi-
ties are said to use it in their daily conversations. Yet, as the Javanese head-
master of a primary school in Penyengat mentioned to me, only two years 
ago he had great difficulty in understanding his pupils but since Indonesian 
popular culture and the Indonesian media have reached the island, things 
have changed very rapidly. According to him, many of them now can speak 
Indonesian and even prefer to talk Indonesian with their classmates. 
What significance does Malayness have for the youth? An SLTA student 
remarked that she was at a loss about what Malay culture (kebudayaan), apart 
from literature and performing arts, could mean. Malayness in Kepulauan 
Riau and, particularly, in Tanjungpinang represents a number of different 
meanings varying from a folklorized representation of literature and arts to 
political interpretations that fit particular territorial claims. 
Barbara Leigh (1999:37) wrote that ‘the spirit of Reformasi is allowing 
young people greater freedom to legitimately explore what were previously 
15  Because of its costs and the limited space for local content in the curriculum this relatively 
‘innocent’ book is not widely used.
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taken as ‘out-of-bounds’ thoughts. This process is in turn making transpar-
ent boundaries that were previously unacknowledged’. In actual prac-
tice, however the production of homogenized national knowledge remains 
the ultimate goal of primary and secondary school education throughout 
Indonesia. The space of contestation remains extremely limited, even in the 
new context. 
Apart from the fact that local history emphasizing Malayness does not 
reflect the actual ethnic make-up of Kepri, local and national history are to a 
large extent intertwined, which makes it difficult to identify with a particular 
local history. Moreover, schooling under the New Order has moved students’ 
orientation away from family, home and village towards the prosperity and 
comfort of modern Indonesian city life (Parker 2002). Indonesia is for many 
young people in Tanjungpinang synonymous with Jakarta and represents an 
urban culture. Singapore, in the other hand is a familiar place where many 
relatives live, but it represents also a regional hierarchy in which Kepri is sit-
uated at the very bottom end. Students pointed out that, although they speak 
Malay at home, they cannot properly understand television programmes 
from Singapore. Tuning in to Indonesian media does not pose this problem. 
As a result the cultural taste of most young people in Tanjungpinang navi-
gates between Tanjungpinang and Jakarta and disregards the wider Malay 
world, including Singapore.16 
Conclusion
In the preceding pages I have argued that it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to define a persuasive provincial identity for Kepri. Elitist Malay 
notions based on the history of the old sultanates is not supported by com-
moner Malays, while more in general the idea of Malayness is contested by 
Chinese and various groups of immigrants, and undermined by strained 
relationships with the surrounding Malay world, that is to say Malaysia and 
Singapore. The irony is that the 1950s facilitated more coherence in the Malay 
world compared with the SIJORI growth triangle in which Kepri labour was 
subordinated to Singapore capital. An interesting and often ignored aspect 
of decentralization is that the school curriculum is still to a large extent 
focussed on the unity of the nation state. Together with education the recent 
penetration of Indonesian mass media in Kepri invited young people in 
Tanjungpinang in search for a comfortable and accessible modernity to turn 
16  Chinese students on the other hand eagerly consume Chinese popular culture produced in 
Singapore, Taiwan and Honkong, but they also share the desire to move away from Singapore’s 
dominance. 
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to Jakarta. The irony is that, whereas the older generation tried to revive, 
invent and rephrase notions of Malayness which served their interests in the 
framework of regional autonomy, the younger generation recently discov-
ered Jakarta as a source of identification. 

jaap timmer
erring decentralization and elite politics  
in papua 
Introduction
In this chapter, I focus on certain members of the bureaucratic elite in Papua 
as influential actors in determining the future of the region. Amid a wave of 
recently established new provinces and districts, these leaders adopt strik-
ingly creative ways to gain both popular and central government support, all 
characterised by marked regional differences. The chapter begins with a sub-
stantial historical introduction describing the territory’s tumultuous passage 
from being the last holdout of Dutch colonialism in Asia in the early 1960s, 
through the history of suffering (memoria passionis) that followed integration 
with Indonesia, and culminating in the Papuan Spring of 1999-2000. Contrary 
to some other accounts of it, that history was marked by both Papuan collabo-
ration and resistance. Set against this background the chapter examines the 
strategies adopted by various Papuan elites to make the most of the oppor-
tunities offered by Special Autonomy and the redrawing of administrative 
boundaries (pemekaran), while at the same time keeping faith with the popu-
lar mistrust of a state that has failed them in so many ways. 
For a number of reasons ranging from Dutch nationalism, geopoliti-
cal considerations, and self-righteous moral convictions the Netherlands 
Government refused to include West New Guinea in the negotiations for 
the independence of Indonesia in the late 1940s.1 At the same time, the 
Government in Netherlands New Guinea initiated economic and infrastruc-
ture development as well as political emancipation of the Papuans under 
paternalistic guardianship. In the course of the 1950s, when tensions between 
the Netherlands and Indonesia grew over the status of West New Guinea, 
the Dutch began to guide a limited group of educated Papuans towards 
independence culminating in the establishment of the New Guinea Council 
1  Lijphart 1966; Huydecoper van Nigtevecht 1990; Penders 2002:55-177; Vlasblom 2004:124-
86; Drooglever 2005:141-74.
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(Nieuw-Guinea Raad) in 1961. In addition, a flag, the Bintang Kejora or 
Morning Star flag, was designed to be flown beside the Dutch flag and a 
national anthem was adopted to be played and sung during official occasions 
after the Netherlands national hymn.
After a twelve-year dispute that was reaching its peak with the threat 
of open military conflict, this policy had to be aborted. In December 1961, 
President Soekarno issued the Trikora (Tri Komando Rakyat or ‘People’s 
Threefold Command’) for the liberation of Irian Barat (West Irian). At the heart 
of this massive mobilization was Operasi Mandala, an Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) cam-
paign designed to put pressure on the Netherlands government. The United 
States and Australia were not willing to support the Dutch military forces.
In an international climate of decolonization and after President Soekarno’s 
sustained pressing of Indonesia’s claim to the territory, the United States spon-
sored negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands about the future 
of West New Guinea under the auspices of the United Nations. The resulting 
New York Agreement of 15 August 1962 outlined the transfer of Netherlands 
sovereignty over West New Guinea to an interim United Nations Temporary 
Executive Authority (UNTEA) from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, to be fol-
lowed by a second phase during which the intervening administration would 
hand over full administrative responsibility to Indonesia. The agreement 
formulated the provision that the people of Irian Barat would exercise free 
choice over their future relationship with Indonesia before the end of 1969. 
The victory over what had now become the Province of Irian Barat was a 
boost to Indonesian nationalism and became portrayed as the final chapter of 
decolonization.2 The Indonesians, ruling the new province under the banner 
of the Trikora mobilization, were triumphant while elements of the Papuan 
elite empowered by the Dutch began to complain about what they saw as 
a blunt Indonesian takeover. Feelings of being marginalized by Indonesian 
bureaucrats and immigrants from other Indonesian islands filling job and 
business opportunities arose mainly among urban Papuans. Some of the 
educated Papuan elite were arrested or sidelined as ‘collaborators with the 
Dutch’ while others continued to play a role in the administration. 
A plebiscite called Pepera (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat, ‘Act of Free 
Choice’) was held in July-August 1969 during which 1020 cautiously chosen 
representatives from eight regions voted overwhelmingly for integration 
with Indonesia.3 Protest was heard, dissonant speeches delivered, desperate 
outcries in the form of written notes were delivered to the United Nations 
2  Soekarno 2000.
3  Pepera 1972:82-3; Vlasblom 2004:479. For an account of the Pepera based on archival materi-
als and concluding that it was a sham, see Saltford 2000.
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observers, and demonstrations in Sukarnopura (former Hollandia, now 
Jayapura), Biak and Manokwari were dispersed swiftly by the Indonesian 
military. Over the following decades, the faith in self-determination as linked 
to the undemocratic implementation of the Pepera became a key ingredient 
in a variety of Papuan nationalisms. 
In response to the ‘Indonesian occupation’ of their land a liberation organi-
zation called the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Organization) 
emerged as a local movement in Manokwari in the 1960s and from there 
spread over the Kepala Burung (Bird’s Head region). It soon became a 
fragmented network of dispersed groups of guerrilla-fighters.4 Its access 
to weapons was limited and popular support scant. Very few elite Papuans 
joined the armed struggle and the vast majority of people living outside the 
urban centres did not feel the sense of belonging to a nation that had been 
invaded by Indonesia. Nevertheless, disillusion with the Indonesian govern-
ment began to grow widely among those who had enjoyed the fruits of the 
accelerated development effort of the Dutch government since the 1950s.
President Soeharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998) put much effort into 
developing the province and it received more funds than all other regions 
of Indonesia. But the implementation of largely top-down development 
programs often failed. At the same time, an ever-growing but relatively 
poorly funded military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), supporting a 
network of alliances for both political control and predator business, has 
lead to the dislocation of Papuans. On top of that, Butonese, Buginese, 
Makassarese and Javanese immigrants began to fill manual labour and seize 
small business opportunities. As a result, frustration about limited access to 
opportunities in modern Indonesia intensified tensions between ‘Papuans’ 
and ‘Indonesians’ in particular those who have arrived in Papua through so-
called transmigration programs or the larger waves of spontaneous migra-
tion.5 Furthermore, in terms of governance, the region is amongst the most 
poorly developed in Indonesia while economic and ethnic and differences 
play a significant and sometimes alarming role in land and resource politics 
(Timmer forthcoming).
Following the fall of Soeharto in 1998 and the presidency being handed 
over to his Deputy President, B.J. Habibie, a spirit of ‘democratic reform’ 
4  A reconstruction of the origin and development of the OPM can be found in Vlasblom 
2004: 469, 486-636. Less thoroughly researched is the Indonesian-language account by Djopari 
1993.
5  Since the Indonesian government began to stimulate economic development in the region, 
an older Dutch colonial programme of population distribution from highly populated regions 
such as Java and Bali to Papua and other less populated regions was continued. Among policy-
makers, this so-called transmigrasi (‘transmigration’) was seen as a way to boost the development 
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(Reformasi) swept across the archipelago. In Papua it led to what has been 
duly called a ‘Papuan Spring’ during which Papuan leaders from all over 
the region carefully sought to balance representations from coast and high-
land in a wave of national Papuan actions and the establishment of Papuan 
organizations (Van den Broek and Szalay 2001). At massive gatherings all 
over the region during which heated debates over the history of Papua and 
its possible future (‘autonomy’ or ‘independence’) were held, the Papuan 
Spring ‘took the form of the indigenous Papuan people demanding merdeka, 
or independence, from Indonesia’ (Agus Sumule 2003a:353; Chauvel 2005:11-
20). Before I discuss the Papuan Spring it is necessary to briefly elaborate on 
what kinds of meanings merdeka has assumed in the history of Papua.
Merdeka and Memoria Passionis
The Indonesian nationalist revolutionary understanding of merdeka dates 
back to the mid-1920s growth of the nationalist movement followed, after 
promises during the Japanese occupation, by the Indonesian revolution of 
1945-1949. During the late 1940s, merdeka became the battle cry with which 
the citizenry was summoned to support the cause, the salute with which 
revolutionaries would greet each other, the cry of solidarity at every mass 
rally, and the signature at the end of every Republican document’ (Reid 
1998:155). As Anthony Reid (1998:156) points out, merdeka meant national 
independence to the revolutionaries but the people experienced it as a far 
more immediate and personal freedom. Later, during Soeharto’s New Order 
government, merdeka became part of the military ideologies and plainly came 
to mean ‘the independence’ that was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 and ritu-
ally celebrated every year since.
In Papua, primarily urban educated Papuans began to absorb the idea 
of merdeka as national independence since the late 1950s, when President 
Soekarno became determined to incorporate Netherlands New Guinea to 
complete the nationalist struggle and resistance amid the Papuan elite against 
the Dutch government grew (Grootenhuis 1961). Before that period, only a 
limited number of educated and politically active Papuans cherished ideas 
about merdeka. For example, in Serui on Yapen Island, Silas Papare established 
the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Freedom Party) in 1946 
of which members read sections of Republican papers in village churches on 
the island, while outside the churches people exercised the exclamation of 
merdeka. Papare was a charismatic leader and the pro-Indonesian movement 
on Yapen got seriously crippled when he left for Indonesia in 1949 (Vlasblom 
2004:162; Chauvel 2005:71). 
Around the same time, also as part of a struggle against the Dutch govern-
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ment, Lukas Rumkorem, a Biak assistant patrol officer, established the Partai 
Indonesia Merdeka on the island of Biak (Vlasblom 2004:163). In Hollandia 
as well, ‘enthusiasm for “red and white” (the colours of the Indonesian 
national flag) got hold of a number of schooled Papuans’ (Vlasblom 2004:163, 
my translation). The merdeka-leader there was Marthen Indey who was 
raised in Ambon, Maluku, and had been posted to Banda Neira where he 
got inspired by the prominent nationalist Mohammed Hatta who was exiled 
there. In 1946, Indey joined the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KMI, ‘Indonesia 
Freedom Committee’) led by the Manadonese government medical doctor, 
Ms Gerungan. KMI advocated the independence of Indonesia, including 
West New Guinea through all legal means (Vlasblom 2004:164). 
As Richard Chauvel (2005:6) concludes, the nationalism of this period 
had a narrow base and the nationalists ‘were culturally isolated from the 
great mass of Papuans’. The majority of Papuans had very little knowledge 
of Indonesia and its merdeka struggles. After the incorporation of West New 
Guinea into Indonesia, people throughout Papua began to learn about mer-
deka as one of the chief dictums of the New Order government. At the same 
time, resentment began to grow due to the failure of development promises 
to crystallize and due to the unrelenting military operations, and merdeka 
began to take on meanings that were part of a struggle to secure freedom 
against a tyrannical state. 
While the OPM and a number of Papuans in exile tried to keep the ideal 
of merdeka alive, for most Papuans it became a principle that is suggested to 
be in the hearts of all Papuans. When asked bluntly about ‘OPM’, Imyan peo-
ple of the south-western Kepala Burung, while having no clear ideas about 
its organizational structure and strategies, tend to suggest that the OPM 
will eventually complete the struggle for merdeka. Further scrutiny of their 
worldviews, however, reveals that many take the view that Jesus Christ will 
perform the role of bringing merdeka. He will bring wealth and prosperity 
to their community (not ‘Papua’) and He will re-establish the just, original 
order in the world. Imyan refer to this order in terms of Toror or Baimla, a 
mythological world during which the Imyan were at the centre of the world 
and possessed all the knowledge and power (Timmer 1998, 2000a, 2000b:302; 
compare Rutherford 2005 and Golden 2003).
Taking into account the immense variety of cultural traditions in Papua, 
it should be no surprise that peoples’ ideas about merdeka are diverse. 
Moreover, there are also divisions within Papuan communities. Imyan vil-
lagers, for example, tend to divide between two groups: one that is inclined 
to withdraw into autonomy (related to ideas about a past community of 
male initiates retreating in the forest to engage with powerful sky beings), 
and another that seeks to benefit from unique opportunities offered by 
‘Indonesia’ by engaging with the government and its promises of develop-
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ment. What the two divisions share is a versatile but persistent concern with 
effective knowledge that they believe is held among foreigners and consid-
ered indispensable for bringing about change that Imyan people themselves 
can control. These beliefs are expressed in terms of a felt need for relative 
autonomy from state control when the government’s administrative grid 
discords with local realities and people’s aspirations (Timmer 2004b:121-4; 
compare Maclean 1994).
This concern is in fact a crucial part of a larger and still more intrusive 
concern with denied identity and lost certainties (Timmer 2004b:130). The 
Imyan share this concern with most other Papuan communities and it can 
be said that a possibly shared merdeka-aspiration in Papua is thus, in gen-
eral terms, about deferential treatment as human beings, and in principal 
irrespective of the political or national context. In these ontological ideas 
about sovereignty and dignity (harga diri), merdeka is thus chiefly a response 
to decades-long denial of the people’s competence in learning and perform-
ing in modern colonial and post-colonial contexts. This partly explains the 
unrelenting search for understanding of the suffering of the Papuans, pref-
erably through a democratic dialogue with ‘Jakarta’ that was so effectively 
expressed during the Papuan Spring. But the idea of having one’s own state, 
right now and for all times, is seldom on the minds of most Papuans, as it 
is a construct far from the more intrusive largely individual and communal 
concern with sovereignty and harga diri. 
During the ‘Papuan Spring’ (1999-2000), merdeka took on the harga diri-
meaning when throughout the territory numerous raisings of the Bintang 
Kejora flag (which was prohibited until 1998) and concurrent praying ses-
sions were organized.6 The Papuan Spring was a period during which 
President Abdurrahman Wahid allowed the Papuans to name their province 
Papua and to raise their national flag along the Indonesian flag. Hundreds of 
prominent leaders from all over Papua found the space to organize a broadly 
supported front. They developed political strategies during two large gath-
erings: MUBES (Musyawarah Besar or ‘Grand Gathering for Discussion’) in 
February 2000, and the Kongres Papua (Papuan Congress) in May-June 2000 
(Agus Alua 2002a, 2002b). These gatherings proceeded undisturbed and 
while the political agenda demanded independence of Papua, the strategies 
developed favoured a dialogue with Jakarta short of violence. The focus was 
on the suffering of the Papuans and numerous discussions revolved around 
human rights. ‘HAM’ (Hak Asasi Manusia, Human Rights) became a widely 
used term taking on a variety of meanings in different contexts but generally 
referring to lack of respect for the Papuans.
6  See Van den Broek and Szalay (2001) for an overview of the turbulent events in Papua from 
1999 to 2000. 
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Expressions of independence for Papua were articulated by the Presidium 
Dewan Papua (PDP, Papuan Presidium Council) that was established dur-
ing the MUBES. Under the combined highland-coastal leadership of Thom 
Beanal and Theys Eluay, the Presidium formulated Papua-wide supported 
resolutions that were adopted during the Kongres. The resolutions include 
the claim that Papua had in fact become independent with the establishment 
of the New Guinea Council in 1961 and rejected the New York Agreement 
because Papuans did not take part in the negotiations. In addition, the reso-
lution states that the Act of Free Choice was not conducted properly (Agus 
Alua 2002b:96). More widely shared was the opinion that ‘the land of the 
Papuans’ had become the plaything of international and capitalist forces and 
that its people had become marginalized in Indonesian society. 
Underlying a strong wish for increased sovereignty with predominant 
millenarian characteristics, the rise of Papuan nationalisms at all levels of 
society also called into question any extent to which Papuans had become 
Indonesians. The differences between ‘Papuans’ and ‘Indonesians’ were, 
however, only rarely expressed. Both the symbolic and explicit messages 
broadcast during gatherings, manifestations, prayer sessions and flag rais-
ings, emphasized the living memory of distress that in human rights activist 
circles in Papua is typified as memoria passionis (or in Indonesian: ingatan 
penderitaan) in circles of human rights activists in Papua.7 Memoria passionis 
refers to the memory of trauma due to general social and economic margin-
alization, frequent denial of dignity, and sometimes outright terror. Since 
the dawn of this period memoria passionis began to be expressed as a shared 
Papuan history of suffering and was flung in the face of ‘Jakarta’ when a team 
of 100 leaders (Tim 100) from all over Papua presented a clear demand for 
independence to President Habibie on 26 February 1999. Next, a fact-finding 
team of the Indonesian House of Representatives was sent to Irian Jaya in 
July 1998, leading to a wave of enthusiasm among virtually all sections of 
society about a dialogue. 
The dialogue was expected to lead to at least formal apologies for human 
rights violations, end impunity for the armed forces, and increase respect for 
the harga diri of the Papuans. At the same time, it also unleashed often very 
political expressions epitomized in such as expressions as OFM (resonating 
with OPM) meaning: Otonomi – Federasi – Merdeka, indicating people’s 
hope that discussion about increased autonomy for Irian Jaya would lead 
to the establishment of a Federal State of Indonesia which would eventually 
7  J. Budi Hernawan and Van den Broek 1999. The concept of memoria passionis was introduced 
into Papua by the Office for Justice and Peace (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian) of the 
Catholic Diocese of Jayapura and is also the title of a series of annual reports on the social and 
political situation in Papua (www.hampapua.org). 
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culminate in independence for West Papua. What followed in reality, how-
ever, was an overall well-intended Papuan response to President Habibie’s 
offer to contemplate on independence aspirations and, within the term of 
reference, establish a dialogue between ‘Jakarta’ and ‘Papua’. 
The dialogue was continued during Aburrahman Wahid’s presidency but 
a ban on flag raisings and a number of bloody military attacks on protest-
ers discouraged most Papuan leaders to continue seeking understanding of 
the situation in Papua amid policy-makers in Jakarta. The Presidium was 
declared illegal and the detention of its leaders on charges of treason and 
subversion, and the brutal murder of the chair of the Presidium, Theys Hiyo 
Eluay in 2000 marked the end of the Papuan Spring. The killing of Eluay was 
orchestrated by Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, the Army Special 
Forces). The counterinsurgency practised by the TNI began to form a major 
threat to most attempts to organize people to defend their rights and to 
continue pressing Jakarta to seek solutions to past and present injustice and 
feelings of disenchantment. By the close of 2000, ‘the developing atmosphere 
of a ‘Papuan Spring’ […] had been replaced by widespread fear, silence, and 
renewed anger’ (Van den Broek and Szalay 2001:91. At the same time, people 
began to distrust the remnants of the Presidium and its regional branches 
because of rumours about the Presidium accepting money from big compa-
nies in Papua and frustration about its leaders travelling abroad all the time 
while neglecting the issues faced by local communities. 
Special autonomy and new blossoms 
Among the most promising developments in this Reformasi period was the 
granting of a so-called Special Autonomy (commonly referred to as Otsus, 
from Otonomi Khusus) for the province of Papua in early 2001. Otsus match-
es an earlier law for the province of Aceh but was drafted by people in Papua 
and establishes provisions that surpass the autonomy conditions for other 
provinces. Otsus envisions enhanced autonomy for Papuan communities 
and their institutions, as well as a greater share of revenues from resource 
extraction projects in Papua, including 70% of the oil and gas industry and 
80% from mining ventures. On top of that, Otsus entails special funds for the 
improvement of health services, education facilities, and infrastructure that 
benefit rural communities for a period of 20 years (Agus Sumule 2003b). 
Otsus was a Papuan political choice that indicated a willingness to coop-
erate with the central government. It was envisioned as a necessary step 
towards justice for the neglected people of Papua (Maniagasi 2001; Agus 
Sumule 2003a). A technical assistance team comprising intellectuals from 
Papua whom the Governor of Papua, Jaap Solossa, had appointed drafted 
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the bill in early 2001. After extensive lobbying by the team and a number 
of influential Papuans, it was accepted as Law no. 21/2001 that was to be 
implemented as of 2002 (Agus Sumule 2003a). This initially positive answer 
from Jakarta was one of an insecure central government after the 1999 bal-
lot in East Timor during which a majority voted against autonomy within 
Indonesia. 
Apart from a few hard-line voices demanding merdeka, people in Papua 
expected positive developments from Otsus. But public interest in Otsus 
dwindled when people saw that implementation of the Otsus was slow 
due to the lack of capacity of legislators and that the establishment of the 
Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP) or Papuan People’s Assembly did not receive 
support from Jakarta. The MRP is an essential element of Otsus as it envi-
sions the protection of the rights of the Papuans. It would assemble people 
from customary groups, religious institutions and women groups and grant 
them extensive political powers. The Ministry of Home Affairs delayed the 
establishment of the MRP because elements in Jakarta saw that the powers 
it granted to Papuans could endanger the stability in Papua (Chauvel and 
Bhakti 2004:38). In the mean time, people in Papua began to question wheth-
er Otsus was yet another hollow promise made by ‘Jakarta’. Others remained 
hopeful that with assistance of and pressure by foreign governments and 
international NGOs Jakarta would eventually grant the MRP to Papua. 
These hopes basically faced a dead end after President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri promulgated a decree on 27 January 2003 on the expedition 
of the implementation of Law no. 45/1999 regarding the creation of two 
new provinces (West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya), three new regen-
cies (Paniai, Mimika, and Puncak Jaya), and one municipality (Sorong). The 
envisioned plan behind the decree is labelled pemekaran (‘blossoming’ or 
administrative fragmentation). While the division of Papua was also part of 
the Otsus Law it outlined the procedure that it could only be implemented 
after deliberation of the MRP and approval of the provincial parliament 
(Sullivan 2003). 
Then Deputy Governor John Djopari stressed that the idea of pemekaran 
was not new but that it had been proposed in 1999 by the then Governor, 
Freddy Numberi, and his three Deputy Governors: Djopari, Herman Monim, 
and Abraham Atururi (ICG 2003d:3). Soon it became clear that Monim and 
Atururi were frustrated because they had been promised governorship for the 
new provinces but that never materialized. Djopari later became Ambassador 
for Indonesia to Papua New Guinea and Monim retired. Atururi, however, 
was still interested in the establishment of a new province. 
In contrast to Otsus, the pemekaran decree was issued without consultation 
with the provincial government. Local communities or leaders of religious 
and other civil society organizations in Papua were also not involved in the 
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decision-making process. While Otsus had been poorly socialized among the 
people it met with support because it came from people whose dialogue with 
Jakarta intended to benefit the development of Papua. Supporters of Otsus 
saw the presidential decree as a sign that the political climate in Indonesia 
was reverting to a New Order-style government. Many began to speculate 
that it was an attempt by Jakarta to ‘divide and rule’ the Papuans. Distress 
in Papua grew when people learned that the initiative for the policy had 
come from disgruntled elements in the Papuan elite in cooperation with 
policy-makers in the central government – the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
the National Intelligence Board (BIN, Badan Intelijen Negara) (McGibbon 
2004:55). 
The International Crisis Group (ICG 2003:8-9) points out that BIN involve-
ment in the revival of pemekaran may have commenced with the lobby by 
Jimmy Ijie, a Papuan from the Sorong region. Ijie heads the so-called Irian 
Jaya Crisis Centre (IJCC) in Jakarta and in that capacity he sent a letter to 
BIN urging that Law no. 45 be implemented immediately. According to him 
an administratively undivided Papua would foster Papuan nationalism (ICG 
2003d:8). In late 2002, Ijie formed a team called Tim 315 consisting of people 
from the Sorong and Manokwari regions and a number of Papuan students 
residing in Yogyakarta and Jakarta to support Atururi to negotiate the plan 
with BIN and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Apparently, a large amount of 
money (approximately U$ 320,000) was involved and a number of financial 
rewards were promised to officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs and to 
Ijie’s IJCC.8 
A possible other motive for the partitioning of Papua is that the creation 
of new provinces and districts will imply a significant increase in the number 
of troops in the territory. Each separate province may get its own Military 
Resort Command (Komando Resort Militer, Korem), with its own network 
of District Military Commands (Komando Distrik Militer, Kodim). A poten-
tial stronger military presence aroused suspicion as it may not only increase 
repression but also facilitate connections with local business in which the 
army is involved. As a result, much of the goodwill that was created among 
Papuans during the dawn of Reformasi turned to disappointment. At the 
same time, the awareness that elements of the Papuan elite were involved in 
the pemekaran policy nourished already widespread distrust of those Papuans 
who are making careers in the formal sector or the armed forces ‘infecting 
them with the Indonesia virus’, as the popular expression runs. This virus 
of Indonesia refers to untrustworthy behaviour of Papuan legislators that is 
also captured under another popular expression, KKN or Korupsi, Kolusi, 
Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) which dates back to the 
8  Muridan Widjojo, personal communication, 7-5-2005.
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New Order period. Swiftly the previous expression ‘OFM’ developed into 
‘OPM’, now referring to a new sequence: Otonomi (autonomy), Pemekaran 
(blossoming), and eventually Merdeka (independence).
Ideally, the devolution of power entailed in the pemekaran policy should 
be a promising move as it can enhance good governance at the local level. 
Currently, government officials in the region are inclined to acknowledge 
local demands to become tuan di atas tanahnya (‘the ruler of one’s own coun-
try’) but they also tend to be hungry for power after decades of curtailing 
bonds to the centre. Elite politics and the responses among local people large-
ly revolve around these issues. Decentralization leads to a diversification of 
political concerns that are connected with local identities which on their turn 
tend to become more extreme. The resulting condition may be labelled as 
‘erring decentralization’, after the discussion by Netherlands New Guinea’s 
penultimate Governor Van Baal of ‘erring acculturation’ among Papuans. 
Van Baal pointed at the counterproductive transformation in people’s atti-
tudes to life due to their confrontation with the Western world, or, more 
precisely, the process in which acculturation goes astray and ‘development 
turns in a direction harmful to the realization of the intended aim’ (Van Baal 
1960:108). In the remaining part of this essay, I elaborate the characteristics of 
‘erring decentralization’ in Papua in more detail.
Papuanization and adaptation
Present-day conflicts in Papua include disputes over natural resources 
and economic and political power struggles, and frictions between differ-
ent ethnicities, religion, and immigrants and locals (ICG 2002b; Amnesty 
International 2002). Studies of ‘the conflict in Papua’, however, commonly 
focus on Jakarta policies and armed forces operations. Most reports pro-
duced by Papua watchers portray developments in Papua mainly in terms 
of violations of human rights by ‘Jakarta’ which is opposed by ‘Papuan 
resistance’. This resistance is often depicted as a single actor with a uniform 
ethnic identity driven by a uniting national consciousness. Papuan identity 
is then presupposed to exist in a bounded cultural and racial sphere defined 
as ‘Melanesia’ as opposed to ‘Indonesia’ or ‘Asia’.9 This is hardly conceivable 
considering the vast variety of cultural backgrounds and centuries-old histo-
9  See for example, Budiardjo and Sioe Long 1983; Osborne 1985; Sharp 1994; Walsh and 
Rouch 1999; J. Barr 2002; Martinkus 2002; P. King 2004; and contributions to a special edition on 
Papua of the New Internationalist (Volume 344, April 2002). By and large, these works follow one 
basic line of argument which suggests that Papua will or should become a second East Timor 
and that Papuans are the victims of genocide or deliberate, well-organized terror, obscuring the 
fact that Papuans are (and have always been) divided. 
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ries of connections between Papua and the Moluccas (see below). Only a few 
recent anthropological and historical studies of Papuan communities relate 
to these histories and include discussions about the integration of Papuans 
into Indonesia and its concomitant internal tensions.10 Danilyn Rutherford 
(2003:4), for instance, points out that the high degree of integration of the 
Biak-Numfor region into Indonesia illuminates ‘a socio-cultural economy 
that stands cheek by jowl with the discourses of Papuan separatism and 
Indonesian nationalism, yet radically undercuts them both’. 
The lack of attention to the variety of and changes in Papuan worldviews 
since the 1960s is astonishing as newly emerging identities and related con-
cerns and strategies lead to tensions in and between local communities and 
shape to a large extent the politics of the elite. In the virtual absence of a mid-
dle-class and very limited private investment in human development and 
the delivery of services, the powerful elites in Papua are to be found in the 
administrative sector and in religious institutions. Therefore, Papuan politi-
cal power is in the hands of these new bureaucratic and religious elite. 
Christian and Muslim leaders in Papua recognize that religion is an 
important source of inspiration for the people and that religious institutions, 
being the largest and most organized civil society organizations in Papua, 
should play an important role as mediators between the government and 
communities (Giay 2001). The varied ethnic and political landscape in Papua 
is accentuated by the timing and nature of contact with outside powers. In 
pre-colonial times, contact with regional others and internal and in-migra-
tion were perhaps the most significant factors in demographic, social and 
cultural change in Papua. More in general many coastal groups looked for 
centuries towards the west. In particular the coastal communities of the 
Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih Bay maintained trade and marriage 
relationship with Maluku and Islam spread along certain coastal stretches.11 
In contrast, people in the highland regions lived relatively isolated in moun-
tain valleys with little direct but extensive indirect trade networks extending 
to the coast (Ploeg 2001). 
Cultural differences between the mountains and the north and the west 
coast changed markedly with the advent of Christian missionization and 
Dutch administration during the twentieth century. Mission activity, fol-
lowed hesitantly by the government, affected the Cenderawasih Bay, the 
Kepala Burung, the north coast and coastal stretches such as Mimika and 
10  Oosterhout 2000; Rutherford 2003; Stasch 2001, 2003; Timmer 2000a, 2000b, 2003. One of 
the reasons for this lack of attention to the cultural and social realities of Papuans is that since its 
incorporation in Indonesia access to the region for researchers has been severely restricted.
11  Chauvel 2005; Ellen 2003; Huizinga 1998; Kamma 1947-49; Swadling 1996; Timmer 2000b; 
Visser 1989.
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Merauke along the southwest coast, while most groups in the highlands and 
communities in the southern plains remained ‘untouched’ until the 1960s. 
Encounters between highland people and the state and church intensified 
after the Indonesian government took over the territory from 1963 (Ploeg 
2001; Hays 1993). 
Shortly before and after the Second World War economic development 
was limited, while at later stages, new political developments took place. 
Especially the rapid expansion of administration and education had a major 
impact on the coastal people in Biak, Manokwari, Yapen en Sentani, and to a 
lesser extent in the Kepala Burung and Fak-fak. Papuans from these regions 
absorbed Dutch teachings at high schools in Netherlands New Guinea and 
were exposed to European life styles. Some were given the opportunity to 
enjoy education in Europe and the Pacific. The figures remained modest 
since in the early 1960s, only about 10,000 Papuans (of a total population 
estimated at around one million) were in government service while a smaller 
number was employed in the private sector (Timmer forthcoming). 
Later generations grew up in the context of the Indonesian nation-
state, undertook studies at Indonesian institutions and made careers in the 
Indonesian civil service, equipping them with the skills and language of 
modern Indonesia. Whereas many members of the old Papuan elite that 
were created by the Dutch were marginalized, the new generations of edu-
cated Papuans (still largely from coastal regions) found their way into the 
civil service. Participation of Papuans in the administration and commercial 
ventures was however still restricted. The Indonesian government was afraid 
that Papuans would gain too much of a voice in the administrative sector 
while banking facilities are few and tend to privilege Javanese, Buginese, 
Maluku and foreign investors. Moreover, the commercial infrastructure is 
poorly developed and bureaucratic approvals for trade are painfully slow, in 
particular for Papuans. 
It was only in the late 1990s that sincere efforts were made to Papuanize 
the formal sector. Today, around 35% of the labour force in the government 
is Papuan which is a poor reflection of the demographic reality in which 
approximately 60% of the population is Papuan.12 Nevertheless, over the 
last few years more Papuans have become legislators both at the district 
and provincial levels. Amid many people from elsewhere in Indonesia, the 
provincial bureaucracy is chiefly dominated by coastal Papuans from the 
Cenderawasih Bay islands of Biak and Yapen, Sentani, and, more recently 
from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions of the Kepala Burung. Muridan 
Widjojo (1998:3) signalled in this respect that the biggest problem facing Irian 
Jaya was social and cultural polarization and domination of the formal sec-
12  Don Flassy, personal communication, 23-4-2005.
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tor by ethnic Biak, Ayamaru, Serui and Sentani. In contrast to the provincial 
bureaucracy, in the district governments in the highlands and south coastal 
regions the local population is more strongly represented notwithstanding 
the presence of a significant number of decision-makers from Biak and Yapen 
in the Cenderawasih Bay, the Sorong region of the Kepala Burung, and a few 
people from Java and Maluku. 
Particularly among the recently ascending Sorong and Ayamaru elites, 
there is a remarkable acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing politics. 
The acquired skills and knowledge of the present-day bureaucratic elite 
enables a number of influential people to establish links with Jakarta which 
primarily serves their own benefit. Highlanders and people from the south-
coastal regions (Mimika, Merauke) are often consumed with envy about the 
power enjoyed by people from the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih 
Bay. Underlying this foremost regional cleavage in Papua is the serious lag 
in development of most regions of the highlands (Timmer forthcoming). 
Moreover, because of isolation and due to ongoing often poorly orchestrated 
TNI action, the highland region is currently the chief nursery of Papuan 
resistance to the Indonesian government. This Papuan resistance also trans-
lates into regional tensions as highlanders regularly challenge both the 
provincial government and coastal Papuans from Biak, Sorong and Sentani 
where they at times accuse of collaboration with ‘Indonesia’. This tension 
highlights one of the main divisions within the Papuan nationalist movement 
which is illustrated by Rutherford (2003:xviii) recounting a joke in which a 
highlander tells another that when Papua gains independence all Biaks will 
become foreigners (amberi) while highlanders will become Biaks. 
As mentioned, during the massive gatherings during the Papuan Spring 
Papuan leaders managed to balance representations from the highlands and 
the coast and Papuans felt united in their memoria passionis. With the advent 
of pemekaran, the tensions between elites from Biak, Yapen, Ayamaru and 
Sorong as well as between ‘the coast’ and ‘the highlands’ intensified. A recent 
Indonesia briefing by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2003d:1) outlines 
that the new pemekaran policy alongside a certain level of support for Otsus 
‘has generated intense acrimony within the governing elite in Papua between 
those who stand to gain from the division […] and those who benefit more 
from the status quo’. Chauvel (2005:xi) notes that ‘the jockeying for position 
that this policy unleashed suggests that regional and tribal interests remain 
politically salient’.
The protagonists
As indicated above, the pemekaran option was supported if not stimulated 
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by a number of Papuan delegates who met with President Megawati, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and BIN throughout 2002. In particular, malcon-
tent Papuan political elements were mobilized by the above mentioned Ijie, 
and the Marine Brigadier General (retired) Abraham Atururi, who had lost 
against the current Governor, Jaap Solossa, during the election campaign 
for governorship in 1999 (ICG 2003d:8-9). Atururi enjoyed Dutch boarding 
school at primary level in Serui, Yapen during the heyday of Dutch efforts to 
develop Netherlands New Guinea. After the Dutch left New Guinea, Atururi 
attended the Navy National Academy after he finished Senior High School 
in Biak. Next he made a career in the Navy and became a Lieutenant Colonel 
and member of intelligence agency (BAKIN, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen 
Negara, currently BIN). He also served in the Paspanpres or the ‘Security 
Guard for the President’. While still a Lieutenant Colonel, he was assigned 
as head of the Sorong District in 1992. After one five-year term in Sorong, 
he went to Jayapura to become one of the three Deputy Governors under 
Freddy Numberi. His term as Deputy Governor allowed him to rise in the 
military ranks and he earned his first star. During the Reformasi period and 
marking the end of the military’s New Order dwifungsi (‘dual function’ of the 
military conflating national defence with nation-building), General Wiranto, 
the then Chief of the Armed Forces, demanded all active military personnel 
who were occupying civilian positions to choose whether they wanted to 
continue in the army or pursue a career as legislators. Atururi chose the lat-
ter as he aspired to become Governor of Irian Jaya but, as indicated, in 1999 
he lost to Jaap Solossa. 
Like Atururi, Solossa enjoyed Dutch education at primary and second-
ary level in Teminabuan and Manokwari respectively, and then Junior High 
School in Sorong. After the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, he 
continued his education at Senior High School-level in Manokwari before 
studying Civil Administration at Universitas Cenderawasih in Jayapura 
for his undergraduate degree. Later, when he served as a member of the 
National Parliament, he used his spare time to pursue a Master Degree in 
Development Economics at Universitas Gajah Mada. He continued this 
specialization at postgraduate level at Universitas Padjadjaran in Bandung 
with a research on Special Autonomy for Papua. In May 2005, he received 
his doctorate. Dr Solossa has a large circle of acquaintances especially from 
the Ayamaru and Sorong elites who became unhappy with Atururi during 
his term as district head in Sorong. In a similar vein, Atururi is currently sup-
ported by elements of the Kepala Burung elite that are not happy with the 
current district head, John Piet Wanane, who is from the Ayamaru region. 
Despite growing controversy over the status of the province, the Minister 
of Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno, inaugurated Atururi as the Governor of West 
Irian Jaya in November 2003, leading to a barrage of regional criticism. The 
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Speaker of the Papua provincial legislature and supporter of Solossa, John 
Ibo, said that the inauguration contradicted a recommendation issued by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly during its latest annual session and urged 
Jakarta to revise the law on the division of Papua. 
Atururi arrived in Manokwari in February 2003 to start work on the 
establishment of the new provincial headquarters. On his way from Jakarta 
he stopped in Jayapura to present to Speaker Ibo an official BIN statement 
signed by its head, Lieutenant General (retired) Hendropriyono, saying that 
Atururi had the authority to establish West Irian Jaya (Timmer 2004a:411). 
Exactly a year later, the Constitutional Court ruled against a lawsuit from a 
Special Autonomy Defence Team that sought to undo the division of Papua. 
Supported by Governor Solossa and elements of the Papuan elite in Jayapura, 
the Defence Team had argued that the establishment of the new province 
served the interests of the Megawati Sukarnoputri-led Indonesian Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, (PDI-P, Democratic Party of Struggle) 
which intended to weaken the dominant Golkar Party in the region through 
the pemekaran plan. The Team suggested that the PDI-P had economic inter-
ests in the Bintuni Bay where British Petroleum is establishing the Tangguh 
liquefied natural gas plant (ICG 2003d:9). The Team added that both the TNI 
and BIN had also a lot to gain with the province as the two institutions have 
economic interests in maintaining a high level of TNI presence in the region. 
The Constitutional Court concluded that the establishment of West Irian 
Jaya remained valid although Law no. 45/1999 was no longer effective. 
Eight of the nine judges argued that the Otsus Law took effect after the 
new province and regencies were designed and that the law had annulled 
no state institution. The court ruling was seen as a victory for Atururi and 
left many in Jayapura, Sorong and elsewhere in Papua confused. While the 
media reported the decision as a win-win solution for all conflicting parties 
in Papua and Jakarta, John Ibo noted that it will lead to increasing disorder 
and growing loss of confidence in Jakarta’s commitment to the problems in 
Papua (Timmer 2005:454-5).
One of the effects of the above-mentioned differences between the Sorong-
Ayamaru elite which is often suspected of conspiring to control Papua as 
‘SOS’ (Semua Orang Sorong, ‘all-Sorong’) and ‘disadvantaged’ highland 
tribes and ‘backward’ south coastal plains peoples was the significant local 
support for the establishment of a separate province of Central Irian Jaya in 
the Timika area. This new province was advocated by the head of the district 
of Timika, Clemens Tinal and the head of the Timika legislative council, 
Andreas Anggaibak. As Anggaibak said himself, he was encouraged by BIN 
to go ahead with the establishment of the new province (Chauvel and Bhakti 
2004:41). In the region he enjoyed support from a group called ‘Group of 
Seven Tribes’. When Anggaibak announced the official establishment of the 
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province in late August 2003 riots broke out during which five people were 
killed and dozens were injured. Anggaibak’s alliance met with opposition 
from a youth group of the Amungme people led by Thomas Uamang, Yopie 
Kilangin and Yohanes Deikme, with the support of the Amungme and other 
ethnic groups around Timika. This regional conflict about pemekaran is an 
extension of older disputes between the communities close to PT Freeport 
Indonesia copper and gold mining operations that relate to the misuse of 
company funds and collaboration of community leaders with the TNI in the 
region.13 Exposing tensions between highland and north coastal people and 
in an attempt to gain a share of the riches of the Freeport mining venture, ele-
ments of the elite in Biak argued that Biak would be a better location for the 
new province’s capital in April and May 2004. They proposed that Admiral 
Henk Wabiser should be appointed as acting Governor (Chauvel 2005:77).
Tensions at the regional level also played a role in the establishment of 
West Irian Jaya. New districts in West Irian Jaya like Fak-fak and Raja Ampat 
(which is rich in forest and nickel resources) felt uncomfortable with what 
they feared as domination by those from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions 
and opted to remain within the Province of Papua. Furthermore, during 
Atururi’s lobbying for the establishment of West Irian Jaya, customary lead-
ers in the region had an interest in the division plans, as it would lead to the 
establishment of 28 new regencies, including Teluk Bintuni, which would 
offer them an opportunity to occupy new administrative positions. The 
importance attached to the creation of the Teluk Bintuni regency is related to 
the above-mentioned operations of the Tangguh plant in the Bintuni Bay. The 
new regency, and the new province of West Irian Jaya of which it is part, will 
be abundantly rich in natural resources. 
The pemekaran decree amplified cleavages within the Papuan elite of which 
one favours Otsus as a means for the development of Papua as a whole and 
is led by Governor Solossa who is supported by a number of civil society 
organizations and prominent Papuan intellectuals. Others were keen to estab-
lish their own provinces and districts to claim their own power positions and 
secure access to natural resources. Ethnic tensions along regional fault lines 
intensified as the pro-pemekaran players in Papua demanded a share of the 
fiscal transfers from the central government and wanted to increase control 
over the territory’s riches. The resulting disunity among influential people in 
the Papuan bureaucratic elite weakened the support for Otsus and eased the 
implementation of the pemekaran law (McGibbon 2004:61). 
13  Leith 2003; Ballard 2002; Muridan Widjojo 2003. Anggaibak, who is a former police man 
tried to control the so-called One Percent Fund that was set up 1996 by the Freeport mining com-
pany to support social development programs which met with opposition from other political 
players in the region.
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Autonomy and its opportunities
Within the plans for the establishment of new districts and new provinces, 
almost no provision has been made to ensure that new government policies 
are adjusted to local circumstances and meet the aspirations of the people. 
The majority of government officials are accustomed to working with top-
down programmes and accountability procedures that rarely involve the 
communities who figure as subjects in the plans and reports. The New Order 
government with its ambition to impose a layer of Indonesianness all over the 
archipelago propagated the idea that the lives of citizens in such remote and 
‘underdeveloped’ regions as Papua had to be transformed according to fixed 
formats. The results are often unsettling in particular when long-standing 
community-based ways of doing things and local ways of resources manage-
ment were disrupted. While development plans for Papua were designed to 
improve the living conditions of so-called ‘isolated people’ (masyarakat terasing) 
they often lead to estrangement. This in turn stimulated a tendency to reflect 
nostalgically on one’s own unique non-state units such as the kinship group 
and the ‘customary people’ (masyarakat adat) whose rights should be restored.
Currently, decentralized governments at the district levels face the daunt-
ing task of finding ways to overcome deep-seated feelings of distrust towards 
the state, and to develop programs that acknowledge the complex varieties 
and recent changes in Papuan society. Newly recruited personnel are for the 
most part educated at schools for public administration with curricula are in 
accord with the New Order and its top-down philosophy. As such, they are 
ill-equipped to adjust themselves to new democratic and open-minded ways 
of governance. 
Reflecting on the colonial context in the Australian-administered Territory 
of Papua and New Guinea in the 1960s, Peter Lawrence (1969) argues that 
the difficulty of establishing a Western type of legal system is that the groups 
concerned, that is, the Australians and the New Guineans, represent quite 
different, specialized social systems. Both systems had their own idiosyn-
cratic process of social control that was not expected to function in a single 
legal framework. Today, the Papua New Guinea Government still faces the 
difficult challenge of binding a variety of distinct communities into an effec-
tive political and ideological organization (LiPuma 1995; Douglas 2000; May 
2001, 2003). The present situation in Papua appears to suffer from a similar 
incompatibility between models of governance structured upon institutional 
principles of modern statehood and variety of everyday political and social 
realities. Otsus aims to counter this, but the formidable challenge facing 
decentralizing governments is beyond most administrators’ imagination and 
not anticipated by the legislative or the executive bodies that enacted and 
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implemented the pemekaran law.
Previously, the political and governmental situation in Papua was char-
acterized as based on an ‘outside’ and ‘Indonesian’ government ruling a 
majority of Papuans through models of governance current in Java and not 
embracing or fully appreciating ‘Papuan ways of doing things’. While there 
were a fair number of Papuans in the bureaucracy at all levels and a few 
Governors in the period from 1963 were ethnically Papuan, local communi-
ties saw the regional and provincial government as dominated by Javanese. 
Since more Papuans began to occupy seats in the formal sector the ideas 
about the government changed to a sense of domination of ‘Indonesian poli-
tics’ endorsed by Papuan elites.
Many criticize provincial leaders because they promise local communi-
ties development and access to resources while they actually profit from 
arrangements with elites in Jakarta, TNI and Javanese and foreign investors. 
This obviously leads to an unstable situation as political support at the local 
level will soon dwindle and break along regional or ethnic fault lines. Since 
administrative procedures lack transparency, the widespread feeling among 
Papuans that their own elite cannot be trusted will no doubt increase. 
There is currently a growing tension between those who seek, find and 
use opportunities offered in the formal and commercial sectors and those 
who are denied such prospects. Papuan communities’ responses to a cor-
rupt administration and dishonest behaviour of their own elite are varied. 
In many of the locations where large-scale resource extraction takes place, 
such as Freeport mining in the Mimika region and the Tangguh project in 
the Bintuni Bay, as well as logging and fishery business, local communities 
organize themselves against neighbouring groups and their elites who also 
claim natural resources and compensation. 
One effect of this development is the emergence of eccentric and charged 
revitalizations of customary structures and the establishment of custom-
ary organizations (masyarakat adat). The expectations of monetary flows 
that resource development projects might bring, and the related compet-
ing claims over land and resources, pose problems for local people who no 
longer know whom to trust and through whom to raise their voices with out-
side companies and the government. At the same, the government and the 
companies find it increasingly difficult to deal effectively with the dispersed 
forms of Papuan leadership.
On top of the resulting frustrations and tensions between groups and 
a growing gap between local communities and the formal sector, criminal 
and predatory business is increasingly entrenching itself in the instruments 
of the state. The ways in which this also affects local sentiments and long-
standing discourses on identity, autonomy and independence, and leads to 
new regional and ethnic alliances, show parallels to situations in African 
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countries as described by Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice 
Hibou (1999), among others. Comparisons between problems with govern-
ance in Africa and the Pacific and Asian region may provide many analytical 
advantages. 
For example, Mahmood Mamdani’s (1996) emphasis on colonial legacies 
and what he calls a bifurcated state, characterized by friction between the 
creation of an urban civil society and a rural zone administrated by means 
of ethnic division and retribalized authority, puts central the super-ordinate 
structure of governance and state strategies. As shown in this chapter, an 
analysis of the legacies of the state and the emergence and politics of urban 
elites since the colonial epoch is crucial to understanding the social and 
political dynamics in present-day Papua. 
However, as Jon Fraenkel (2004) points out, comparisons between Africa 
and Oceania and Asia ought to be done cautiously. A careful comparison 
between Papua and Africa is beyond the scope of this paper but let me make 
the point that the most obvious parallel between Papua and certain regions 
in Africa is, as said, the criminalization of the state in Papua. In the capac-
ity of provincial legislator, district head, head of a department and so on, 
they not only gain influence over state resources but they also enjoy relative 
freedom to make profitable deals with resources extraction ventures. These 
businesses are largely unregulated exploitation of the minerals, oil, fish, and 
forest resources.
A striking example is rampant logging and the illegal trade of merbau 
(kayu besi) threatening the pristine forests of the region. (EIA/Telapak 2005; 
Logging 2002). Merbau (kayu besi) is a luxurious dark hardwood that is the 
main target of a billion-dollar trade route from Papua to the booming cities 
of China’s Yangtze River delta. Another unsettling example is the involve-
ment of the TNI and government officials in the gathering and trade of 
gaharu (eaglewood) that is sold for high prices to the Arab world.14 One of 
the results is that wealth is taken away from the bottom up while opportu-
nities for advancement are redistributed inside and outside Papua within 
limited elites by the provision of gifts, commercial opportunities, and so on. 
Politically and economically, Papua begins to show signs of the privatization 
of the state and the criminalization of the behaviour of power-holders. 
14  SKP Merauke 2004. The rampant spread of the HIV/AIDS-virus is partly connected to the 
prostitution centres established and run by the TNI to service local and migrant workers. These 
prostitution centres are a principal source of the infection. Estimates suggest that the number of 
HIV-infected people in Papua stands at approximately 15,000 at present.
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Conclusion
The post-Soeharto Reformasi period in Papua was marked by revivals of 
optimism about change and expectations of imminent far-reaching sover-
eignty. The prospect of justice, the acknowledgement of the ‘true history of 
Papua’, and increased respect for the Papuans, alternated with strong disap-
pointment and mounting resentment towards ‘Jakarta’ due to renewed harsh 
and poorly controlled TNI operations. Amid a persistent undercurrent of dis-
trust towards the national government many in Papua showed a remarkable 
ardour for entering into a bargaining process (albeit often with high opening 
bids, alarming policy-makers in Jakarta). Hopes that justice can be done for 
the Papuans were again visible during the recent national elections in which 
the people of Papua went to the polls in high numbers (Timmer 2005:448-50). 
Also the Otsus and pemekaran lobbies indicate that many in Papua want to 
participate actively in a political economy of dependence on and engagement 
with Jakarta.
Dependence is constructed and maintained as much by Papuans who sup-
port a dialogue with ‘Jakarta’ and are eager to cast votes during democratic 
elections, as by political actors who try to convince Jakarta of the importance 
of recognizing the grievances of the people of Papua, or merely seek to profit 
financially from this relationship. On the other hand, both the ‘indigenous 
Papuans’ and those generally labelled as ‘immigrants’ – the divisions between 
the two can never be clear, let alone desirable – have for a number of reasons 
quite a strong urge to live their lives largely autonomously. This is due to 
their memoria passionis and disappointment with the central government’s 
policies towards Papua. When the need to distance oneself from unreliable 
elites and a decentralization that goes astray, people begin to revitalize tradi-
tions of relative freedom allegedly enjoyed in the past. 
At the level of local communities, throughout history, people have been 
subject to forms of destabilization as the result of interactions with others 
and they continuously developed new strategies with locally specific inven-
tiveness. Papuan people’s potent histories of relative autonomy and their 
recent experiences with the church, the colonial government and Indonesian 
institutions are diverse. Generally, local institutions have been internally 
negotiated in response to the administration and the church. At the same 
time, from the district level up to the provincial bureaucracy and the national 
parliament, Papuan leaders and politicians increasingly usurp the pow-
ers of the civil service. Less promising is that in particular the district and 
provincial levels of the administration have become intertwined in personal 
patronage systems.
The voices for more autonomy in Papua are generally not about Papuan 
nationalism but are cast in opposition to the dominance of the state. The state 
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has not brought what Papuans expected and is thus challenged by social, 
ethnic, religious and regional identities. Most Papuans treat the state with 
a high degree of suspicion. Only when the promise of commitment to and 
respect for their demands and aspirations is in the air, they want to engage 
with the state. Currently, there are two points of contention among the vast 
majority of people in Papua. One is the unpredictability of ‘Jakarta’ as the 
model of the state that the central government is propagating to Papua is 
unclear, and the other is frustration over the wealth and influence of Papuan 
elites whose agendas are often too detached from the circumstances they 
suggest to address.
To remain critical of what is going on in Papua, policy-makers (as well 
as Papua watchers) should be careful not to fall into the classical mistake of 
seeing that there is a united Papuan cause that is frustrated by ‘Indonesia’. In 
fact, there has never been an en masse Papuan effort to struggle for secession 
from Indonesia or a ‘compact, self-conscious, and organized community’, as 
Chauvel (2005:3), among others, observes. There have always been strong 
divisions within Papua even when people organize in civil society organiza-
tions, government bodies, or alongside activist circles abroad. What most 
Papuans have in common though is a memoria passionis and the experiences 
of development programs and democratization efforts dogged by unfulfilled 
promises and failures. During the Papuan Spring this shared history was 
expressed Papua-wide in terms of a demand for the straightening of Papuan 
history and enhanced respect for the Papuans. But the attempts of organizing 
people into a united front were undermined by military operations and the 
pemekaran decree that was supported by elements of the Papuan elite. What 
remained was Otsus but this promising reform policy was frustrated by 
Papuan and Jakarta politics surrounding the pemekaran decree which brought 
to the surface a spate of old and enduring regional, political and personal 
tensions in the region. The pemekaran plan provided opportunities for dis-
enchanted Papuan leaders and subsequently unleashed regional and ethnic 
sentiments as well as mutual distrust among Papuan leaders.
Finally, with respect to the increasing prominence of the informal econ-
omy in Papua, it is important to realize that already since the New Order 
period major parts of domestic Papua operated more as an unofficial or 
‘unconventional’ economy than an economy of wage earners, formal institu-
tions, and legal contracts. While it is true that a formidable number of people 
earn government wages, most rural people trade and exchange goods in and 
between communities in order to survive. Erring decentralization and the 
limited presence of meaningful development programs trigger fractionali-
zation when people begin to compete for political and economic resources. 
Self-interest in this context is the result of a realistic view that relates to cur-
rent and past development promises. People know that outsiders come and 
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make promises about financial rewards, roads, bridges, sago factories, log-
ging activities, fish factories and so on. Then things – people in Papua know 
from experience – are unlikely to be sustainable and will favour some over 
others. In these circumstances, elites and local people have a realistic view to 
get what they can while they can. 
Hence what is often seen as greediness, is a response to the ongoing defer-
ral of development alongside failing policies that aim at enhancing serv-
ices to the people of Papua. In a region which is abundantly rich in natural 
resources, whose people do not share equally in the profits of resource devel-
opment projects, and of which many people’s dignities have been denied in 
violent ways for a long period of time, this kind of response is understand-
able. In other words, ‘disorder’ in Papua is not merely a condition created by 
‘Jakarta’ or as a state of dereliction; it is a condition that offers opportunities 
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APDN		 Akademi	 Pemerintahan	 Dalam	 Negeri	 –	 Domestic	 Government	
Academy
BAKIN	 Badan	 Koordinasi	 Intelijen	 Negara	 (currently	 BIN)	 –	 State	
Coordinating	Intelligence	Service















































FPPDP-LR	 Front	 Penuntut	 Pemekaran	 Kabupaten	 dan	 Provinsi	 Luwu	 Raya	
–	 Front	 for	 the	 Demand	 of	 District	Autonomy	 and	 Formation	 of	
Luwu	Raya	Province






















Abbreviations and acronyms 489
of	Luwu	Students
IPPMEN	 Ikatan	 Pemuda	 Pelajar	 Mentawai	 –	 Association	 for	 Young	
Mentawaian	Students	and	Scholars





















KPPPL	 Komite	 Pusat	 Pembentukan	 Provinsi	 Luwu	 –	 Central	 Committee	
for	the	Formation	of	Luwu	Province
KPPB	 Komite	 Pembentukan	 Propinsi	 Banten	 –	 Committee	 for	 the	
Establishment	of	the	Province	of	Banten	
KPPSI	 Komite	 Persiapan	 Penegakan	 Syariat	 Islam	 –	 Preparatory	
Committee	for	the	Upholding	of	Islamic	Law	
KPU	 Komite	Pemilihan	Umum	–	General	Election	Committee





LAN	 Lembaga	 Adat	 Nagari	 –	 Village	 Adat	 Law	 Institution	 (West	
Sumatra)	
LIPI	 Lembaga	 Ilmu	 Pengetahuan	 Indonesia	 –	 Indonesian	 Institute	 of	
Sciences
LKAAM		 Lembaga	 Kerapatan	 Adat	 Alam	 Minangkabau	 –	 Minangkabau-
wide	Association	of	Village	Adat	Councils





















PDI-P		 Partai	 Demokrasi	 Indonesia	 Perjuangan	 –	 Indonesian	 Democratic	
Party	of	Struggle















PPDKB	 Partai	 Pembela	 Demokrasi	 Kasih	 Bangsa	 –	 Defenders	 of	 Love	 the	
Nation	Democratic	Party
PPIM	 Pusat	Pengkajian	 Islam	dan	Minangkabau	–	Centre	 for	Studies	of	
Islam	and	Minangkabau







PPSDAK	 Pembinaan	 Pengelolaan	 Sumber	 Daya	 Alam	 Kemasyarakatan	 –	
Strengthening	Community	Natural	Resource	Management
PRRI			 Pemerintah	 Revolusioner	 Republik	 Indonesia	 –	 Revolutionary	
Government	of	the	Indonesian	Republic
PSDH	 Provisi	Sumber	Daya	Hutan	–	Forest	Resource	Royalty
PUIL	 Persatuan	 Ummat	 Islam	 Lombok	 –	 Lombok	 Association	 for	
Muslims
RAPBD	 Rancangan	Anggaran	Pendapatan	dan	Belanja	Daerah











SIPAD		 Surat	 Izin	 Perdagangan	 Antar	 Daerah	 –	 Inter-Region	 Trading	
Licenses
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